Ukraine faces decisive months ahead as key allies gear up for crunch elections. While early presidential campaigning in the US and a looming general election in Poland will grab the international headlines, a snap election in Slovakia on 30 September may prove every bit as consequential. 

With Robert Fico — Slovakia’s former prime minister and one of the West’s most outspoken critics of the Ukrainian war effort — poised to win the vote, a change of government in Bratislava could have a profound effect on EU policymaking. Fico has promised that if his party makes it into government “we will not send a single bullet to Ukraine,” proudly proclaiming that “I allow myself to have a different opinion to that of the United States” on the war.  

Fico has also claimed on the campaign trail that “war always comes from the West and peace from the East,” and that “what is happening today is unnecessary killing, it is the emptying of warehouses to force countries to buy more American weapons.” Such statements have resulted in him being blacklisted by Kyiv as a spreader of Russian propaganda.  

Yet the former prime minister spearheads a new brand of Left-wing, anti-American populism that has become a powerful force in Central Europe since the war began. Perceptions that “the Americans occupy us” — as one MP in Fico’s Smer party evocatively put it — are shared with a similar groundswell of anti-Western opinion in the neighbouring Czech Republic.  

Yet Smer has been handed a chance to gain power thanks to the chaos which has engulfed Slovakia’s pro-EU, pro-Western forces. Personal grievances coupled with serious policy errors tore apart a four-party coalition formed after elections in 2020, leaving Fico to capitalise on heightened mistrust in establishment politics. Smer is expected to become the nation’s largest party after this month’s election, with an anticipated 20% of the vote.  

Whatever the specific makeup of the new government, if Smer is the largest party it will likely pursue a foreign policy similar to that of Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary. A halt to until-now generous Slovak arms shipments to Ukraine is Fico’s central electoral pledge, while the arrival on the scene of another Orbán-style government prepared to obstruct EU aid efforts for Ukraine would create a serious headache. That is particularly the case as Brussels struggles to win support for both short and long-term war funding commitments. 

Victory for Fico would also amplify Orbán’s scepticism about the overall Western narrative on Ukraine — a scepticism which the Hungarian Prime Minister recently conveyed to Western conservatives during an interview with Tucker Carlson. Orbán portrayed Ukraine’s attempts to win back the territories taken by Russia as ultimately hopeless and claimed that Donald Trump’s promise to end the war quickly makes him “the man who can save the Western world”. 

Like Trump in America and Orbán in Europe, Fico is hated with a passion by establishment forces. But in Slovakia, the pro-Western establishment itself has become so mistrusted that power may soon pass to a man intent on shattering what’s left of European unity on Ukraine. 

Mykhailo Drapatyi became widely known in Ukraine when his armored vehicle was the first to crash through pro-Russian barricades in the city of Mariupol in 2014. Yesterday, he was made commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, replacing the unpopular Oleksandr Syrskyi after a week of protests calling for his removal.

Ukraine’s allies have hailed the move as good news, putting a talented military professional in charge of the war effort and proving the continued vibrancy of Ukraine’s democracy. Look more closely, however, and this narrative is nothing but a spin job. Instead, Kyiv’s latest saga points to a country that is increasingly consumed by political dysfunction as it tries to distract audiences at home and abroad from its military struggles.

Drapatyi’s appointment was just the latest in a series of personnel moves ordered by President Volodymyr Zelensky over the past week. Among the most high-profile was the firing of Ukraine’s defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who had been widely credited with Ukraine’s recent successes using drones to strike Russian energy targets and cut off Moscow’s logistical supplies to Crimea.

This was Zelensky’s second government overhaul in the past year and, much like last time, few clear explanations have been offered. There has been speculation that the moves were driven by a corruption cover-up, personality clashes, or substantive disagreements. Zelensky himself says the changes in personnel are necessary to prepare for the coming winter, which many expect to be difficult.

From the outside, however, Zelensky’s repeated shake-ups seem more like expressions of his own political ambition. These changes can be seen to be part of a play for domestic political consolidation, achieved by removing possible challengers such as Fedorov and installing replacements he believes he can control.

This can be explained by Zelensky’s fixation on domestic politics, which has grown over this year and should worry his backers in Europe and the United States. Focused on his own domestic political success, the Ukrainian President is both distracted from the war effort and beholden to it. To avoid elections he might lose, he needs the war to continue. But his efforts to secure his own future with constant political reshuffles put Ukraine’s future at risk.

There are other reasons to worry about Ukraine’s future. Zelensky’s decision to change the leaders of the country’s armed forces and defense ministry in the same week reveals much about the war’s progress — and the signs are worrying.

For months, Ukraine’s fiercest supporters have argued that Ukraine has “turned the tide” and is winning the war. But countries that are winning their wars do not remove and replace their defense leaders in the middle of a successful campaign. It might break well-established lines of communication, while it could also damage soldier morale or weaken centralized control of the force.

That Zelensky chose to make these moves now suggests that the war may not be going as well as Kyiv has publicly claimed. Russian military forces continue to make slow gains in Ukraine’s east and are moving closer to the “fortress belt” cities that are the crown jewels of Kyiv’s defense. Ukraine’s vulnerability to Russia’s deep strikes is also increasing as it lacks the Patriot missiles to protect civilian infrastructure and populations. Turmoil in the leadership ranks is therefore the canary in the coal mine, indicating that Ukraine’s war is going worse than advertised.

Unfortunately, a new commander-in-chief, no matter how battle-hardened and accomplished, is unlikely to shift the trajectory of the war because he will not be able to overcome the structural challenges that have faced Ukraine since day one.

He cannot address Ukraine’s lack of manpower, which is as much a function of its smaller population as the diminishing interest of Ukrainian men to join a brutal military fight. He cannot address Ukraine’s lack of the necessary air defense systems to protect military and civilian targets, which stems from a global shortage. Most importantly, he cannot reverse the slow ebb of Western support, most recently manifested in the EU’s inability to agree on a 21st sanctions package and the growing number of states now drawing back their military or economic support to Ukraine.

Despite hopes for a new beginning, Drapatyi will take control of the Ukrainian armed forces while facing many obstacles. Worst of all, already institutionally weakened by the chaos that preceded him, he will have to deal with the lingering fear that before too long, he may be the next victim of Ukraine’s political machine.

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Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.

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