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August 19, 2024 - 4:10pm
Over the past week, Ukrainian forces have established a 1,000-square-kilometre bulge in Russia’s Kursk region. An additional thrust to the south, in the Belgorod region, is also underway. Ukraine‘s foreign ministry says it aims to create a buffer zone to prevent missile attacks, but other objectives seem paramount: to draw Russian forces from the front lines, seize a bargaining chip for future negotiations, embarrass the Kremlin, and boost Ukrainian morale while heartening its Western backers.
The Kursk attacks are more akin to border raids than a genuine offensive campaign. As with Ukrainian missile attacks on Russian naval forces in the Black Sea or targets inside Russia, the raid serves to harass Russian forces and distract them from their main objective. But it cannot substitute for the combat power needed to exploit a breakthrough in Russia’s front lines — combat power that Kyiv does not possess and seems unable to generate.
So far, Russia does not seem to have drawn significant forces from the front lines, though the army has reportedly moved some. Russian commanders may prefer to keep up pressure there and let reserve forces labour to reverse the incursion, expecting that logistical burdens will make it harder to maintain. What’s more, with Russia concentrating airpower on stopping Ukraine’s forces, and the heavier losses troops on offensive tend to suffer versus defenders, Ukraine may be sacrificing manpower it increasingly needs for defence. But it’s also worth noting that as Ukraine grabs territory in Russia, Russia is making steady and more consequential progress inside Ukraine.
Gaining leverage to negotiate over territory is also a worthwhile objective, but no leverage is gained unless Ukrainian forces hold the territory they have seized or can attrit a lot more Russian forces than they themselves lose. At the moment, neither seems likely.
Likewise, any boost to Ukraine’s morale and its Western support from the Kursk offensive will be lost if the territory is. And while Russian leaders may be embarrassed, it is far too early to assume that this will undermine support for Vladimir Putin or the war. Indeed, it may ultimately anger and motivate Russians more than it demoralises them, as often happens with direct attacks on enemies’ territory.
So far, any negotiating leverage Ukraine may gain by seizing Russian land seems less relevant than its negative effect in hardening the enemy’s position. The Kremlin reportedly cancelled negotiations with Ukraine around limiting attacks on energy facilities because of the Kursk incursion, though Russian leaders deny it. Had those talks occurred, they might have provided the eventual basis for a full ceasefire.
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SubscribeIf I am surprised in any way about how the Ukrainian offensive has played out, it is that the Ukrainians haven’t used the opportunity to drive hard in a Southerly direction, making merry hell in the Russians rear areas, before heading West to meet a new Ukrainian offensive looking to cut the Russian lines. Ukraine will not prevail by sitting in a hole and slugging it out, blow for blow. Creativity is dangerous and risks disaster (Operation Micheal, 1918), but sometimes it’s the least worst option.
This is by-and-large a sober analysis, but I would object two related points:
(1) If Russia’s “weakness” is measured against western russophoby and paranoia, then Russia surely is (“surprisingly”) only half as strong as fearmongering dictated that it would be. But from that does not follow it could not still be twice as strong as needed to vanquish Ukraine on the battlefield.
(2) When the authors attest “a defence-dominant environment that Ukraine can harness to its own benefit”, they seem to confound those two aspects of “weakness”. For Ukraine was already “defence-dominant” since their own failed offensive in 2023, and nevertheless the Donbass front had started to crumble already before AFU troops were withdrawn for the Kursk offensive.
The delusive phrase here is that “Russia has suffered serial embarrassment at the hands of a foe far weaker than Nato”. For NATO is factually already “half-in” with equipment, volunteers, and battlefield data (in fact, providing data for firing solutions alone makes NATO an active combatant).
When Russia now brings Ukraine to its limits, then because it has brought NATO to all its limits short of an overt war in advance. The notion that Ukraine has any “benefits” left, be it by offense or defense, is delusional.
Edit: it might be taken symbolic that “New York” today has fallen.
Fair point. It must be time for the “overt war” one then.
Yeah, by now I’ve got the message that you’re a crusader.
You, but contrast, are the measured voice of reason.
A good comment on what I thought was a very astute analysis. I follow Weeb Union for day by day coverage of the battlefield and what these authors are saying is at least consistent with this (neutral and very good) source.
Maybe just to highlight on your point (2) what for me is the biggest omission in this article: The current situation in Donbass is close to breaking point, for the simple reason that the Russians are steadily making incursions into the 2014 lines. They are breaking down Ukraine’s system of defences. When these are gone and the Russians have pushed past the long-standing front line, Ukraine’s defensive advantages will be largely gone. Once you get past Toretsk, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, Ukraine’s defensive advantage evaporates. It’s an open field to the Dnieper from there.
This is why Russia is not taking the bait in Kursk. They are prepared to allow the Ukrainians to overextend for weeks, even months, if it means they can continue their current momentum along the 2014 line.
Nevertheless, ‘experts’ are willingly employed thinking up more implausible war winning scenarios because the war on Russia ‘must be won.’
There are many ways to win a war. Whatever happens in the current phase of the Ukraine war, Russia must be frozen out of any trade in anything with the West in perpetuity, the “frozen” Russian assets must be sold and the money given to Ukraine, all Russian citizens must be expelled from Western countries, and wherever the final line ends up, the remainder of Ukraine must be fast tracked into the EU and NATO. Any future incursions by Russia must be met with NATO nukes.
