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Will Ethiopia get sucked into Cold War II? The Chinese and Americans have plenty at stake if a civil war erupts

The Chinese are eyeing Ethiopia with interest. Credit: Eduardo Soteras / AFP / Getty

The Chinese are eyeing Ethiopia with interest. Credit: Eduardo Soteras / AFP / Getty


November 25, 2020   7 mins

Imagine North and South Korea normalising relations with one another. The Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for doing something equivalent: for negotiating a peace deal with neighbouring Eritrea. The two countries, which were united until Eritrea seceded in 1993, had fought a bloody border war from 1998 to 2000 that killed tens of thousands of people, and left the nations on edge. Ending the stand-off not only relaxed the threat of a new war between the countries, but also brought stability to the volatile East Africa region, where ethnic and religious clashes have created overlapping conflict in multiple countries — and a steady stream of refugees.

But barely a year after winning the Peace Prize, Abiy is leading his country’s military in a war against one of its own regional states. The conflict between the federal army of Ethiopia and troops loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the party that once controlled the country, is not simply a “large-scale law enforcement operation” as Abiy has called it. Nor is it just a localised conflict. The military forces of the Tigray Region, where the TPLF rules, have fired rockets into the nearby Amhara Region — and into Eritrea, accusing that country’s forces of intervening against the Tigrayans.

Many aspects of the conflict are troubling, including reports of civilian massacres, growing numbers of fleeing refugees, and unease over the total media blackout that Abiy has imposed on the Tigray region. Facing these humanitarian crises, international actors have urged both sides to pull back. Abiy has so far rebuffed offers from neighbouring countries and from the African Union to mediate. As federal forces prepared to lay siege to the Tigray capital, Mekelle, a senior aide was blunt in his remarks to the BBC about the Ethiopian PM’s position: “We don’t negotiate with criminals… We bring them to justice, not to the negotiating table.”

Similarly, statements from the TPLF express a refusal to surrender, maintaining that Tigrayans are “ready to die in defence of our right to administer our region”. The party has reasons to be confident that, even if it is ultimately outmatched, it can put up a fight. It has hundreds of thousands of fighters, a large chunk of the country’s heavy artillery, and the loyalty of many officers and soldiers within the national army, some of whom have defected to the Tigrayan side. The US Ambassador to Ethiopia, after speaking to both Abiy and the Tigrayan president, Debretsion Gebremichael, reported that there remains “a strong commitment on both sides to see the military conflict through”.

With two intransigent sides, there’s not much that Ethiopia’s neighbours or the African Union can do. Similarly, the UN has been limited to practically begging Addis Ababa to guarantee the safety of civilians and aid workers. And for now, the two powers with the influence to pressure the Ethiopian government or the TPLF to back down seem unwilling to do so. But both the United States and China have reasons to change their policies should peace prove elusive.

The US has leverage. The nation is home to a large and influential Ethiopian diaspora, many of whom live in Washington DC. This community sends billions of dollars in remittances back to Ethiopia, supplementing the nearly $1 billion a year in official aid that the federal government has sent to the country recently.

At the moment, of course, there’s no evidence that Donald Trump has even realised there’s a war going on in Ethiopia. To the extent that he knows who Abiy is, the President probably just regards him as the leader who took the Nobel Peace Prize that he thinks should have been his. Abiy, meanwhile, is probably still smarting at Trump’s reckless remarks that Egypt was likely to “blow up” a Nile River dam in Ethiopia that has caused tension between the two countries. He is therefore unlikely to listen to the American president should Trump attempt to wade in on the issue.

So far, his administration has largely backed the Ethiopian government’s moves. The top State Department official for Africa tweeted that the US “strongly condemns the TPLF’s unjustifiable attacks against Eritrea” and later characterised the conflict as “a faction of the government running a region in Ethiopia that has decided to undertake hostilities against the central government”. While advocating for peace, US officials have signalled that they are monitoring, rather than influencing, the situation.

The US government’s support for Addis Ababa is driven by its concern for continuing cooperation with Ethiopia, its regional ally against extremism in the Horn of Africa. The two countries have significant shared national security concerns — the US has supported efforts by Ethiopia to prevent Islamist militants from seizing power in neighbouring Somalia, including a 2007 Ethiopian invasion of the country. But the American stance also reflects a desire not to push Ethiopia — or other African governments for that matter — further into the orbit of China.

