A reverse Nixon. Jorge Silva/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.
As the world reels from the scenes of the televised boxing match between Zelensky and Trump, with Vance egging the fight on, we are in danger of losing sight of what the encounter reveals about Trump’s priorities. Though it was not explicitly named during the entire undignified episode, it is China and not Russia that is the White House’s main concern these days, and that explains the refusal to subordinate everything to Ukraine’s needs and ambitions.
The first signs emerged back in 2017, during the years of Trump One, when the US for the first time acted very directly against China’s techno-economic rise. Seeing its increasing threat, the Administration cut off access to some of the advanced technology that China really needs, starting with advanced microprocessors, the “chips” of both missiles and smartphones. Tellingly, this was the one Trump policy that Biden did not reverse. Indeed, his Administration tried to strengthen the technology export controls.
Now, as Trump Two kicks off, America is dealing with a distinctly more aggressive China. It has become clear that Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” is not about a richer or a happier nation, but rather a stronger and indeed more warlike one. He has been visiting the different headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army to urge the assembled officers to be ready to fight — to really fight, and win! Further, it seems that defectors have reported that Xi has told members of the Central Military Commission to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.
So while the immediate rationale behind the humiliation of Zelensky in the White House would have been to soften-up Russia and obtain a prompt ceasefire, and start negotiations for a territorial compromise, it was all done in the service of Trump’s larger and longer term ambition of neutralising China. In this, he is pulling off a “reverse Nixon”: instead of courting China to oppose the USSR, as Kissinger and Nixon did in 1972, Trump wants to detach Moscow from Beijing.
Of course, today’s Russia is but a shadow of the still vigorous USSR that Nixon had to contend with. But even in its much-weakened state, Russia still adds a great deal to Chinese power. It provides everything from jet engines for Xi’s fighters (its own remain stubbornly unreliable), to Polar access via Russia’s arctic ports, railway access to Western Europe via Kazakhstan and Moscow, and overland access to Iran and the Middle East.
More simply, Russia’s immense territory interposed between China and the “West”, both in Europe and North America, would function in war as the Pacific Ocean serves the US, from San Diego and Pearl Harbor to Taiwan and China.
Trump is much better placed to bargain with Putin than Biden ever was — for one thing, he never insulted Putin as Biden did. But that is not the main reason why Trump has a decent chance of pulling off this diplomatic manoeuvre. These days, one of Putin’s growing worries is the territorial integrity of easternmost Siberia, Russia’s Maritime Province.
Local officials and academics in Vladivostok voiced acute concerns about Chinese intrusions even during my last visit in 2019 — before the sharp increase in China’s relative power caused by the Ukraine war. Since then, things have only grown more concerning.
Ultimately, the problem is demographic. Eastern Siberia — officially the “Far Eastern Federal District” — is a tad smaller than Australia, much bigger than the European Union and twice the size of India, but only had a population of 8.1 million at the last count. Meanwhile, China’s northernmost big city Harbin has more than 10 million inhabitants all by itself, while its Heilongjiang province has 30 million, and Inner Mongolia another 24 million.
As the Chinese increasingly outnumber Russians along that immensely long and scarcely patrolled border, there are other shifts there to alarm Moscow. One small example tells a significant tale. In 2023, the Chinese government abruptly issued an ordinance that mandates the use of the pre-Russian name “Haishenwai” for Vladivostok, in place of the previous “Fúlādíwòsītuōkè” — which was clearly a meek attempt at a Chinese pronunciation of the Russian name.
This seemingly innocuous linguistic tweak belies a deep historical resentment. The Chinese still remember with great bitterness the collapse of imperial power in the 19th century, and the ensuing territorial losses under “unequal treaties” and forced concessions to the British, French, Japanese, Austro-Hungary, Germany (in Qingdao where good German beer is still made), and even Italy, in Tianjin.
Over time, most of those territorial losses were revoked, including Hong Kong that reverted to China in 1997, but not the biggest territorial losses by far, which were extorted by Imperial Russia in 1858 and 1860. They now constitute a slice of Siberia and Russia’s Maritime Province in the Far East, including Vladivostok. In spite of the passage of time, many in China still remember the lost territories and the old humiliations only too keenly. Let’s not forget why the Russians invaded Ukraine.
