This article clearly makes the case that our country has been diminished because we sent off armies to do tasks in difficult circumstances with inadequate equipment , and unrealistic instructions . In the meantime , we can use the soldiers to build hospitals, drive petrol tankers , help with floods and give inoculations and generally hide our inadequate planning for so many aspects of our lives here .
What astounds me is the plan to send our ships to the pacific to confront the Chinese. If a shooting war starts , the surface ships will be as vulnerable as the Repulse and the Prince of Wales and just as useless. Meanwhile, our home waters need guarding.
Perhaps the idea of force projection needs to be reviewed and thrown out.
Last edited 2 years ago by Ray Hall
Galeti Tavas
2 years ago
Basra has been very hard for the British Army. ‘The siege of Kut Al Amara’, (WWI, up the river from the army based at Basra) a book very worth reading, ended in one of the large disasters of the British Army, and their Batan Death March.
Basra in the recent war was a huge failure of the Army, and one I thought was in part to the ROE (rules of engagement – rules of when, and at whom, you are allowed to shoot). And it goes back to an early line in this article:
“Junior ranks are hauled before the courts for individual war crimes — rightly, he feels —” (Akam)
I had heard once the British Army got heading into Basra the political leaders back in London (Blair) decided they could not tolerate causalities as that would cost votes, in the political mood of the time turned against the war – and did not want civilian causalities for the same reason, so the British had to fight safely to avoid their own causalities, and also avoid the native casualties, a defensive offensive with one arm tied behind ones back, The ROE were such it was the final nail turning it all into fiasco. (This is what I had heard).
But then add in the above quote, that the soldiers were likely afraid of their own courts as much as anything. They dare not fight aggressively. I kind of agree with General Powell, and Clausewitz, that if one has a war it must be fought as absolute war, or you get stalemate, and an even worse disaster, humanitarian and military, than by fully committing with everything, (and not afterwards blaming the soldiers for the horrors, it is war).
Peter Francis
2 years ago
Great article; keep them coming! Just one micro-quibble: you refer to Afghanistan as “warfare that the Germans managed to avoid”. Germany had several thousand troops in Afghanistan and suffered more than 60 fatalities and more than 200 injuries.
And you should had added defence secretaries, John Reid and Geoff Hoon, to your list of New Labour nitwits. Reid famously sent the troops off to Afghanistan telling them that he hoped that their mission would be accomplished “without a shot being fired”. And in a pre-invasion Commons debate, when a backbencher in the Commons suggested that British troops might have to remain in Iraq for “weeks, or even months”, Hoon dismissed this as “scaremongering”.
Yes the Germans were there – as they quite famously made the decision to not operate at night because it was “too dangerous”. For all the US and UK’s failings, too many of the coalition lent little other than token support to the mission. A criticism of the political and command classes rather than the forces themselves.
The German Military leaders back at home wrote a number of directives to the troops on how to stop from getting fat.
Because the Germans were there really to be part of a show of unity – for most of the time there they stayed behind fences and blast walls protected by contractors and native forces – and in the camp played video games mostly, wile drinking beer and eating lots of snacks, and gaining weight.
Which was no reflection on them – the Politicians did not want casualties, but were there to give political support by just being on the ground – not as a fighting army.
Jeremy Bray
2 years ago
The glories of our blood and state are shadows not substantial things. Afghanistan has long been the graveyard of Britain’s military reputation.
My great granduncle wrote a Journal following a punitive expedition to avenge the utter destruction of the British army in the retreat from Kabul through the Kyber Pass in the First Afghan War in which he lambasted the idiocy of the politicians in sending the Army in to Afghanistan in the first place and optimistically predicting that it would be the last time a British army would be engaged in Afghanistan.
Sadly his prediction was very wide of the mark. His nephew, my grandfather, was back in Afghanistan to suffer yet another humiliating destruction of a regiment at Maiwand at the hands of the Afghans in the second Afghan War. My grandfather only escaped with his life as the result of being a young second-lieutenant involved in the baggage train and thus able to effect a retreat through the Kyber Pass with his life, if not his pride, still intact – one of the few officers able to effect an escape.
The litany of brave defeat in portions of the globe we had no real strategic interest in continues as a theme throughout the ages. Theirs not to reason why theirs but to do and die.
Giles Chance
2 years ago
This article is wrong and profoundly misplaced.
The British Army at battalion and regimental level, especially at the human and small unit level, remains as competent and well-trained as it has ever been. The story of Iraq and Afghanistan is a story of political failure, in which one man – Blair – was able to impose his deeply misguided war concept upon Britain, in the face of an anti-war march to London involving 1 million people. In 2002, French President Jaques Chirac had the courage to veto the attack on Iraq in the UN Security Council. Blair, for some reason related probably to his deep-seated ambition and desire for recognition, partnered with the hapless George W and the “Axis of Evil” crew to pursue the attack, in the face of the UN veto. George W was pushed all the way by his nasty and evil vice-president Cheney, aided by Wolfowitz and pro-Israeli elements who thought they perceived opportunities for aggrandisement in the Middle East, and supported, inevitably, by the big weapons suppliers like General Dynamics. Generals are soldiers, who do what they are told. The British Army is a weapon which the country’s leaders can point in any direction they choose. The terrible failures in Iraq and Afghanistan were not down to the soldiers, but to the politicians, especially Blair.
Army Procurement has been a disaster for ever, mainly because weapon planning requires a three-decade time horizon which the politicians and civil service won’t give it. In addition, BA and other weapons manufacturers are past masters at pulling the wool over the eyes of the MOD.
Yes, for me our armed forces should be for the defence of the British realm and its people not political posturing or making global corporations loads more money
Cheryl Jones
2 years ago
If climate change apocalypse is real then surely part of our preparation for it is massive expansion of our defensive capabilities, including national service, to learn discipline, self reliance and skills. Our island of 67 million will otherwise be no match for the 100s of millions who will head to our shores and who won’t be as civilised in their conquests as we are.
Matthew Powell
2 years ago
I don’t particularly see a problem with the army moving from the kind which was designed to fight large scale conventional battles of the Cold War to a much smaller more tactically flexible one, capable of small scale, high impact interventions in potential future hot spots.
Internationally, if armed force is required to oppose the rise of Chinese hegemony, this battle will be fought on the sea and in the sky, where the majority of our funding should be concentrated. Similarly, if there should be conflict with the Russians, Britain would be far better off looking to maintain air superiority whist our allies did the fighting on the ground.