Ethiopia was one of the first countries to receive high levels of Chinese investment; it is seen as an important component of President Xi Jinping’s trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative trade network. Over the past 15 years, Beijing has financed vast infrastructure projects within Ethiopia, as well as building links between the landlocked country and its neighbour Djibouti, where China has also built its first overseas naval base. China is Ethiopia’s main trading partner and investor (and holds billions in Ethiopian debt), giving Beijing strong economic leverage.

So far, China has been silent on the conflict. Xi probably doesn’t mind which side wins. Beijing has had a long relationship with the TPLF — which started as a Marxist, Chinese-trained rebellion against a Soviet-backed communist dictatorship in Ethiopia called the Derg. On the other hand, Abiy has maintained a solid relationship with China since taking office, negotiating a delicate debt restructure. Beijing also has a track record of support for Abiy’s ally, the Eritrean president, Isaias Afwerki, who also received training in China in the 1970s as a rebel fighting against the Derg (Eritrea was at the time incorporated into Ethiopia).

The risk to China is not that either side will win, but that no one will, and that ongoing instability will endanger Chinese investments and disrupt its trade networks in the East Africa region. If the Tigray crisis devolves into a guerilla war — and the UN has privately assessed that this is a likely outcome — then China may see the need to put pressure on Abiy and the TPLF to negotiate a settlement.

Recent examples give some hints as to how China could approach a protracted conflict in Ethiopia. China has engaged in mediation efforts with the government and rebels in nearby South Sudan, where Chinese firms have substantial investments in that young country’s oil industry. There have also been longstanding rumours that China approved, or at least knew about, the coup that removed President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, another country where China had valuable investments. As in Ethiopia, China had decades-old relationships with all sides, including Mugabe (whose rule became increasingly untenable), his replacement Emmerson Mnangagwa, and Constantino Chiwenga, the general who led the coup after returning from a visit to Beijing. Should one side of the Ethiopian conflict prove a liability to Chinese interests, it is conceivable that Beijing would throw its weight behind the opposing force — discreetly.

Meanwhile, there are reasons to believe that, should the conflict still be going on two months from now, the Biden administration may take a more active role in addressing it. His foreign policy team includes diplomats with great expertise in African politics — such as Susan Rice, who almost negotiated a peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998 — and has signalled that it will both be more attentive to Africa and more concerned with human rights than the current US administration. Last month, Biden condemned the Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari, and his security forces for a massacre of peaceful demonstrators protesting against police brutality, and the Secretary of State nominee, Antony Blinken, recently condemned the Egyptian government for arresting the head of a well-respected civil rights organisation.

And yet, in relation to the war in Ethiopia, Blinken has issued a more even-handed and humanitarian-focused statement than that of the current State Department: he urged that both “the TPLF and Ethiopian authorities should take urgent steps to end the conflict, enable humanitarian access, and protect civilians”. The American people rarely support the US getting involved in complicated African conflicts, and the Biden team will not want to spend much political capital on such an endeavour.

Nevertheless, Biden could frame American diplomatic intervention in national security terms — one of the consequences of the current fighting is that Ethiopia has withdrawn thousands of troops from fighting al-Qaeda-linked militants in Somalia in order to send them to Tigray. The US also has an important military base in Djibouti, from which its military launches many of its drone strikes against targets in countries such as Somalia and Yemen. Putting pressure on the warring sides in Ethiopia to negotiate a settlement would therefore free up troops and protect American assets that are essential the war on terror.

American involvement — diplomatically, at least — can also be framed as a check against Chinese influence in Africa. Biden and Blinken have already suggested that they see the rivalry with China as perhaps the biggest foreign policy challenge facing the US, and indicated that they want to take a multilateral approach based on amassing allies against Beijing. Ethiopia serves as a hub for Chinese influence across East Africa; by intervening in the nation’s conflict, the US could increase its own influence, curbing Xi’s sway over not only Addis Ababa but the wider region.

Any US intervention is unlikely to involve American troops — the negative perceptions of past American interventions in Somalia and Libya all but rule out that possibility — but Biden will have diplomatic and economic tools at his disposal. One tool would be for the US to implement more generous debt relief measures for Ethiopia (which were rejected by the Trump administration) — on the condition that Abiy’s government negotiate peace with the TPLF. It was Abiy who earlier this year urged the G20 countries to provide such relief for Africa. The US taking a leading role in providing aid could serve American interests by pulling Ethiopia away from China and its debt-heavy investments.

Pulling this off successfully would be tricky: if the US pushes Ethiopia too hard, it could drive Abiy further into the arms of Beijing. But a properly negotiated agreement would benefit both nations significantly.

