The war with Iran could turn out to be a major problem for China. Just as Beijing appeared to be making inroads into the Middle East, the conflict has scuttled any influence it might have had. Rather than expanding its leverage, the conflict exposes the limits of China’s strategy in the Middle East.

Beijing’s strategy in the Middle East has long rested on three factors: sustainable oil and gas prices, secure shipping lanes for its exports to the region and Europe, and balanced relations with both Iran and the Gulf monarchies. The current conflict weakens all three at once: it is disrupting Chinese oil flows from Iran and other Gulf producers by choking key shipping routes, and it is pushing the region toward a more security‑driven order that makes China’s Arab energy suppliers more reliant on the US for protection and market stability.

China remains heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Roughly half of its imports come from the region, including an average of 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian crude in 2025 alone. For Beijing, the Strait of Hormuz is not an abstract geopolitical chokepoint, but a direct economic vulnerability. According to the IEA, some 20 million barrels per day — about a quarter of global seaborne oil trade — pass through the strait, with roughly 80% destined for Asia.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has driven shipping costs sharply higher, with daily rates for oil tankers carrying Middle Eastern crude to China soaring above $400,000. Despite Iran’s longstanding ties with Beijing, the Chinese Foreign Ministry swiftly condemned Tehran’s attacks on Arab Gulf states and the disruption of oil flows. This is hardly the stance of a power benefiting from the conflict.

For China, a rise in oil prices is just one part of the problem. As the world’s top exporter of manufactured goods, it is highly dependent on foreign trade, meaning that any disruption in shipping routes has a significant impact. Given that the country just set its lowest growth target in decades, higher freight costs, longer maritime routes and rising energy costs are about to make China’s economic situation much worse.

An open conflict between Iran and the Gulf states is precisely what China doesn’t want. Until this year, decreasing security concerns and the potential rise of the petro-yuan suggested that Beijing was building a bigger footprint in the Middle East. But following the US strikes, this now appears to be a pipe dream.

With American attention, munitions and naval capacity moving away from the Indo-Pacific front, China might, however, benefit from the US entanglement in the Middle East. Yet, given China’s dependence on foreign markets during a domestic slowdown, the price America pays in this conflict is hardly any comfort to Beijing. No wonder, then, that during China’s annual plenary sessions, Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlighted 2026 as a potential “landmark year” for US-China ties and urged an end to the war.

It is simply not China’s style to try to speed up an end to the conflict in Iran. For now, Beijing will bide its time, taking advantage of the fact that it is one of the few countries willing to defy Western sanctions and purchase Iranian oil. It can therefore access the supply sitting on Iran’s tankers already in international waters.

Nevertheless, the Iran war has laid bare China’s many vulnerabilities. Its regional strategy is no longer secure.

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Miquel Vila is a political consultant specialising in international affairs. He is also the executive director of the Catalonia Global Institute.

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