Ukraine faces decisive months ahead as key allies gear up for crunch elections. While early presidential campaigning in the US and a looming general election in Poland will grab the international headlines, a snap election in Slovakia on 30 September may prove every bit as consequential. 

With Robert Fico — Slovakia’s former prime minister and one of the West’s most outspoken critics of the Ukrainian war effort — poised to win the vote, a change of government in Bratislava could have a profound effect on EU policymaking. Fico has promised that if his party makes it into government “we will not send a single bullet to Ukraine,” proudly proclaiming that “I allow myself to have a different opinion to that of the United States” on the war.  

Fico has also claimed on the campaign trail that “war always comes from the West and peace from the East,” and that “what is happening today is unnecessary killing, it is the emptying of warehouses to force countries to buy more American weapons.” Such statements have resulted in him being blacklisted by Kyiv as a spreader of Russian propaganda.  

Yet the former prime minister spearheads a new brand of Left-wing, anti-American populism that has become a powerful force in Central Europe since the war began. Perceptions that “the Americans occupy us” — as one MP in Fico’s Smer party evocatively put it — are shared with a similar groundswell of anti-Western opinion in the neighbouring Czech Republic.  

Yet Smer has been handed a chance to gain power thanks to the chaos which has engulfed Slovakia’s pro-EU, pro-Western forces. Personal grievances coupled with serious policy errors tore apart a four-party coalition formed after elections in 2020, leaving Fico to capitalise on heightened mistrust in establishment politics. Smer is expected to become the nation’s largest party after this month’s election, with an anticipated 20% of the vote.  

Whatever the specific makeup of the new government, if Smer is the largest party it will likely pursue a foreign policy similar to that of Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary. A halt to until-now generous Slovak arms shipments to Ukraine is Fico’s central electoral pledge, while the arrival on the scene of another Orbán-style government prepared to obstruct EU aid efforts for Ukraine would create a serious headache. That is particularly the case as Brussels struggles to win support for both short and long-term war funding commitments. 

Victory for Fico would also amplify Orbán’s scepticism about the overall Western narrative on Ukraine — a scepticism which the Hungarian Prime Minister recently conveyed to Western conservatives during an interview with Tucker Carlson. Orbán portrayed Ukraine’s attempts to win back the territories taken by Russia as ultimately hopeless and claimed that Donald Trump’s promise to end the war quickly makes him “the man who can save the Western world”. 

Like Trump in America and Orbán in Europe, Fico is hated with a passion by establishment forces. But in Slovakia, the pro-Western establishment itself has become so mistrusted that power may soon pass to a man intent on shattering what’s left of European unity on Ukraine. 

For decades, London has been defined by a Labour-dominated inner core, encircled by the so-called “blue doughnut” of suburban, Conservative-leaning outer boroughs. Historically, this state of affairs, while occasionally disturbed by Liberal Democrat incursions in the South West, has provided the guidelines for campaign strategy at each election cycle. Now, however, Nigel Farage believes that the combination of a toxified Conservative Party and a beleaguered Labour administration will provide an opportunity for Reform UK to make inroads in the capital.

According to reporting this week, Farage believes his party can win at least six London council seats in next year’s elections, targeting areas such as Bromley, Bexley, Havering, and Barking & Dagenham. These are boroughs with economic anxieties and traditional cultural values, which are at least amenable to a Right-populist movement.

These ambitions are hard to dismiss outright. Farage’s party has a track record of local election success, most crucially the symbolic seizure of Kent County Council in May. It’s these councils that are the primary indicator of what a Reform-run London might look like. The party’s detractors can then weaponise any failure to deliver on local election promises as proof that insurgents don’t always know what to do with power. In Kent, Reform campaigned on a platform to ease the burden on households, with a clear mandate to slash waste, cut bureaucracy, and operate an efficient, low-tax council. Yet, when faced with statutory funding obligations and a £60 million black hole, the transition from manifesto rhetoric to administrative reality has been tricky.

Of course, this chequered history won’t deter Farage in his belief that he can make significant gains in the capital. The MP for Clacton has highlighted policymaking failures which have enabled London boroughs to become lawless and unaffordable. In response, he’s proposing a zero-tolerance approach to policing based on the “broken windows” philosophy popularised by Rudy Giuliani in New York in the Nineties. Internal campaign documents also suggest that the party will aim to address poorly maintained local infrastructure and depleted essential services, as well as promising to tackle council waste.

This signals a shift in strategy, away from a style of campaigning which leans on Farage’s own popularity and charisma. Yet, it will require a concerted effort to address Reform’s recurring problem of poor candidate selection, where filling seats has taken precedence over finding suitable council members. To rapidly professionalise its operation for 2026, the party has relied heavily on recruiting defectors, particularly former Conservative councillors who bring existing local networks, data on voting intentions, and — crucially — experience in the mechanics of policy implementation.

From the party’s inception, Farage has made targeting London a fundamental element of Reform UK’s national strategy. But while ultimate victory may prove elusive, even a mild shift away from the historic main parties will send a message to rival politicians. Actual council victories are just one part of a plan which is also about giving Reform legitimacy and control in the heart of power. The party has built up support in some of London’s more deprived outer boroughs, and the fragmentation of council authority in the capital will only put more pressure on Labour. Don’t expect a teal takeover, but the old political order is certainly under threat.