March 22, 2025 - 4:00pm

The nascent European project of forming a “coalition of the willing” to support Ukraine could be a precursor to a larger joint undertaking. According to the Financial Times, Europe’s biggest military powers and the Nordic states are discussing a plan to “replace the US in Nato”, with a view to guaranteeing the continent’s security. At the heart of the proposal is massively increased defence spending and arms procurement over the coming five to 10 years.

This overcorrection to Vice President JD Vance’s recent critique of decades of European dependency on US military protection is intended to stop the Trump administration from crashing out of Nato. Instead, European countries are trying to persuade America to consider a gradual withdrawal. “Increased spending is the only play we have,” says one European official privy to the discussions.

Yet the possibility of “Amexit” from Nato is not the only challenge posed to the cohesion of the military alliance. As the emergence of the “coalition of the willing” clearly demonstrates, European countries are themselves split over commitments to Ukraine; Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte increasingly resembles a frustrated chief whip, unsuccessfully trying to control disruptive members. Poland and the Baltics also question, more or less openly, whether the mutual defence clause Article 5 can really be relied on in the context of the alliance as a whole.

None of this will be solved by a “European pillar of Nato” as imagined by Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron, which would essentially continue Nato’s current idealistic and rhetorically driven framing of policy — only without US guarantees for continental security. What’s more, such a scheme would have a shelf life only until a nationalist figure in the style of Germany’s Alice Weidel or Britain’s Nigel Farage is elected to high office in a major European country.

The only way, arguably, to keep the Americans in Europe and the Europeans together is to renegotiate the very mission and purpose of Nato. This is something which should have been done long ago, after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the inclusion in Nato of post-Soviet states with a strong desire to reclaim sovereignty and national identity.

There is a precedent that could be useful here: former French president Charles de Gaulle’s critique of supranational authority during the Sixties. Put another way: what if Nato were transformed into an alliance with a more “native” character, in which the highest degree of military solidarity would be expected only in the event of a threat against all members? In other Nato operations around the globe, member states would have the explicit freedom to participate in relation to what countries consider in line with their national beliefs and interests — meaning that if such a rule had been in place for the 2011 Libya campaign, Germany would not have been scolded for opting out.

In the longer term, a repurposed Nato could lead to member states developing different “profiles” based on their respective strengths. For example, countries such as Sweden, with limited military resources to defend their sovereignty but industrial prowess, could potentially focus on becoming the “workshop of Nato”. By this measure, they could offer high-tech weaponry and supporting systems instead of contributing troops to Nato missions. As a result, not all Nato members would have to chime in on a single, often Western-aligned analysis of world affairs — such as the wisdom of bombing Libya in 2011 — yet would still be deserving of the collective’s protection in a World War III scenario.

Similar to the original conception of the EU as a web of economic dependencies and hence political loyalties between historically warring powers, a “native Nato” could even dissipate doubts about the reliability of Article 5. With some form of work-sharing arrangement in the alliance, it would be in the interests of every member to support the “musketeer principle”. The coalition of the willing is a noble idea. To survive, however, Nato must accommodate its more unwilling member states too.


Johan Wennström is a Research Fellow at the Swedish Defence University, currently writing a book about Sweden’s stay-behind network during the Cold War.

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