Of course, all these scenarios could be rendered moot if the conflict in Ethiopia comes to a swift end, either through a decisive government victory, a collapse of the regime in Addis Ababa, or a negotiated settlement. Unfortunately for the civilians forced from their homes or caught in the crossfire, peace does not seem to be on the horizon. The conflict risks becoming a humanitarian crisis — one that could kill thousands in combat (and perhaps as many civilians, through collateral damage or intentional attacks), and send hundreds of thousands fleeing to neighbouring countries. A protracted guerilla war in Tigray could also inspire other ethnic militia and separatist groups in Ethiopia to rise up, destabilising the region further.

It’s in the best interests of the international community, therefore, to promote a peaceful settlement. And for the globe’s two de facto superpowers, currently competing for the allegiance of Ethiopia and other African nations, the stakes are high.


Dr Christopher Rhodes is a Lecturer at Boston University’s College of General Studies.
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Fraser Bailey
Fraser Bailey
3 years ago

Is this the same writer responsible for an article a few days ago on the way in which Ethiopia was ‘slipping into civil war’? My response was that I had not been aware that Ethiopia had ever slipped out of civil war. As for caring about what happens in Ethiopia, the brutal truth is that most of us don’t. Not really. We just don’t have the bandwidth and all of these place seem to be permanently dysfunctional, even more so than our own societies.

While we’re here, can anyone tell me why none of the Professors of African Studies etc in Leeds, Boston and Denver etc never actually seem to go to Africa, still less live there? Of course, one cannot blame them, but it does seem remiss. Do they have Professors of European/American Studies etc in Bulawayo, Lagos and Johannesburg who never go to Europe and America?

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago

Sadly Ethiopia never had the inestimable benefit of being part of the British Empire.

Despite conquering the place twice, we saw fit not to retain it, leaving it instead, to the tender mercies of the wretched Italians, who behaved barbarically, and have yet to be called to account.

Some may recall the ” hairy wonder” Bob Geldof’s efforts to alleviate the Ethiopian famine, nearly forty years ago. Then the population was about 40 million, today it is nearly 120 million. Such benign intervention comes at a heavy price, as we will now see.

Vivek Rajkhowa
Vivek Rajkhowa
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

The British should’ve backed Haile Selaisse and his imperial regime.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago
Reply to  Vivek Rajkhowa

Hardly possible in 1974, with Harold Wilson and his crypto-communist government in power.

Vivek Rajkhowa
Vivek Rajkhowa
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

Indeed, a grand shame that.

Fraser Bailey
Fraser Bailey
3 years ago
Reply to  Vivek Rajkhowa

To paraphrase the Two Ronnies, if he’d been merely Mildly Selaisse perhaps that might have been an option.

Vivek Rajkhowa
Vivek Rajkhowa
3 years ago
Reply to  Fraser Bailey

Lol

Basil Chamberlain
Basil Chamberlain
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

“We saw fit not to retain it, leaving it instead, to the tender mercies of the wretched Italians, who behaved barbarically, and have yet to be called to account.”

I’ve never been to Ethiopia, but I went to Eritrea two and a half years ago, drawn by the admirable Art Deco architecture in Asmara (a legacy of Italian rule) and the ruined but beautiful Ottoman-era port of Massawa.

Eritrea has more or less the same mixture of ethnicities, languages and religions as does Ethiopia, the same food, the same coffee (supplemented in Asmara by vintage prewar espresso machines) and a very similar culture. So one night I asked a local what was the source of Eritrean nationhood. He, rather to my surprise, told me that Eritrean nationhood was rooted in pride at having being colonised by the Italians, whereas Ethiopia had remained, except very briefly during the war, independent!

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago

Conversely I have travelled extensively in Ethiopia, where even today people are proud of the fact that they destroyed a modern Italian army at Adowa in 1896. In fact I think it is the worst defeat ever suffered by a modern western army, at the hands of essentially what was a medieval, tribal one. Over 6,000 Italians were duly dispatched, and it is rumoured that some of the surviving prisoners were castrated by the local women! It was an even more humiliating defeat that ‘ours’ against the Zulu, seventeen years before! (Isandlwana).

The Italian Occupation of 1935-41 was marred by barbarism for which Italy should hang its head in shame.
Whatever benefits they may have brought to Eritrea between 1880-1941, were totally negated by the completely unnecessary savagery they displayed in their subjugation of Ethiopia. It made Amritsar look “like Noddy”.

Sadly the old British links with Ethiopia via the Pankhurst family and others, have now nearly faded.

