It should come as no surprise that Iran quickly rejected the Trump administration’s 15-point peace plan for ending the ongoing conflict. The proposal, as currently formulated, is a non-starter as a pathway to peace.

The plan put forward by Washington this week contains many of the same maximalist conditions rejected by Tehran in the last round of negotiations, held in February in Geneva. They include a termination of Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme, destruction of the country’s nuclear facilities, limits on its ballistic missile programme, and an end to support for Tehran’s regional proxies. On Friday, Trump extended his deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by 10 days, following a request by the regime in Tehran.

In presenting these demands, the Trump administration seems to believe that four weeks of fighting have substantially improved the US bargaining position and weakened Iran’s resistance. This view is mistaken.

While Iran has suffered significant damage to its military capabilities and infrastructure and lost many of its most senior leaders, the war has also strengthened its hand and resolve in several ways. For starters, Iran has shown its ability to impose significant damage on the US, Israel, and the Gulf states at low cost to itself. Its missiles and drones have wreaked havoc on energy infrastructure and expensive US air defence and communications systems across the region. Defending against these attacks requires that the US and its partners expend scarce and expensive air interceptors in large quantities. Iran’s war strategy is simply more sustainable than that of the US and Israel, and it can afford to keep fighting.

Iran’s regime has also grown more extreme after bearing the brunt of US and Israeli airstrikes. Many moderate figures have been assassinated, entrenching the control of hardline IRGC commanders who are in no mood to compromise. By some accounts, the Trump administration is struggling to find Iranian leaders willing to talk, let alone make concessions.

Most importantly, Iran has used the threat of sea and air drones, mines, and missiles to stop most commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. For Trump, this has become the focus of the war, and it is a problem that military power cannot solve — at least not quickly or easily. Restoring navigation — and oil prices — to pre-war levels requires an enduring end to fighting and guaranteed security for commercial tankers. Only diplomatic resolution can offer this outcome.

The bottom line is that if there is an urgency around a ceasefire, it is coming from Washington rather than Tehran. This leaves the Trump administration on the back foot and Iran’s leadership with an advantage in any near-term negotiations.

Iran has already set its own terms for peace, including an end to all military activity, commitments from the US that there will be no future attacks, reparations to support its reconstruction, Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps even the closure of some US bases. Washington cannot accept all these terms but will have to meet some of them to avoid additional escalation and the risk of more severe domestic and global consequences.

To get a deal, the Trump administration should narrow its goals and focus on one objective: reopening the Strait of Hormuz. In return for an Iranian commitment to restore freedom of navigation through the maritime chokepoint, the US should offer guarantees against future aggression and commit to restraining Israel from future attacks. These guarantees should be negotiated multilaterally, including with Gulf partners, and backed by the permanent members of the UN Security Council to make them credible. To support Iran’s economic recovery, Washington should also agree to the phased lifting of some sanctions, conditional on the continued free passage of maritime commerce through Hormuz.

Importantly, this trade would mean putting aside efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, at least for now. These concessions will not compromise US security, which was never under imminent threat from Iran in the first place, but they may be hard for Trump and his advisors to accept. Still, they are a necessary cost of this war and a likely requirement for peace.

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Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.

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