Then, more recently, another warning appeared, with China’s very quiet but momentous request to build a modern container port in the bay of Slavianska, in Russia’s Maritime Province south of Vladivostok, where Chinese territory arrives within 11 miles of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese certainly have a very good reason to build the port: the economy of the entire its north-east, the “rust belt” Dongbei, has long suffered from its distance from a seaport. As the economy there is transformed, so the Chinese threat increases.
So, yes, it is certainly a key Western interest that the war in Ukraine ends advantageously, with an agreed territorial settlement not imposed by either side. Equally, it is vitally important that Russia should not be as dependent on China as it now is. Europe may have its head stuck in the sand in this regard, but it seems that Trump has spotted this opportunity, realising that in Putin’s pursuit of a favourable outcome in Ukraine there is an opportunity to detach him from Beijing. While it might seem far-fetched, even for this most unpredictable of presidents, the televised humiliation of Zelensky did seem to indicate that Nixonian intent.
Professor Edward Luttwak is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.
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SubscribeThere exists a concept of winning the battle and losing the war. So it is, for Russia as it attacks Ukraine, it may itself be attacked by a still larger power. Indeed so …..
Perhaps China can see that if Russia weakens itself over Ukraine they will be easier to overcome when Russia is no longer useful.
When Russia found itself isolated after it’s invasion of Ukraine, it was only too happy to accept Chinese (and via China, North Korean) assistance in maintaining troop numbers and access to markets. I don’t know if Putin actually thought Xi was offering the “hand of friendship” but it’s far more likely to be a strategic ploy.
I expect Putin also sees the noises coming from the White House in the same way. Trump’s manoeuvring to end the Ukraine conflict, and taking Zelensky to task for seemingly trying to forestall it has resulted in favourable noises coming from the Kremlin, but it’s all just part of the same game: the US and China vying with each other to take the Russians out of the equation.
Sadly, the Europeans aren’t even in the game, although they’re desperately jumping up and down on the touchline to try to look as if they might be available if needed; substitutes that aren’t even match-fit, and don’t understand the rules.
It won’t work. When Nixon went to China, Mao had already broken with the Russians. Putin and Xi are allies. They’ll take Trump for a ride.
Russia is not a naturally ally of China. They recognise China as a treat and would jump at the chance to resolve Ukraine and wipe the slate with the West
There’s no such thing as ‘natural allies’, or for that matter, ‘natural enemies’. Hitler thought Britain was not Germany’s natural enemy, but Churchill wasn’t falling for that one.
Wipe the slate with the West? Obama tried a reset with Putin, didn’t he? Look how far that got him.
There are such thing as natural and unnatural allies. Britain and France for example.
No Obama didn’t
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet
He did claim to do so, but it was more of a ‘look we tried’ for the viewing public than anything else. In reality it didn’t reflect any meaningful change in US policy or any recognition of Russia’s areas of concern. It was not anything like what we’re witnessing now, which is Trump signaling his willingness to separate American interests from that of Europe. Putin likely sees the EU as the source of most the conflict and the US simply as backing EU interests. Negotiating without them is thus a powerful signal that Trump may be willing to address Russian concerns directly and not through the EU and NATO. He would like to see America stop backing the Europeans and Trump would like to see Russia stop backing China. If one wants to get something, one must give something back, and Trump clearly questions the value of the European alliance in its entirety.
There are natural allies and enemies. Russia and China make natural economic allies because China has a large industrial manufacturing base and is relatively resource poor, while Russia is resource rich and its economy is, and to some extent always has been, about exporting those resources. Entire books have been written about Russia’s historic quest for warm water ports to facilitate trade. These sorts of things can be temporary or long term. Nations have certain geographic properties that dictate their interests to some degree. Britain became a trading nation and then an empire because it was an island nation. It was long considered a natural ally of Russia for this reason. It had little interest in territory in continental Europe but always stood to gain from trading with Russia.
Natural rivals tend to occur when there’s a longstanding dispute between nations over land and resources. Russia and China have a territorial rivalry in east Asia. France and Germany have regions that were and theoretically could still be points of contention between them. Russia was a rival with the Ottoman Empire for a long time as they vied for influence and power in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
All this is subject to change temporarily or permanently. Russia and Britain are no longer considered natural allies, nor are France and Germany natural enemies. Technology can change these things, and the natuaral tendencies can be overcome by political expediency. Whether Russia and China becomes a long term natural alliance due to economic factors or whether their traditional rivalry over territory becomes the greater factor remains to be seen. They could either resolve their disputes in order to reap economic benefits and oppose ‘the west’, or their territorial dispute could reignite over trivial things like the names of cities.