Architecturally and topographically, as I’m sure you know, it is a fascinating country. Additionally its very early, idiosyncratic Christian culture has to be seen to be believed.

Paul Tanner
Paul Tanner
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

As we are trading “visit experiences” I have travelled widely in Ethiopia and have spent an uncomfortable 2 weeks travelling (in the face of considerable restrictions) in Eritrea. Whether that makes any insights I might have any more valuable is another matter! But I will make a couple of points.
It is, I think, worth noting that the boundaries of Ethiopia are, unlike those of most African countries, very much the result of late 19th century expansion by an African ruler rather than the impositions of colonial powers. Not for nothing did those rulers title themselves “Emperors” as they did indeed rule over a range of conquered peoples. This took them right up to the boundaries which those European powers felt able to or worth defending. Indeed they even took territory from Anglo Egyptian Sudan which Britain declined to fight for, given it’s other troubles there re Khartoum/Mahdi etc.
It would be incorrect to see “Ethiopia” as a coherent country which avoided being part of a European empire because of its special cultural unity.
Ethiopia is as much (if not more) of an incompatible mix of peoples as other African countries created by European empires. Unlike them, however, it failed to receive such infrastructural and cultural “benefits” as were provided by those empires to their colonies. The continued widespread existence of slavery for instance – was an “excuse” used by Mussolini for his invasion.

That it was not incorporated (other than in part and very briefly) into a European empire was indeed partly the result of a pre-existing strong ruler. But there were many other factors as well – such “strength” didn’t prove enough elsewhere on the continent to avoid being conquered. Ethiopia was “lucky” In it’s European foe and to categorise the troops which defeated the Italians at Adowa as being “mediaeval” and “tribal” undervalues the assistance in equipment etc it received from Russia and France – the former spurred on by its shared “Orthodox” traditions.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago
Reply to  Paul Tanner

In the unlikely event that the Italians had been victorious at Adowa, no doubt the benefits that were later visited on Asmara, (so eloquently described by Basil Chamberlain above), would have been spread across the country.

I agree the Ethiopian army had considerable material support from both France and Russia, but only a handful of their ‘advisors’ were present. Most of the fighting, as I understand was face to face, sword and spear versus bayonet and revolver. In effect, traditional combat.

Thesiger’s description of the Army even in 1916, does conjure up a picture of a medieval,feudal host, does it not?

Basil Chamberlain
Basil Chamberlain
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

Indeed, everything I know about Ethiopia makes it sound like it would be a very rewarding destination, in good times. I hope eventually to be able to go there, geopolitics permitting. I suppose I chose to go to Eritrea first on the basis that it seemed, at that moment, more likely to fall apart; I was evidently mistaken in that supposition.

Of course, Sylvia Pankhurst, with her bias towards Haile Selassie, was partly responsible for ensuring that Eritrea got bundled back under Ethiopian rule, triggering a lengthy and unnecessary struggle for independence.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago

Basil, if you haven’t already read it, may I recommend Dervla Murphy’s, “In Ethiopia with a Mule”?

It recounts her odyssey across northern Ethiopia, accompanied by her truly magnificent mule ‘Jock’, in the late 1960’s.

Basil Chamberlain
Basil Chamberlain
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

Thanks for the recommendation, and no I haven’t read it. Not long ago by chance, I came across an intriguing book by the Duke of Pirajno, who served as a doctor and colonial governor in Italy’s African possessions. He writes intriguingly about Libya (he was wartime governor of Tripoli) but also about Eritrea; in fact I bought the book, coming across it by chance in a second-hand book sale in a rural Suffolk church, because it contained the only photograph I’ve ever seen of Massawa in its original splendour. Of course, it was taken long before the Ethopians bombed and shelled it in the late 1980s.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago

How very fortunate, I have always been interested in Libya or Africa Proconsularis as it used to be. I have managed five ‘adventures’, there but there is so much more to see.

I would have liked to see Massawa, but never made it. I gather the punchy Portuguese under Alphonso di Albuquerque, contemplated using it as base for an assault on Mecca in the early 16th century.

That “rural Suffolk church” wasn’t Ufford by any chance was it?

