January 31, 2025 - 7:30pm

It’s a tough time for the Democrats. After defeating Donald Trump four years ago, the party struggled to effectively navigate the US through the fallout from the pandemic and watched as Americans turned against them on issue after issue. Joe Biden became too frail and unpopular to run again, and his refusal to drop out early saddled Democrats with another unpopular candidate in Kamala Harris. All this ultimately resulted in the return of Trump, who has already taken a battering ram to many projects and policies that Democrats hold dear.

But the pain didn’t stop in November. This week has produced fresh evidence of just how far the party has fallen. A new Quinnipiac poll has found that the Democrats’ favourability rating among the public sits at 31%, its lowest point since the firm began tracking that question back in 2008. Meanwhile, 57% hold an unfavourable view. This isn’t just due to a general dissatisfaction among voters — on the other side, Republicans essentially break even, with 43% of the public viewing them favourably (a historic high in this poll) versus 45% unfavourably.

It’s not just Quinnipiac, either. A CNN survey from this month showed that nearly one-third (32%) of Democratic-leaning adults said the political events of the past few years made them feel like they’ve been pushed away from the party, compared to 23% who said they feel closer to it. For the Democrats to dig themselves out of this hole, they will need to honestly address how they got there.

Party leaders must first reckon how, over the past two decades, they came to believe in the idea of an “emerging Democratic majority”: a coalition of racial minorities, women, young people, and the professional class that would deliver them sustained electoral success as many of these groups grew in size. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer once even uttered: “For every blue-collar Democrat we lose in western Pennsylvania, we will pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs in Philadelphia, and you can repeat that in Ohio and Illinois and Wisconsin.”

Yet this was ill-fated in multiple ways. Working-class non-college-educated voters make up 58% of the electorate, giving them substantial influence. The “emerging majority” thesis, rooted in an identitarian understanding of the country, also viewed many of these groups as essentially monolithic, and the party apparently convinced itself that each section of support was unconditional. But as the Trump era has shown, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, some of the party’s largest losses between 2020 and 2024 came from these exact groups.

Additionally, as the Democratic base has shifted from being more moderate and working-class to being better-educated, wealthier, and more liberal, it has trended away from the median American voter. A post-election study from the group Third Way found that voters placed themselves slightly Right-of-centre on an ideological scale, closer to Trump than to Harris. This perfectly captures the party’s predicament: its base is moving further Leftward, even as the country remains steadfastly centre-right.

Many Americans also believed the Democrats cared less about core issues such as the economy and immigration, and more about the ones which motivated their base, such as abortion and LGBT rights. Pre-election polling showed that Democratic voters valued social issues over the economy, perhaps indicative of why the likes of abortion and “democracy protection” were front and centre in Harris’s campaign.

Another key factor in the Democrats’ recent struggles was their inability to govern competently. Though Biden promised to steady the ship after Trump, his own first-term agenda ended up setting in motion a series of events that brought his rival back, including an inflationary stimulus package and misguided immigration reforms — both of which swing voters cited as reasons for not supporting Harris in the election.

Worse still, the party’s difficulty in dealing with crime and the cost of living in deep-blue states has provoked an exodus towards red states, while those who remain have begun swinging Rightward. Some of Trump’s biggest gains between 2020 and 2024 came in historically Democratic strongholds such as New York (+10.6 points), New Jersey (+10), California (+9.1), and Massachusetts (+8.3).

So, where do the Democrats go from here? Some have argued that all they need to do is sit tight, let Trump overreach, and then enjoy the benefits of normal political gravity, which will deliver victories in special elections and the midterms. This worked during Trump’s first term, so why not again? There is some logic to this, at least in the short term, as Democratic voters turn out at higher rates in off-year elections than Republicans.

But the party’s problems run deeper. The Democrats’ brand is underwater, and they must find a way to win back the working-class Americans lost to Trump, move toward the median voter’s values, and demonstrate to the public that their states are better-run and more desirable than Republican ones. If not, they may find themselves sitting at home in November 2028 wondering why America rejected them once again.


Michael Baharaeen is chief political analyst at The Liberal Patriot substack.

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