The US is a bit of a wild card in that it has at times been an exporter or resources like Russia, a manufacturing powerhouse, and a trading empire at different points in its history and to different extents. It has very rarely been entirely one or the other, but one was usually dominant in terms of political considerations. The US remains more flexible in its ability to produce most necessities domestically, and is one of the few nations that could legitimately wall itself off from the rest of the world and survive. The only others are Russia, Canada, and perhaps Australia. As such, it’s not hard for America to shift its alliances without long term economic consequence. The US can reconcile with Russia for entirely political reasons if it wants. The two nations are neither natural allies nor rivals at present or historically. They have been two giants on opposite sides of the world who had a short term conflict over Europe which was ended for all intents and purposes in 1991. The disputes since that time are largely based on the EU, which has always been the dominant force pushing for eastward expansion of NATO and the EU. Since the Russia/China relationship could easily go either way based on both natural synergies and traditional disputes, it makes sense for the US to favor the latter outcome, as our principal rival is China. If the US can take political actions to tilt the board towards Russia and China becoming rivals rather than allies, it stands to benefit greatly, and has little to lose for the attempt, besides pissing off the Europeans, which Trump was already doing in a number of other ways.
One interpretation of the present dynamics is that the US and Europe are not natural allies and in the absence of a common foe, that’s becoming apparent. Once again, the US has no direct dispute with Russia. The Cold War was ideological and centered on Europe. That war is long since over and Europe isn’t nearly as important now. Absent the European influence, there really is no conflict between Russia and the US beyond Ukraine, which would likely not be a dispute without the influence of the European alliance, the value of which is in serious question. If we settle the matter of Ukraine, it can serve as a gateway to more normalized bilateral relations with Russia and a recognition that there is no outstanding dispute directly between the two nations. The pivot may not be towards Russia as much as away from Europe, which the Russians may indeed view favorably as Europe is far less formidable without the US backing their interests militarily.
Yes, the Europeans are coming face to face with the reality that the EU has limited strategic value to the US. The transatlantic alliance was predicated upon the conflicts of the 20th century, the world wars and the Cold War. Those conflicts are over and resolved, and there are new conflicts and new interests to prioritize. The US’s strategic priority is Asia, because any of our major allies in that region are strategically more important than the whole of Europe, and are facing the more significant threat. Trump’s policy is blunt, unfiltered, realism. He sees everything in terms of raw power, interests, and strategic realities. He has no appreciation for history, and I suspect little knowledge of history. The history of the transatlantic alliance is irrelevant to Trump because the alliance is burdensome to the US in the present. Historical friendship appealed to Biden, an old man who was formed in and by and earlier era, but has no appeal to a man like Trump, whose mind is always in the present and looking to the future despite his similar age.
We should not overlook the fact that Trump has strong familiar and emotional ties with the UK given that his mother was born in Scotland. This fact in itself qualifies Trump for UK citizenship! The WW2 relationship may have run its course, as recent events suggest. However, the entire USA legal system and that of its political governance, institutions and civic administration are substantially British in their conception and orientation. These are strong bonds that will endure beyond the reshaping of the relationship from its 20th Century foundations. I think Trump is right to put a stop to the decades of complacency by UK and Europe whereby they’ve relied on American largesse to cover them militarily (ditto Canada). Such a reckoning is long overdue – though nobody can claim it comes as a surprise considering that Trump made loud noises about this during his first term in office.
Hopefully a politically healthier and more balanced relationship will emerge, though I am doubtful if the EU is sufficiently cohesive to handle the burden of responsibility that has been thrust upon it by Trump. Is it perhaps a possibility that the individual EU nations might be stronger collectively as individual entities than the monumental, socialist, corrupt behemoth that it currently is?
… familial and emotional ties!
Great stuff. This is the second report I have read of this nature – of real potential tensions between Russia and China.
Luttwak back on track as a serious geopolitical commentator.
The Neocon attempt to destroy Russia was always going to drive it into China’s “embrace” and was a huge error. Of course it may be too late to correct it.
So China wants back the 665,000 square miles that Russia ‘stole’ in the mid nineteenth century.
Nothing unreasonable or particularly unusual about that.Mr Putin will have to ‘prepare to repel borders’ if he can!
He can’t really have any complaints after his recent escapades in Ukraine and Georgia.
I hope China wipe the floor with them
Two nuclear powers slugging it out…how far does fallout travel?
Not as far as New Zealand apparently.
