Trump wants to have and sell his dollars. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images


March 17, 2025   6 mins

Amid all the talk of tariffs, something far bigger is happening in the United States. Donald Trump’s current trade war is just one part of his team’s radical plan to realign the entire global economy and the dollar’s relationship in it — the biggest shift since Bretton Woods.

It is hard to exaggerate the role of the dollar in the global economy. It is the currency that holds the financial world together “in its inmost folds”, as Goethe put it in Faust. Since the Forties, the US has been the anchor of the global financial and monetary system. It’s a set-up that made sense at the time. It did so all the way up until the collapse of communism. But this millennium, it has become more like a Faustian bargain. It has allowed Europe and Asia to specialise in industrial production and dump their trade surpluses onto the US, and to a lesser extent the UK and Australia. America, meanwhile, has been only too happy to play along, running large trade deficits against the rest of the world. But this came at the cost of de-industrialisation — arguably the very reason Trump was first elected.

Economists mostly do not care about such imbalances. David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage suggests that everybody is better off when they specialise and open the borders to trade, and let the deficits and surpluses fall wherever they may. This Faustian bargain works until it hits big political obstacles. Obstacles like Trump.

The irony, then, is that even as it created the conditions for his election, the continued success of the global free trade system depended critically on Trump not getting elected. It depended on him not imposing tariffs on steel and aluminium, for example, or on threatening retaliatory tariffs over 200% on French wine and champagne. Now that part of the bargain is crumbling.

“There is no way that China or Germany would ever voluntarily refrain from running export surpluses.”

Trump is clearly not worried about global imbalances, or the sustainability of the global economic order. He thinks of trade balances like business deals. The country with the surplus is the winner. This is without a doubt the wrong way to think about, but Trump’s crude trade policies may be the only thing that spurs change. There is no way that China or Germany would ever voluntarily refrain from running export surpluses. They, like Trump, define their economic models in terms of trade balances. It will take a political sledgehammer to force them to change, which is what is happening right now.

The tariffs, though, are only one part of the story — the visible part of the bargain and the one that is receiving most of the media attention. But there is another, more important side to it, the financial side, in which the dollar underwrites the entire global economy. The current system means that when, say, Porsche exports a car to the US, two things are happening. The car moves from Germany to the US; the dollars move in the opposite direction. You could think of the transaction in a different way: Porsche is buying US dollars, and pays for the dollars by delivering cars. So when countries dump their exports on the US, they are buying US dollars. Accordingly, when a lot of foreign companies do this, the value of the dollar goes up. The dollar accounts for almost 60% of central bank reserves, but the US only accounts for 14% of the world’s economic output, if measured in purchasing power. But the dollar is not only the biggest currency. It is also one of the most overvalued. The two concepts, the global role of the dollar, and its relative value, are not the same, but they are linked. And this is where Team Trump sees an opportunity.

If the dollar is devalued, Porsche, in our example, would still get the same amount of dollars, but these dollars would be worth less. And Porsche would be powerless to do anything about it. This makes devaluation far more effective than tariffs from the US perspective. Tariffs are legally and procedurally complicated. Countries can, and do, retaliate. It is much harder to retaliate against a devaluation.

When I first heard that Trump’s finance team, led by Scott Bessent, the treasury secretary, was trying to devalue the dollar, it seemed that they had not thought this through. I thought this was the Achilles heel of Trump’s economic agenda because it seemed to have conflicting goals — to keep the dollar’s global predominance and reduce its value at the same time. How on earth could they do both? I put this down as an unresolved contradiction in Trump’s head. Like the English cake aphorism, you could describe it as having your dollar and selling it — something only Trump would do.

The reason Trump cares about having his dollars is not to support the global economy, but because of its geopolitical power. There is no other currency that could take its role. The second largest currency in the world is the euro. It accounts for some 20% of global reserves. But the Europeans are not equipped to play the role the US is now leaving vacant.