Domestically, attacks on infrastructure pose far more of a threat to our country than defeat in a land based conflict. With long ranged missile guidance systems improving, making attacks with conventional warheads on key targets possible and the threat of mass cyber attack, both a real danger. What defence can be mounted against these will not be done so by the army.
Perhaps then, having the “Best Little Army in the World” is not such a bad strategy to pursue?
Agree with the sentiment of your comment, but it’s sadly far from what’s happening.
The trouble is that this shift to being “more tactically flexible” with a greater focus on “cyber” and “asymmetric threats” is marketing guff.
It’s a cost saving exercise dressed up to sound clever. Unless there is a matching increase in funding to allow the units to upskill to an adequate level, they will just be the same undermanned, undertrained (in things that actually matter) units at a fraction of their previous capability.
We already had a small army that did a lot with what it had, now it’s smaller yet.
As for increased air superiority – the RAF already struggles to mount any sustained operation even with US support. Modern aircraft and equipment are absurdly expensive and would require an enormous increase in funding. The carriers (joint RN and RAF aircraft) were a step in that direction, but are now looking vulnerable as everything else across all 3 services had to be scaled back to pay for them.
And yes a large part of the blame lies with the procurement over the years, like most government departments the MoD has wasted vast sums
“if armed force is required to oppose the rise of Chinese hegemony, this battle will be fought on the sea and in the sky,”
You do not know that – boots on the ground have always been what matters in the end, and we do not know it will be an absolute war we prepare for – And part of having a military is the training it leeches out into society.
Like the USA Army – the millions of troops who get to serve overseas makes a huge contribution to national understanding of the world. The numbers of young men given discipline, team spirit, skills, and later when out free university. That was what made America great, the G.I. Bill, post WWII when university and trade school became free to ex-military, and they took it up in the millions and this was the kicker pushing USA to the top.
A military is much more than the soldiers in trenches.
A consistent obstacle to effective and ground and sea capability has been the RAF, right back to 1918 really.
The RAF’s Goering-like determination that everything which flies should be theirs was a big part of why our aircraft carriers were ill-equipped in WW2 and why the later ones were decommissioned just before the Falklands War. The RAF assured all concerned that it could defend the Navy’s ships anywhere. Of course 8,000 miles from the UK it could not. It is still making the same objection to the AUKUS initiative because it involves naval forces without much role for the RAF.
We might actually be better off disbanding it.
As an Army Falklands veteran, you could never underestimate how much the army and navy hated the RAF (crabs). Their unsuccessful Blackbuck missions with Vulcans were just wasteful PR exercises. It was just to show that the RAF were in, what was really a navy and marine war with army support. To be fair they did a decent job of providing logistic support. Their Rapier Air defence ground crews were whinging boy scouts compared to the RA teams.
Even today, the Chinook fleet, nearly 100% used to support the army is RAF crewed and supported. Just so they can have a few aircraft.
The RAF is a political organisation still fighting the Battle of Britain. Period!
A saying at the time was FLY Navy, SAIL Army and WALK sideways!
A Spetzari
2 years ago
Good article Aris
Clare Short, whose intransigent refusal to provide the British troops who found themselves suddenly governing Basra, a city of 1.5 million people, with even basic DFID support due to her opposition to the war
Interesting – did not know this. The US by and large seemed to learn a lot from Iraq and Afghanistan. Though far from perfect, their State Department and other organisations at least try and coordinate at all levels from operational to tactical. The UK’s organisations by contrast are a sh*t show, where the left hand doesn’t let the right hand know what it is doing. Whilst the US adapted and developed, we went backwards; each department fights for its slice of the pie from increasingly disinterested politicians who are fixated on domestic issues and opinion polls.
The Army’s focus on the new Ranger battalions, tasked with training and directing local partner forces, in place of line infantry
Fancy name for nothing other than stripped-down and neutered Infantry battalions. It’s a continuation of a trend following the last defence review’s “SPIBs” (SPecialist Infantry Battalions). Not deserving of the name ‘Ranger’ (after Roger’s Rangers years ago, and more recently the Tier 2 US Special Forces units who have a good reputation and effective track record).
Last edited 2 years ago by A Spetzari
David McDowell
2 years ago
Intelligent, insightful writing.
Patrick Heren
2 years ago
The major fault lies with politicians who have little or no understanding of wars or the armed forces that fight them. Certainly the generals did not do enough to educate them, but ultimately they and their men tried to obey orders issued by the vainglorious Blair and his acolytes. The procurement failures arguably lie more with the MOD than with the services. They are mirrored, after all, throughout central government.
It’s not clear whether there could have been any strategic success in Iraq or Afghanistan – probably not – but there was absolutely no chance with the pitifully inadequate numbers of troops we committed to both. And that leads to a very sad fact: the British Army has for many years been too small to fight any but the most insignificant of wars, which require sufficient mass to seize and hold ground.
Sarah Ingham
2 years ago
Given that the British Army remains one of the most respected institutions in Britain according to opinion polls for the best part of 15 years, the headline about ‘humiliation’ is a tad misleading. The public continues to revere the Army and its serving soldiers, despite being largely out of civilian sight and mind – as they have been for the past 360-odd years.
Ben Barry is rightly respected, but I’d be less willing to bet the defamation ranch on a less militarily seasoned source. I am pretty sure Richard Dannatt has contested that he stated “use them or lose them”, as a third party once alleged.
PM Blair indicated a willingness to join an expanded NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan at a NATO summit in 2004. The assumption was that Operation Telic in Iraq would be – to quote George Bush – ‘mission accomplished’ by Summer 2006 when British troops got to Helmand, long before Charge of the Knights.
Faulty intelligence played a malign role in Telic and Herrick, but as Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman highlighted back in 2009, we had Blair’s Wars on Brown’s budgets.
Mark Knight
2 years ago
The lack of accountability of senior officers is the key issue – none of them noticed during 20 years in Afghanistan that we were not going to achieve anything, and kept “pushing-on”. A fish rots from the head, and unless ‘we’ remove the head, the whole body of the Army will suffer.
Is this because many of the best officers in the Marines/Paras/Special Frces leave as Captains or Majors and enter the private security World?