Basil Chamberlain
Basil Chamberlain
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

Libya’s another one I have to envy you, alas! Although as of this week, the ceasefire there seems to be holding, so perhaps one day…

Despite having been badly damaged, Massawa is still a highly evocative place – a city out of Joseph Conrad – stern facades and delicate lattices of coral limestone; curved and pointed arches; wooden lintels, shutters and enclosed balconies carved into geometric patterns. It feels like a rare survivor; I was left mourning the fact that a hundred, fifty, perhaps even thirty years ago, it would have been just one of numerous such intricate and beautiful ancient cities around the Red Sea, the Gulf and the Western Indian Ocean, some now broken, like Sana’a or Mogadishu, by war; some swallowed up by time and entropy, like Suakin in Sudan, some stripped of history and heritage by mere philistinism, like Mecca and Medina themselves…

I stumbled on that church walking between Saxmundham Station and Snape Maltings to attend a performance at the Aldeburgh Festival. I think it must have been St John the Baptist, on the outskirts of Snape. I notice I neglected to give the title of the book I found there: A Cure for Serpents.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago

I shall look out for a copy of: A cure for Serpents, many thanks.

Your mention of Sana’a reminds me that some years ago the Courtauld held an exhibition of photographs taken by the late Iain Browning in the 1930’s. There were many of Sana’a taken in black and white, and probably around midday when the light was perfect. Without a car, camel, or human being in sight, it looked magnificent. I wonder if any of those great towers survive?

By the way, the next time your in Suffolk try and see Ufford. It’s only a few miles from Woodbridge. The church is unremarkable, but inside you will find the finest font cover in England. A fantastic expression gothic beauty, a mid 15th century, gilded, crocketed spire, that soars eighteen feet above the font, and is crowned, as you would expect by the ‘Pelican in her piety’.

Even the notorious iconoclast, William Dowsing (aka Witchfinder General) was impressed when he came to destroy it in the 1640’s. However after condemning it as a vile Popish ornament, he “let it stand”. Local mythology has it that the peasantry politely informed Mr Dowsing that if he attempted to burnt it, he too would find himself on the bonfire!

Basil Chamberlain
Basil Chamberlain
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

I understand that Sanaa has got off relatively lightly so far – the Saudis and Emiratis, philistines though they be, largely honoured their pledge not to target the historic part of the city (a World Heritage site) directly. There has been some, apparently accidental, collateral damage to some of the historic structures – and alas, this was compounded this autumn by torrential rainstorms normally rare in that part of the world. However, other historic Yemeni cities such as Saada and Taiz, appear to have been more seriously damaged. Apparently Biden has pledged to end US support for our “allies” in Saudi Arabia in this war.

The one I would love to have visited in the 1920s or 1930s is Suakin – old photographs look just ravishing; and it’s almost all gone now.

Thanks for the recommendation of Ufford’s font – next time I have occasion to be on that side of the country, I’ll endeavour to reach it.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago

Suakin, now that’s a name that conjures up memories of Imperial adventure. Garnet Wolsey, and Fuzzy-Wuzzys as RudyardKipling called those ferocious, redoubtable, Sudanese/Dervish warriors, who gave us such a run for our money.

“The desert sand is sodden red, red with blood of the square that broke,
the Gatlings jammed and the Colonels dead, and the Regiment blind with dust and smoke, and Englands far and honour a name” etc

Taiz also featured in the early 1960’s during the Radfan Campaign, when an SAS patrol was ambushed, loosing two dead, who were subsequently beheaded. The heads were later displayed on stakes in Taiz. They were Captain Robin Edwards and Trooper Nicholas Warburton.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago

Due to a sporadic attack of Alzheimer’s, I forgot to mention that Browning also produced two excellent books on Palmyra and Petra. That on Palmyra is particularly good on explaining the Monumental Arch on the Colonnade Street, an its subtle concealment of the 30 degree change in the axis of that street.

Additionally, he also visited and photographed the astonishing Gonbad -e Qabus in north eastern Iran.
It is a thousand year old cylindrical brick mortuary tower, that soars 200 feet above the barren plains, and is topped with a conical roof.Its original inhabitant (Qabus) was placed in a glass coffin suspended from the apex of the cone by a silver chain! Sadly they don’t survive!

Needles to say it is well off the beaten track, but well worth every ounce of effort expended getting there, which I am sure you will someday.

Anne-Marie Mazur
Anne-Marie Mazur
3 years ago

Talking about Biden and human “rights” in the same sentence is laughable…then the “war on terror” and Yemen in the same paragraph talking about drone strikes with my tax dollars that followed the same blibbering statement about human “rights”. I mean REALLY?

Andrew Baldwin
Andrew Baldwin
3 years ago

“At the moment, of course, there’s no evidence that Donald Trump has even realised there’s a war going on in Ethiopia.” There is a definite whiff of TDS here. Has he forgotten about the secret Presidential Daily Brief (PDB)? Does he really think the Ethiopian war doesn’t get mentioned there?