“This reduction in the share of nuclear ​was a choice,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the Nuclear Energy Summit on Tuesday. “I believe that it was a strategic mistake for Europe to turn its back ⁠on a reliable, affordable source of low-emissions power.”

The share of electricity in the EU27 generated by nuclear reactors fell from over 30% in the Nineties to 23.3% last year, most of which is generated by France. However, even in France the output has declined significantly, with reactor output down by 20% since 2013 as the older facilities built under the Messmer Plan were taken offline for protracted maintenance. Larger still was the fall in Germany, when following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident the Energiewende plan saw all 17 working reactors in the fleet decommissioned by 2023.

Brussels does not directly dictate the energy mix of member states but it has a variety of tools with which it pursues aggressive climate mitigation, narrowing or proscribing those choices. The European Green Deal of 2020 was followed by the expansive DNSH (Do No Significant Harm) principle, which must be considered before any infrastructure project is approved. In reality, it meant no funding for hydrocarbon infrastructure or research on using fossil fuels more efficiently. Additionally, a lack of agreement between member states has prevented the support of nuclear projects. To make matters worse, in 2007 the EU’s Energy Commissioner pledged to reduce energy consumption by 13% before 2020 — a Malthusian target.

The consequences of this are dire and now apparent in high electricity prices and a populist “greenlash”. The closure of Germany’s nuclear fleet and the loss of Russian gas has caused electricity prices to rise by 57%, while energy-intensive industrial prices have shot up by 70%. The result has been a creeping deindustrialization, which is now gathering pace. Chemicals giant BASF lost €1 billion last year, while Volkswagen has just announced another 50,000 layoffs by 2030.

Solar and wind facilities in Italy and Spain have been attacked, while thousands have marched against the closure of coal plants in Poland. Though this was previously a largely Right-wing issue, even some centrist politicians are now moving in the same direction.

The EU has made some concessions. It will permit internal combustion engines which use synthetic hydrocarbons, or “e-fuels”, rather than implement a total ban. Poland has also received aid for its first nuclear reactors this century, and von der Leyen made a symbolic pledge of €200 million for small modular reactors.

But the vast apparatus of regulation which the EU has constructed to enforce climate policies remains intact. For example, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism has come into effect this year, while the goal of a 55% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030 remains.

French President Emmanuel Macron called for a break from regulation in 2023, and finds the apocalyptic rhetoric unhelpful. But the EU’s problem in changing course is institutional, and largely of its own making. It has grown dependent on the third sector for legitimacy, with €5.4 billion allocated to environmental NGOs for the period 2021-27. “NGOs play a crucial role in shaping, monitoring, and enforcing legislation,” the Commission claims, alongside an academic sector dependent on green Horizon grants. For example, the Jacques Delors Centre frets that the Green Deal’s foundations are being “hollowed out”, which it calls “a puzzling choice and a strategic miscalculation”. This makes a full-blown retreat difficult.

Aggressive climate mitigation increasingly looks like a policy designed for a distant age, when large CO2 reductions appeared easy and electorally popular. Ironically, the EU does not contribute significantly to global CO2 emissions, with its share falling to 5.9% in 2025. Defining itself by climate change mitigation risks the entire project.

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Andrew Orlowski is a business columnist at The Daily Telegraph and a former systems engineer.

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