I hear a lot of nonsense about the EU as the new leader of the Western world. But Europe has ageing populations, and its economy is much less innovative than those of the US and China. The EU depends on other countries to buy its exports. It does not suck in foreign capital as the US has done. Unlike the US, the EU does not have the equivalent of US treasury securities, government bonds with a reputation of being the safest assets on earth. The EU has a monetary union, but it lacks a political union. Nor does it have a large capital market. It lacks the infrastructure of a global economic power.

Given Europe’s weakness, Trump’s goal to devalue the dollar and to maintain the dollar’s global role might not be as contradictory as at first seems. It does beg the question though, if the world diversifies away from the dollar, and if the euro cannot absorb this, who else will?

Enter crypto-currencies. Is this perhaps why Trump has just signed an executive order to create a strategic crypto reserve, very much like the strategic petroleum reserve which the US set up in the Seventies after the oil crisis? Crypto is purely ethereal, not backed by any assets. Fiat money, like the US dollar, is also not backed by assets. Our currencies are issued by governments. Money, whether fiat or crypto, relies on trust. The French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau talked about money as a social contract. I always thought of this as a more useful definition than the much narrower point of view of economics, which defines money as providing three services: to act as a medium of exchange, a store of value and a unit of account. This does not capture the bigger picture: if we lose trust in our own money, we use someone else’s. Given the central banks’ failings since the crash, it is perfectly reasonable for people to be sceptical about money. It is also rational for people to be sceptical about crypto currencies like Bitcoin. They are highly volatile, so they are not really a store of value. They are definitely not a unit of account. And you cannot go to most shops and pay in crypto.

But crypto currencies have one killer feature: their supply is fixed by algorithm. People still dig for gold and find some. They might even find some on Mars, if they started digging there. But they are not going to find any Bitcoin. There is no central bank in the crypto universe. There are no economists involved — perhaps one of the reasons economists hate crypto with such a passion.

Crypto, then, is well placed to play an important part in the global dollar detox story, as we move towards a different monetary system. Apart from setting up a strategic crypto reserve, the US administration and Congress are about to implement a regime of ultra-light crypto regulation. This may be the answer to how Team Trump is going to address the dollar-cakeism problem. If foreigners diversify away from the dollar and move towards crypto, then the US would stay in control: the dollar remains the number one fiat currency, and the global crypto market is also concentrated on the US. Either way, Trump wins.

Such tactics are borne out by the emergence of what is sometimes referred to as the Mar-a-Lago accord, whereby the US will no longer play the anchor of the global monetary and financial system. Europeans will not only have to wean themselves off the US for defence, but also for finance and trade. It would be the biggest shift in the global economy since the 1944 Bretton Woods accord. That system went through various mutations, originally based on gold, but throughout this entire period, the dollar was the lynchpin. Before the Americans, the pound was the global reserve currency. But before that, there were no backstops. From the Greek empire all the way to Napoleon, European rulers issued coins made from precious metals, mostly gold and silver. With the US no longer willing to shoulder the responsibility of keeping the system going, we may well be returning to that world, except in today’s world, crypto is the new gold.

The brains behind this transition is Bessent. He is the guy who did the critical analytic work that allowed George Soros to carry out his infamous assault on the pound in 1992 — one of the most devastating acts of financial speculation of all time. Earlier this month, he stated clearly that “international economic relations that do not work for the American people must be re-examined”.

It’s a realignment that carries serious risks. It reminds me of that point in Christopher Nolan’s Oppenheimer when a scientist asked whether a nuclear bomb could unleash an atmospheric chain reaction that could destroy the world. The answer he gave was: possibly, but unlikely. Similarly, here, nobody can rule out the possibility that the sudden withdrawal of the US as the global financial anchor could lead to a catastrophic financial meltdown. It might be possible. It might be unlikely. But what is significant is that for the first time in 80 years, someone is seriously trying to make it happen.


Wolfgang Münchau is the Director of Eurointelligence and an UnHerd columnist.

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