March 15, 2025 - 1:00pm
High Court, London
Yesterday, in a small locked room in a remote corner of the High Court in London, a panel of two judges considered Apple’s appeal against an order issued by the British Government. The tech firm was responding to a technical capability notice (TCN) from the Home Office, which is attempting to force Apple to create an encryption backdoor. If implemented, this notice would effectively break end-to-end encryption, giving UK authorities access to Apple users’ data — an unprecedented move for a major democracy.
Unfortunately, the Investigatory Powers Act stipulates that this whole process must be shrouded in secrecy. Although the hearing was publicly listed as “an application in private” to be heard in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, no one involved is legally allowed to comment — or even confirm that the session was related to the Apple case.
I was one of around a dozen campaigners and journalists who spent yesterday in the corridor outside the courtroom, hoping that our submissions urging the Tribunal to open proceedings would be considered and that we might be allowed in. My organisation, Big Brother Watch, had written jointly to the tribunal along with Open Rights Group and Index on Censorship. Privacy International and Liberty also filed a submission, as did a number of the country’s leading media organisations, all seeking for the hearing to be opened to the public.
This performative level of secrecy seems particularly absurd given how much public attention the case has received since it was first reported by the Washington Post last month. Perhaps the British Government underestimated how much pushback it would receive — from the public, civil society organisations, tech companies, politicians, and even across the Atlantic, with US officials now examining whether the UK has violated a key bilateral data treaty.
The reason for this outcry is clear: the privacy rights of millions are at stake, starting with Apple’s British customers. UK users have already lost access to the company’s most secure encryption tool, Advanced Data Protection (ADP), with reporting by the Financial Times suggesting that the Government considered the removal of ADP insufficient to comply with the TCN. If the Government wins in this tribunal, it could force the creation of an encryption backdoor that would compromise all of our personal data.
Even more alarming is what could follow. We could very easily see a proliferation of similar orders to other platforms. And there is no such thing as an encryption backdoor which magically targets only criminals, or which gives access to the UK authorities alone. Once encryption is broken for anyone, it is broken for everyone, leaving our data vulnerable to malicious actors such as hackers or foreign adversaries. No matter how it is sold to the public — whether under the guise of combatting terrorism, protecting children, or other seemingly worthy claims — this erosion of our most fundamental rights doesn’t make anyone safer.
Such brazen efforts by states to access citizens’ data are usually reserved for authoritarian regimes such as China, and have no place in a country which values human rights and civil liberties. When viewed in the context of other ongoing legislative moves seeking access to our data — from provisions in the Data (Use and Access) Bill permitting surveillance of bank accounts, to proposals in the Crime and Policing Bill that would effectively turn the driving licence database into a gallery of police mugshots — the UK is on a very worrying path indeed.
It is currently unclear when the Investigatory Powers Tribunal’s consideration of the Apple encryption case will continue, or whether it will ever be open to the public. But dangers certainly lie ahead if this current trajectory doesn’t change. It’s not too late for the Home Office to rescind its order to Apple, and use the targeted powers already at its disposal to fight crime rather than eroding the rights of an entire population through mass surveillance. It is difficult to imagine any situation where this could be considered proportionate. Just because these powers exist does not mean they should be used, now or ever.
Rebecca Vincent is the Interim Director of Big Brother Watch, a UK civil liberties organisation that defends privacy rights and free speech.
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SubscribeDeeply worrying. State overreach is a big problem in the west now. It must stop. At least Trump and Vance have called the Europeans out and could ultimately stop it if they so chose … let’s hope they do.
A dangerous weakening of the public’s security to no purpose. Once it is known by malefactors that Apple’s encryption data is compromised they will find other means of communication, however inconvenient, that will side step the risk. The public, however, will be left with the compromise system for other malefactors to take advantage of.
Thank you Big Brother Watch and everyone who is fighting this on our behalf. Anyone who doubts the authoritarian tendency of this government are naive in the extreme.
Serious question.
How does Apple know whether it’s a UK users phone or say, a US users phone being used in the UK, or indeed a UK user who has a US purchased phone?
Or is it simply that the advance level of encryption is disabled for everyone for all data saved during any period whilst within the UK?
If it’s simply Apple phones registered to a UK account then I imagine that there will be a roaring trade in accounts registered to the online equivalent of the “drop box” going forward.
The upticks were appreciated but I’m still none the wiser regarding how the higher level of encryption is being blocked in the UK without there being several potential workarounds.
I agree but, why is this surprising? As pointed out in the article, there plenty of outrageous transgressions of privacy from the DVLA/ANPR and banking acts, not to mention freely rendered data on Facebore, Instagrope, DikDork , so called ‘reward cards’ and all the other ‘socials.’ With Thiel’s recent NHS contract and mass facial recognition surveillance powered by quantum computing, it’s a bit late…. I don’t see mass protest or wholesale revocation of the moronic social platforms. Looks like it’s only approbrium from the X meister that we can rely on to challenge Sir DEI-ago two tier and his Stasi.
I agree that ideally the reporting of the case should be open given the principles at stake.
The UK Govt won’t be doing this though without some serious reason given the tension it creates with Washington. Having read much about how the FBS and MSS use social media, smart technologies and the perhaps unwittingly the providers of those. And furthermore how AI technology to identify the next Axel Rudakabana needs to be able to access data, I’m torn in who I trust if I have to trust. Should I trust Apple?
Put not thy trust in princes, or in fruits, Malus domestica especially.
All this so people can’t meme Yookay
Britain is an authoritarian state so this should not come as a surprise.
Where was the outcry when the legislation was passed? All a bit late now.