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		<title>War - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Why German tanks are rolling into Lithuania</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-german-tanks-are-rolling-into-lithuania/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Dispatch</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Lucy Ash]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[German tank crew in Lithuania participates in a Nato exercise. (Sean Gallup/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><span lang="EN-AU"><strong>Lucy Ash</strong> is an acclaimed presenter of radio and TV documentaries on foreign affairs. Based in Moscow for the BBC in the early Nineties, she has reported regularly from Russia and Ukraine in the intervening decades. <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Baton-Cross-Russias-Church-Pagans/dp/1837731837" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i>The Baton and The Cross</i></a> (Icon Books 2024), </span><span lang="EN-US">a finalist for both the Orwell and British Academy Book Prizes,</span><span lang="EN-AU"> is her first book.</span></p>
]]>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an acclaimed presenter of radio and TV documentaries on foreign affairs. Based in Moscow for the BBC in the early Nineties, she has reported regularly from Russia and Ukraine in the intervening decades. <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Baton-Cross-Russias-Church-Pagans/dp/1837731837" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i>The Baton and The Cross</i></a> (Icon Books 2024), </span><span lang="EN-US">a finalist for both the Orwell and British Academy Book Prizes,</span><span lang="EN-AU"> is her first book.</span>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 00:01:32 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 10:07:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conscription]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lithuania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1079754</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Nato has overhauled its Baltic strategy]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>A heavy rain is falling on Rukla, a former Soviet army base an hour north of Vilnius in Lithuania. Infantry fighting vehicles race past through the mud, decked with fir branches for camouflage. “This is a great opportunity to show what we’re capable of and train with our allies,” Robin Eskeland, a Norwegian lieutenant, tells me as I take shelter in the back of his CV90 battlefield taxi. “Of course, we have our differences,” he says. “We like to be flexible; Germans want to stick to the plan. And they’re ultra-punctual. If an exercise is due to begin at 8am, they’re always there, guns at the ready, half an hour beforehand.” For all the <i>Jeux Sans Frontières </i>stereotypes of national quirks, Eskeland sees this deployment as the “most meaningful” of his seven-year army career so far — a chance to prepare for a war that, in this corner of Europe, no longer feels quite so unimaginable.</p>
<p>Since 2017, Germany has led NATO’s multinational force in Lithuania, with troops from eight other countries rotating in and out to serve alongside German forces. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted Vilnius to seek firmer guarantees that its allies would come to its defense if the Baltic states became the Kremlin’s next target. Berlin responded by committing to permanently station an armored brigade in Lithuania, establishing a combat-ready deterrent on NATO’s northeastern flank. The move is unprecedented for the Bundeswehr: this is its first permanent military deployment abroad since the Second World War. Latvia and Estonia sought similar commitments from Canada and the UK, respectively, but Lithuania alone secured an entire brigade.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bmvg.de/en/news/defence-minister-pistorius-speaks-in-the-lithuanian-parliament-5843956" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Addressing parliament in Vilnius two years ago</a>, Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius promised that German troops would stand shoulder to shoulder with their Lithuanian counterparts, ready to defend the country — part of a wider Alliance commitment to protect every inch of NATO territory. A year later, in May 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz attended the commissioning ceremony of the newly created 45th Panzer Brigade against the backdrop of a grand neoclassical basilica in Vilnius’s Cathedral Square. &#8220;The security of Lithuania is also our security”, he declared. “The protection of Vilnius is the protection of Berlin.&#8221;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The brigade has its own coat of arms, worn on every soldier’s uniform. A black Staufer lion, the heraldic emblem of Germany’s medieval Hohenstaufen dynasty, stands next to a sword and Gediminas’s Tower, one of Vilnius’s most famous landmarks. Green, red, black and gold, the colors of the German and Lithuanian flags, tie the design together.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<figure id="attachment_1080281" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1080281" style="width: 1600px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1080281 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg" alt="" width="1600" height="1200" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg 1600w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=300,225 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=768,576 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=1024,768 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=1536,1152 1536w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=267,200 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=253,190 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=250,188 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=660,495 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Sgt-Maik-mechanic-in-Panzerbrigade.jpeg?resize=480,360 480w" sizes="(max-width: 1600px) 100vw, 1600px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1080281" class="wp-caption-text">‘Germany’s newly formed brigade will be supplied with state-of-the-art equipment.’ (Credit: Lucy Ash)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Germany’s newly formed brigade will be supplied with state-of-the-art equipment designed to repel a potential Russian attack, including kamikaze drones, Leopard 2 A8 main battle tanks, Puma infantry fighting vehicles, and Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers. It brings together combat battalions from Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, backed by artillery, reconnaissance, armored engineers, logistics and signals units. Next month, more than 700 drones will take to the skies as the 45th Brigade puts new reconnaissance, strike and loitering munition capabilities to the test.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The arrival of the 45th Brigade marks a major shift in how NATO plans to defend the Baltics. Under the old “tripwire” strategy, a small force would be expected to hold off an attack until allies arrived to push the invaders back. Now, the aim is to stop an invasion from the outset. That means keeping tanks and other heavy equipment in Lithuania, ready to fight, rather than waiting weeks for them to arrive from Germany or other NATO countries.</p>
<p>One of the brigade’s main jobs is protecting the Suwałki Gap, a 40-mile strip of land along the border between Poland and Lithuania — the vital land link between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO. It’s the region’s Achilles Heel or “neuralgic point”, as the German Lieutenant Colonel escorting me puts it.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>We drive through a small village and stop at a level crossing. A freight train rumbles past, heading west from neighboring Belarus towards Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad. Perched on the Baltic Sea, it is a Russian island inside the European Union, sandwiched between Poland to the south and Lithuania to the north and east. The wagons are marked “<i>Sodruzhestvo”</i>, the name of Russia’s top agro-industrial conglomerate. Lithuanian border guards constantly monitor the trains to prevent illegal military equipment from passing through the European Union corridor.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Western intelligence agencies have long suspected Russia may have nuclear weapons stockpiled in Kaliningrad. Since 2016, Moscow has stationed 9K720 Iskander short-range missiles there, capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Yet<a href="https://securebaltics.org/news/analysis/kaliningrad-2050-fragile-fortress/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> new research</a> conducted by the Baltic International Security Centre (BISC), a nonprofit policy institute, suggests that the region has been “stripped bare” of ground forces and air defenses because Russia is diverting resources to the war in Ukraine.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>“They may have nuclear warheads,” says Edward Lucas, security expert and director of the BISC, “but they haven&#8217;t got anything to launch them on because the missiles are all busy bombarding Ukrainian cities.” He adds that there is no real difference from NATO&#8217;s point of view whether a nuclear warhead is launched from Kaliningrad or from a missile on a Sukhoi Su-57 bomber or from a submarine because “in the end, if Russia wants to go nuclear, it&#8217;s not going to be the nuclear warheads in Kaliningrad that are decisive”.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1080284" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1080284" style="width: 1200px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1080284 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg" alt="" width="1200" height="1600" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg 1200w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg?resize=225,300 225w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg?resize=768,1024 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg?resize=1152,1536 1152w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg?resize=267,356 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg?resize=253,337 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg?resize=250,333 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg?resize=660,880 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Major-Sven-Krause.jpeg?resize=480,640 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1200px) 100vw, 1200px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1080284" class="wp-caption-text">‘Green, red, black and gold, the colors of the German and Lithuanian flags.’ (Credit: Lucy Ash)</figcaption></figure>
<p>However, he stresses that the exclave remains an important hub for hybrid operations such as GPS electronic warfare or propaganda and, crucially, serves as a useful pretext for escalation. In September,<a href="https://apnews.com/article/nato-russia-nuclear-kaliningrad-hybrid-sabotage-2bd21dbaf9d67f5e2aada61e9ce8bf06?utm_source=copy&amp;utm_medium=share" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Moscow accused NATO of plotting to blockade Kaliningrad</a> and threatened nuclear retaliation. More recently, the Russian military website <i>Voennoye Delo</i> <a href="https://voennoedelo.com/en/posts/id20648-sivkov-russia-would-need-baltic-territory-for-kaliningrad" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggested that</a> a hypothetical blockade might require Russia to seize a 100-kilometer swathe of Baltic territory to secure access to the exclave.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Such sabre rattling, Lucas tells me, has led to a complete overhaul of defense policy in both Poland and the Baltic States. “I can&#8217;t quote him by name,” he says, “but a Baltic official once told me, “If a seagull shits in the harbour, we know what it had for breakfast when it last went to Russia, who it dates, where it nests. And what its parents did during the Soviet era”.” In other words, monitoring Kaliningrad is a priority for the Valstybės Saugumo Departamentas (VSD), Lithuania’s counterintelligence agency.</p>
<p>Despite heightened vigilance, Lithuanians feel increasingly exposed. In May, residents of Vilnius received emergency alerts on their phones<a href="https://apnews.com/article/lithuania-russia-belarus-ukraine-war-drone-alert-65a07ddd19cc4aa73776418135379669" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> ordering them to immediately take cover</a> amid suspected drone activity near the Belarusian border. It was the first major alert to send people in an EU and NATO capital scrambling for shelter since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Then, in September, an Italian fighter jet on a NATO mission shot down a drone over Lithuanian airspace. A Ukrainian military source identified the wreckage as belonging to a Geran-2, a long-range attack drone widely used by Russia.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Across Vilnius, bright yellow signs reading “<i>Priedanga</i>” — “shelter” — sprung up following Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine in 2022. But when frightened residents rushed to them in May, some found the doors locked. Others described them as unfit for purpose: dilapidated and covered in cobwebs. The chaos and complaints prompted Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė, who had sheltered with the President in a strategic government bunker, to apologize and promise a review. But many fear their country is woefully unprepared for worst-case scenarios. In 2016, the US think tank RAND war-gamed a Russian attack on the Baltics and reached a chilling conclusion: without more NATO troops on the ground, Russian forces could overrun the Baltic states in just 36 to 60 hours. Lithuania has been a NATO member for more than two decades but that did not prevent an MP from Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party<a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/en/articles/2022/06/08/russian-mp-suggests-to-revoke-lithuanias-independence-recognition-news" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> publicly questioning Lithuania&#8217;s independence</a> in Russia’s State Duma four years ago.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Many fear their country is woefully unprepared for worst-case scenarios.&#8221;</div>
<p>Most Lithuanians know from bitter experience what it means to be controlled by Russia. Memories of the Soviet occupation, which lasted nearly half a century after the Second World War, are still fresh. Almost every family has relatives who were murdered or sent to gulags in Siberia. There’s a dark history with the Germans too. Vilnius was once known as the “Jerusalem of the North”, home to at least 55,000 Jews and a celebrated tradition of Torah scholarship. Across Lithuania, Jews made up nearly a tenth of the population. But under Nazi occupation, the country suffered one of the highest per-capita rates of Jewish murder in Europe.</p>