Jon Redman
2 years ago
the Army’s shambolic and wasteful recent record in procurement
The Army’s, or the MoD’s?
Where does the blame lie? Barry lambasts Labour politicians
…who thought the Army were, to quote Mandelson, “chinless wonders”. The current situation does appear to resemble that faced by Britain’s armed forces in about 1941-2. The army had spent the years since WW1 assuming there would never be another war, and being used as an imperial gendarmerie. As a result, it had developed no ideas about modern corps-level all-arms warfare to pit against the Germans’. The disastrous decision to create the RAF resulted in a force that thought it could win wars on its own by bombing. As a result, the RAF failed to develop close ground support aircraft (or tactics) akin to the Germans’ Stuka and it ignored the Navy’s needs so that the RN’s front line fighters were biplanes in 1941. The bill for all these mistakes was always going to come in eventually. The result was defeat in France, the western desert, and the Far East. Yes, there was Alamein, but it was timed to start at the same time as the invasion of Tunisia, so that if Rommel moved west to deal with that, it could be painted as Monty’s victory. Alamein also relied on US armour as the home-made stuff was so lamentably poor. Meanwhile the RAF, having achieved a draw in 1940, went over to the offensive over France in 1941 and suffered the same fate as the Germans had the year before. The reason there were no Spitfires in Malaya was because they were too busy getting defeated over France. Bomber Command was then defeated in 1942-44 and really only got the upper hand after the US air forces had destroyed the German fuels industry and shot down most of the Luftwaffe in daylight. Britain’s armed forces were just about ready for WW2 by 1946.
It’s difficult to know where to start demolishing this nonsense. The Aremy’s fault after WW1 was in failing to learn the lessons of armoured warfare which they had pioneered. They also entered into a p155ing contest with the Navy over aircraft. It was Army and Navy officers who created the RAF, recognising that died-in-the-wool Army brass simply couldn’t understand the pace and scope of air warfare. And the RN stuck with capital ships in the inter-war years; they neglected naval air power. The international consensus during the inter-war years was that ‘the bomber would always get through’, and have such a devastating effect on targeted nations’ morale that they would give in; that was proved wrong by the Luftwaffe, and later by the RAF, though the US air campaign against the Japanese mainland came close to forcing capitulation. But the RAF bomber campaign was the only offensive front Britain could open till the US entered the war. It didn’t win the war, but diverted enormous numbers of Germans and resources from the Eastern and other fronts. An independent air force such as the RAF was followed by many other nations.
FGS, what a lot of uninformed tosh. The Army assumed after WW1 that there’d never be another war and consequently had no idea how to fight one when one came along. Germany had panzer divisions with integral mechanised infantry, supported by aircraft built, optimised and utilised for the role. The Eighth Army had “jock columns” and “boxes” and “brigade groups” and “infantry tanks” (8mph) and “cruiser tanks” (that broke down) and arguments between the ex-cavalry regiments, which wanted to do cavalry charges in tanks, and the RTR, which wanted all tank formations with no organic infantry, artillery or anti-tank. The only Army-dedicated aircraft in use by the RAF was the Lysander, which wasn’t an attack aircraft. The Army did not enter a “pi55ing contest” with the Navy over aircraft. The RAF decided it would win wars by bombing, so it ordered Battles and Hampdens and Wellingtons, and that Hurricanes and Spitfires were required for defence. None of these types was remotely suitable for naval operation, which the RAF couldn’t have cared less about. Hence when the FAA was formed in 1924, its buying power was limited to tiny orders of no interest to manufacturers because the RAF had neglected all needs except its own. This is why the US Navy and Marine Corps had the Wildcat by 1941, while we had the Gladiator and later the Fulmar (slower, less manoeuvrable and worse armed than the Wildcat). The RN’s first decent fighter was the F4U Corsair and they only got that because it bounced all over the place and was rejected by the USN. The RN solved its bouncing problems and by 1944 finally had a competitive fighter. The Sea Hurricane was a rebuilt Mark 1 with 1939 performance deployed in 1941. The Seafire was a navalised 1941-era Mark V Spitfire deployed in 1943. Both were outclassed by both the Oscar and the Zero. The Royal did not “stick with capital ships” – they completed two 16″ battleships in the early 20s and then, like everyone else, didn’t build any more until the late 30s because the Washington Naval Treaty limited construction to 5:5:3 (USA, UK, Japan). All three nations cancelled battleship plans and the USA and Japan each completed two as carriers instead. By the late 1930s the RN then faced the Italians with three 9 x 15″-gunned battleships, Germany with two 8 x 15″-gunned battleships and two 9 x 11″-gunned battleships intended to be upgraded to 6 x 15″, and the IJN with nine WW1 battleships, three 9 x 18″-gunned battleships building and six fleet and six light carriers embarking 600+ aircraft. Meanwhile HMS Victorious hunted Bismarck with exactly 15 aircraft embarked.
The RAF was an independent air force established at the expense of the air component of the army and navy. Countries that established an independent air force post-war did not make this mistake.
You are ignoring comments by G Orwell. From the early 1930s , the middle class Left attacked patriotism. Orwell stated that many of the more intelligent middle class were put off the Armed Forces, especially the Army. As flying was at the forefront of technology in the 1920s and 1930s it attracted the best engineers. Tanks and anything to do with the Army and to a lesser extent The Royal Navy attracted few engineers; hence little innovation.
WW1 traumatised a civilian population which had known peace since 1815. Hardly anyone could complate war up to 1939. Pacifism slowly changed to defeatism. People like Vera Brittain who had served as as a nurse in WW1 had her fiancee, the next man she planned to marry, her brother and her brother’s best friend killed in WW1. Trying to increase defence exoenditure until September 1939 was impossible.
Germany started to plan for WW2 in 1919 and by the 1920s was undertaking training in the Ukraine. Germany sent engineers to the Netherlands and Finland to develop military technology.
Orwell understood a truth which most ignore; the British are not a military nation and do not like soldiers close by. The Royal Navy has been our wooden walls.As Orwell pointed out , the British do not goose step. The British march is a formalised walk. As Admiral Ramsey said after Dunkirk ” All British victories start in defeat.” Britains have disliked military rule ever since that imposed by the Major Generals under Cromwell and long may it continue.
However, the British attitude to the military is disasterous on the when it comes to procuring military equipment with the exception of Radar, The Hurricane, The Spitfire, The Lancaster, the Mosquito and the Jet engine.
