As peace negotiations progress over the war in Ukraine, the European Union is still trying to stamp out the last vestiges of its old relationship with Russia. The European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament are now in negotiations over a possible ban on Russian oil and gas imports from the beginning of 2028. These talks are reportedly stuck because the Parliament doesn’t want exemptions for countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, which rely more on Russian oil and gas imports. Earlier this month, the EU refused to allow loopholes for landlocked countries.

Currently, the EU imports much less Russian oil and gas than it did before 2022. Russian oil imports have virtually halted compared to pre-war levels, thanks to an EU embargo. Gas imports have dropped significantly, but not to zero. In 2021, Russian gas made up 48% of the EU’s total imports. Through the first eight months of this year, the figure was 15%. While considerably lower, it’s still noteworthy.

The question, especially while these talks take place and the oil and gas ban remains under discussion, is what this would look like should the war end. For now, it’s hard to imagine the EU going back to anything like what the situation was before. Infrastructure such as the destroyed Nord Stream pipelines would have to be repaired, while Ukraine would need to conclude a new transit agreement with Russia.

More seriously, a couple of other factors would slow any enthusiasm for Russian fossil fuels. For one, many European buyers would likely be wary of signing any new long-term contracts with Gazprom. Before 2022, this was how most business was done with Russia’s majority-state-controlled gas supplier.

The squeeze began when Gazprom itself started choking off supplies, making spurious arguments about technical maintenance. That left a number of gas buyers — including Uniper, then the single largest importer of Russian gas in Europe — in the hole. In mid-2022, the German government had to bail out Uniper to the tune of €15 billion. Both the buyers themselves and governments will want to avoid this.

Another reason, as Reuters energy columnist Ron Bousso pointed out this week, is that there is a lot of new global gas export capacity coming online. The US in particular is adding liquefied natural gas terminals like there is no tomorrow. EU countries have also significantly increased their import capacity, to the point at which about half of it is going spare. This is already driving down gas prices, and the European benchmark recently went below €30 per megawatt-hour. This is the lowest it’s been at this point in the year since Russia’s 2022 invasion.

But there are a couple of reasons to think it also won’t be a total end, despite what the EU is discussing. First, there may well be political pressure from the US if a deal is agreed with Russia. The lifting of sanctions and reintegrating Russia into the global economy is one point that would almost definitely stay in any final agreement. That would presumably include the EU dropping both its oil embargo and its pending gas import ban.

Another is domestic political pressure within Europe. In Germany, for example, the AfD is already calling for the reopening of Nord Stream and the resumption of Russian gas purchases as part of the party’s own economic plans. These calls will only grow louder if the war does end, and the main impetus for the bans seemingly no longer exists. If governments increasingly have to enter into coalitions with parties like the AfD, and if the center-right parties ally with them at the EU level, bans on Russian imports may quickly be consigned to history.

This is an edited version of an article which originally appeared in the Eurointelligence newsletter.