March 22, 2025 - 8:00am

When it comes to Keir Starmer’s bid to carve out a leading role for the United Kingdom in Ukraine’s post-war security, the reality checks just keep coming.

The Prime Minister’s enthusiasm for putting boots on the ground always contrasted sharply with the stark warnings from senior military figures that the Army is simply too small to play even a meaningful peacekeeping role along the 1,500-mile Russo-Ukrainian front line, which is why the plan depended on assembling a so-called coalition of the willing.

Unfortunately for Starmer, there was an inverse relationship between a country having troops to send (such as Poland) and a country being enthusiastic about sending them (Britain). Nor was it clear that Europe was — at least yet — up for the huge logistical challenge of deploying and maintaining 30,000 or more troops in the Donbas. As such, the game was probably up for that even before Vladimir Putin made European troop deployment a red line in the ceasefire negotiations.

Now, we have a pivot. Speaking to 31 potential members of the “coalition of the willing” near London this week, Starmer has started shifting his emphasis. Any intervention, he now suggests, is far more likely to hinge on air and sea power. This is certainly more realistic, but how much more realistic?

Air power is certainly Nato’s strongest card. An aerial commitment could operate out of bases in Poland, Romania, and other members of the alliance, and could be adequately supplied by land or air. Enforcing a no-fly zone over Ukraine is practically achievable, and well within the alliance’s comfort zone.

It is not without risk, though. No-fly zones have become a Nato staple, but usually in the context of overwhelming superiority against either insurgencies or ramshackle national militaries. Ukraine would be different: as when the war started, the big question would concern whether countries enforcing a no-fly zone would be prepared to actually engage the VKS, Russia’s air force, if it came to it.

Then there is the danger that deniable forces, such as the separatist militias in Donetsk and Luhansk, could inflict greater losses of very expensive aircraft than Western politicians might expect. Nato’s reliance on air power is well known, and if countries such as Serbia have been investing heavily in state-of-the-art anti-aerial weapon systems, Russia will no doubt do the same.

But what about the sea? One can see the appeal for London: one ship looks like a much more substantial contribution than a small number of troops. Consider the “Anglo-American” task force off Yemen that boasts just one Royal Navy vessel — which in turn lacks the proper weapons for hitting land targets.

Yet the odds of a naval deployment to Ukraine are minimal, for one simple reason: Turkey would have to let the vessels into the Black Sea, and it probably won’t. There aren’t even any US Navy vessels deployed there at present. Turkey is formally part of Nato, but its actual foreign policy posture is markedly different. From the start of the war it has walked a very fine line, helping to broker important deals on things such as Ukrainian grain exports but also continuing to let Russian gas flow through its pipelines.

Ankara has other reasons to oppose a Western fleet deployment on its northern flank. Principal among these is its increasingly bellicose approach towards Greece and Cyprus on the question of their maritime Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), due to a major new pipeline from Israel threatening its geographic chokehold on oil and gas supplies. This has become sufficiently serious that in 2021 France and Greece signed a mutual defence pact, outside Nato, aimed squarely at deterring Turkish aggression in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. It therefore doesn’t seem likely Erdoğan will invite a Nato task force into his back yard.

That might come as a bit of a relief to the Royal Navy, which already has a majority of its surface fleet either in maintenance or long repairs. It’s also another reason why a land deployment, which would likely need to be resupplied by sea, was always a very uncertain proposition.

But it does mean that we can expect Europe’s immediate contribution to Ukraine’s post-war security — assuming that a proper ceasefire even occurs — to eventually boil down to Nato’s favourite job: policing the skies. Starmer thus just needs to make sure that Britain, which currently lacks the aircraft planned for its own aircraft carriers, has something real to contribute.


Henry Hill is Deputy Editor of ConservativeHome.

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