Yes and Luttwak has a narrative that doesn’t fit MSM game plan to discredit the neocons despite HRC, Biden, Kerry etc voting with them. He is among most experienced strategists. And his personal take on Rumsfeld adds a context to the 2003 invasion well worth recalling. What if the 4th ID had invaded through Turkey and garrisoned Baghdad?
Last edited 2 years ago by rick stubbs
Ian nclfuzzy
2 years ago
For Gen Xers like me, Iraq was our Vietnam. I remember being animated as for nothing else in the lead up to the war and for 18 months or so thereafter.
Rumsfeld can rot in hell for all I care. We knew it was a tragic bloodsoaked mistake and that the honourable Shinseki was right.
W was too dumb, Cheney too venal, and Rumsfeld too smart to see the truth.
M A R C US M A R C U S
2 years ago
Then I gratuitously added that strategy was beyond the capacity of Anglo-Saxons because they are gloaters, while only brooders seriously think about threats.
Great line.
Placing strategy at the back squandered resources often enough in history that it can now be seen as the rule, not the exception for America, my country. It’s true that when lucky we ten to propagandize the strategic brilliance of a long-serving general or secretary who usually does not deserve the credit, and when not, we sweep the failure under the rug. There’s signs of strategic maturity, though, and actually learning our lessons, to be seen in the continuity of policy between the two very different administrations recently in power. Leaders know now voters will abandon traditional political loyalties if they fail to “get it right”, and are not only trusting the warnings of their subordinates more, but also verifying policy with outside experts like you, a welcome sign for many citizen soldiers and veterans.
Thank you for this article, Edward. Mr. Rumsfeld was trying to improve methods and did not succeed, as you note:
Instead, what followed was the prolonged farce of “counter-insurgency warfare” (military malpractice institutionalised) with its corrupt “nation-building” twin (a very expensive and impotent form of colonialism).
Working day to day in counterinsurgency felt to me like how SoCal often gets described: “there is no there, there.” But if given the opportunity, I’d probably go back and give it another shot. As an American, I don’t know how not to be optimistic. It’s a great national curse, and blessing.
strategy was beyond the capacity of Anglo-Saxons because they are gloaters. I’m left wondering what ancestry a lot of white Americans have if not Anglo Saxon. As someone who lives in the northern part of Ireland, we see lots of Americans who arrive in Dublin to trace their ‘Irish’ roots, only to have to make the trek to Belfast after discovering the that Irish blood they thought they had, was in fact, either Ulster Scots or Ulster English.
Martin Le Jeune
2 years ago
Great piece. I remember reading EL’s Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire when I was a student and being struck by how visionary it was compared to the narrow articles written by the classical specialists. Have enjoyed his work ever since.
Hardee Hodges
2 years ago
Much of Rumsfeld political and personal machinations ring true but Luttwak’s take on the failure in Iraq ignores Paul Bremer’s Iraq policy of dismantling locals who could run the post-war nation. I suspect Rumsfeld deciding he had done enough was a consequence of the State Department and Bremer being involved. The changes to the military forced by Rumsfeld persit today and have improved agility. But Rumsfeld lacked strategic vision in choosing short term advantage. But history is all about these perceptions from different vantage points.
Matt B
2 years ago
Even at the time you only had to remember Somalia and wider directions in asymmetric urban conflict across the Levant (inc Gaza) to see how hubris in Iraq, with no plan and backed by downright lies, would get bogged down after the 1st phase and ultimately favour Iran – and the rise of militias and daesh.
This sort of article is why I subscribe to UnHerd. Long, thoughtful, educational articles way beyond the limited scope of the MSM.
Yes and Luttwak has a narrative that doesn’t fit MSM game plan to discredit the neocons despite HRC, Biden, Kerry etc voting with them. He is among most experienced strategists. And his personal take on Rumsfeld adds a context to the 2003 invasion well worth recalling. What if the 4th ID had invaded through Turkey and garrisoned Baghdad?
For Gen Xers like me, Iraq was our Vietnam. I remember being animated as for nothing else in the lead up to the war and for 18 months or so thereafter.
Rumsfeld can rot in hell for all I care. We knew it was a tragic bloodsoaked mistake and that the honourable Shinseki was right.
W was too dumb, Cheney too venal, and Rumsfeld too smart to see the truth.
Great line.
Placing strategy at the back squandered resources often enough in history that it can now be seen as the rule, not the exception for America, my country. It’s true that when lucky we ten to propagandize the strategic brilliance of a long-serving general or secretary who usually does not deserve the credit, and when not, we sweep the failure under the rug. There’s signs of strategic maturity, though, and actually learning our lessons, to be seen in the continuity of policy between the two very different administrations recently in power. Leaders know now voters will abandon traditional political loyalties if they fail to “get it right”, and are not only trusting the warnings of their subordinates more, but also verifying policy with outside experts like you, a welcome sign for many citizen soldiers and veterans.
Thank you for this article, Edward. Mr. Rumsfeld was trying to improve methods and did not succeed, as you note:
Working day to day in counterinsurgency felt to me like how SoCal often gets described: “there is no there, there.” But if given the opportunity, I’d probably go back and give it another shot. As an American, I don’t know how not to be optimistic. It’s a great national curse, and blessing.
strategy was beyond the capacity of Anglo-Saxons because they are gloaters. I’m left wondering what ancestry a lot of white Americans have if not Anglo Saxon. As someone who lives in the northern part of Ireland, we see lots of Americans who arrive in Dublin to trace their ‘Irish’ roots, only to have to make the trek to Belfast after discovering the that Irish blood they thought they had, was in fact, either Ulster Scots or Ulster English.
Great piece. I remember reading EL’s Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire when I was a student and being struck by how visionary it was compared to the narrow articles written by the classical specialists. Have enjoyed his work ever since.
Much of Rumsfeld political and personal machinations ring true but Luttwak’s take on the failure in Iraq ignores Paul Bremer’s Iraq policy of dismantling locals who could run the post-war nation. I suspect Rumsfeld deciding he had done enough was a consequence of the State Department and Bremer being involved. The changes to the military forced by Rumsfeld persit today and have improved agility. But Rumsfeld lacked strategic vision in choosing short term advantage. But history is all about these perceptions from different vantage points.
Even at the time you only had to remember Somalia and wider directions in asymmetric urban conflict across the Levant (inc Gaza) to see how hubris in Iraq, with no plan and backed by downright lies, would get bogged down after the 1st phase and ultimately favour Iran – and the rise of militias and daesh.