July 8, 2024 - 10:00am

The Left-wing coalition victory in France is a triumph for Pax Americana. But for how long?

Though routinely mentioned in the same breath as the Nazi collaborationist Vichy government, in policy terms the Rassemblement National (RN) is more accurately understood less as “fascist” than as a group of anti-universalist social democrats. For instance, Marine Le Pen’s party doesn’t question the legitimacy of social welfare as such. Rather, the RN has sought to entrench in French law the principle of “national preference”, with welfare and social housing prioritised for French citizens over foreign nationals.

Even more than a national political question, this is an international one: it serves as a core signal of affiliation with, or disaffiliation from, the internationalist consensus that has held since America’s victory in the Second World War. Is it morally legitimate, under any circumstances, to distinguish between an in-group and an out-group in allocating social resources? Do out-groups exist at all? This is a fundamental ideological question; and since America won the Second World War, and egalitarianism by fiat consequently triumphed in the Land of the Free in the Sixties, the only permissible answer to this has been “no”.

The 20th-century Pax Americana dream of universal abundance and harmony that emerged from this consensus was predicated on there being no hard boundaries on countries, peoples, cultures, or polities. Instead, the world would tend toward what Leo Strauss termed the “universal and homogeneous state”, a condition of felicity in which conflict would no longer be necessary — at least, not between states with a McDonald’s.

The McDonald’s Doctrine held, by and large, until 2008, when the Global Financial Crash also saw conflict between the McDonald’s States of Russia and Georgia. This year also, perhaps not coincidentally, marked the beginning of the comeback for the Front National, the RN’s predecessor — a rise enabled by the increasingly beleaguered appearance of a neoliberal worldview seemingly no longer able to distribute rising living standards for all. Over that same period, too, America’s capacity to project power and maintain the economic and cultural dominance which underpinned McDonald’s Peace has come to seem increasingly fragile: a sense of imperial fraying that has culminated in the first serious European conflict since 1945, in Ukraine.

We might infer from this that peoples who acceded to the American paradigm in its salad days, complete with its internationalist and post-cultural edicts, are growing restive now the tide of abundance is withdrawing. Those for whom this is most apparent include the rural poor, the less well-educated, and downwardly-mobile young people: the very groups from which the RN draws its voter base. For such groups, it is growing less self-evident why European peoples should adopt an internationalist outlook, complete with ahistorical American “nation of immigrants” narrative, when these seem only to be delivering more intense resource competition and unwanted cultural change.

In this context, the RN’s “national preference” platform makes sense. When resources are limited, this argument goes, the in-group should be defined as a nation rather than the whole world, and this should be reflected in law and policy. Based on last night’s results, this view is now held by some 37% of French voters, a substantial minority.

These were resoundingly defeated by a rag-tag coalition of Left-wing utopians and neoliberals who agree internally on very little else, but remain nonetheless still broadly in favour of American-style egalitarian internationalism. However the press has framed it, then, this is less a contest between Left and Right than between political paradigms at a far more fundamental — and international — level.

How long will it hold? At the last count, the decisive factor probably lies outside France. If broad support for egalitarian internationalism is a proxy for more general affiliation with Pax Americana, its victory or defeat probably depends on what happens at the imperial core in Washington, DC. Should a less internationalist, more Nato-sceptic regime take power in the United States later this year, and its geopolitical focus shift East, how long will the ghost of the Second World War go on frightening Europeans into their current efforts at America-style egalitarian universalism? Not forever, most likely.

In this case, we should anticipate a far more substantial resurgence than we have seen to date, across Europe, of the nationalist sensibilities long suppressed by the postwar settlement.


Mary Harrington is a contributing editor at UnHerd.

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