Why Israel can’t give up the Philadelphi Corridor Righteous anger risks undermining smart strategy

Does this make keeping the Corridor a no-brainer? Strategically speaking, yes. But not in a vibrant democracy like Israel, where hundreds of thousands took to the streets after the cold-blooded murder of six hostages, while 101 still remain in Gaza. No doubt, if among the murdered six hostages were my own children, I would march to liberate Yahya Sinwar’s remaining pawns. Anything to “bring them home now”, as the demonstrators demand, and set aside any strategic priorities held up by Netanyahu.

Yet righteous anger does not crack Israel’s harrowing dilemma: save lives or defang Hamas, secure a ceasefire or keep the Corridor? Let’s not forget that Sinwar, a leader whose tactical savvy is matched only by his inhumanity, is not eying a lasting stand-off, let alone a modus vivendi. The point is to restore Hamas to power.

On the tactical level, the cruel point, which might escape a tortured nation, is obvious: Hamas will not release all 101 hostages. For the simple reason that the value of each remaining Israeli will rise. What is more likely is that they will dribble them out and keep the remainder as human bargaining chips to maintain pressure and trade lives for concessions. This game will not end.

Despite knowing this, defence minister Yoav Gallant continues to dismiss the Corridor’s strategic value. A retired major-general, this old hand should know better. Likewise, opposition leader Benny Gantz argues that the IDF could always return, which is true. But how often has the IDF surged into Gaza in vain? The “grass” has always grown back, while the Qassam Brigades have grown stronger with more sophisticated hardware.

History, too, does not favour the optimists, who are convinced that a 42-day ceasefire will produce stability. The multi-year Arab-Israeli truce of 1949 granted only a pause to this accursed region, which then segued into the three Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973. An armistice, after all, only works when a beaten enemy can no longer fight, as was the case of Germany in 1918. More importantly, the “Islamic Resistance” isn’t interested in a durable deal, and neither is Iran, which uses Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis as helots in an unending war against the “Zionist entity”.

And there is also a lesson here for Washington, for Iran’s ambitions dwarf Gaza by an order of magnitude. With its proxies, Iran goes after the Little Satan Israel, but the real target is the Great Satan America. Hit Israel, its only reliable ally, and you damage the US. Gaza is not a local mano-a-mano, but the “Great Game 2.0”, to recall Britain vs Russia in the 19th century. And yet, the US is lobbying for a ceasefire.

None of this is to say that Joe Biden or his successor will have an easy decision to make. Desperate to stay in power and out of prison, Netanyahu insists on clinging to such shameful characters as Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. The former heads the “Jewish Power” party that would “cleanse” the West Bank of Arabs; the latter leads “Religious Zionism” and believes that starving two million Gazans is “justified and moral”. But spearing Netanyahu’s domestic agenda does not erase strategic issues where he has a valid point.

For argument’s sake, let’s sketch a scenario where Israel vacates the Philadelphi line. Billions of dollars would pour into the Strip for reconstruction. Re-embedded, Hamas would determine who gets what from this cornucopia to restore control and allegiance. With Iran at one step removed, the “Resistance” would rebuild tunnels, re-arm and prepare for the next strike. So far, so bad for the Jewish state — a familiar remake.

Now, contrast this with Israel’s long-term control over Philadelphi, with the Navy patrolling the coast and the Air Force the skies. With its southern flank secured, the Army could concentrate on the far more potent Hezbollah threat in the north. Reliable deterrence would sober up Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon and Ali Khamenei in Iran. All of which is good for the US, as well.

And what of the wider Arab world? Its rulers do have to keep an eye on the “Arab street”, but it is no secret that they want to neutralise Iran’s Hamas stand-in. Though mumbling to do so, Egypt will not tear up a 45-year-old peace treaty, while the “Gulfies” plus Riyadh are not eager to shred the Abraham Accords — an insurance policy against Iran. Not even those 40,000 Gazan dead hawked by the Hamas Health Ministry (and not checked by Western media) have ruptured the tacit alliance. Such is the icy logic of power politics. Yet in a democracy like Israel, exhaustion, angst and anger about slain hostages can overwhelm the reason of state.

Tyrannical regimes such as Hamas and Iran suffer no such constraints. Just regard their murderous game. Hamas wanted to sacrifice its own multitudes to rouse the world against the Jewish state. Part one worked perfectly: Israel is isolated, sanctioned and abhorred. Now we are in phase two: Hamas murders hostages to demoralise and immobilise Israel. That deadly gambit is bearing fruit, as well. But how could Israel give in?

“The state is the coldest of cold monsters,” Nietzsche once wrote. And no state, least of all beleaguered Israel, genuflects before the God of Goodness. It must act morally when it can and avoid foolish wars when it must. Nothing is more important than strategic necessity when the security of the nation is at stake. And it doesn’t take a Clausewitz to figure out why the diminutive Philadelphi Corridor is so critical in this new Great Game.