<p>Today, though, Lithuanians are grateful for German support. The government has pledged up to €1.7 billion to construct housing, training areas and support facilities while the Germans supply the military hardware and the troops. Bundeswehr soldiers are applauded in the streets and people buy them drinks. Lithuania’s national army has surrendered its new garrison at Rokantiškės to the Bundeswehr; men from its own infantry are sleeping in tents and portacabins until the Germans’ facility is ready.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Germany’s ambassador to Lithuania recently praised the new modern barracks at Rūdninkai, near the Belarusian border. Each soldier gets a private en-suite room, a queen-size bed and a kitchenette. With gleaming sports facilities and vast windows overlooking the pine forest, the barracks could almost pass for a hotel rather than a military base. For soldiers bringing their families to Lithuania, homes in or near Vilnius are less than an hour away. German schools and kindergartens have opened in both the capital and Kaunas, the country’s second-largest city.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1080286" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1080286" style="width: 1600px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1080286 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp" alt="" width="1600" height="1067" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp 1600w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=768,512 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=1024,683 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=1536,1024 1536w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=566,376 566w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=253,169 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=250,167 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=660,440 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Staff-Sergeant-Phil.webp?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1600px) 100vw, 1600px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1080286" class="wp-caption-text">In Germany and Lithuania, Sgt Phil says he is increasingly thanked for his service. (Credit: Lucy Ash)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Despite the warm welcome and all the perks on offer, the Bundeswehr is struggling to find enough volunteers for the brigade, which is due to be fully operational by the end of next year. The German defense ministry says around 80% of the brigade’s 5,000 posts are filled, but key roles remain vacant, particularly IT technicians, tank mechanics and medics. These specialists are in short supply across the Bundeswehr, which struggles to compete with civilian employers.</p>
<p>Ambivalent attitudes towards the military may in part explain the Bundeswehr’s recruitment problems. In Berlin, soldiers were once warned for their own safety to change into civvies before going home from work. Germany’s unease with its army was shaped by the atrocities of the Nazi era and decades of anti-militarist sentiment. Now uniformed soldiers get free train tickets, and nobody bats an eyelid. Yet growing respect for the military has not erased divisions over plans to introduce a new form of military service. The prospect of a draft has already fueled protests, particularly after the government introduced mandatory medical checks this January for 18-year-old men. Last month, tens of thousands of students <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cxnvlnve52qdo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">walked out of class</a> in cities across Germany carrying banners with anti-war messages including &#8220;conscription means cannon fodder&#8221; and “We are peaceful, what about you?”<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>All this gives political ammunition to those at the extremes of Germany’s political spectrum who resent government funds spent on Ukraine and who lobby to get sanctions against Russia lifted. Sahra Wagenknecht and Amira Mohamed Ali, co-leaders of the populist Left-wing BSW, have denounced Merz’s military service reform as “absolute madness” and empty warmongering. On the far-Right, the AfD is divided: while some back conscription for 18- to 25-year-olds, others rally behind the slogan “<i>Keine Wehrpflicht für fremde Kriege”</i> — “No Conscription for Foreign Wars”. They argue that young Germans should not be drafted to fight for “foreign geopolitical or power interests”, a thinly veiled swipe at NATO and German support for Ukraine.</p>
<p>During a coffee break at the Rukla base, I meet Staff Sgt Phil — Bundeswehr protocol insists that the media use only first names — from Hamburg, who trained as tank commander and drone operator. I ask him whether tanks are becoming obsolete in the age of drone warfare. He shakes his head. “They deliver a lot of firepower and can move speedily on the battlefield,” he says. “Plus you still need heavy armor to take and hold ground.” He adds that in Lithuania, German crews are fitting their Leopard tanks with anti-drone cages, electronic jammers and active protection systems to counter incoming threats.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>He says Lithuanians he meets in cafes and shops often tell him they feel safer because of the brigade’s presence. In Germany too, he adds, he is now increasingly thanked for his service. Like many in the Bundeswehr he believes that conscription is needed — the sooner the better — because you cannot create a combat-ready reserve overnight. The war in Ukraine, he says, has forced a change in mindset: “We’re beginning to understand that we can no longer take our liberty for granted.”<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1079754</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Britain shouldn’t leave Sierra Leone</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/10/why-britain-shouldnt-leave-sierra-leone/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/10/why-britain-shouldnt-leave-sierra-leone/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1247975602.jpg?w=399</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Civil war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Alex Diggins]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Screenshot-2026-10-11-at-15.04.09.jpg?w=89</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[A camp not far from Freetown, following the British intervention in 2000. (Seyllou Diallo/Getty) ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Alex Diggins</strong> is a reporter, editor, and researcher based in the UK. His work has featured in the <em>Telegraph</em>, <em>Spectator</em>, and <em>Observer</em>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a reporter, editor, and researcher based in the UK. His work has featured in the <em>Telegraph</em>, <em>Spectator</em>, and <em>Observer</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 23:01:51 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 02:33:45 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[foreign aid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intervention]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sierra Leone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1078000</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Military intervention saved the country]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>You don’t have to travel long in Sierra Leone to hear stories of its 11-year-long war. On my second day in the country, dazzled by heat, I visited a secondary school and met its head teacher, Joseph M Kai. It was Independence Day – 27 April – but the celebrations were muted, as Sierra Leone’s President, Julius Maada Bio, was worried that the partying might spill into anti-government protests. Still, Kai’s pupils had the day off, and they were making the most of it, playing a riotous game of soccer on the dusty pitch.</p>
<p>Kai looked out at the boys playing, and told me about his childhood during the war. He was, he said, younger than his pupils when he saw someone burned alive in front of him. The man was a rebel, and a few weeks previously, he’d shot another person, an act which Kai witnessed too. Now, the murderer was at the mercy of a mob, seeking revenge.</p>
<p>They shoved a tire around his neck, doused him with gasoline, and set him alight. This was 1997, Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. Kai and his family had been driven from their home in Kenema, a city in the east of the country, by the rebel advance. They arrived in Freetown among thousands of other refugees. “We were accused of being rebels, spat at, called ‘monkeys’, people said we had tails,” he says. Kai’s older brother didn’t make it – he was captured by the rebels and taken to Liberia.</p>
<p>Kai&#8217;s family were educated, but in Freetown there was no work. So Kai and his siblings sold charcoal to support themselves. They sheltered in a hotel commandeered by “Kamajors”, a civil defense militia, who wore voodoo-infused “body-armor”: string vests, hung with woolen charms and trinkets. When there was a general amnesty for weapons in 1999, Kai’s mother persuaded him to take in one of their guns to receive payment. It was a believable story – child soldiers were common. The money kept them going for a while. But “it was very, very hard,” Kai says. Throughout the war, he barely went to school.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1078006" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1078006" style="width: 1920px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1078006 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg" alt="" width="1920" height="1280" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg 1920w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=1024,683 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=1536,1024 1536w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=566,376 566w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252546815.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1920px) 100vw, 1920px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1078006" class="wp-caption-text">Two child soldiers, photograph in 2000. (Jean-Philippe Ksiazek)</figcaption></figure>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>***</strong></p>
<p>It’s been 25 years since the end of Sierra Leone’s war. What began as an army uprising against the corrupt administration of the then-President Joseph Momah on 23 March, 1991, swiftly spilled into a bloody regional conflict. In a small country of five million people, more than 50,000 people were killed, and hundreds of thousands more wounded, disabled and displaced. At one point, the army rebels held almost all the country, including parts of Freetown. Speak to anyone in Sierra Leone over the age of 30, and they will have stories of trauma and loss.</p>
<p>It’s too easy to dismiss Sierra Leone’s conflict as a historic tragedy – simply the kind of thing that happens in Africa, as inevitable as the rains. But the British military intervention, which brought the war to an end in an extraordinary fashion in 2001 – through concentrated force, in-depth understanding of regional politics and clear, boundaried objectives – showed how Western powers can use military force humanely and effectively to create change, including in current conflicts, such as Iran.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;UnHerd can today report that Britain has ended its permanent military presence in Sierra Leone, citing security concerns.&#8221;</div>
<p>Yet after a bright period of stabilization and peace, the country seems to be backsliding into the conditions which led to the war in the first place. Indeed, <em>UnHerd</em> can today report that Britain has ended its permanent military presence in Sierra Leone, citing security concerns. And as the Western powers have pulled out of West Africa, other countries – principally China and Russia – have hungrily stepped in to fill the breach. Sierra Leone today provides a front-row seat to the new Great Game, as Western and non-Western powers scramble to control their &#8220;spheres of influence&#8221; through diplomatic, military and economic might.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1078005" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1078005" style="width: 1920px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1078005 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg" alt="" width="1920" height="1280" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg 1920w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=1024,683 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=1536,1024 1536w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=566,376 566w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-536011504.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1920px) 100vw, 1920px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1078005" class="wp-caption-text">The West Side Boys militia, 2000. (Patrick Robert/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>***</strong></p>
<p>Even by the standards of Africa’s civil conflicts, Sierra Leone’s war was breathtaking in its brutality. It began when a breakaway commander in the Sierra Leone army, Foday Sankoh, led an incursion from neighboring Liberia. His nominal goal was to overthrow Momoh’s government. But sponsored by Charles Taylor, the dictator of Liberia, who wanted a piece of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry, Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) ran riot. Allied with elements of the Sierra Leone Army — a faction which came to be called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) — the rebels terrorized ordinary Sierra Leoneans. In response, many formed militias, the Kamajors, to fight back. They were a rag-tag bunch: alongside their faith in voodoo-infused protection from bullets, they also believed that a mirror could deflect an RPG.</p>
<p>The rebels lacked a central command structure, and individual commanders effectively acted as private warlords, rampaging across the country, looting, raping and kidnapping children to fight for them. Among the various factions were foreign mercenaries from Britain and South Africa, the Kamajors and the West Side Boys, a gang of drugged-up thugs. Adding to the chaos were the Sierra Leone Army’s “sobels” — soldiers by day, rebels by night. Child soldiers were used by all sides — but were a signature of the RUF, as were mass mutilations. Fighters would cut off people’s arms to spread terror among the population, especially after the 1996 election returned a democratically-elected President. (“Vote for the government, lose your hand.”)</p>
<p>By late 1999, it looked like Sankoh and the rebels were poised to seize full control of the country. The previous decade had seen coups, counter-coups and democratic elections; there had been half-hearted attempts at peace deals and disarmament. Though the government was nominally run by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former UN development worker who had been elected by a landslide in 1996, the power lay with Sankoh. He paid lip-service to the 1997 Lome Peace Agreement, which was supposed to defuse the fighting, but refused to disarm the RUF and had himself installed as Minister for Mines. The UN peacekeeping forces were underpowered and ineffective; the rebels were becoming increasingly assertive, attacking positions on the way to the airport and threatening Freetown.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/africas-crisis-is-europes-too/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/africas-crisis-is-europes-too/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-1185354867.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/africas-crisis-is-europes-too/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/africas-crisis-is-europes-too/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Africa’s crisis is Europe’s too</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/africas-crisis-is-europes-too/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At this point, the Foreign Office ordered a Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) — Operation Palliser — of British citizens, headed by the then-Brigadier, David Richards, who had already visited the country on several occasions. With a small team of British officers, paratroopers and special forces soldiers, he set about taking the fight to the RUF. This went explicitly against orders from London, who wanted Richards to remain solely focused on the evacuation mission. He ignored them, rallying beleaguered UN troops and forging an “unholy alliance” between the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the Kamajors and warlord Johnny Paul Koroma’s West Side Boys — all of whom had been at each other’s throats in previous months. Using British troops as a spearhead, they pushed back against the RUF with maximum force. They were aided in this blitzkrieg campaign by Neall Ellis, an eccentric South African mercenary who piloted a Russian-made Hind Mi-24 attack helicopter.</p>