I don’t find such analysis especially convincing from people who are neither personally familiar with the operation at ground level nor accurately knowledgeable of the political shenanigans that take place backstage. Interesting nevertheless!
What was the interesting bit?
Agree otherwise, thanks for pointing it out.
The definition of a raid is that the attacker returns to his initial departing point in a swift retreat.This is certainly not the case.Also,this piece totally neglects the effects on the rail logistics that the Russians rely on for everything.It’s a poor attempt at framing and should be more at home with the NY Times.
To be fair to the author and everyone reporting on this, it is Ukraine’s English language press releases that described it as a raid. And it isn’t to belittle Ukraine to describe it as a raid but rather to reflect the fundamental balancing act Ukraine has to perform here: to not unnecessarily commit to holding a new line that has no strategic advantage, and to not become beholden to a narrative that means tactical retreat is reported as defeat.
1000sqkm of Kursk is just 33km wide and 33km deep. It’s tiny. The significance of it isn’t the seizing of it. If Ukraine did retreat tomorrow it would be no loss to them and no gain to Russia. But it would create a bigger headache for Russia: left guessing if and where Ukraine might raid next. And that is why I believe Ukraine reported this as a raid to sponsors and the media.
Perhaps the word “incursion” is more to your liking? What it is not, though some report it to be, is an invasion. Ukraine has no use for any part of Russia and no desire to keep it. Very much unlike Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the Donbas.
Sure, but at least they can get in there, destroy a few bridges (and hopefully oil infrastructure), burn a few government buildings, capture a heap of Russian soldiers, and get out.
Absolutely right.
UKR forces are digging new trenches and fortifying their new positions in Kursk. Clearly not a raid, despite clumsy language in press release.
Even cursory knowledge of the Kursk offensive tells you this much.
These authors are merely betting their reputation on what they see as the likely outcome of the operation in a poor and pessimistic analysis of very significant events.
You are assuming that the military action, raid, offensive, whatever you call it, had a military objective.
So far, military actions by Ukraine, as guided by their overlords, seem to have two objectives – 1. tik tok PR videos, and 2. Ensuring that the war drags on forever, neither pushing Ukraine to victory nor allowing a Russian victory.
So far, the Kursk attack has been spectacularly successful on both counts. That’s what matters, not whether Kursk results in any benefits, not the thousands of Ukrainians who are going to die there, not the collapsing fronts elsewhere….
“Russia is making steady and more consequential progress inside Ukraine”
Steady and less consequential — for Ukraine. Ukraine has already taken as much territory from Russia in Russia, as Russia has taken from Ukraine in Ukraine since February.
What do they always say about property markets? It’s about three things: (1) location (2) location and (3) location.
So these two journalists are smarter than the Ukrainians? I doubt it.
The counter-strike has no guarantees but who was predicting it a couple of wks ago? It’s boosted Ukrainian morale – hugely important – and that of it’s allies. And it must clearly have shaken Putin and many others on his side.
The Putin sabre rattling about tactical nuclear and strikes on Zaporizhzhia will continue. But the former will never happen (tactically the launchers would be destroyed first because they have to close the range and come within range of counter measures) and the latter would give Ukraine the casus belli for equivalent strike. The threats are designed to weaken resolve but won’t.
Zelensky known for some time a deal has to be struck and he won’t get everything back. But he needs a new armistice line that is strategically a bit stronger than he has now. That’s what a land trade would be about. Next spring after the US elections and after Putin realises the White House ain’t riding to his rescue. And that’s why Ukraine strengthening their hold on that land.
How about the Dnieper? North and South.
Poorly written. Distractingly link-heavy. Near-sighted analysis.
People in Moscow not that bothered about Kursk, wishful thinking that it’s provoking crisis on any level. Putin’s sure to keep the train on the rails because it’s working economically and socially as well as militarily.
You can see why some in Kyiv were desperate to roll the dice for that reason, even if they don’t actually have a strategy other then hoping Moscow will overreact and upset their own applecart. But WW II’s Kursk supplied a lesson in the use of your own territory to soak up, separate and destroy agressies. Odds now that Russia will have cleared the Donbas by Christmas and be pushing towards the Dneioer north of Zaporozhye. Where they’ll encounter the remnants of the UA Kursk adventurers.
If the Kursk invasion had compelled Russia to pull reserves out of the Donbas, it could have been a stunning success. Russia’s inexorable advance in the East would have stalled and Ukraine would have gained valuable breathing space.
Unfortunately, Russia didn’t take the bait.
There is a very large body of Russian conscripts who are forbidden by law from fighting outside Russia… but they can certainly be used to contain and slowly degrade the Ukrainian forces in Kursk.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is deprived of these experienced and valuable reserves to reinforce the Donbass front, which actually makes a Russian breakthrough much more likely.
So yes, Kursk may well be a very costly failure in the near future.
“By law”? What are you talking about? Russian soldiers fight where Putin tells them to fight! Plus, those bits of Ukraine in which Russians are fighting are now part of Russia, according to Russian law anyway (after the “referendums” where the citizens of those regions voted to be part of Russia)!
Then Ukraine will take Kursk.
Not at a cost the mothers will let Putin will to charge against their lives.
I agree with the authors about Russia’s weakness. There is no doubting the military potential of Russia (we know that from history) but without buy-in from society as a whole, especially the middle and privileged classes, who resent the war, including sanctions, especially travel sanctions, Putin is going to continue to struggle,