April 4, 2024 - 11:40am

The first secretary-general of Nato, Hastings Ismay, famously said that his organisation’s aim was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”, and for decades, this held true.

This week’s news that the summit of foreign ministers in Brussels is considering — and planning for — a proposal by outgoing Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to establish a Nato support fund for Ukraine of $100 billion suggests, however, that the German, or in a wider sense European, part of Ismay’s formula may soon become more pronounced.

According to the Financial Times, Stoltenberg’s rationale for his proposal is to shield Nato’s commitment to Ukraine “against the winds of political change”; or, in plainer words, against Donald Trump — who apparently has said that he would “not give a penny” in support of the alliance’s Ukraine arms programme. The Ukraine fund’s five-year rollout plan would obviously extend beyond a second Trump presidency.

“Some resistance is expected from states,” the report notes. Yet one Nato diplomat confidently remarks, “I see consensus emerging and I think [the support fund] will be there by the time we get on the plane to Washington” in July to celebrate the alliance’s 75-year anniversary.

The Atlanticist establishment is thus evidently counting on those member states that are sceptical of the proposal to eventually be brought to heel. But does this way of proposing and deciding policy not remind us Europeans of something familiar?

What appears to be happening is that Stoltenberg — whom no popular parliament has elected as secretary-general — is in fact drawing up plans to make Nato independent of national political authority. If his Ukraine fund is approved, it would not matter if US and European voters, on an issue as vital as war, preferred a different strategy to further military support packages, since supranational elites have already reached a consensus to – in the FT’s words – “lock in long-term financing”.

This anti-democratic move therefore has a distinct EU flavour to it. And such an unprecedented step could also Europeanise the alliance in a different way. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken apparently expressed “some concerns” about the fund at the summit, but a second Biden administration would probably welcome the opportunity to bear a smaller part of the economic burden for assistance to Ukraine (the US share of the $100 billion might be as low as $16 billion) and begin to focus on the envisioned “pivot to Asia”.

By contrast, for the entirety of his presidency, this fund could put Trump in an antagonistic relationship with the Europeans in Nato, with uncertain consequences for the post-1945 transatlantic link. A perpetual state of conflict within the alliance is likely to encourage those prominent voices on both the Left and the Right in the US who already believe that an American strategic departure from Europe is overdue.

Some European leaders might favour an inversion of Ismay’s quip, in which the Americans are knocked down or even out of Nato altogether. Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock notably sounded a positive note about the Ukraine fund: “For us, it is essential that we pour the ad hoc structures into reliable, long-term structures.”

But if the EU is any indication of how well European states cooperate in other important matters — for instance, Covid-19 — one can only imagine the turmoil that could be created by attempts to coordinate a military response to an expansionist Russia.

The “Trump-proof” fund for Ukraine, as the FT calls Stoltenberg’s pitch, is a nascent idea of a Nato removed from both its national and transatlantic moorings. Whether it is an idea worth pursuing is another question entirely.


Johan Wennström is a Research Fellow at the Swedish Defence University, currently writing a book about Sweden’s stay-behind network during the Cold War.

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