<p>Within weeks, the RUF were on the back foot, and driven to the negotiating table. Whitehall — despite sneers about Richards’ buccaneering tactics, earning him the nickname “Richards of Africa” — was forced to concede that Operation Palliser had been a success. The lightning campaign was the making of Richards’s career; afterwards, he went on to command NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and served as Chief of Defense Staff. By the end of 2000, Sankoh was in prison awaiting trial, and the democratically-elected government could begin to rebuild. Thirteen of the ringleaders of the conflict were put on trial in the high court in Freetown. Sankoh died before he could begin his sentence, but Charles Taylor, the Liberian dictator, was sentenced to 50 years for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He is currently serving his term at HMP Frankland in County Durham.</p>
<p>Yet Richards says now that he wasn’t concerned about the storm the Sierra Leone intervention caused back home. “I never expected to be a Field Marshal or anything like that. I had a rather romantic idea of what the military could do — that the Armed Forces could make people’s lives better, rather than the conventional view of armies as brutal killing machines. This was the last British-only foreign intervention. We had sufficient military muscle to do it then. I’m not sure we could do it now.”</p>
<figure id="attachment_1078004" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1078004" style="width: 1920px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1078004 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg" alt="" width="1920" height="1240" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg 1920w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=300,194 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=768,496 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=1024,661 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=1536,992 1536w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=267,172 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=253,163 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=250,161 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=660,426 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-1252330222.jpg?resize=480,310 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1920px) 100vw, 1920px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1078004" class="wp-caption-text">Soldiers on patrol in Kirima in 2000. (Issouf Sanogo/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>***</strong></p>
<p>Unlike the sprawling, messy interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan – and now in Iran – Richards’s campaign was short, sharp and goal-limited. There were no lofty aspirations about “regime change” or “sowing the seeds of democracy”; instead, the campaign was about supporting Kabbah’s military until they could stand on their own against the RUF, and then lending a hand as Kabbah sought to shore up his country again. To this end, for ten years afterwards, the British ran a training center for future officers in Freetown and provided foreign aid to support the government. “We helped get it back on its feet,” says Richards. “Most coups and dictatorships in Africa are born of the armed forces, so we were very keen in Sierra Leone that we had a democratically-elected president, with an accountable armed forces.”</p>
<p>After that first decade, British support began to dwindle. Since 2019, the UK’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been cut from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income; and, as of this year, it will hit its lowest since 2008 — down to 0.3%. This drop in foreign aid has blindsided countries like Sierra Leone. In the country, things seem more precarious; politics appears to be polarizing along the lines of old tribal animosities. So far, presidential elections have peacefully rotated every five years between the two main parties, the SLPP and the APC, and no president has tried to push their two-term limit. But the current President Julius Maada Bio is seen in some quarters as autocratic and nepotistic — and some Sierra Leoneans I spoke to felt it was only a matter of time before the peaceful transition of power broke down. In addition, many of the factors that led to the war — illiteracy, uneven development, drugs and corruption — are still present; by themselves, each is a manageable issue. But taken together, their effect is corrosive, especially given the context of Sierra Leone’s endemic poverty. The minimum monthly wage is 1,200 Leones (less than £40), and outside of Freetown, mains electricity and running water are scarce. People make do with solar power units, but they also look across to the nearby Ivory Coast, which has almost comprehensive mains electricity coverage, and wonder what is going wrong.</p>
<p>One compelling answer to that question is corruption. It operates at all levels — I was frisked for money several times by policemen at the ubiquitous roadblocks — but, more damagingly, it pervades the apparatus of the state. Only 6% of businesses which can pay tax do so, and the main industries — mining, ports and defense — are run by the President’s inner circle. &#8220;My time to eat,&#8221; runs a local saying. This lack of altruism leads to widespread culture of short-termism: few ordinary Sierra Leoneans have many savings, and the economy still operates on a wartime GDP. After all, why bother to save, to build businesses, to invest, if an iffy contract or an insufficiently-stuffed brown envelope could undermine all your efforts?</p>
<p>Drugs are a caustic problem, too. “Kush” — a synthetic, psychoactive drug which sends the user into a brief, catatonic high — is endemic. Addicts are easily identified, stumbling in a zombie-like daze through the streets; in 2024, the President declared its abuse a national health emergency. It mostly leads to petty crime as addicts steal to afford a hit — but its long-term use is lethal. Last year, a corpse lay outside on the smart streets of the embassy quarter for days, as the unlucky soul had no one to bury them.</p>
<p>West Africa, and Sierra Leone in particular, also appears to be becoming a hub for global cocaine trafficking — and, most concerningly, the Sierra Leonean government seems to be involved. Jos Leijdekkers, a Dutch cocaine kingpin, sentenced to 25 years <em>in absentia</em> in the Netherlands, appears to be operating with impunity in Freetown, enjoying Sierra Leone’s lack of an extradition treaty with the Netherlands. He is even rumoured to be married to the President’s step-daughter and the father of her child.</p>
<p>Still, Sierra Leone is far from a failed state: some of the robust civil society so carefully built after the war remains. No-one, aside from the police and the armed forces, carries guns. And despite the occasional flutterings of unrest — there was a squib of a coup in November 2023, in which 17 soldiers died — the upper echelons of the armed forces are seen as competent and loyal. “Coup-proof”, in the words of one insider. (Though whether they would stand up to a determined incursion from neighboring Liberia or Guinea, a distant but plausible scenario, is another matter.) In addition, Freetown has a small but feisty independent media. And Sierra Leonean social media — while occasionally unhelpfully hysterical — is rambunctious and critical: a vital outlet via which to safely complain against the government and the state of the country.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1078003" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1078003" style="width: 1920px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1078003 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg" alt="" width="1920" height="1423" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg 1920w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=300,222 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=768,569 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=1024,759 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=1536,1138 1536w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=267,198 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=253,188 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=250,185 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=660,489 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-74358821-1.jpg?resize=480,356 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1920px) 100vw, 1920px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1078003" class="wp-caption-text">Tony Blair is thanked for his principle of democracy. (Leon Neal/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>***</strong></p>
<p>Traveling through Sierra Leone 25 years after its war, you can’t help but call to mind other, more recent conflicts, such as Afghanistan and Iran. So what went right in the 2000 Sierra Leone intervention — and what is going wrong with more recent Western interventions?</p>
<p>For a start, militarily, there was sufficient use of concentrated force to deal a “shock and awe” blow to the RUF, vaporizing desire to fight. In one memorable episode, the RUF were goaded into attacking a small, isolated force of British soldiers near the airport. This was, in fact, a ruse and they were met with overwhelming firepower, killing dozens of rebels. “Clout, don’t dribble” was the maxim which lay behind any engagement with the RUF.</p>
<p>Richards also worked with a small, agile command structure, with responsibility for everyday tactical decisions delegated to trusted commanders. And he could also operate autonomously — free from both oversight and backseat battle-fielding from London, but also without having to manage other allies in the field. Lastly, he and his team understood the country. Their multiple previous visits meant that they knew its top people, knew where power lay and could navigate its complex tribal structures adroitly.</p>
<p>All of these factors were absent or lacking when it came to Iraq and Afghanistan — and it seems Trump is in danger of making the same mistakes with Iran too. From the first in Iran, there has been a lack of clear, obtainable objective — is it regime change? Neutralizing Iran’s nuclear capability? Reopening the Straits of Hormuz? It’s been all of these and more throughout the months-long conflict. Another key difference was that Sierra Leone was already at war: Britain could back one side against the other. In Iran, America initially appeared to be attempting to topple a regime, and keep a lid on any resulting instability indefinitely: “Pandora’s Box” doesn’t begin to do it justice.</p>
<p>And while the initial US strikes accorded with the idea of maximum, overwhelming force, they failed to deal with a knockout blow. The escalating nature of the fighting — and the way that Iran is able to wreak havoc through asymmetric drone strikes and small boat attacks — wasn’t factored in beforehand. Nor was the unpredictable way it might draw in regional allies. As Richards puts it, “I think it will be looked on as an example of how not to run operations, because of the chaos it’s caused to the global economy. And if it causes a recession, I don’t think Trump will ever be forgiven.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/inside-tony-blair-inc/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/inside-tony-blair-inc/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/2023-08-03-unherd-blair-4b.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/inside-tony-blair-inc/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/inside-tony-blair-inc/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Inside Tony Blair Inc.</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/inside-tony-blair-inc/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And once the Iran intervention is over, what then? Again, Sierra Leone’s recovery, though imperfect, is instructive. After a promising start, which brought much-needed prosperity and stability, Britain and other Western countries took their eye off the region. In Britain’s case, this absentmindedness is especially unforgivable. The UK’s ties to Sierra Leone run deep — the state was established in 1787 by abolitionists as a refuge for escaped slaves, and it was a British colony and protectorate until independence in 1961. It sits in a key position geographically, with the largest natural harbor on the west coast of Africa. Yet even before the recent military withdrawal, Whitehall appeared to have no grand strategy for the country — or the region more broadly. There is not only, therefore, a lingering moral obligation to Sierra Leone, but also, most pressingly, an opportunity. English is widely spoken and Britain, unlike the region’s other former colonial masters, is largely looked on fondly. I remember whizzing on the back of a motorbike over stone bridges deep in the northern bush, while my guide proudly pointed out that they were built during the period of the British Protectorate, and still standing many decades on.</p>
<p>Into the breach, Sierra Leone has welcomed other partners. The Lebanese community, traditionally involved in the country’s mineral industry, provides 30% of the country’s GDP. China is heavily involved in mining as well. In fact, the Chinese have rebuilt the old British railway to neighboring Liberia, which last ran a passenger service in 1975; its massive, 90-carriage long trains now ferry gold, bauxite and coltan. Turkey is a key player as well. Its Karpowership, a floating power station anchored in Freetown harbor, provides 80% of the city’s electricity. Disputes over unpaid debts have frequently led to blackouts: powerboat diplomacy in action. Lastly, Russia is heavily invested in Sierra Leone’s shipping industry. Its boats provide a “shadow fleet” of Sierra Leonean-flagged vessels, running oil and avoiding international sanctions. Quite whether this is an explicit arrangement with the Sierra Leonean government is unclear; nonetheless, to date around 85 tankers registered to Sierra Leone have been sanctioned by the US, UK and EU for connections to Russian oil trade.</p>
<p>The danger here is twofold. First, that Sierra Leone might slip back toward the corruption, inequality and disillusionment which were among the factors that led to its 11-year war. Such a result would be a disaster for the ordinary people of Sierra Leone, and would have profound consequences for Western security. As it stands, Sierra Leone has been relatively untouched by the Islamic terrorism which has ravaged nearby Mali and the Sahel; a breakdown in law and order would create fertile conditions for terror. Any conflict would also create a massive refugee crisis which, as recent years has taught us, will inevitably end up on European doorsteps.</p>
<p>But even if that doesn’t come to pass, Sierra Leone deserves better than to become a vassal state, carved up between China, Russia. Or to become a safe haven for international organized crime. On my travels through the country, I found a deep optimism, a desire to reckon with its past and hope that, through education and a robust civil society, life might be different.</p>
<p>And by reaching out into the world again in this way, Britain may begin to strengthen its position – at home, and abroad. It’s perhaps naive to think it can recapture the swashbuckling success of the 2001 intervention. But to pull back entirely, and pull up the drawbridges, is also a mistake.</p>
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					<title>Diesel diplomacy will decide the midterms</title>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Energy</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[David Rundell]]>