John Lee
2 years ago
There is only one remedy, close down the MOD, The MOD is merely the cost cutting arm of the treasury. It’s procurement policy is determined by the treasury and is in no way concerned with the operational needs of the armed forces.
The armed forces budget should be agreed between The Prime Minister and the Senior members of the defence forces. This will ensure that the PM must take personal responsibility for the defence of the realm.
Cheryl Jones
2 years ago
Civilisations either survive through superior military technology or overwhelming demographics. We are unlikely to survive with the latter.
Cheryl, in the seventh decade of this century the indigenous British become a minority in the UK. What do you think we are fighting to defend after that happens?
Michael Davison
1 year ago
Interesting article, failure to cover the fact that both Iraq and Afghanistan had no political posers placed on trail unlike the PBI’s who were fighting for their lives primarily and to protect the public secondary – it was galling that the legal eagles hoovered around waiting to swoop and earn £’000’s in legal aid fees when allegations of murder and mistreatment were made. Until you have been at the sharp end of receiving incoming fire, regardless of training, it is both a shock and a wake up call – get down, scan, locate, eliminate, move, move, scan, locate, eliminate – the ROE, written by civil servants in a cosy office, where the most dangerous thing is a paper cut, are usually the last thing on your mind – survival is critical – your squad needs you, you need your squad. No war is fought fair, modern warfare is both distant and upfront and immediate, distant warfare is a video game – push the button, they are dead – upfront and immediate is just that – smell them, see them, and where necessary disabled them by any effective means.
Terence Fitch
2 years ago
We appear to spend as much as Russia. I realise that total amounts spent is probably an invidious comparison but is it the case then that Russia actually spends too little and is really a paper tiger or they just pay soldiers far less or they simply don’t have the tanks and aircraft they appear to have?
R S Foster
2 years ago
…can’t help feeling that the only way the Soldiers could have avoided this supposed “humiliation” was to refuse to deploy…because successive Governments had cut numbers, equipment and training budgets and war supplies year after year and ignored any arguments to the contrary…because the left/liberal establishment had pretty much branded anyone in uniform an inadequate, a psychopath and probably a war criminal for years…and because the press aided and abetted both processes, and added a big dollop of performative grief in respect of the inevitable casualties of war for good measure.
The only way it might be avoided in future is if we operate (proportionately) at the same level as the US…which would mean at least doubling the numbers in unifom (regulars and reserves)…and aiming to spend approaching 4% of GDP, not struggling to reach a niggardly 2%. Which I personally would welcome…but I doubt if most here would..!
GA Woolley
2 years ago
The author makes a number of good points, but conflates many issues. And citing Akam, whose minimal experience as a junior ‘intern’ in the military is outweighed by his ignorance of anything outside that internship and his bitterness at the experience, shows the author’s own lack of knowledge.
Procurement starts with a ‘capability’ to meet a stated defence commitment. Options are identified and evaluated, then scientists, MoD civil servants, the DTI, defence companies, politicians, and military experts, all get involved, with the Treasury holding the whip hand. It takes at least 10 years to deliver that capability, with the military having less and less say, politicians coming and going, the original requirement having been changed, and budgets reduced. And the net result? A piece of equipment which is over-engineered, over budget, late, and has little flexibility to do the job it’s now needed for, and which has been procured more for its ‘UK content’ and jobs than to serve its purpose.
As for ‘use it or lose it’, and the Iraq war, this refers to operational capability, not to units. Mounting a major operation in a distant theatre takes enormous logistical and planning effort and resources, over many months. As units arrive in theatre, acclimatise, train, deploy, etc, plans are refined, and support is put in place, capability slowly reaches a peak. It can be held at that peak only for so long, then, as units are rotated, kit begins to show signs of wear and tear, morale deteriorates, and the cost mounts up, capability degrades, and you have to ‘use it or lose it’. That was the problem; the US began its build up too soon, but once it was committed, it had to back down or fight.
And the UK’s forces were undermined by penny-pinching politicians and the Treasury, in numbers and equipment, and constrained by political decisions remote from understanding or practicality. As always.
For me, two points stand out amidst the notably interesting responses to Aris Roussinos’ article. First, that no senior officer fell on his sword, or was sacked, after the failures of the last two or three decades. Would some Unheard reader please enlighten us further on the reasons why?
Second, Jon Redman’s perceptive comments on naval aviation and its marginalisation by the RAF, culminating in the elimination of the Harrier force and maritime reconnaissance in the 2010 Defence Review. It would be good to restore to the navy the things that are the navy’s, though I would hesitate to entrust the army very much with anything that flew beyond helicopters. And to cap it all,now that carriers have been restored, their chosen aircraft is the inferior F35B and their design precludes their ever operating anything else.
I don’t think anyone in the Army or Armed Services felt they were behaving wrongly or dishonourably in Iraq or in Afghanistan. The Generals were following orders, which is what they are trained to do. The efforts to defeat the Taliban in Helmand were not very successful, but the Army felt that it did well nevertheless, in spite of being heavily outnumbered in terrain which strongly favoured numbers and ambushes. The person who should have felt deep shame was T Blair – but since when has Blair felt anything except the certainty of his own righteousness and cleverness ?
How much is this to do is the lack of career options?. Unless one has a private income, above the rank of Major, can an officer afford to oppose a politician?A highly experienced SF officer can afford to leave the Army and will be able to join the private security World but above this rank, most officers cannot afford to oppose politicians.
Charles Hedges
2 years ago
What is ignored is that after communism collapsed , people thought there would be no further conflicts. My Father who spent 5.5 years in combat in WW2 and then sailed the World for 42 years thought after the 1990, the World had become far more complicated . Under communism one was either for the West or against it. After 1990, thousands of years of conflict based upon race, religion, and language emerged. The conflict in Yermen between Fiver Shia and Wahabi Sunni goes back a 1000 years The conflict between Croat and Serb can be traced back to 300AD when then Roman Empire was split between West and East. !.
