MISSED OPPORTUNITY ONE: BUILDING A ONE NATION CONSERVATISM
The period after Britain voted for Brexit could have been a great opportunity for the Conservatives. The party had been given the chance to respond to a a clear vote for change from the nation’s more disadvantaged communities – communities that turned out in numbers not seen in modern times. From her speech on the steps of Downing Street, on becoming Prime Minister, Mrs May appeared to ‘get it’. But the appointment of the ultra-cautious Philip Hammond as her Chancellor served as a better indication of her government’s trajectory. The policies that she inherited from David Cameron and George Osborne – overwhelmingly geared to the middle classes – continued.
MISSED OPPORTUNITY TWO: TAKING CONTROL
This could have been the moment at which Britain began to set out exciting plans to make use of the post-EU freedoms that its people had voted for. If, over the past 18 months, the British government had focused on crafting an intelligent immigration policy that would deliver control as well as the skilled labour that the economy needs… if it had taken advantage of low interest rates to build much-needed homes in the South and better infrastructure in the North… if it had drawn up a regulatory system to supercharge the competitiveness of the high-tech, life sciences and other industries of the future… if it had done even half of this, we wouldn’t look like such an enfeebled nation, obsessed with the terms of exit that the EU might give us. But Theresa May spent all of her political time on negotiations that are largely beyond her control, while failing to develop the policy freedoms that would have amounted to “taking back control”.
MISSED OPPORTUNITY THREE: HONOURING THE SPIRIT OF THE LEAVE CAMPAIGN
Those mass and vindictive sackings of talented people during her first 24 hours as PM were another indication that she had no intention of building a government of the talents to guide the country through the tricky time ahead. Her lack of respect for her new colleagues was never more obvious than in the process that produced the 2016 Tory election manifesto. Ministers weren’t even consulted on the draft policies affecting their own departments. The result was a succession of screw-ups, such as the rushed-then-aborted plan for long-term care, and a host of own goals on vote-determining issues such as animal welfare. But it was through her dismissal of the issues used by the Vote Leave campaign to win that 52% of the vote that the May administration’s arrogance would be most costly. She decided she had no loyalty to the Brexit pledges made by Boris Johnson and others – pledges which led to the biggest ever vote in the country’s history. Her subsequent actions have not only given rise to the idea that Leave was secured on something of a false mandate, eroding its legitimacy in some eyes, but they have failed to incite much enthusiasm for Brexit beyond harder core sovereignty-driven supporters. By failing to talk about how Brexit would deliver extra cash for the NHS (if not the £350 million on the infamous bus) or, for example, the abolition of VAT on fuel, the Government has nothing to tout beyond changes to the colour of British passports as one of very few retail policy benefits from leaving the EU. But, then, the May operation always seemed much more interested in ensuring that Boris Johnson could not emerge as a leadership rival, than honouring at least some of the pledges which Vote Leave had employed to make Brexit more than just a eurosceptic enterprise.
And, so, we arrive at today: 26 February 2018.
For nearly all of the 614 days between 23rd June 2016 and today, news bulletins and newspapers have been full of Brexit coverage but it has mostly been of a speculative nature. This, in large part, is because Theresa May’s “Brexit means Brexit” soundbite was not a device to bridge the moment between her unexpected appointment as PM and the articulation of a concrete plan for Britain’s post-EU identity. It was an early-warning sign of the vacuous premiership to come, along with more empty slogans. More alarming was her promise of a “red, white and blue Brexit”: while vacuous, it also suggested that Mrs May was, at heart, a Remainer trying to be a Leaver – but wasn’t really getting it.
Today, however, is not another day of yet more speculation. The well-trailed news is of a concrete nature. But it’s provided by Her Majesty’s Opposition, rather than HMG. Despite having Eurosceptic voting credentials to match those of Bill Cash, Bernard Jenkin, Iain Duncan Smith and all those other Tory MPs they walked through the Commons voting lobbies with for all those years, Jeremy Corbyn and his Shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell, have been won over by their Brexit spokesman’s tenacious campaign to move Labour policy towards a softer or (Eurosceptics would argue) dirtier, less clinical Brexit. Sir Keir Starmer has, in the process, emerged as a hugely significant figure in his party and can claim that his willingness to serve on Mr Corbyn’s frontbencher has been vindicated. His decision – and that of Emily Thornberry – was taken a long time before the 2016 election result and the similar willingness to be accommodating that winning votes elicited from the once staunch but now silent rows of anti-Corbynistas on the Labour benches.
But Labour’s decision to support membership of a permanent customs union isn’t merely an interesting sign of what might happen if Labour were to win power. It’s very possible that Mr Corbyn’s new policy will become the nation’s. For while Tory MPs such as Anna Soubry and Dominic Grieve suggested a loyalty to their PM’s Lancaster House speech and its approach to Brexit before the election, they’ve been attempting to sabotage it since their return to parliament. By defying three-line whips and defeating the government in votes on Brexit strategy, they have shot through May’s negotiating authority. Her parliamentary weakness has given Brussels the upper hand in talks where they were already holding the best cards.
It’s clearly time to conclude that the gamble by Eurosceptic MPs, made in the days after the shock of the Tories’ general election result, has failed. They calculated that ousting Mrs May might produce a leader less committed to Brexit, or without the mandate that she could claim from her vote haul. While the risk they took was understandable, it ignored all of the evidence that Mrs May simply wasn’t up to the job. She had lost the unlosable election – throwing away the majority that, only two years earlier, David Cameron had secured in the unwinnable election. She had promised big on social justice but had delivered almost nothing. And no one should have been surprised. The shambolic Child Abuse Inquiry that she launched as Home Secretary wasn’t an aberration but too typical of her time in that ministry.
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