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							<![CDATA[Trump signs an executive order to lower the cost of diesel during a campaign rally. (Win McNamee/Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Rundell</strong> served as an American diplomat in the Middle East for 30 years. He is a former Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the author of <em>Vision or Mirage, Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads.</em></p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ served as an American diplomat in the Middle East for 30 years. He is a former Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the author of <em>Vision or Mirage, Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads.</em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 23:01:40 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 23:01:40 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026 midterms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diesel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1077966</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Trump’s deal with Putin may not help]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Nothing promotes economic growth more assuredly than cheap energy. Nothing dampens economic growth more comprehensively than high energy costs — and this is particularly true with regards to diesel fuel. Over 90% of freight in the UK moves by heavy-goods vehicle. Despite mandates to electrify the fleet, almost all these trucks still run on diesel. Diesel prices therefore impact everything you buy, and are critical to the construction, agriculture and manufacturing sectors. The 40% rise in UK diesel prices this year has increased inflation; slowed economic growth; and made interest-rate cuts much less likely. This painful price rise is a result of both current events and long-term, structural problems.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Diesel fuel trades in a global market. Gulf states usually provide 20% of this market, and Russia another 10%. Notwithstanding Donald Trump’s new plan to suspend sanctions on diesel imports from the latter, both these supplies have been severely disrupted. Yes, crude oil is now leaving the Gulf via pipelines, while a shuttle system of state-owned vessels, protected by the US Navy, ensures volumes very close to their pre-war level.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But shipments of refined products and petrochemicals have not recovered. Ukrainian drone attacks have damaged several Russian refineries, perhaps also explaining Trump’s rising anger with President Zelensky, whatever the truth of this latest “energy ceasefire”. China, for its part, has also prohibited the export of refined products in an effort to control domestic prices. Little wonder the rest of the world’s refineries are hard-pressed to meet demand. First of all, there are simply fewer refineries. In 2000, Britain had 18 refineries. Today it has four. Many of the closed refineries were too small to compete internationally, but high industrial electricity costs and environmental regulations also helped make them uneconomic.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Second, a barrel of crude oil contains a variety of molecules that refineries break down into different products: based primarily on their boiling points. Gasoline is a light distillate with a low boiling point. Diesel and jet fuel are middle distillates with higher boiling points, while marine bunker fuel is a heavy distillate. Most refineries are built to process specific types of crude and produce a specific mix of fuels. Separating the different segments of a barrel of crude oil is a complex process; refineries cannot always adjust quickly, even if demand shifts from one product to another.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-cars-fuel-the-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-cars-fuel-the-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2198788504.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-cars-fuel-the-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-cars-fuel-the-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How cars fuel the forever war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-cars-fuel-the-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> B. Duncan Moench</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Another factor is the shipping industry, which uses 4% of global oil production. In 2020, the United Nations’ International Marine Organization dramatically shifted global energy demand, when it compelled the world’s ship owners to stop using heavy marine bunker fuel, and start burning more environmentally friendly fuels like marine gas oil. Unfortunately, marine gas oil comes from the same segment of the crude barrel as diesel and jet fuel. While the impact of this change was initially masked by Covid, which reduced oil demand, this has permanently increased demand for middle distillates. That, in turn, has raised the cost of all shipping, flying and heavy goods transport, and made diesel and jet-fuel prices more volatile.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Britain now produces only half of the roughly 500,000 barrels of diesel it consumes every day. The rest is imported. Since Russian supplies were suspended in 2022, most of those imports come from the US, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Middle East. All over the world, refineries that can produce diesel and jet fuel are operating at maximum capacity. In the US, capacity utilization has reached 98%, the highest utilization rate in a quarter of a century. The “crack spread”, which measures the difference between what a refinery pays for crude and what it sells product for, is now three times its historic average. If refineries could produce more diesel, they surely would.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The headline-grabbing news in the UK has been £2-a-litre diesel. However, the fuel’s retail price has actually risen by less than the price of crude oil. Dated Brent crude is up 70% this year, while the price of diesel has risen by only 40%. This is largely because, in the UK, two fifths of the price of diesel is tax: which does not vary with the price of crude. Moreover, dated Brent is a spot price that changes with the latest news, while refineries producing diesel operate on more stable long term contracts.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;If refineries could produce more diesel, they surely would.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Things look very different in America. The United States is the world’s largest oil producer, and its largest diesel exporter. Most of those exports go to Latin America, not Britain. Nevertheless, diesel fuel prices in the US have risen by nearly 80%, compared with only 40% in the UK. In fact, while retail diesel prices in the UK have risen by a smaller percentage than the price of Brent crude, in the US the opposite is true.</p>
<p dir="ltr">With diesel prices reaching the equivalent of $200 per barrel in the US, and crucial midterms coming up, the Trump administration had ample motivation to act. America is exporting 30% of its diesel production into a global market. At the same time, America’s own strategic petroleum reserve is at its lowest level in 44 years. Between 2021 and 2025, the Biden administration drew down America’s reserve by 45% — or 245 million barrels — largely following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. During that same period, all the other G7 nations together drew down their own reserves by only 40 million barrels. In other words, the US government provided the global market with 85% of the oil used to calm markets after the Russian invasion.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Always a proponent of America first, President Trump concluded that other nations should now draw down their own stocks, rather than continue to rely on American reserves. Trump’s threat to ban US diesel exports has anyway been effective, resulting in a commitment by other G7 members to release 100 million barrels of oil over just four months. As a result of this agreement, diesel prices in both Europe and the United States have declined slightly. For his part, Trump has also signed an executive order granting fuel tax breaks, usually reserved for farmers, to truckers. This latest diesel-exporting agreement with Russia — while mattering more from a geopolitical perspective — is also perhaps intended to help drivers at the pump.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Whether any of this will bring down prices enough to benefit Republican election prospects next month remains to be seen. What may be more long-lasting is the damage done to public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans increasingly view European governments as freeriders: unwilling to meet their Nato defense commitments, but quite happy to use America’s strategic petroleum reserve and diesel exports to keep their own fuel prices down. As for the Europeans, they see a transactional Trump administration extorting its allies for domestic political purposes. Both sides have a point. Either way, the old political adage remains true: if loyalty is a sentiment, leverage is a fact.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1077966</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Britain’s military bases are imperiled</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/10/how-britains-military-bases-are-imperilled/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/10/how-britains-military-bases-are-imperilled/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-39.jpg?w=622</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Investigation</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Shipley]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Screenshot-2026-10-01-at-16.13.43.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['Britain’s adversaries can call on organised crime networks of Islamists, Iranians or Albanians.' (Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div class="archive-entry__header-description">
<div class="archive-entry__header-description">
<p><strong>David Shipley</strong> is a former prisoner who writes, speaks and researches on prison and justice issues.</p>
</div>
</div>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a former prisoner who writes, speaks and researches on prison and justice issues.

</div>
</div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 23:01:44 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 10:42:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Raf fairford]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1076783</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[RAF Fairford was just the start]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The tale of RAF Fairford grows stranger and stranger. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the early hours of Sunday morning, three white vans were found near the Gloucestershire base. Five men were arrested, first on suspicion of explosives offenses, and then on suspicion of terrorism. The men were soon released on bail, prompting warnings from Donald Trump, and then US Secretary of State Rubio, that they were linked to Iran. British officials were less forthcoming, though they disclosed, confusingly, that one of the suspects had called 911 on himself. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On Wednesday, Andy Burnham finally acknowledged the Iran link, and the defense secretary, Wes Streeting, admitted that Britain faces state-backed threats to our military bases. On the same day, Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel </span><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/10/01/netanyahu-israel-warned-uk-terror-plot-raf/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">had told Britain</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> there was going to be an attack; and on Thursday, Scotland Yard said a 27-year-old British-Iranian man had been arrested in Westminster on suspicion of the preparation of terrorist acts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In short, the details of the Fairford incident remain murky. But the wider story, at least, is becoming clearer. This week I have spoken to current and former military personnel, Ministry of Defense civil servants, members of the intelligence community, and family members of soldiers, for whom these bases are home. What emerged was an account of new technologies and new social phenomena imperiling military bases. British territory as a whole, it seems, can no longer be thought of as wholly safe and friendly.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Of the </span><a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10559/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">2,000-odd</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">military bases in Britain, among the most significant are the far smaller number that host runways and aircraft. An even smaller portion of these, such as RAF Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall, both in Suffolk, as well as RAF Fairford, are used by the US Air Force. Fairford, like most runway-equipped RAF bases, has its origins in the Second World War, before being expanded in the Cold War. It is the only European airfield from which the USAF launches bombing sorties.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Even during the Cold War, the bases in Britain itself — those in Northern Ireland being a separate matter — faced few direct threats. As a result, they are far less secure than British bases abroad. Typically, they are guarded by a chain-link fence, a gatehouse, and a flimsy barrier. One army wife, who lives on a base, told me that damage to the perimeter fence has gone unrepaired for years. I was also told of procedural weaknesses as well as physical ones. It is widely-known that at some bases, staff do not check the ID of every person entering. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-1282838606.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Inside Britain’s broken war machine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Those security weaknesses are becoming increasingly dangerous. Our adversaries, particularly Russia and Iran, conduct proxy and gray war against us, and have even recruited in-country agents via social-media platforms. On the one hand, these subcontractors might not have the competence of seasoned agents. On the other, they can offer our adversaries plausible deniability. And if they are caught, they will not be able to reveal much valuable information.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A recent example of this “Deliveroo terrorism” came via the Ukrainians whose arson attacks target a property and vehicle owned by Keir Starmer. These men were recruited via Telegram, and offered money for the task. There have also been instances of foreigners being </span><a href="https://www.clactonandfrintongazette.co.uk/news/national/26581379.no-proceedings-taken-iranian-man-following-faslane-base-incident/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">seen around key military sites</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Britain’s adversaries can call on organized crime networks of Islamists, Iranians or Albanians. “They can enact whatever form of mischief they want to create,” said George Simm, former Regimental Sergeant Major of the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment, calling it “terrorism by proxy”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Worse, the recruitment efforts appear to have stepped up. Gwythian Prins, a geopolitics strategist and research professor emeritus at LSE, said that, since the beginning of the Iran War, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has switched to “swarm” tactics, meaning they are seeking to overwhelm our intelligence service by “recruiting useful idiots in the thousands”. “Can [the security services] monitor them? Not a hope.