Major cut defence spending post 1990. He is a suburban bank clerk with a suburban bank clerks understanding of the World and those Prime Ministers who followed are no better. Fighting in built up areas and jungles needs vast numbers of soldiers who are highly skilled and have no rules of engagement which reduces their ability to kill the enemy. Major and those PMs who followed him have no experience of combat, come from families with no combat experience nor appear to have friends who have it. Roy Mason the Secretary of State of N Ireland was miner but obtained advice from those who understood what it took to defeat the PIRA. Martin Mc Guiness said the PIRA was three weeks away from being defeated under Mason. My guess was that though being a miner he contacted NCOs from elite units especially the Special Forces and listened to what they had to say.Apparently during one meeting Mason’s solid fist hit the table and he said ” The gloves are off!”.
Who would be scared of Major’s fist or any PMs who came afterwards ?
This article clearly makes the case that our country has been diminished because we sent off armies to do tasks in difficult circumstances with inadequate equipment , and unrealistic instructions . In the meantime , we can use the soldiers to build hospitals, drive petrol tankers , help with floods and give inoculations and generally hide our inadequate planning for so many aspects of our lives here .
What astounds me is the plan to send our ships to the pacific to confront the Chinese. If a shooting war starts , the surface ships will be as vulnerable as the Repulse and the Prince of Wales and just as useless. Meanwhile, our home waters need guarding.
Perhaps the idea of force projection needs to be reviewed and thrown out.
Basra has been very hard for the British Army. ‘The siege of Kut Al Amara’, (WWI, up the river from the army based at Basra) a book very worth reading, ended in one of the large disasters of the British Army, and their Batan Death March.
Basra in the recent war was a huge failure of the Army, and one I thought was in part to the ROE (rules of engagement – rules of when, and at whom, you are allowed to shoot). And it goes back to an early line in this article:
“Junior ranks are hauled before the courts for individual war crimes — rightly, he feels —” (Akam)
I had heard once the British Army got heading into Basra the political leaders back in London (Blair) decided they could not tolerate causalities as that would cost votes, in the political mood of the time turned against the war – and did not want civilian causalities for the same reason, so the British had to fight safely to avoid their own causalities, and also avoid the native casualties, a defensive offensive with one arm tied behind ones back, The ROE were such it was the final nail turning it all into fiasco. (This is what I had heard).
But then add in the above quote, that the soldiers were likely afraid of their own courts as much as anything. They dare not fight aggressively. I kind of agree with General Powell, and Clausewitz, that if one has a war it must be fought as absolute war, or you get stalemate, and an even worse disaster, humanitarian and military, than by fully committing with everything, (and not afterwards blaming the soldiers for the horrors, it is war).
Great article; keep them coming! Just one micro-quibble: you refer to Afghanistan as “warfare that the Germans managed to avoid”. Germany had several thousand troops in Afghanistan and suffered more than 60 fatalities and more than 200 injuries.
And you should had added defence secretaries, John Reid and Geoff Hoon, to your list of New Labour nitwits. Reid famously sent the troops off to Afghanistan telling them that he hoped that their mission would be accomplished “without a shot being fired”. And in a pre-invasion Commons debate, when a backbencher in the Commons suggested that British troops might have to remain in Iraq for “weeks, or even months”, Hoon dismissed this as “scaremongering”.
Yes the Germans were there – as they quite famously made the decision to not operate at night because it was “too dangerous”. For all the US and UK’s failings, too many of the coalition lent little other than token support to the mission. A criticism of the political and command classes rather than the forces themselves.
The German Military leaders back at home wrote a number of directives to the troops on how to stop from getting fat.
Because the Germans were there really to be part of a show of unity – for most of the time there they stayed behind fences and blast walls protected by contractors and native forces – and in the camp played video games mostly, wile drinking beer and eating lots of snacks, and gaining weight.
Which was no reflection on them – the Politicians did not want casualties, but were there to give political support by just being on the ground – not as a fighting army.
The glories of our blood and state are shadows not substantial things. Afghanistan has long been the graveyard of Britain’s military reputation.
My great granduncle wrote a Journal following a punitive expedition to avenge the utter destruction of the British army in the retreat from Kabul through the Kyber Pass in the First Afghan War in which he lambasted the idiocy of the politicians in sending the Army in to Afghanistan in the first place and optimistically predicting that it would be the last time a British army would be engaged in Afghanistan.
Sadly his prediction was very wide of the mark. His nephew, my grandfather, was back in Afghanistan to suffer yet another humiliating destruction of a regiment at Maiwand at the hands of the Afghans in the second Afghan War. My grandfather only escaped with his life as the result of being a young second-lieutenant involved in the baggage train and thus able to effect a retreat through the Kyber Pass with his life, if not his pride, still intact – one of the few officers able to effect an escape.
The litany of brave defeat in portions of the globe we had no real strategic interest in continues as a theme throughout the ages. Theirs not to reason why theirs but to do and die.
This article is wrong and profoundly misplaced.
The British Army at battalion and regimental level, especially at the human and small unit level, remains as competent and well-trained as it has ever been. The story of Iraq and Afghanistan is a story of political failure, in which one man – Blair – was able to impose his deeply misguided war concept upon Britain, in the face of an anti-war march to London involving 1 million people. In 2002, French President Jaques Chirac had the courage to veto the attack on Iraq in the UN Security Council. Blair, for some reason related probably to his deep-seated ambition and desire for recognition, partnered with the hapless George W and the “Axis of Evil” crew to pursue the attack, in the face of the UN veto. George W was pushed all the way by his nasty and evil vice-president Cheney, aided by Wolfowitz and pro-Israeli elements who thought they perceived opportunities for aggrandisement in the Middle East, and supported, inevitably, by the big weapons suppliers like General Dynamics. Generals are soldiers, who do what they are told. The British Army is a weapon which the country’s leaders can point in any direction they choose. The terrible failures in Iraq and Afghanistan were not down to the soldiers, but to the politicians, especially Blair.
Army Procurement has been a disaster for ever, mainly because weapon planning requires a three-decade time horizon which the politicians and civil service won’t give it. In addition, BA and other weapons manufacturers are past masters at pulling the wool over the eyes of the MOD.
Yes, for me our armed forces should be for the defence of the British realm and its people not political posturing or making global corporations loads more money
If climate change apocalypse is real then surely part of our preparation for it is massive expansion of our defensive capabilities, including national service, to learn discipline, self reliance and skills. Our island of 67 million will otherwise be no match for the 100s of millions who will head to our shores and who won’t be as civilised in their conquests as we are.
I don’t particularly see a problem with the army moving from the kind which was designed to fight large scale conventional battles of the Cold War to a much smaller more tactically flexible one, capable of small scale, high impact interventions in potential future hot spots.