“Boarders” – as when in naval battles of old, ships would come together and pugnacious mariners from one ‘board’ the other to take it captive.
My apologies for such slovenliness.
Why would Putin accept friendly relations with America that have a four year expiration date? Trump only has one term left and I can’t see his successor trying to maintain a cordial relationship with Russia.
All depends how the Chinese situation is playing out..His Successor may need them like we needed the Chinese against the Soviet Union. Hillary Clinton took a red reset button to Lavrov in 2009, if you remember…
I can if the real threat is China
His successor is likely to be JD Vance whom he picked for continuity of policy.
“In this, he is pulling off a “reverse Nixon”: instead of courting China to oppose the USSR, as Kissinger and Nixon did in 1972, Trump wants to detach Moscow from Beijing.”
Someone gets it.
That is exactly the plan. That would be my priority if I were Trump. It would be about avoiding another world war
It’s a neat theory and, for the reasons the article sets out, Russia is definitely the junior partner in that relationship. However, in the nearer term, what leverage has Trump got to stop Putin from breaking a ceasefire, just as he has repeatedly in the past?
Detaching Russia from China does nothing to protect Taiwan.
Kissinger simply knew that if any two of three powerful countries decide to lock arms against a third powerful country, the third would be in big trouble. Trump faces the same problem. So the question becomes which country do we try to pull more into our orbit. One would think we have economic leverage on our side with China. But if the author is right about Russia’s apparent uneasiness with China, Russia might be the better choice.
“Let’s not forget why the Russians invaded Ukraine.”
There were historical factors, but it was American meddling that brought things to a head.
If Putin’s aim was simply to maximise Russian territory, why hasn’t he invaded Belarus?
Putin likes to have “buffer states” under Russia’s sphere of influence.
Why would he invade Belarus? It is a vassal state with Russian troops and nukes there…
The Ukraine could become a second Belarus.
Indeed.
As long as Ukraine was comfortably under Russian influence, there was no need to invade it. Just as America has so far seen no need to invade Canada, Mexico or the UK.
When Victoria Nuland and friends started encouraging Ukrainian nationalists to sever ties with Russia, trouble was inevitable.
The number of people who are either u aware of this back story or choose to ignore it is substantial.
Which is why America should take responsibility for the mess it partially created, rather than cutting and running.
So Putin wants to reset Russian territory back to the early 20th century, Xi wants to reset Chinese territory back to the really 19th century. Russia and China may be allies at present but for how long? This article makes clearer why Trump acted as he did, he still looks like an untrustworthy bully though. He may be able to strong arm Ukraine (and Europe) at present, but in future battles he will have to consider who might be his allies and not weaken them now but short sighted actions.
Very interesting. Is Edward saying that we should condone or acquiesce to Russia’s takeover of eastern Ukraine and hope that Putin would be placated to separate from China?
I feel we are in this predicament because of the delays and restrictions in armaments provided to Ukraine during the Biden Administration, the Ukrainians are in a weaker negotiating position.
Tell it to the people who want their Cold War back.
That’s certainly a ‘stretch’ as regards strategic arguments. Xi has made no pronouncements on current Russian territory similar to those on Taiwan. It’s having vibrant free economies adjacent that worries Autocrats the most and which they cannot abide. An adjacent decaying Autocratic regime no threat – it’s why Putin left Lukashenko alone.
Xi and Putin are bonded by the threat from the West and it’s values. Trump and other strategists need to wake up and realise containment is essential. Trying to find an accommodation a sign of weakness they’ll eat up.
Autocrats don’t like having free populations near them, but there’s more than that alone going on.
Many of Trump’s recent actions make sense if you consider China as their primary concern –
Forcing Ukraine to come to terms quickly so the US can pivot to China as soon as possible.
Refusing to offer Ukraine security guarantees thereby pushing Europeans to spend more on defence to contain Russia, which will also make them more useful in the upcoming struggle with China.
Putting pressure on Canada, Greenland and Ukraine (again), for the mineral resources and/or access to the Arctic that they offer. China has control of over 90% of a number of vital minerals whilst the US has little.
Getting on better terms with Russia so that they can access resources from there also (whether from Russia proper or occupied Ukraine).
And, as this article suggests, getting on good terms with China’s major ally to try and drive a wedge between them.
You’ve identified the containment goal and the risks; especially the propensity for autocrats taking a mile when dealing for an inch. Separating the two states, if accomplished, is containment.