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Many of these potential operatives have arrived via legal immigration, which has expanded in recent years to an unprecedented scale. Some of them have slipped in via Britain’s porous borders. Iran is among the countries believed to have sent agents or proxies via small boat. And if operatives arrive in boats which aren’t intercepted, </span><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/09/17/security-fears-over-tens-of-thousands-of-unchecked-flights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">or via light aircraft</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, they are able to bring with them equipment such as weapons or detonators. Simm warned that poorly guarded airfields are enabling adversaries to carry out smuggling operations “all the time — contraband, guns, people. I mean, the whole thing&#8217;s wide open&#8221;. This is a threat the state seems to be aware of, with Border Force </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-suspicious-behaviour-at-small-airfields-project-pegasus/report-suspicious-behaviour-at-a-small-airfield-project-pegasus" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">issuing guidance in August</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> encouraging people to report suspicious activity at private airfields. For its part, recent Royal United Services Institute report warned that “aviation misuse may extend beyond organized crime to wider national security”. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Many of these potential operatives have arrived via legal immigration&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Roy McComb, a former Detective Chief Superintendent in the Police Service of Northern Ireland told me: “If you&#8217;re a hostile force, you find the weakest part of your enemy&#8217;s armor. There&#8217;s no doubt in my mind that the border is one of those vulnerabilities, and if you wanted to bring people in who were going to be involved in a hostile act, the easiest way [is to] bring them in, have them go dark for a period of time, have them meet up with some of their compadres, and then go to work.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The task of the subcontractors is made easier by advances in drone technology. Thanks to the technological foment of the war in Ukraine, one can now </span><a href="https://shop.thebioniceye.co.uk/products/abz-m40?srsltid=AU7gw4X8NVdlKZQump1broFsOGI3T8_QKNgWquoDQiHydW7LHtJ9FNe2" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">legally purchase devices</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that can carry 40 kilograms, and be controlled via the internet from anywhere on Earth. Modern drones, I was told by Steve Tisseyre, a former police officer who specialized in counter-drone work and is now a director of an aerial defense firm, are “attractive to anyone wanting to carry out surveillance, cause disruption or get around traditional security measures”. They could also, as we have all seen in the Ukraine war, be used to directly attack vehicles and kill people. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Only in February did the Ministry of Defense establish restricted airspace areas over 44 critical bases. Until those orders were in place, therefore, it was legal to fly a drone over those bases. Indeed, it remains legal to fly drones over many other military sites. The MoD told me that restrictions will be put in place over 160 further sites “in the autumn” — surely an unnecessary delay.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What form could an attack take? Roy McComb, a former Detective Chief Superintendent in the Police Service of Northern Ireland, told me that a “capable opponent” might even attack a base with an improvised bomb, “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">whether it&#8217;s placed within the fence, driven inside the compound, brought in as a proxy, or launched as a mortar attack, I don&#8217;t think most of the bases in Great Britain are ready for that.” Other forms of attack, I was told during the course of my reporting, could come via drone, on foot, or through surface-to-air missile strikes against military aircraft during takeoff. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As McComb added, Troubles-era attacks on police bases in Northern Ireland resulted in significant effort and expenditure being directed towards hardening those bases with enhanced physical security, patrols and other measures. “Whether we get to the point of having to do that in GB is the question.”</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-english-question/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-english-question/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2276004653.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-english-question/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-english-question/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The English Question</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-english-question/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Maximal physical security, however, is not necessarily optimal. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a retired very senior British army officer, told me that “there is a high degree of pragmatism necessary when one’s talking about protecting military bases, because the whole of the military could consume itself in marching up and down behind the wire.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What, then, does Fairford mean for the defense of this country? Prins described it as “a wake-up call… we have become lazy and lax. And we know that our exposure to infiltration through immigration is wide-open.” The situation is exacerbated, he said, by Israel’s decision, following Britain’s sanctioning of its West-Bank settler population, to withdraw its intelligence cooperation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A spokesperson for the MoD told me that the Government maintains </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“robust and proportionate security measures across the Defense estate,” and takes action where necessary “in response to evolving threats.” The MoD , I was also told, has committed £790 million to strengthen protection from air, drone and missile threats. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“Whilst we will not comment on specific security measures, the public should be reassured the UK, and its allies remain vigilant against potential threats.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But concerns remain that we are not doing enough to be secure. For instance, the British military has been slow to adapt to drone warfare. On 1 March, Iran launched strikes on RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“The only way we could think of defending the RAF base at Akrotiri,” said the retired senior officer, “is to send one of our Type 45 destroyers out [rather than deploying] some sort of system in a box that could be whizzed out there”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And military bases are far from the only potential targets of hostile states and their proxies. Our military supply chain, as well as our critical national infrastructure, including power plants, water supply and airports, are all at risk of attack. And the targets aren’t only on land. As Prins noted, we face an acute and proven sabotage threat to British undersea critical infrastructure — internet, gas pipelines, electrical interconnectors — from Russia’s formidable GUGI fleet of specialized submarines, which are designed to attack targets on the sea floor.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Intelligence is absolutely key to defending our bases. As Simm put it, that the men arrested near Fairford “could rock up almost to the fence unchallenged is a sign the system is overwhelmed or at least confused”. It doesn’t help that operatives are savvier than they used to be. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“These days the terrorists are very surveillance aware and good at communicating in codes, which makes it harder to know exactly what they’re talking about.” This means that intelligence is rarely able to identify a “specific threat” unless we have “got an agent in there”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As several of my interviewees said, Britain is still underspending on its military. We need better-resourced intelligence services and urgent investment in anti-drone technology — as well as radically strengthened borders, both at sea and at our airfields.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the long peace is long over. The rules-based international order is dead. Soft power, always a comforting lie, must be cast aside. We need to get serious about security, serious about funding the military, and serious about our borders before it is too late. </span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1076783</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Britain can&#039;t win the Everywhere War</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/britain-cant-win-the-everywhere-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/britain-cant-win-the-everywhere-war/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2296927751.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Terrorism</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mary Harrington]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/mary.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['The foiled weekend attack on RAF Fairford was incubated in the policy gap between the national and post-national versions of Britain.' (Marcin Nowak/Anadolu /Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mary Harrington</strong> is a contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>moveincircles</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 23:03:08 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:17:13 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Britain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RAF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1076363</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Long Peace is long gone]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>To widespread scorn, cartoon posho Jacob Rees-Mogg has been making videos, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4midrloSzb0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">enjoining</a> young Brits to get ready to fight and even die for the nation. But do we even know what “fight” means these days? Or “nation”, for that matter? Perhaps not: the Imperial War Museum recently announced a major re-brand, because young people reportedly <a href="https://www.gbnews.com/news/imperial-war-museum-rebrand-young-people-world-wars" target="_blank" rel="noopener">can’t relate to the two World Wars</a>.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The trouble is, it’s been so long since a full-on war that no one alive remembers what it was like. Our template for what “war” means is woefully out of date. And, worse, what’s driving us toward conflict now is the very architecture of institutions and beliefs that proved so successful, for so long, at keeping the peace.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>It’s perhaps understandable that young people visiting the IWM today should be left cold by its exhibits: we live in the successor polity to the Britain that is its subject. It marks 20th-century wars that were fought between nation states, including Britain. But the Britain we now live in is only sometimes, and in some respects, a nation on this model.</p>
<p>Nation states were the characteristic political form of the modern age, combining multiple tribes agglomerated by a border, legal regime, national language, and <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Imagined-Communities-Reflections-Origin-Nationalism/dp/1844670864" target="_blank" rel="noopener">imagined community</a>. Great Britain was one of the first to coalesce in this way, but by the 19th century much of Europe comprised such entities, some expanding into global empires. And all of this was, as the great political economist Harold Innis <a href="https://gutenberg.ca/ebooks/innis-empire/innis-empire-00-h.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argued</a>, inseparable from the role of print in consolidating, expanding, and mediating these nation-states to themselves.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Our 19th-century nation states applied much the same template to geopolitics as classical liberal economics did to the free market. Every state was seen as an individual, pursuing its national interest. Statecraft consisted of jockeying to ensure a balance of power, in which no one nation-state became too mighty. For a long time, with the odd blip, this worked well. The 99-year era from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 is known as the Long Peace. But it couldn’t last.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The media theorist Marshall McLuhan drew on Innis’s work to <a href="https://themmm.marshallmcluhan.com/book/electronics-have-not-only-abolished-the-old-boundaries-between-nations-and-the-planet-but-between-the-arts-and-the-sciences-and-if-post-literate-men-find-the-psychic-price-for-these-adventures-is-to/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argue</a> that electrified communications disrupted the 19th-century equilibrium by speeding up communication across vast distances, intensifying national-interest politics until war broke out. These days, we tend to frame those wars as Good vs Evil narratives about democracy and Nazis. But at the time, as A.J.P. Taylor <a href="https://archive.org/details/originsofsecond00tayl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recounts it</a>, the concern was much more about balance of power. For British statesmen in the Thirties, the problem with Hitler was less a moral evaluation of his regime, than the geopolitical risks of allowing Germany to expand.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/europe-isnt-ready-for-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/europe-isnt-ready-for-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2199610789.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/europe-isnt-ready-for-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/europe-isnt-ready-for-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe isn’t ready for Russia</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/europe-isnt-ready-for-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Even then, no one fully reckoned on the role industrial technology would play in scaling up the violence. The result was the frenzy of manufactured slaughter and industrial production and destruction commemorated by the IWM. In the aftermath, many blamed nationalism. From the understandable longing to avoid a re-run was born the America-led rules-based international order, and with it the now-dominant story about democracy and Hitler.</p>
<p>In this new world, culture and communications dissolved borders, flashing round the world via radio and TV antennae. Nationalism was re-envisioned as a thin, symbolic thing of sports teams and boring ceremonies. Its more atavistic 19th-century predecessor was consigned to oblivion, as the mortal sin of “racism”. The new internationalism set out to soften national interest through international trade, and porous borders. National identities, meanwhile, might be moderated through the intermingling and integration of peoples.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Everyone’s model was America, the new hegemon and, aided by the transnational impact of American media, energetically promoted after the war as a “nation of immigrants”. Arguing  for American immigration law to be relaxed, Senator Ted Kennedy <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/immigration-and-nationality-act-of-1965/immigration-and-nationality-act-amendments-of-1965/5B2448754D89B62C16C6D490121AF949" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rejoiced</a> at the way this broadcast empire globalized and homogenized would-be immigrants: “In an age of global television and the universality of American culture,” he said, “assimilation, in a real sense, begins before they come here.” Downstream of this ebullient, successful, inspiring example, every developed nation retrofitted itself on a similar template.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>In Britain, this consensus has diversified the national population. But notwithstanding all the school civics stuff about British Values, there are indications that the resulting post-war Britain feels at best ambivalently affiliated to the nation-state entity that preceded it. This is delicately implied by the IWM in its decision to rebrand: one that, its Corporate Plan stated, “reflects the growing number of people with no connection to someone who lived through the First or Second World Wars, or who was involved in the post-1945 conflicts”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Though it’s not spelled out by the IWM, this isn’t just about generational change but also the demographic kind. Any contemporary 10-year-old of historic English descent is certain to have had forebears caught up in the two wars, even if the individuals themselves are long dead. But while this is surely true of some more recent migrants to Britain, it’s less necessarily so. Given that <a href="https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2025-26" target="_blank" rel="noopener">38% of schoolchildren in Britain</a> are now from ethnic minority backgrounds, perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised if school groups visiting the IWM today don’t always feel a personal connection to that particular past.</p>
