Hezbollah is the most successful terror group in history. The Lebanese Shia militia may not have conquered as much territory as ISIS nor attracted so many recruits, but since its founding in 1985 it has fought Israel for almost 40 years, and it has fought it well. In May 2000, Hezbollah expelled the IDF from the “security zone” it had occupied in South Lebanon for nearly two decades; in 2006 Hezbollah then fought it to a military stalemate. In doing so, the “Party of God” did more than just inflict casualities on its long-standing enemy. Since Israel’s crushing defeat of the combined Arab armies in the 1967 Six Day War, no one thought an Arab force could do more than just terrorise or harass the Israelis. Hezbollah proved them wrong.
When it comes to Israel, the Arab world can be divided — loosely — into blocks. There’s the so-called “Axis of Accommodation”: states like Egypt and Jordan that have made peace with the Jewish state, accept (officially at least) its existence and seek to avoid future conflict. Set against them is the “Axis of Resistance” — countries that believe all compromise to be a betrayal of principle, centred on Iran and Syria.
It is important to understand that these are more than just opposing stances to Israel — they are alternative modes of Middle East statecraft. As Thanassis Cambanis observes in his rigorous book, A Privilege to Die, Hezbollah has “convinced legions of common men and women that Israel can be defeated and destroyed — and not just in the distant future, but soon.” Its leader Hassan Nasrallah now regularly “reminds his millions of listeners across the Arab world that Hezbollah and its allies — the ‘Axis of Resistance’ — have wrung more concessions from Israel by force than the pro-Western ‘Axis of Accommodation’ has won through decades of negotiation.”
But the Middle East is riddled with militia groups allied against the West and, specifically, Israel — not least Hamas, which recently fired hundreds of rockets from Gaza into the country. The Iranian-controlled Shia militia organisation, the Popular Mobilisation Front (PMF), has spent years attacking Western targets in Iraq; in Yemen, the Houthis have battered the Saudi Army. But Hezbollah towers above them all, both in its military efficacy and political strength. Why? The answer lies with Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur, the Iranian cleric who died aged 74 last week from Covid-19.
Few know more about Hezbollah — and Mohtashamipur — than Shimon Shapira, a retired Brigadier General in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), former military secretary to ex-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and now a fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. “Mohtashamipur was the architect of Hezbollah,” he tells me. “And Hezbollah changed everything.”
“Mohtashamipur was a real revolutionary, and a close associate of the founder of the Islamic Republic [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini himself,” he continues. “It was Khomeini who personally sent Mohtashamipur to Damascus to create a new Shiite radical movement to rival Amal, the Lebanese Shia movement founded in 1976. Amal is secular, and the Mullahs knew it would never be what they wanted: an Iranian arm in Lebanon.”
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SubscribeThey aren’t so bad. They’re friends of a certain north London MP……
Shocking what has happened to Lebanon in the last 40 years. Truly tragic.
(I have to say that I’m not an expert on the area or its politics). About 20 years ago I read an old copy of ‘Survival In Beirut’ by Lina Mikdadi Tabbara. This is a diary of the civil war in 1975.
My main memory of this is that she, the diarist, was shocked or merely observed that the ‘terrorists’ were so young. She comments on the fact that they seemed to be 15-year-old ordinary kids who had been transformed from poverty and obscurity into heroes because they carried submachine guns. The action took place in 1975, which would make the survivors into 60-year-old terrorists now. If experience is required on your cv as a terrorist, this would make Hezbollah into super-terrorists.
When I have watched footage of ISIS on Al Jazeera I have always thought that they also looked like 15-year-old ordinary kids with submachine guns. This observation would support the above essay’s thesis that Hezbollah are indeed super-terrorists and well organised because they would have a lot of experience. Hamas were also late on the scene because they had to wait for Yasser Arafat to die.
In Gaza, Hamas did not wait for Arafat’s death (2004). They took over in 2001, since when, and following Sheikh Yassin’s assassination by Israel, Gaza has been developed more as an Iranian forward base than for its people – goals that will hard to reconcile in the perpetual deadlock, not least with Iran’s goal of casting Israel into the sea on principle, regardless of policy.
Makes uneasy reading.
Which begs the question: “Why did the US invade Iraq in 2003 ?”
Unless of course the plan was to use Iraq as a base to invade Iran.
Conspicuous by his absence in the article: Qassem Suleimani, eliminated by the US shortly before the pandemic. Building and training Hezbollah is one of his early successes, and indeed part of his legacy.
As the article rightly explains: Iran and Suleimani in particular, unlike Sunni petrol monarchies, did more than just pouring money over fanatics.
How fascinating! Another UnHerd piece that carries water for Salafism and the interests of Saudi Arabia.