Iran doesn't care for the Houthis. Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images


March 28, 2025   5 mins

Donald Trump took to Truth Social last week to give Iran a violent warning: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN. IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences and those consequences will be dire!” It didn’t sound as if he was pondering another round of sanctions.

A few days later came a shift in tone, as Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, extended an olive branch: “Our signal to Iran is let’s sit down and see if we can, through dialogue, through diplomacy, get to the right place,” he said. “If we can’t, the alternative is not a great alternative.” This followed a letter Trump sent to the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei on 7 March, which supposedly set a two-month deadline for a new nuclear deal to be signed.

As Iran gets closer and closer to building a bomb, Trump will have to decide whether to avert the coming nuclear crisis using military or diplomatic might. His team is divided. The Signal exchange published this week in The Atlantic, in which high-ranking officials discussed plans for air strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, revealed a split within the Trump administration over Yemen — and, more importantly though indirectly, over Iran.

In one camp is Vice President JD Vance and the President’s consigliere, Stephen Miller, who together head up the isolationists. Vance has repeatedly expressed strong reservations about Middle Eastern engagements, even those with Israel against Iran, which might lead the United States into conflict. Vance wants the US to do less, and its allies to do more — though not anything that would oblige Washington to intervene militarily. In the other camp is Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose more confrontational views on Yemen echo those of the President. Hegseth’s stance reflects the President’s seeming willingness to extend US power into the Middle East to protect Israel vis-à-vis Iran. Though in other areas of foreign policy, Trump’s reluctance to protect traditional allies and avoid “forever wars” is more in line with his Vice President’s sentiments.

Vance’s and Miller’s animosity towards “free-loading” Europeans, as exposed in the leaked messages, reflects a widespread Right-wing allergy towards any dangerous American commitment in the Middle East. These isolationists oppose America bombing Yemen because they think that Suez Canal trade routes, which are continuously harassed by the Iran-allied Houthis, supposedly benefit Europe more than the United States. So why should America be the one to police them?

“The Signal exchange revealed a split within the Trump administration over Yemen — and, more importantly though indirectly, over Iran.”

This aversion to protecting international shipping lanes in the Middle East can be traced back to 2019, when Trump failed to respond militarily to Iranian missile-and-drone and mine attacks on Saudi oil facilities and Gulf shipping. In doing so, he put the so-called Carter Doctrine of 1980— which stipulated that Washington would go to war to protect Persian Gulf oil — on life-support. The decision to sit tight badly damaged US credibility, and might explain Trump’s recent hawkish makeover.

However, one suspects that the Signal debacle was less about shipping lanes, and more about the potential for the Yemen imbroglio to trigger a conflict with Iran. Vance and Miller surely see the Middle Eastern momentum.

The Signal discussion didn’t touch on how the Yemen bombings would affect Washington’s current diplomatic overture to Tehran. Hegseth and the President likely think it can’t hurt: Tehran will see Trump’s Washington as tougher for it, and capable of coercing the Iranians into nuclear negotiations. Meanwhile, Vance may not care: the Vice President doesn’t believe Washington should go to war with Tehran over the nuclear issue, let alone Suez Canal traffic. If he isn’t willing to bomb an Iranian proxy for fear of a slippery slope, then he is surely unlikely to want to bomb its sponsor.

In August 1998, President Bill Clinton fired cruise missiles at al-Qaeda in Khost, Afghanistan, in retaliation to the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. I recall speaking to my old professor, the Anglo-American historian Bernard Lewis, about the barrage. This was his wry assessment: “I was in Khost in 1956. I don’t think it’s changed.  Not sure we will be able to see much difference between the before and after shots.”

What was true in Afghanistan then is undoubtedly true in Yemen now: attacking the Houthis, who have always given Tehran a big strategic bang for their buck, isn’t likely to cause significant long-term damage. After all, peasant societies repair infrastructure pretty quickly. Ten years ago, the Saudis and Emirates tried to bomb the Houthis into better behaviour. Despite their overwhelming air power and American targeting assistance, they failed abysmally.

This is partly because Yemen has been at war with itself for decades, and the years of fighting have shredded Yemeni communitarian restraint — the social, political, and economic capital of older men that checks the aggressive passions of younger men. Violence is now the norm in a deeply fractured society. The only military actions against Yemen that might be more effective would entail constant, scorching assaults by US naval and land forces that would turn the littoral into a wasteland — a more destructive version of what British imperial forces did to quiet the Wahhabi-inspired Gulf pirates of the early 19th century. However, even under Trump, Washington is surely unprepared to support such sustained devastation, and to commit manpower and money to it.

Nor are US military actions in Yemen likely to provoke much fear in Tehran. The whole point of Iranian-backed proxies is to absorb pain. The Islamic Republic has been clandestinely nurturing foreign militants since its inception — and for all this time it’s never cared much about allied-Arab casualties.

All this means that American, European, and Israeli reprisals against the Houthis are likely refortifying an old Iranian doctrine: that the Islamic Republic’s enemies are willing to attack the clerical regime’s proxies, but not Iran directly. The Israelis discombobulated this in October 2024, but now it seems to be back in force.

Yet until Iranian supplies are cut off directly, check-mating the Houthis is impossible. The US and allied navies and air forces have so far failed to stop the Houthis harassing shipping. And they are unlikely to do better until the United States is willing to attack Iranian ports — the primary entrepôts for the Houthis — while also hitting Yemeni targets.

Unlike the Houthis, the clerical regime has much to lose in a duel with the United States. By Middle Eastern standards, Iran has a fairly advanced society, cursed with an incompetent government. The Iranian currency, the riyal, now appears to be in free-fall, which, given the history of economic protests in the country morphing into violent political protests, must give the theocracy pause. In this context, US military power is a threat to its capacity to govern. If sustained, US military action against the clerical regime will surely convulse the theocracy at the very least, and disrupt its support to its proxies.

For now, however, Trump still believes that a nuclear deal with Khamenei is possible. And until he abandons this idea, he’ll likely have no more success against the Houthis than his predecessor. The quest for a nuclear deal handicapped Washington’s willingness to counter Tehran in the past. A limited nuclear agreement, which exchanges sanctions relief for some easily reversible diminution of uranium enrichment, would just give Tehran the cash to fortify its proxies again. Trump would become Obama redux.

During the first Trump administration, Tehran essentially stopped the growth of its enriched-uranium stockpile. This time round that doesn’t appear to be happening, and Tehran’s mass of highly enriched, near-bomb-grade uranium is growing larger by the month. Senior officials in the Biden administration more or less operated under the assumption that Iran only had a few technical hurdles left to jump; if provoked, Khamenei could cross the nuclear red line.

But what about Trump? If the President decides to attack the Islamic Republic’s ports and missile factories because of its Yemeni machinations, then hitting the nuclear sites will surely follow. The Trump administration’s intentions on a lot of issues are challenging to assess since the President isn’t captured by consistency and humbled by contradiction. But he does seem to understand that the nuclear issue cannot be separated from the Islamic Republic’s proxy imperialism. They are solved together, or they are lost separately.


Reuel Marc Gerecht is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.

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