Internationally, if armed force is required to oppose the rise of Chinese hegemony, this battle will be fought on the sea and in the sky, where the majority of our funding should be concentrated. Similarly, if there should be conflict with the Russians, Britain would be far better off looking to maintain air superiority whist our allies did the fighting on the ground.
Domestically, attacks on infrastructure pose far more of a threat to our country than defeat in a land based conflict. With long ranged missile guidance systems improving, making attacks with conventional warheads on key targets possible and the threat of mass cyber attack, both a real danger. What defence can be mounted against these will not be done so by the army.
Perhaps then, having the “Best Little Army in the World” is not such a bad strategy to pursue?
Agree with the sentiment of your comment, but it’s sadly far from what’s happening.
The trouble is that this shift to being “more tactically flexible” with a greater focus on “cyber” and “asymmetric threats” is marketing guff.
It’s a cost saving exercise dressed up to sound clever. Unless there is a matching increase in funding to allow the units to upskill to an adequate level, they will just be the same undermanned, undertrained (in things that actually matter) units at a fraction of their previous capability.
We already had a small army that did a lot with what it had, now it’s smaller yet.
As for increased air superiority – the RAF already struggles to mount any sustained operation even with US support. Modern aircraft and equipment are absurdly expensive and would require an enormous increase in funding. The carriers (joint RN and RAF aircraft) were a step in that direction, but are now looking vulnerable as everything else across all 3 services had to be scaled back to pay for them.
And yes a large part of the blame lies with the procurement over the years, like most government departments the MoD has wasted vast sums
“if armed force is required to oppose the rise of Chinese hegemony, this battle will be fought on the sea and in the sky,”
You do not know that – boots on the ground have always been what matters in the end, and we do not know it will be an absolute war we prepare for – And part of having a military is the training it leeches out into society.
Like the USA Army – the millions of troops who get to serve overseas makes a huge contribution to national understanding of the world. The numbers of young men given discipline, team spirit, skills, and later when out free university. That was what made America great, the G.I. Bill, post WWII when university and trade school became free to ex-military, and they took it up in the millions and this was the kicker pushing USA to the top.
A military is much more than the soldiers in trenches.
A consistent obstacle to effective and ground and sea capability has been the RAF, right back to 1918 really.
The RAF’s Goering-like determination that everything which flies should be theirs was a big part of why our aircraft carriers were ill-equipped in WW2 and why the later ones were decommissioned just before the Falklands War. The RAF assured all concerned that it could defend the Navy’s ships anywhere. Of course 8,000 miles from the UK it could not. It is still making the same objection to the AUKUS initiative because it involves naval forces without much role for the RAF.
We might actually be better off disbanding it.
As an Army Falklands veteran, you could never underestimate how much the army and navy hated the RAF (crabs). Their unsuccessful Blackbuck missions with Vulcans were just wasteful PR exercises. It was just to show that the RAF were in, what was really a navy and marine war with army support. To be fair they did a decent job of providing logistic support. Their Rapier Air defence ground crews were whinging boy scouts compared to the RA teams.
Even today, the Chinook fleet, nearly 100% used to support the army is RAF crewed and supported. Just so they can have a few aircraft.
The RAF is a political organisation still fighting the Battle of Britain. Period!
A saying at the time was FLY Navy, SAIL Army and WALK sideways!
Good article Aris
Interesting – did not know this. The US by and large seemed to learn a lot from Iraq and Afghanistan. Though far from perfect, their State Department and other organisations at least try and coordinate at all levels from operational to tactical. The UK’s organisations by contrast are a sh*t show, where the left hand doesn’t let the right hand know what it is doing. Whilst the US adapted and developed, we went backwards; each department fights for its slice of the pie from increasingly disinterested politicians who are fixated on domestic issues and opinion polls.
Fancy name for nothing other than stripped-down and neutered Infantry battalions. It’s a continuation of a trend following the last defence review’s “SPIBs” (SPecialist Infantry Battalions). Not deserving of the name ‘Ranger’ (after Roger’s Rangers years ago, and more recently the Tier 2 US Special Forces units who have a good reputation and effective track record).
Intelligent, insightful writing.
The major fault lies with politicians who have little or no understanding of wars or the armed forces that fight them. Certainly the generals did not do enough to educate them, but ultimately they and their men tried to obey orders issued by the vainglorious Blair and his acolytes. The procurement failures arguably lie more with the MOD than with the services. They are mirrored, after all, throughout central government.
It’s not clear whether there could have been any strategic success in Iraq or Afghanistan – probably not – but there was absolutely no chance with the pitifully inadequate numbers of troops we committed to both. And that leads to a very sad fact: the British Army has for many years been too small to fight any but the most insignificant of wars, which require sufficient mass to seize and hold ground.
Given that the British Army remains one of the most respected institutions in Britain according to opinion polls for the best part of 15 years, the headline about ‘humiliation’ is a tad misleading. The public continues to revere the Army and its serving soldiers, despite being largely out of civilian sight and mind – as they have been for the past 360-odd years.
Ben Barry is rightly respected, but I’d be less willing to bet the defamation ranch on a less militarily seasoned source. I am pretty sure Richard Dannatt has contested that he stated “use them or lose them”, as a third party once alleged.
PM Blair indicated a willingness to join an expanded NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan at a NATO summit in 2004. The assumption was that Operation Telic in Iraq would be – to quote George Bush – ‘mission accomplished’ by Summer 2006 when British troops got to Helmand, long before Charge of the Knights.
Faulty intelligence played a malign role in Telic and Herrick, but as Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman highlighted back in 2009, we had Blair’s Wars on Brown’s budgets.
The lack of accountability of senior officers is the key issue – none of them noticed during 20 years in Afghanistan that we were not going to achieve anything, and kept “pushing-on”. A fish rots from the head, and unless ‘we’ remove the head, the whole body of the Army will suffer.
Is this because many of the best officers in the Marines/Paras/Special Frces leave as Captains or Majors and enter the private security World?
The Army’s, or the MoD’s?
…who thought the Army were, to quote Mandelson, “chinless wonders”.
The current situation does appear to resemble that faced by Britain’s armed forces in about 1941-2.