You can’t have it both ways – if Europe is as feeble as the pro-MAGA commentators make out, (and they may very well be right), then all Trump is doing by dumping the alliance is forcing them into bed with China, which is a much less immediate and geographically-proximate threat than Russia. If America exits stage left (or perhaps that should be right?), then it leaves a vacuum for the CCP.
A China turn for Europe, possibly. Recall, more immediately, Germany, in particular, has taken turns toward Russia. Ostpolitik? As a way to submit to Russian influence since war is not an option.
I’ve actually thought of Trump’s overtures towards Moscow as a sort of reversal of Nixon’s China strategy before and may have commented on it. Everything Luttwak says here is basic geopolitical strategy. The US’s strategic priority is Asia. That much has been clear since the Obama administration if not even earlier. It makes sense to peel away China’s allies by exploiting their fear of aggression. Even in a world where the US has it’s own set of strategic interests, demands, and territorial ambitions, those demands, interests, and ambitions will conflict with some nations but not all nations. For all the history of the transatlantic alliance, it has become rather one sided from a US perspective, even as the strategic importance of Europe declined precipitously. If the US can somewhat reconcile with Russia by pushing the Ukrainians to the table, it may open the door to using territorial disputes in the east as a wedge to drive the two apart in exactly the same way Nixon recognized decades ago, but from the other side of the table. Current events have led to my gaining a far greater appreciation of Nixon’s political and strategic acumen. His strategies echo in the present. From his effort to correct the first signs of trade deficits by pulling the US off the gold standard, to his southern strategy to build the Republican party base, to his China strategy, Nixon showed a remarkable understanding of politics an strategy both at home and around the world. He has had more long term impact than nearly any other American politician in the postwar era, yet is remembered mostly for a botched political crime that may not be any worse than some committed by others who were in lesser offices or who just didn’t get caught.
Nixon certainly would have also come off looking better if he had not applied price controls which have never worked in the history of commerce. But overall, I agree with your assessment.
The problem with the Brzezinskite assumption that without Ukraine Russia becomes a democratic state not an empire is that in reality, without Ukraine Russia becomes a vassal
This is more like it.
The question is whether the Chinese want more than Eastern Siberia and Taiwan.
Whaddya think, experts?
One of the ironies of this article is that it illustrates quite clearly just why Trump won’t succeed in pulling Russia away from China to the extent required. They are too close geographically, and there is simply too much at stake for the Russians to do anything else other than cleave to the Chinese where possible.
I completely agree, but in that case it is rather counterproductive that Trump is working so hard to impose a pro-Putin settlement on Ukraine.
AS the great realist Luttvak wiill surely agree, Putin will continue to pursue his interests until he is forced to stop. His interests are taking control of Ukraine and large parts of Eastern Europe. What is Trump doing that might stop him?
What are the Europeans doing to stop him?? Not our problem anymore…EU has a much bigger economy and population than Russia…take care of it yourselves
“Of course, today’s Russia is but a shadow of the still vigorous USSR that Nixon had to contend with”
You have been at the Kool Aid again.
There is no evidence that Putin has any interest whatsoever in taking control of large parts of Eastern Europe.
It is the warmongers’ bogyman trotted out to justify continuation of the war in Ukraine
There’s never dispositive evidence until it is attempted, or even accomplished. What about Putin or his history leads you to believe he will rest content with the portion of Ukraine that gets carved off for bare face-saving purposes?
The other portions are not ethnically Russian nor speak Russian. That’s the evidence.
You’re probably right about Putin. There’s no telling how far his ambition might reach. There’s probably nobody on the planet except Putin himself that does know. Among the hazards of autocracy is the fact that one sufficiently unstable individual can create significant destruction. We can’t say what Putin really wants or intends or the full extent of his ambitions, but the Ukraine conflict has given us valuable insight as to Russia’s military capability. His ambition is meaningless if his military can’t back it up, and the fact remains the Russian military fought to a stalemate with Ukraine, which wasn’t exactly considered a great power. As decrepit as the EU’s military capabilities are, I can’t imagine it’s an easier target than Ukraine, nor can I imagine the US would actually stand aside and let Putin march into Poland if he actually thought he could.
Makes sense from what we know, or think we do. Note that I didn’t say I knew Putin would have a persistent expansionist itch. With the world thrown so quickly into heightened uncertainty it’s hard to know where we’re headed, but this direction could prefigure a much bigger global role for China in the very near future.
Russia controls 70% of Asia.