March 28, 2025 - 4:00pm

Many in Europe have convinced themselves that the EU’s relationship with Russia will not normalise after the end of the war in Ukraine. However, it seems that the Trump administration has other plans. It could use normalisation, especially in the energy relationship, as a carrot to try and persuade Russia to accept a peace deal. If Washington were prepared to pull that lever, Europe would find itself in an intractable position.

The German newspaper Handelsblatt has reported that, according to Russia, restarting Nord Stream 2 is actively being discussed as part of negotiations. It is never easy to distinguish truth from rumour in times of war, but it wouldn’t be totally surprising if this were the case. Previously, the US has been interested in exploring energy cooperation with Russia as part of the peace talks.

It also wouldn’t be surprising if Russia demanded access to European markets directly through its pipelines. Gas is a source of revenue for the Kremlin. But, more than that, it is geopolitical leverage — especially if Russia floods the market with cheaper gas, driving out competition.

There are, however, multiple complications here. One is the fact that the pipeline is damaged, following a series of underwater explosions in September 2022. Another is the pending bankruptcy of Nord Stream AG, the firm responsible for building and running both Nord Stream pipelines. Handelsblatt has reported that an American investor is interested in taking over the firm and assuming responsibility for the pipeline itself. Based on how Donald Trump sees the world, it’s plausible that this is at least something his administration would support and attempt to facilitate. It bears some resemblance to both his “Gaza Riviera” plans and the Ukrainian minerals deal.

But it won’t be that simple to get Russian gas running through Nord Stream 2 again. Aside from the damage to the pipeline’s physical integrity and the financial troubles of Nord Stream AG, Germany has refused to issue a permit for the pipeline. Equally, the European Commission could halt any possible gas deal with Russia if it believes it would be incompatible with single-market rules, competition, or security of supply. Trump’s administration can lean on Germany and the EU to go along with any deal he wants. But it will be more complicated to resolve the legal mess that has ensued as a result of the gas shut-off in 2022.

A new paper from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies outlines yet more reasons why Nord Stream 2 is likely to remain defunct. There is the matter of arbitration between Gazprom and the various companies that bought gas from it prior to 2022. In some cases, such as Uniper’s, arbitration decisions have allowed firms to unilaterally terminate their long-term contracts with Gazprom. In others, there may be awards that have to be paid by Gazprom to affected companies.

Complicating this further is that Gazprom, which is state-controlled, has engaged in its own proceedings against these firms in Russia, filing anti-suit injunctions and seeking its own damages. In an eventual deal, it’s conceivable that the Kremlin could get Gazprom to drop these claims as leverage. But this is not the case for the buyers. European governments also obviously cannot force arbitration tribunals to drop cases against Gazprom.

Ultimately, the fate of Nord Stream 2 and any future energy relationship between Europe and Russia will depend on the coercive powers and decisions of Trump and Putin. The Russian government can obviously bend Gazprom and the court system to its will. Although the US government doesn’t exercise such direct control, the Trump administration has proven capable of intimidating various firms into doing its bidding. This is not the case in Europe, where national governments and the EU simply don’t hold that kind of power.

This is an edited version of an article which originally appeared in the Eurointelligence newsletter.


Jack Smith is an analyst at Eurointelligence. He focuses on energy policy, security and defence, EU politics, and the domestic politics of Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.