The army had spent the years since WW1 assuming there would never be another war, and being used as an imperial gendarmerie. As a result, it had developed no ideas about modern corps-level all-arms warfare to pit against the Germans’. The disastrous decision to create the RAF resulted in a force that thought it could win wars on its own by bombing. As a result, the RAF failed to develop close ground support aircraft (or tactics) akin to the Germans’ Stuka and it ignored the Navy’s needs so that the RN’s front line fighters were biplanes in 1941.
The bill for all these mistakes was always going to come in eventually. The result was defeat in France, the western desert, and the Far East. Yes, there was Alamein, but it was timed to start at the same time as the invasion of Tunisia, so that if Rommel moved west to deal with that, it could be painted as Monty’s victory. Alamein also relied on US armour as the home-made stuff was so lamentably poor.
Meanwhile the RAF, having achieved a draw in 1940, went over to the offensive over France in 1941 and suffered the same fate as the Germans had the year before. The reason there were no Spitfires in Malaya was because they were too busy getting defeated over France. Bomber Command was then defeated in 1942-44 and really only got the upper hand after the US air forces had destroyed the German fuels industry and shot down most of the Luftwaffe in daylight.
Britain’s armed forces were just about ready for WW2 by 1946.
To be fair , some of our aircraft and tanks had been sent to the Soviet Union. Just possibly , they could have swayed the balance in Malaya
It’s difficult to know where to start demolishing this nonsense. The Aremy’s fault after WW1 was in failing to learn the lessons of armoured warfare which they had pioneered. They also entered into a p155ing contest with the Navy over aircraft. It was Army and Navy officers who created the RAF, recognising that died-in-the-wool Army brass simply couldn’t understand the pace and scope of air warfare. And the RN stuck with capital ships in the inter-war years; they neglected naval air power. The international consensus during the inter-war years was that ‘the bomber would always get through’, and have such a devastating effect on targeted nations’ morale that they would give in; that was proved wrong by the Luftwaffe, and later by the RAF, though the US air campaign against the Japanese mainland came close to forcing capitulation. But the RAF bomber campaign was the only offensive front Britain could open till the US entered the war. It didn’t win the war, but diverted enormous numbers of Germans and resources from the Eastern and other fronts. An independent air force such as the RAF was followed by many other nations.
FGS, what a lot of uninformed tosh.
The Army assumed after WW1 that there’d never be another war and consequently had no idea how to fight one when one came along. Germany had panzer divisions with integral mechanised infantry, supported by aircraft built, optimised and utilised for the role. The Eighth Army had “jock columns” and “boxes” and “brigade groups” and “infantry tanks” (8mph) and “cruiser tanks” (that broke down) and arguments between the ex-cavalry regiments, which wanted to do cavalry charges in tanks, and the RTR, which wanted all tank formations with no organic infantry, artillery or anti-tank. The only Army-dedicated aircraft in use by the RAF was the Lysander, which wasn’t an attack aircraft.
The Army did not enter a “pi55ing contest” with the Navy over aircraft. The RAF decided it would win wars by bombing, so it ordered Battles and Hampdens and Wellingtons, and that Hurricanes and Spitfires were required for defence. None of these types was remotely suitable for naval operation, which the RAF couldn’t have cared less about. Hence when the FAA was formed in 1924, its buying power was limited to tiny orders of no interest to manufacturers because the RAF had neglected all needs except its own.
This is why the US Navy and Marine Corps had the Wildcat by 1941, while we had the Gladiator and later the Fulmar (slower, less manoeuvrable and worse armed than the Wildcat). The RN’s first decent fighter was the F4U Corsair and they only got that because it bounced all over the place and was rejected by the USN. The RN solved its bouncing problems and by 1944 finally had a competitive fighter.
The Sea Hurricane was a rebuilt Mark 1 with 1939 performance deployed in 1941. The Seafire was a navalised 1941-era Mark V Spitfire deployed in 1943. Both were outclassed by both the Oscar and the Zero.
The Royal did not “stick with capital ships” – they completed two 16″ battleships in the early 20s and then, like everyone else, didn’t build any more until the late 30s because the Washington Naval Treaty limited construction to 5:5:3 (USA, UK, Japan). All three nations cancelled battleship plans and the USA and Japan each completed two as carriers instead. By the late 1930s the RN then faced the Italians with three 9 x 15″-gunned battleships, Germany with two 8 x 15″-gunned battleships and two 9 x 11″-gunned battleships intended to be upgraded to 6 x 15″, and the IJN with nine WW1 battleships, three 9 x 18″-gunned battleships building and six fleet and six light carriers embarking 600+ aircraft. Meanwhile HMS Victorious hunted Bismarck with exactly 15 aircraft embarked.
The RAF was an independent air force established at the expense of the air component of the army and navy. Countries that established an independent air force post-war did not make this mistake.
You are ignoring comments by G Orwell. From the early 1930s , the middle class Left attacked patriotism. Orwell stated that many of the more intelligent middle class were put off the Armed Forces, especially the Army. As flying was at the forefront of technology in the 1920s and 1930s it attracted the best engineers. Tanks and anything to do with the Army and to a lesser extent The Royal Navy attracted few engineers; hence little innovation.
WW1 traumatised a civilian population which had known peace since 1815. Hardly anyone could complate war up to 1939. Pacifism slowly changed to defeatism. People like Vera Brittain who had served as as a nurse in WW1 had her fiancee, the next man she planned to marry, her brother and her brother’s best friend killed in WW1. Trying to increase defence exoenditure until September 1939 was impossible.
Germany started to plan for WW2 in 1919 and by the 1920s was undertaking training in the Ukraine. Germany sent engineers to the Netherlands and Finland to develop military technology.
Orwell understood a truth which most ignore; the British are not a military nation and do not like soldiers close by. The Royal Navy has been our wooden walls.As Orwell pointed out , the British do not goose step. The British march is a formalised walk. As Admiral Ramsey said after Dunkirk ” All British victories start in defeat.” Britains have disliked military rule ever since that imposed by the Major Generals under Cromwell and long may it continue.
However, the British attitude to the military is disasterous on the when it comes to procuring military equipment with the exception of Radar, The Hurricane, The Spitfire, The Lancaster, the Mosquito and the Jet engine.
There is only one remedy, close down the MOD, The MOD is merely the cost cutting arm of the treasury. It’s procurement policy is determined by the treasury and is in no way concerned with the operational needs of the armed forces.
