Yugoslavia was said to be one country with two alphabets, three religions, four languages, five nationalities, six republics and seven neighbours.
In fact, it was a lot more complicated than that – especially in the 1990s, when the country collapsed into ethnic war.
Today there are seven sovereign states within the borders of what used to be Yugoslavia – or eight, if you separate the two main components of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which, confusingly, aren’t Bosnia and Herzegovina).
Writing for the Guardian, Ivan Krastev argues that the bloody demise of Yugoslavia helped to precipitate an ideological ‘divorce’ between liberals and nationalists in the new democracies of the former Communist bloc:
“Remember how nationalists and liberals were allies in the overthrow of communism in 1989. Central European liberals were aware of the political appeal of post-communist nationalism, so they did a lot to shape it and soften it. Appealing to national sentiment was critically important as a way of mobilising society against the communist regimes. Poland’s Solidarity movement was not liberal, but a mixed – social and nationalist – coalition that endorsed the values of liberal democracy.”
This is a crucially important point. Indeed, the history of liberal nationalism goes back much further – it was, for instance, a vital force in the European revolutions of 1848.
Krastev argues that “the Yugoslav wars made it impossible for liberals to define liberalism as anything but anti-nationalism”. However, I’m not sure, that “impossible” is quite the right word. Looking back at what happen in Yugoslavia, it strikes me that it was just as possible to conclude that it’s coercive federalism that’s illiberal.
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