<p>A plurality of ancestries and historic affiliations isn’t axiomatically bad. But much as electricity intensified national-interest politics, so the internet is both intensifying and undoing post-war internationalism. Specifically, it’s both accelerating global mobility, and also algorithmically sorting people into tribes. The result is the “global village” McLuhan predicted — but not in the way the utopians hoped.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The internet makes travel easier, facilitating legal and illegal migration alike. It also makes integration in a new country optional. Whereas a migrant to Britain or the USA in 1965 would have had to learn English, now between video calling, Google Translate, and social media, everyone takes their “community” with them. Concurrently, remittance services (and, less legally, money-laundering) have allowed finance to uncouple from nation-state economies and be re-routed via transnational familial, tribal, or ideological networks.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The internet is both intensifying and undoing post-war internationalism.&#8221;</div>
<p>Meanwhile, everyone, whatever their heritage, gets sorted by social media into epistemic bubbles, then fed agonistic rage-bait about outgroups. What’s emerging is a multi-layered and digitally networked tribalism among migrant communities — and, increasingly, also<a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-return-of-english-tribalism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> former nation-state populations</a>. That is: not “global village” in the optimistic hippie sense of borderless planetary love-in, but closer to what McLuhan actually <a href="https://marshall-mcluhan-speaks.com/interviews/violence-as-a-quest-for-identity" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expected</a>: “a place of a very arduous interfaces and very abrasive situations.”<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>A lot of bread-and-butter culture war turns on street-level examples of such “arduous interfaces” and “abrasive situations”. That is: low-level aggro between re-tribalized subgroups, occupying contiguous or overlapping physical territories in the digital-age, post-national entity that used to be “Great Britain”. This is uneasy enough. But it gets more unnerving once mapped to questions of hard power and geopolitics, friend and enemy, whose most extreme expression is hot war.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Here the tensions inherent in our transitional phase are uncomfortably plain. Human rights lawyers may treat “national interest” as a wicked impediment to the universal good, but nation-state Britain isn’t altogether obsolete. The tribally constituted, post-national entity is rather superimposed on the older model and its bewildered, angry former imagined community. Meanwhile the erstwhile nation state still retains some functions — including, albeit in a threadbare way, foreign policy and military power.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>A whole genre of low-grade post-national warfare has been incubated in the policy gap between these two versions of Britain. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgmdjpmmng7o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Incidents of domestic terrorism</a> linked to geopolitics have <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-iran-linked-criminal-group-that-publicly-claimed-responsibility-for-recent-attacks-on-jewish-locations" target="_blank" rel="noopener">grown frequent of late</a>, of which the latest was genuinely frightening: over the weekend, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c85ydnwqpzyzo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">an RAF base in Gloucestershire was evacuated</a>, after a farmer spotted men in balaclavas leaving suspicious vans near the boundary. Five men have been arrested on suspicion of attempted bombing, and police are now <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/crime/article/whelford-explosives-bomb-disposal-evacuated-gloucestershire-06q9z2nmx" target="_blank" rel="noopener">investigating links to Iran</a>.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>But should we be surprised? An ideologically post-national governing class has so far clung to the older model, as to drive the formal military capabilities of nation-state Britain to the brink of hard-power confrontation on several fronts. This would be bad enough if we still had much hard power, or a cohesive nation. It’s made infinitely worse by the insouciance shown by the same class, at the same time, over who can come in and out of Britain, and how freely. This is consistent with the post-national worldview <i>provided everyone is living in peace and harmony.</i> But every indicator suggests everybody is not, in fact, doing that.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Instead, every element of the post-war order that once fostered peace is now doing the opposite. The internationalist regime of human rights has incentivized “<a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmdfence/405/report.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">grey zone</a>” or “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/33631/chapter-abstract/288151400?redirectedFrom=fulltext" target="_blank" rel="noopener">liminal warfare</a>” conflict across operations such as <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/2252022/putin-attacks-britain-uk-infrastructure" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cyber-attacks</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/plan-to-toughen-protections-for-subsea-internet-cables-amid-heightened-russian-activity" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sabotage</a>, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35706238" target="_blank" rel="noopener">weaponized migrant flows</a>. The internet is accelerating and re-tribalizing demographic diversification, incubating sometimes radicalized subcultures within host nations. And the asylum regime, itself a post-war act of atonement by states which failed to do enough to prevent the Holocaust, has been weaponized for economic migration, organized crime, and infiltration by hostile actors.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>What does war look like, when everyone lives everywhere, and loyalties are not geographic but networked? When soldiers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-has-remote-control-drones-that-can-hit-targets-great-distance-minister-2026-04-23/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">don’t even need to be in the same country as the explosive drones they pilot</a>? When <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c9dg217glveo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">you can get a child proxy to do terrorism for you via a website</a>? The 19th-century model offers no very useful guides. Nor does Jacob Rees-Mogg’s demand for stiffer upper lips, among Britain’s now very diverse and sometimes ambivalently patriotic youth. The 20th-century postwar model is what got us into this mess. I wish I could tell you how we get out of it again.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Very obviously, no one currently in power has a clue what to do about the new normal. There are some obvious first steps to take, such as not granting citizenship to known senior Hamas operatives. We might also stem the tribalization of Britain by withdrawing from the asylum system, expelling known criminals and terrorists, cracking down on <a href="https://unherd.com/newsroom/are-underground-mafias-responsible-for-britains-grooming-gangs/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">networked ethnic mafias</a>, and being considerably more robust about ending the migrant dinghy industry <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cly48nmmzdro" target="_blank" rel="noopener">operated by these mafias</a>. But none of this would be anywhere near enough. The internet will still beam all wars everywhere, all the time, and whip everyone into agonistic tribes.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>And meanwhile, the principal obstacle even to trying such measures is our own elites and institutions. Still grimly living in the internationalist 20th century, these will fight tooth and nail to obstruct any substantive policy response to the 21st. And this, not democracy and Hitler, is the real lesson of how the Long Peace ended. Institutions, ideologies, and elites that delivered good results for a long time are not hastily abandoned, even when it’s plain that, under new conditions, they are careering toward disaster. Alas: change on that kind of scale more often comes through having learned the hard way.<span class="Apple-converted-space">     </span></p>
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					<title>Europe isn’t ready for Russia</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/europe-isnt-ready-for-russia/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/europe-isnt-ready-for-russia/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2199610789.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Blue-thumbnail-example-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Soldiers don't win wars. (Anadolu/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2026 23:04:11 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 10:33:54 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Logistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1076162</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Wars aren't won on the battlefield alone]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>They’re everywhere, those retired generals and grand officials who keep on briefing about Ukrainian advances and successes in the current conflict. Mark Rutte <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/09/24/rutte-says-putin-is-in-a-bad-place-as-he-reassures-nato-allies-amid-threat-reports" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was at it</a> only last week: “Putin is in a bad place,” he said. “He is not winning the war.” And yet, just the other day, Denmark warned Europe to prepare for an imminent Russian attack. It’s like they can’t wait for the great war to finally kick off.</p>
<p>Certainly, Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, is prepping for it. “I have stocks of rice, I have a hand pump at home, and I have also made preserves from fruit from my own garden,” he <a href="https://hromadske.ua/en/europa/271387-polands-foreign-minister-stocks-rice-and-homemade-jam-as-country-prepares-for-potential-crises" target="_blank" rel="noopener">told</a> the Polish magazine <em>Fakt</em> last week.</p>
<p>It is easy to mock Sikorski and his jam. But he does have a point. In times of war, nobody cares about the percentage of GDP that their country is spending on defense: they care about food and water. Not  that our military leaders and planners will listen, though; soldiers like to talk about battles and gear, not rice and jam.</p>
<p>Tales of heroic battlefield victories are far more persuasive, after all, than those of supply chains. And yet, defeat often comes because of weakness elsewhere. A few years before Napoleon lost his famous battle at Waterloo, he had launched a disastrous attempt to invade Russia. Although the brutal winter contributed to his failure, Napoleon had struggled to keep his troops fed and healthy. Hunger and disease took a terrible toll. As much as the enemy, it was his supply chains that thwarted him.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/mark-carneys-eu-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/mark-carneys-eu-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2295115232.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/mark-carneys-eu-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/mark-carneys-eu-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Mark Carney&#039;s EU delusion</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/mark-carneys-eu-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Likewise, when the German high command unveiled its master plan to invade France in August 1914, the generals hadn’t factored in an unexpected heatwave. The right wing of the German army was to invade France from the north and encircle Paris. But the soldiers were marching in thick woolen uniforms and carrying heavy backpacks in 30-degree heat. As the men advanced, the supply lines fractured leaving the troops exhausted, hungry and weakened.</p>
<p>Meanwhile the Allied naval blockade of 1914 triggered food shortages in Germany which escalated over the years into a full-blown humanitarian catastrophe. Germany and Austria did not lose the First World War on the battlefield alone, they also lost it in the warehouse and the kitchen. The people starved.</p>
<p>The food situation was better during the Second World War, but this time the critical shortage was of oil. Back then, the US produced over 60% of the world’s oil and together, the Allied powers controlled most of the global oil supply. But the German generals were heavily reliant on machinery that used diesel and the chronic shortage of oil was why Hitler diverted his troops from the outskirts of Moscow to the south of Russia: to capture the oil fields in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. En route, they became trapped in Stalingrad and suffered their worst defeat of the Second World War.</p>
<p>The battlefield perspective of history, then, critically underestimates the importance of supply chains. The stories of Europe’s wars are understood much better in terms of logistics than in tales of battles.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The stories of Europe’s wars are understood much better in terms of logistics than in tales of battles.&#8221;</div>
<p>And nothing has changed. One of the consequences of the Iran war is the fluctuating cost of crude oil. But that is only part of the story. As the Ukraine war has led to critical shortages of diesel and kerosene on global markets, the price of European diesel has gone through the roof. In a display of his classic short-termism, Donald Trump <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/26/diesel-export-ban-energy-europe-01094058" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggested</a> that the US should stop supplying Europeans with diesel. He almost certainly did not think this through. If the US were to carry out his plan, Europe would suffer an immediate supply emergency. And we need only look at the vast number of diesel-powered lorries on European motorways to realize how critically reliant we are on the fuel. The economy would grind to a halt. It might be a smart idea if our leaders addressed that situation before heading into battle with the Russians.</p>