The armed forces budget should be agreed between The Prime Minister and the Senior members of the defence forces. This will ensure that the PM must take personal responsibility for the defence of the realm.
Civilisations either survive through superior military technology or overwhelming demographics. We are unlikely to survive with the latter.
Cheryl, in the seventh decade of this century the indigenous British become a minority in the UK. What do you think we are fighting to defend after that happens?
Interesting article, failure to cover the fact that both Iraq and Afghanistan had no political posers placed on trail unlike the PBI’s who were fighting for their lives primarily and to protect the public secondary – it was galling that the legal eagles hoovered around waiting to swoop and earn £’000’s in legal aid fees when allegations of murder and mistreatment were made. Until you have been at the sharp end of receiving incoming fire, regardless of training, it is both a shock and a wake up call – get down, scan, locate, eliminate, move, move, scan, locate, eliminate – the ROE, written by civil servants in a cosy office, where the most dangerous thing is a paper cut, are usually the last thing on your mind – survival is critical – your squad needs you, you need your squad. No war is fought fair, modern warfare is both distant and upfront and immediate, distant warfare is a video game – push the button, they are dead – upfront and immediate is just that – smell them, see them, and where necessary disabled them by any effective means.
We appear to spend as much as Russia. I realise that total amounts spent is probably an invidious comparison but is it the case then that Russia actually spends too little and is really a paper tiger or they just pay soldiers far less or they simply don’t have the tanks and aircraft they appear to have?
…can’t help feeling that the only way the Soldiers could have avoided this supposed “humiliation” was to refuse to deploy…because successive Governments had cut numbers, equipment and training budgets and war supplies year after year and ignored any arguments to the contrary…because the left/liberal establishment had pretty much branded anyone in uniform an inadequate, a psychopath and probably a war criminal for years…and because the press aided and abetted both processes, and added a big dollop of performative grief in respect of the inevitable casualties of war for good measure.
The only way it might be avoided in future is if we operate (proportionately) at the same level as the US…which would mean at least doubling the numbers in unifom (regulars and reserves)…and aiming to spend approaching 4% of GDP, not struggling to reach a niggardly 2%. Which I personally would welcome…but I doubt if most here would..!
The author makes a number of good points, but conflates many issues. And citing Akam, whose minimal experience as a junior ‘intern’ in the military is outweighed by his ignorance of anything outside that internship and his bitterness at the experience, shows the author’s own lack of knowledge.
Procurement starts with a ‘capability’ to meet a stated defence commitment. Options are identified and evaluated, then scientists, MoD civil servants, the DTI, defence companies, politicians, and military experts, all get involved, with the Treasury holding the whip hand. It takes at least 10 years to deliver that capability, with the military having less and less say, politicians coming and going, the original requirement having been changed, and budgets reduced. And the net result? A piece of equipment which is over-engineered, over budget, late, and has little flexibility to do the job it’s now needed for, and which has been procured more for its ‘UK content’ and jobs than to serve its purpose.
As for ‘use it or lose it’, and the Iraq war, this refers to operational capability, not to units. Mounting a major operation in a distant theatre takes enormous logistical and planning effort and resources, over many months. As units arrive in theatre, acclimatise, train, deploy, etc, plans are refined, and support is put in place, capability slowly reaches a peak. It can be held at that peak only for so long, then, as units are rotated, kit begins to show signs of wear and tear, morale deteriorates, and the cost mounts up, capability degrades, and you have to ‘use it or lose it’. That was the problem; the US began its build up too soon, but once it was committed, it had to back down or fight.
And the UK’s forces were undermined by penny-pinching politicians and the Treasury, in numbers and equipment, and constrained by political decisions remote from understanding or practicality. As always.
For me, two points stand out amidst the notably interesting responses to Aris Roussinos’ article. First, that no senior officer fell on his sword, or was sacked, after the failures of the last two or three decades. Would some Unheard reader please enlighten us further on the reasons why?
Second, Jon Redman’s perceptive comments on naval aviation and its marginalisation by the RAF, culminating in the elimination of the Harrier force and maritime reconnaissance in the 2010 Defence Review. It would be good to restore to the navy the things that are the navy’s, though I would hesitate to entrust the army very much with anything that flew beyond helicopters. And to cap it all,now that carriers have been restored, their chosen aircraft is the inferior F35B and their design precludes their ever operating anything else.
I don’t think anyone in the Army or Armed Services felt they were behaving wrongly or dishonourably in Iraq or in Afghanistan. The Generals were following orders, which is what they are trained to do. The efforts to defeat the Taliban in Helmand were not very successful, but the Army felt that it did well nevertheless, in spite of being heavily outnumbered in terrain which strongly favoured numbers and ambushes. The person who should have felt deep shame was T Blair – but since when has Blair felt anything except the certainty of his own righteousness and cleverness ?
How much is this to do is the lack of career options?. Unless one has a private income, above the rank of Major, can an officer afford to oppose a politician?A highly experienced SF officer can afford to leave the Army and will be able to join the private security World but above this rank, most officers cannot afford to oppose politicians.
What is ignored is that after communism collapsed , people thought there would be no further conflicts. My Father who spent 5.5 years in combat in WW2 and then sailed the World for 42 years thought after the 1990, the World had become far more complicated . Under communism one was either for the West or against it. After 1990, thousands of years of conflict based upon race, religion, and language emerged. The conflict in Yermen between Fiver Shia and Wahabi Sunni goes back a 1000 years The conflict between Croat and Serb can be traced back to 300AD when then Roman Empire was split between West and East. !.
Major cut defence spending post 1990. He is a suburban bank clerk with a suburban bank clerks understanding of the World and those Prime Ministers who followed are no better. Fighting in built up areas and jungles needs vast numbers of soldiers who are highly skilled and have no rules of engagement which reduces their ability to kill the enemy. Major and those PMs who followed him have no experience of combat, come from families with no combat experience nor appear to have friends who have it. Roy Mason the Secretary of State of N Ireland was miner but obtained advice from those who understood what it took to defeat the PIRA. Martin Mc Guiness said the PIRA was three weeks away from being defeated under Mason. My guess was that though being a miner he contacted NCOs from elite units especially the Special Forces and listened to what they had to say.Apparently during one meeting Mason’s solid fist hit the table and he said ” The gloves are off!”.
Who would be scared of Major’s fist or any PMs who came afterwards ?