When Rupert Lowe first founded Restore Britain, he made no attempt to limit expectations or ambitions, suggesting quite plainly that his party could win a majority and carry him into Downing Street at the next election. That belief strained credulity, rendering his overture to Nigel Farage all the more surprising.
Yesterday, Lowe said he was willing to work with Farage if Reform adopted some of his party’s policies. These include demands for the mass deportation of illegal immigrants in the UK, a ban on the burqa and Halal meat, as well as a referendum on the death penalty.
In light of Restore’s disappointing electoral results over the last six weeks (6.8% in Makerfield; 8.7% in Manchester despite the aid of the alternative vote system, and only 10.9% in their home county of Norfolk), Lowe appears to have come to a realisation: that Restore is just big enough to prevent Reform victories, but far too small to win itself.
A deal, then, is the only way for Restore to advance its agenda, and it reflects well on those offering it that they have done so so quickly. Indeed, Lowe’s leverage will only decline as his momentum wanes in the face of a hard cap on his support. No credit should be given, on the other hand, for offering peace on terms plainly unacceptable to its counterparty.
Much of what Lowe demanded is already either official Reform policy or in line with the public positions of Reform spokespeople. Some of it, such as bans on burqas and halal slaughter, is trifling and should not be given undue importance. However, there are a number of substantial and controversial conditions that deserve addressing.
First and foremost is the demand to denaturalise and deport friends and families of rape gang perpetrators who knew about their crimes and failed to act. Reform has so far only tested the questioning of citizenship regarding the Alaa Abd El-Fattah case, and going further carries some risk. But this was always going to be a key Restore demand, and it is a reasonable one to make regardless of one’s thoughts on the issue itself.
Lowe’s most awkward demand is his last. Despite his record of effusive praise for the very same ex-Tories who subsequently defected, Lowe has effectively demanded the sacking of Reform’s shadow chancellor as a price for co-operation. This is not a coincidence. Restore surrogates have been out in force following the release of Lowe’s offer, suggesting that Lowe be readmitted to Reform and made treasury spokesman in place of Jenrick.
This is the fatal flaw in Lowe’s offer that will kill any prospect of co-operation. A party must be able to determine policy and communications strategy, and must expect its representatives to adhere to those decisions. Does anyone really believe that Lowe will quietly accept a future decision that he does not personally agree with?
Reform has much to gain from ending the party’s feud with its most notable prodigal son. That Restore’s standing down would avoid potentially disastrous vote splitting is obvious, but an equally valuable reward is to be found in turning the party’s biggest critic on the Right into a supporter.
Reform’s strategic challenge is a difficult one: maintaining the support of an increasingly exasperated Right while convincing an increasing share of more moderate voters to trust it with the powers of the state. Whatever Reform does to ameliorate concerns over its ability to govern, it cannot get around the fact that it is untested, and that this make it a risky choice for wavering voters. That disadvantage needs to be countered by a sense of excitement — a vibe which is hard to maintain in the face of constant attacks suggesting that their platform does not go hard enough.
If yesterday’s offer truly represents putting ego aside in the national interest, Restore should fully commit to the partnership. But in politics, as in love, a relationship once broken can be impossible to repair. Lowe cannot save this ill-fated marriage, but if he accepts that it is over, he may still be able to negotiate an amicable divorce.