<p>But it’s not just diesel. The other shortage is natural gas. Iranian attacks have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-attack-damage-wipes-out-17-qatars-lng-capacity-three-five-years-qatarenergy-2026-03-19/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">taken out 17% of liquid natural gas</a> (LNG) production in Qatar, the world’s second largest LNG producer after America. Russia is the fourth — but Europeans have imposed an import ban on their gas. That’s why <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/business/europe-natural-gas-winter.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Europe is currently assessing whether it has enough fuel to get through the winter</a>. And remember, this is still peacetime.</p>
<p>On the other side of the ledger is Russia. It, too, suffered from a diesel shortage last spring after Ukrainian attacks on its energy infrastructure. But Moscow immediately increased production in the east and halted exports of diesel to stabilize the situation. By doing so, Putin reduced the globally available supply of diesel and contributed to the rise in prices.</p>
<p>Russia’s food supply is also secure. This year, it had a bumper crop of grains, the wheat crop is forecast to be one of the best on record and oilseed production is also better than usual. Is this the “bad position” Rutte was talking about?</p>
<p>And let’s not forget those other vital commodities: good, old-fashioned money and debt. Russia is practically debt-free. It runs a small fiscal deficit because of the Ukraine war, but nothing compared with the crippling deficits of the US, France, and nowadays also Germany.</p>
<p>As a consequence, the West is vulnerable to a potentially crippling financial crisis. Last week, the interest rate on 10-year US Treasury bonds, the most important financial security on earth, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-bond-yield" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rose to a 21-year high of 5.2%</a>. Ordinary investors such as pension funds are dumping their US bond holdings because they are no longer secure following Joe Biden and Donald Trump outbidding each other in terms of fiscal irresponsibility.</p>
<p>All the while, the war in Ukraine drags on. And could get much worse this winter. The peace process is effectively dead; Putin gave up on it after Ukraine rejected his demand for the entirety of the Donbas region and is now determined to achieve his military goals by war alone. Ukraine is running short of interceptor missiles and so is more vulnerable to attacks on critical infrastructure. And there is no sign of Ukraine’s western supporters stepping up military supplies — if only because they need what they have for themselves. Exacerbating the situation in Europe are the attacks, possibly orchestrated by Russia, on western supply infrastructure for Ukraine within Germany and Poland.</p>
<p>So this is how the Ukraine war risks escalating. Consider if Russia shoots down a plane over Nato territory carrying supplies to Ukraine. If Nato were to retaliate with a strike on Russia, we would be at war. Over the past few months, my assessment of this scenario has shifted from small but non-trivial, to one with a significant probability.</p>
<p>We should be under no illusion about a war with Russia. We are absolutely not in a position to win. Whose bond markets are going to be blown up first? Who is going to run out of interceptor missiles first? Thanks to the much maligned Common Agricultural Policy, Europe is not going to run out of food. But on every other count — military, energy, finance — Europe is at a disadvantage.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2252937217.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West is losing two wars at once</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>That’s not all. There is a relatively plausible scenario in which Ukraine and Iran merge into a single West Eurasian war — and become the ultimate proxy conflict between the US and China. The love-in between Trump and President Xi Jinping of China notwithstanding, the rivalry between the US and China is and will remain the dominant geopolitical story of our time.</p>
<p>Trump’s war against Iran and Putin’s war against Ukraine have demonstrated how difficult it is even for a larger power to impose its will on a smaller adversary. Putin may have the advantage over Ukraine, but his struggles there suggest that war against Nato wouldn’t produce a quick or decisive victory.</p>
<p>More likely, it would be the kind of war where, in the end, nobody would care who won and who lost. You might as well stock up with jam.</p>
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					<title>What the West forgets about China</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/why-china-is-the-ultimate-frenemy/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/why-china-is-the-ultimate-frenemy/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>State visit</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Lloyd Dusenbury]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/guy-3.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[It’s probably too much to hope for President Xi to be given a first edition of Whitman’s Leaves of Grass during his stay in Washington, DC. (Kenny Holston/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Lloyd Dusenbury </strong>is a philosopher and historian of ideas. His latest book, <a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/i-judge-no-one/david-lloyd-dusenbury/9781787388055" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>I Judge No One: A Political Life of Jesus</em></a>, is out now.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DusenburyDavid</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a philosopher and historian of ideas. His latest book, <a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/i-judge-no-one/david-lloyd-dusenbury/9781787388055" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>I Judge No One: A Political Life of Jesus</em></a>, is out now.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 23:02:10 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 07:24:59 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civilisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Walt Whitman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1075583</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[East and West are civilizational peers]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">In September 2015, Xi Jinping made his first state visit to Washington, DC. During a six-day American itinerary, he made the usual rounds: the summits, the forums, the dinners. Yet during his first speech in the country, Xi also mentioned that he <a href="https://www.ncuscr.org/event/chinese-president-xi-jinping-addresses-american-public/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.ncuscr.org/event/chinese-president-xi-jinping-addresses-american-public/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0MThm-JYRXBxczpLZ7-PiM">had read</a> some of Walt Whitman’s poetry. This should not surprise us, since Whitman has had a rather strong reception in China. In the Twenties, the avant-gardists of China’s New Culture Movement held him up as an icon, and by knowing some of Whitman’s verse, Xi showed that he’s familiar with a figure who inspired modern China’s literati.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It seems doubtful that the sitting US president will have spent much time with Whitman’s <em>Leaves of Grass.</em> But I feel confident that several of his lines in the “Song of Myself” might still resonate with Donald Trump. “I know perfectly well”, the <a href="https://whitmanarchive.org/item/ppp.00707_00733" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://whitmanarchive.org/item/ppp.00707_00733&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0Ga_ypQWf2jQFT3vIP5dUB">poet says</a>, “my own egotism”. Whitman is not alone in this self-consciousness. “I chant the chant of dilation or pride”, he goes on, “I show that size is only development”. A line like that could be the motto of any New York property developer. Whitman then asks, bringing a rare end-rhyme to development: “Have you outstripped the rest? are you the President?” Mr Trump could coolly answer: Yes.</p>
<p dir="ltr">With all this in mind, it is worth noting that Whitman penned a fair number of fraternal lines about China. In a poem of delirious cosmopolitanism, “Salut au monde”, he <a href="https://whitmanarchive.org/item/ppp.00707_00789" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://whitmanarchive.org/item/ppp.00707_00789&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1Y9w9K4P1ZJmHTNXfMciiT">claimed</a>: “I see the four great rivers of China, the Amour, the Yellow River, the Yiang-tse, and the Pearl.” We would now write Whitman’s “Yiang-tse” as Yangtze and his “Amour” as Amur; but what matters is that China’s rivers were flowing in the Brooklyn poet’s mind in the middle of the 19th century.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/assassinating-the-ayatollah-was-uncivilised/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/assassinating-the-ayatollah-was-uncivilised/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2264273696.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/assassinating-the-ayatollah-was-uncivilised/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/assassinating-the-ayatollah-was-uncivilised/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Assassinating the Ayatollah was uncivilised</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/assassinating-the-ayatollah-was-uncivilised/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Lloyd Dusenbury</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Whitman even went to Qing-dynasty China, in a poetic transport, to see for himself how the common people lived. “I go among them”, he dreamed. “I mix indiscriminately”. And he found the people of China to be, in the blinding light of his ecstasy, no different from him or from the Americans of his day. “Each of us [is] inevitable”, he thrummed, “Each of us [is] limitless.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">We do not know what it is in Whitman’s ultra-democratic poetry that stirred something in a young Xi Jinping. But as China’s paramount leader returns to the US for another state visit, he surely knows that America has long dreamed of his people.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And it is not only in poetic reveries that the West and China have been friendly. Before the full-bore Industrial Revolution; liberal trade policies (and concomitant trade wars); and the high-watermark of Western imperialism in Whitman’s 19th century, the West and China had several hundred years of largely peaceful cultural, commercial, and intellectual contact. From roughly 1500 to 1800, China and the West rather candidly recognized each other as the world&#8217;s most advanced civilizations. Leibniz — a baroque savant and China-watcher avant la lettre — did not <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/leibniz-and-china/3EB0EE42F77EE8809F22432C16E19E61" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/leibniz-and-china/3EB0EE42F77EE8809F22432C16E19E61&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0Fw9t2NdNJpNbyQVWoSldM">hesitate</a> to call them “the two most cultivated parts of the world”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">More recently, and no less importantly, the 21st century’s two great powers were ultimately aligned in all three of the 20th’s great contests: the First World War, Second World War, and the Cold War. This is currently better known in Beijing than it is in Washington, London, and Brussels. And, because we rarely hear it in the West, it’s worth taking each conflict in sequence.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A couple of years before Whitman’s poems began to appear in translation in the pages of the New Culture Movement’s <em>Young China</em> magazine, the Chinese republic declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary. The <em>casus belli</em> was a lawless German strike, in February 1917, on a French transport ship sailing in international waters. Hundreds of Chinese nationals aboard the vessel had drowned. In March 1917, the Chinese parliament voted to break diplomatic relations with Germany. But this brought no change to Germany’s scandalous U-boat policy. In August 1917, Beijing then joined London and Paris, Petrograd and Washington in their <a href="https://www.kentuckypress.com/9780813123141/v-k-wellington-koo-and-the-emergence-of-modern-china/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.kentuckypress.com/9780813123141/v-k-wellington-koo-and-the-emergence-of-modern-china/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw20Xk9QRVVoFQs-cqiVtwAf">titanic</a> struggle against the Central Powers.</p>
<p dir="ltr">China’s man in Washington at the time was a formidable diplomat with an evocative name: Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo. In a letter printed a month or so later, in <em>The American Journal of International Law</em>, Wellington Koo notified the US Secretary of State of his government’s grave decision: “I have the honor to inform you that China… declares that a state of war exists with Germany and Austria-Hungary.” Notably, Wellington Koo stressed in this letter that his government would “observe all the stipulations of the conventions signed at the International Peace Conferences at The Hague”. The Republic of China, founded in 1912, would <a href="http://jstor.org/stable/2212571?searchText=Declaration%20of%20War%20by%20China%20on%20Germany%20and%20Austria&amp;searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DDeclaration%2Bof%2BWar%2Bby%2BChina%2Bon%2BGermany%2Band%2BAustria%26so%3Drel&amp;ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&amp;refreqid=fastly-default%3A6ec0bdca4e42378ebe7cad9947d9ea2f" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http://jstor.org/stable/2212571?searchText%3DDeclaration%2520of%2520War%2520by%2520China%2520on%2520Germany%2520and%2520Austria%26searchUri%3D%252Faction%252FdoBasicSearch%253FQuery%253DDeclaration%252Bof%252BWar%252Bby%252BChina%252Bon%252BGermany%252Band%252BAustria%2526so%253Drel%26ab_segments%3D0%252Fbasic_search_gsv2%252Fcontrol%26refreqid%3Dfastly-default%253A6ec0bdca4e42378ebe7cad9947d9ea2f&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3_KR1VVtRUli3BwrQRMOW8">uphold</a> the laws of “civilized warfare” that Imperial Germany had relinquished. In other words, Wellington Koo’s Asian republic was <em>more civilized</em> than one of Europe’s great monarchies.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In the Second World War, meanwhile, the Republic of China staked a similar claim, fighting <em>alongside</em> Washington in defense of <em>civilization</em>. But now, the lawless power China had to resist was Japan: a monarchical Asian ally of a post-monarchical Nazi Germany. On 7 December 1941, Japan struck Pearl Harbor without formally declaring war. This “treacherous” strike was made in violation of the conventional laws of war and later judged to be illegal — which is to say, uncivilized — by a postwar tribunal. The more <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41279769?searchText=china+world+war+2&amp;searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dchina%2Bworld%2Bwar%2B2%26so%3Drel&amp;ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&amp;refreqid=fastly-default%3Aeb065e621ce8397706b10167fed13335&amp;seq=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.jstor.org/stable/41279769?searchText%3Dchina%2Bworld%2Bwar%2B2%26searchUri%3D%252Faction%252FdoBasicSearch%253FQuery%253Dchina%252Bworld%252Bwar%252B2%2526so%253Drel%26ab_segments%3D0%252Fbasic_search_gsv2%252Fcontrol%26refreqid%3Dfastly-default%253Aeb065e621ce8397706b10167fed13335%26seq%3D1&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3VFwNu_EaNXmdEEXCLRYLJ">immediate</a> effect of Pearl Harbor was to forge a momentous link between the US and China.