One aspect of American foreign policy that is unlikely to be changed by the Iran war settlement is its attitudes towards Europe, and in particular European security. With Vice President JD Vance arriving in Switzerland today for talks centred on Tehran’s nuclear programme, every sign indicates that the Trump administration will continue to both deprioritise Europe and try to change its arrangements with European countries. It’s no coincidence that on Thursday Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced a wide-ranging six-month review of American military assets in Europe, the same week that Donald Trump was in Versailles to sign a memorandum of understanding with Iran.

What is telling about the announced review is that it mentions base access arrangements specifically. There have been various conflicting reports of troop withdrawals, as well as different leaked estimates for how much military equipment the US would seek to remove from Europe. These military equipment withdrawals, which include fighter jets and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, should be taken more seriously than the troop announcements, which in some cases were hastily reversed and seemed mostly to have a signalling effect.

Mentioning access arrangements suggests, however, that the Trump administration will leverage its current troops and equipment in Europe to secure the broader use of military bases. There were several instances of European countries — including the UK and Italy — not allowing the US access to bases for its Iran-related operations. Spain went even further at the end of March, closing its airspace for Iran military operation overflights. All of this clearly irritated the Trump administration, with Hegseth this week labelling the obstructions “shameful”.

In justification for restricting access, these countries cited bilateral agreements struck with the US when the bases were established. The agreements vary in detail, but generally give host countries latitude to deny America permission to use the bases for certain operations, and require Washington to seek approval first.

But, of course, the agreements can be renegotiated. This may well be one of the Trump administration’s aims. If or when that happens, it puts European governments in a difficult spot. The Trump administration is widely unpopular in Western and Central Europe. Giorgia Meloni, for instance, managed to dig herself out of a fairly deep political hole earlier this year in part by being more critical of Trump and his administration, and has engaged in a fresh spat with him this week. How would it look if she went back and signed a much more permissive base agreement? Then there’s the fact that it could drag European countries into even more unpopular US military campaigns.

This is an edited version of an article that first appeared in the Eurointelligence newsletter.