April 10, 2024 - 10:00am

In a sign that life is slowly returning to a semblance of normality, food price inflation has now dropped back below where it was when Russia invaded Ukraine. The wartime fall in agricultural exports from Ukraine, which in its former life was known as the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, had worsened pandemic-era inflation, raising the spectre of hunger in some import-dependent nations.

But with exceptions, food prices are now not only rising at a more tempered pace, and in some cases are even falling. Prices of meat and fish, among other items, recently began dropping in Britain and the United States, much to the relief of strapped consumers.

That said, we probably won’t breathe easier for a while. We’ve all been scarred by the memories of the last couple of years, when inflation reached double digits. And despite those recent falls, prices remain well above where they were before the surge began.

All the same, this inflation was always bound to run its course. Most of it was supply-related, caused by the bottlenecks that resulted from the pandemic’s collapse in global trade. Not only did these bottlenecks gradually work their way through trade pipelines but central banks, initially caught sleeping at the wheel by price-rises they misdiagnosed as “transitory”, raised interest rates to squeeze demand, and helped to restore balance to the market.

Still, it will be only a semblance of the old normality. Inflation appears to be settling at a higher level than it did in the recent past, when central banks set targets of keeping inflation around 2%, with interest rates only slightly above that. It’s more likely that inflation will settle closer to 3%, and interest rates will probably stay above 4% or more.

That’s because over the last few years there have been a series of structural changes in the economy which will provide tailwinds to prices. Supply-chain diversification, coupled with increasing trade protectionism in many countries, is constraining supply and reducing the disinflationary impact that global trade once provided.

Meanwhile, labour shortages are becoming a chronic constraint in Western economies. The increasing turn in Western politics against immigration as a recourse — even Canada, famously welcoming to newcomers, has begun to restrict it — will only exacerbate this effect. Labour shortages are thus driving up the bargaining power of labour, the result being rising real wages in many countries.

That helps sustain demand, which is a big part of the reason that economies are proving resilient amid higher interest rates. But this resilience will also keep interest rates from coming down as much as many had been hoping. We’re already seeing this effect in bond markets, where rising yields even amid falling inflation suggests that investors expect real rates to be higher in the future than they were in the past.

Assuming real wages stay positive, workers will continue adapting to higher interest rates, as they so far have mostly done. But while that’s good for economies, it will prevent interest rates from falling to the near-zero levels we once knew. Asset markets which had soared on the back of cheap credit are going to struggle going forward. Even if prices on property, stocks and private equity don’t fall in absolute terms, they probably will in real terms.

It amounts to a quiet revolution of sorts. For decades, income had been moving from workers to owners. That may now be reversing. And given that the owners in this day and age are often large pension funds, we may be in the midst of a substantial rebalancing of society, one whose significance we’ve yet to fully grasp.


John Rapley is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West (with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a religion (Simon & Schuster, 2017).

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