A reverse Nixon. Jorge Silva/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.


March 4, 2025   4 mins

As the world reels from the scenes of the televised boxing match between Zelensky and Trump, with Vance egging the fight on, we are in danger of losing sight of what the encounter reveals about Trump’s priorities. Though it was not explicitly named during the entire undignified episode, it is China and not Russia that is the White House’s main concern these days, and that explains the refusal to subordinate everything to Ukraine’s needs and ambitions.

The first signs emerged back in 2017, during the years of Trump One, when the US for the first time acted very directly against China’s techno-economic rise. Seeing its increasing threat, the Administration cut off access to some of the advanced technology that China really needs, starting with advanced microprocessors, the “chips” of both missiles and smartphones. Tellingly, this was the one Trump policy that Biden did not reverse. Indeed, his Administration tried to strengthen the technology export controls.

Now, as Trump Two kicks off, America is dealing with a distinctly more aggressive China. It has become clear that Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” is not about a richer or a happier nation, but rather a stronger and indeed more warlike one. He has been visiting the different headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army to urge the assembled officers to be ready to fight — to really fight, and win! Further, it seems that defectors have reported that Xi has told members of the Central Military Commission to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.

So while the immediate rationale behind the humiliation of Zelensky in the White House would have been to soften-up Russia and obtain a prompt ceasefire, and start negotiations for a territorial compromise, it was all done in the service of Trump’s larger and longer term ambition of neutralising China. In this, he is pulling off a “reverse Nixon”: instead of courting China to oppose the USSR, as Kissinger and Nixon did in 1972, Trump wants to detach Moscow from Beijing.

Of course, today’s Russia is but a shadow of the still vigorous USSR that Nixon had to contend with. But even in its much-weakened state, Russia still adds a great deal to Chinese power. It provides everything from jet engines for Xi’s fighters (its own remain stubbornly unreliable), to Polar access via Russia’s arctic ports, railway access to Western Europe via Kazakhstan and Moscow, and overland access to Iran and the Middle East.

More simply, Russia’s immense territory interposed between China and the “West”, both in Europe and North America, would function in war as the Pacific Ocean serves the US, from San Diego and Pearl Harbor to Taiwan and China.

“As Trump Two kicks off, America is dealing with a distinctly more aggressive China.”

Trump is much better placed to bargain with Putin than Biden ever was — for one thing, he never insulted Putin as Biden did. But that is not the main reason why Trump has a decent chance of pulling off this diplomatic manoeuvre. These days, one of Putin’s growing worries is the territorial integrity of easternmost Siberia, Russia’s Maritime Province.

Local officials and academics in Vladivostok voiced acute concerns about Chinese intrusions even during my last visit in 2019 — before the sharp increase in China’s relative power caused by the Ukraine war. Since then, things have only grown more concerning.

Ultimately, the problem is demographic. Eastern Siberia — officially the “Far Eastern Federal District” — is a tad smaller than Australia, much bigger than the European Union and twice the size of India, but only had a population of 8.1 million at the last count. Meanwhile, China’s northernmost big city Harbin has more than 10 million inhabitants all by itself, while its Heilongjiang province has 30 million, and Inner Mongolia another 24 million.

As the Chinese increasingly outnumber Russians along that immensely long and scarcely patrolled border, there are other shifts there to alarm Moscow. One small example tells a significant tale. In 2023, the Chinese government abruptly issued an ordinance that mandates the use of the pre-Russian name “Haishenwai” for Vladivostok, in place of the previous “Fúlādíwòsītuōkè” — which was clearly a meek attempt at a Chinese pronunciation of the Russian name.

This seemingly innocuous linguistic tweak belies a deep historical resentment. The Chinese still remember with great bitterness the collapse of imperial power in the 19th century, and the ensuing territorial losses under “unequal treaties” and forced concessions to the British, French, Japanese, Austro-Hungary, Germany (in Qingdao where good German beer is still made), and even Italy, in Tianjin.

Over time, most of those territorial losses were revoked, including Hong Kong that reverted to China in 1997, but not the biggest territorial losses by far, which were extorted by Imperial Russia in 1858 and 1860. They now constitute a slice of Siberia and Russia’s Maritime Province in the Far East, including Vladivostok. In spite of the passage of time, many in China still remember the lost territories and the old humiliations only too keenly. Let’s not forget why the Russians invaded Ukraine.

Then, more recently, another warning appeared, with China’s very quiet but momentous request to build a modern container port in the bay of Slavianska, in Russia’s Maritime Province south of Vladivostok, where Chinese territory arrives within 11 miles of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese certainly have a very good reason to build the port: the economy of the entire its north-east, the “rust belt” Dongbei, has long suffered from its distance from a seaport. As the economy there is transformed, so the Chinese threat increases.

So, yes, it is certainly a key Western interest that the war in Ukraine ends advantageously, with an agreed territorial settlement not imposed by either side. Equally, it is vitally important that Russia should not be as dependent on China as it now is. Europe may have its head stuck in the sand in this regard, but it seems that Trump has spotted this opportunity, realising that in Putin’s pursuit of a favourable outcome in Ukraine there is an opportunity to detach him from Beijing. While it might seem far-fetched, even for this most unpredictable of presidents, the televised humiliation of Zelensky did seem to indicate that Nixonian intent.


Professor Edward Luttwak is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.

ELuttwak