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Why so momentous? Well, on 1 January 1942, a statement titled the “Declaration by United Nations” was drawn up and signed at the Arcadia Conference in Washington, DC. The ur-document of the United Nations, it had four original drafters and signatories: the US, UK, USSR and China. It is no coincidence these four great powers still form the core of the UN Security Council (with France joining later). China belongs to the innermost circle of powers that created the postwar order, and the UN.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Just a couple of days after the Arcadia declaration was signed, Chiang Kai-shek — or “Generalissimo Chiang”, as he was known — accepted the “supreme command over all forces of the United Powers… in the Chinese theater”. The idea for this centralization of “United Nations” forces in Chiang’s hands <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941-43/pg_303" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941-43/pg_303&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0nGdOCuVDnFiiqI9lWmhrw">came</a> from President Roosevelt himself. And there can be no doubt that FDR had a strategic vision for what he called “the gallant people of China”. By May 1942, he was <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fireside-chat-5" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fireside-chat-5&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3hoaBOndaz0JiMZYKjO7-z">declaring</a> that &#8220;in the future a still unconquerable China will play its proper role in maintaining peace and prosperity, not only in eastern Asia but in the whole world”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">China remained “unconquerable” at the close of the Second World War. But its anticolonial struggle had not decided the issue of a decades-long civil war between Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists and Mao Zedong’s communists. Of course, Chiang and the Republic of China did not hold the mainland; in the bitter fight for sovereignty, the Maoists prevailed. A successor republic, a “People’s Republic”, was formed in Beijing in October 1949. And with it, a steely party-state was formed which had immense debts to one of America’s <em>other</em> wartime allies: Stalin’s USSR.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The cruelties of China’s civil war and the fantastical complexity of early-Cold War geopolitics cannot be dealt with here. But two brief points can be made. First, China’s postwar settlement in no way cancels out the vast sacrifices <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/hans-van-de-ven/blood-dawn/9781541620469/?lens=basic-books" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/hans-van-de-ven/blood-dawn/9781541620469/?lens%3Dbasic-books&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3NG1HNjQHcxB53USuP3ujZ">made</a> by the “gallant people” of the country during the Second World War. Second, the communist ascendancy in China was not preordained. Indeed, certain actions by the US may have moved the dial in favor of Mao and his Soviet-backed troops. Frank Dikötter has <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/red-dawn-over-china-9781639733972/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/red-dawn-over-china-9781639733972/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0eayykff89y23oDO0H2k8g">stressed</a> in a recent book that it was FDR’s successor, President Truman, who put an arms embargo in place in 1946: not on Mao and his communist brigades, but on Generalissimo Chiang and his nationalists.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A 1946 <em>New York Times</em> headline tells us why: “Aid to China Hinges on Ending of Strife and Unification of Nation”. Truman confirms this in a personal note he sent to Chiang. In it, the US president made clear that his government’s “generous attitude” towards the Republic of China was highly conditional: Chiang had to demonstrate “genuine progress” towards achieving a “peaceful settlement” with Mao. In hopes of seeing a coalition government formed in Nanjing, Chiang’s capital, Truman leveraged US money and materiel, imposing more than one ceasefire which, in Dikötter’s view, “changed the course of the civil war”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The early years of the Cold War were therefore treacherous and highly complex. There is much we still do not fully understand. But however we choose to reconstruct that era, it’s clear that a dangerous bloc-formation swiftly formed within the “Big Four” powers that built the UN: the US and UK in the “West”, the USSR and China in the “East”. And no one disputes that China, having aligned with Washington and London in the century’s first two global conflicts, took a hostile posture during the third. This revolutionary, Soviet-backed posture of Mao’s China held up for roughly two decades.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But it is surely worth noting that, for a <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691215167/the-rise-and-fall-of-imperial-china?srsltid=AfmBOoqbfZV-e855pitckDzwks6DuM9j3Xli9Ja2v0jG7NRNnPyemZ8V" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691215167/the-rise-and-fall-of-imperial-china?srsltid%3DAfmBOoqbfZV-e855pitckDzwks6DuM9j3Xli9Ja2v0jG7NRNnPyemZ8V&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0TxInlfeccxHVr7xwUaR0n">great power</a> with a 2,000-year history, that’s the blink of an eye. The People’s Republic of China had only been in existence for 22 years when President Nixon touched down in Beijing to make his visionary overtures in February 1972. In the years that followed, Maoist China decided to normalize relations with Washington. And, less than 20 years after that, due in part to the West’s strategic rapprochement with China, the Cold War ended.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This point is especially important. The liberal Nineties narrative of the USSR’s dissolution is highly Eurocentric — but modern China has never been a geopolitical periphery. Any rigorous account of the collapse of the USSR must frankly reckon with the fact that it was not only the Western powers, but the Western powers <em>plus China</em>, which created the conditions that <a href="https://lsupress.org/9780807142899/a-cold-war-turning-point/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lsupress.org/9780807142899/a-cold-war-turning-point/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2qexWfkg48U8nPn2eYHxQ3">doomed</a> the Soviet system.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Any rigorous account of the collapse of the USSR must frankly reckon with the fact that it was not only the Western powers, but the Western powers plus China, which created the conditions that doomed the Soviet system. ”</div>
<p dir="ltr">Strange to say, the US had a strategic commitment during the Cold War to what we would now call a sort of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2026-09-22/a-multipolar-world-the-mishal-husain-show-live-video" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2026-09-22/a-multipolar-world-the-mishal-husain-show-live-video&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3_T6fdn0jjXJMUHOLHzDiX">multipolarity</a>. Cultivating ties with peripheral communist regimes was part of this strategy: Washington’s heavy investment in Tito’s Yugoslavia is a case in point. Nixon’s grand maneuver in 1972 was to invite Mao’s Beijing, a central communist regime, to form a third pole in the bipolar world order of the Seventies. And, indeed, a new pole was formed. “Without abandoning its communist trappings”, as Bruce Mazlish <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/history/civilization-and-its-contents" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.sup.org/books/history/civilization-and-its-contents&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1vSGs6L6_UBsS2VuUkM8zv">puts</a> it, “China under Deng Xiaoping and his successors has been pursuing its own amalgamation of socialism, Confucianism, and capitalism in a unique blend.” The PRC’s scale is unique, too, and the systemic effects of its late-Cold War opening are often missed in Western discourse.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The triumphalist liberal narrative of the Nineties is also ideologized. Any serious account of China’s reopening to the West must reckon with the fact that it was not instigated or navigated in the early days by Western liberals. Whatever we make of this fact, the breakthrough diplomacy in China was undertaken by Western conservatives: Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, with some <a href="https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-to-negotiate-with-china/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-to-negotiate-with-china/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2GSshPUUesl0ZeDmqmwy9X">fine diplomatic play</a> by Margaret Thatcher. Beijing has not forgotten who conceived its Cold War détente with the West. Nixon is <a href="https://www.economist.com/analects/2014/08/11/they-still-love-him-in-china" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.economist.com/analects/2014/08/11/they-still-love-him-in-china&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3o-DKIl3gOhOTwmM-lEb0V">highly respected</a> in 21st-century China, as he <a href="https://www.wsj.com/politics/richard-nixon-social-media-videos-6c983cd1" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.wsj.com/politics/richard-nixon-social-media-videos-6c983cd1&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790251156251000&amp;usg=AOvVaw03hQfcI7YfHTKBvvBq0QTZ">seems</a> to be among a growing number of young Americans.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-chinas-zoomers-lost-hope/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-chinas-zoomers-lost-hope/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-2026-09-18-at-14.29.17-2-e1789739584230.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-chinas-zoomers-lost-hope/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-chinas-zoomers-lost-hope/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How China’s Zoomers lost hope</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-chinas-zoomers-lost-hope/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tianle Zhang</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">But China cannot be reduced to a partisan question in the West. It is too massive, too comprehensive, for that. Our ideologies do not capture it. And it cannot be stressed too heavily that it was Western <em>diplomacy</em> in the Seventies — not politics, not ideology — which drew Beijing back towards Washington, London, and Brussels. It was <em>diplomacy</em> which made “unconquerable China” a stabilizing presence in late-20th-century geopolitics.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It’s probably too much to hope for President Xi to be given a first edition of Whitman’s <em>Leaves of Grass</em> during his stay in Washington, DC. But there is, in any case, a pair of words that Whitman brings forward in “Salut au monde” that still speak to the occasion. As he gazes out on the world of the 1850s, Whitman tells us that he sees “barbarisms” and “civilizations”. Not much has changed, perhaps. But this is no time for great-power barbarisms. The stakes are too high.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The task, then, is for China and the West to exemplify their long-related civilizations. Today, we&#8217;d be more likely to call them the world&#8217;s largest economic zones, and it’s tempting to see these tensions, over AI or rare earths, as insurmountable. But perhaps we shouldn&#8217;t be too quick to make the shift to brute economic calculation. For diplomacy is, ultimately, a civilizational legacy. And if diplomacy is what we need in the early 21st century, then surely we can find the strength and calm to engage in it: by returning to the deeper traditions which made several centuries of relatively peaceful trade and intellectual exchange possible between a strong China and a powerful West.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1075583</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Russia’s plot to break Nato</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/russias-plot-to-break-nato/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/russias-plot-to-break-nato/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michal Kranz]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/author30aug.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Nato special operations take part in the Trojan Footprint 2026 military exercise in Constanta, Romania. (Andrei Pungovschi/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Michal Kranz</strong> is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>Michal_Kranz</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
<div></div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 23:04:06 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 23:57:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1075452</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Gradual escalation will sow discord]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Off the coast of Hiiumaa, history is about to be made. A combined fleet of Nato battleships — led by destroyers from the Royal Navy and involving five nations — steams toward this windswept island at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. Just ahead: Russia’s Baltic Fleet, which for the past 36 hours has attempted to enforce a naval blockade of Estonia. Further east, 100,000 Russian troops have gathered, too, with Vladimir Putin demanding that Nato withdraw any assets posing “a threat to the security of the Russian Federation” from Estonian territory. More than that, Putin wants Tallinn to grant regional autonomy to the “Narva People’s Republic” — a breakaway statelet purportedly declared by Estonia’s Russian minority, but which in reality has been invented by the Kremlin, then mercilessly promoted on social media. No matter. Martial law has been declared, &#8220;separatist&#8221; drone attacks are underway, and Estonian forces have already engaged Russian warships anchored in Tallinn Bay.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Following a Russian strike on an air-defense system in Poland a week before, which Putin framed as retaliation for Nato involvement in the war in Ukraine, the alliance has sheepishly declared Article V. But, leaning on the North Atlantic Treaty’s legal technicalities, Donald Trump has refused to intervene, preferring to support European allies in “other ways”. Without American backing, only a handful of European states have deployed their armed forces to bolster Poland and Estonia. And with a second Russian army assembling in western Belarus, and the prospect of missiles flying at Warsaw from Kaliningrad, Poland’s large and robust military is mostly tied up at home. As American envoys arrive in Moscow to negotiate Putin’s terms on Estonia, and likely much of Nato’s east for that matter, British commanders aboard HMS Duncan train their guns on the Neustrashimy, a Russian frigate just appeared on their radar. With fighters screaming into action overhead, the Duncan’s crew hold their breath, as their ship enters the range of Russian guns.</p>
<p dir="ltr">I’m hardly the first observer to speculate on what war between Russia and Nato might look like — and, given the storm clouds gathering in Eastern Europe, I surely won’t be the last. After months of escalating Russian gray-zone attacks against Nato, ranging from drone incursions to <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2026/07/31/russian-missile-that-crashed-in-poland-carried-significant-amount-of-explosive-material/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stray missiles</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5ylm3m67n2o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">attempted bombings</a> at Leipzig airport, warnings about Putin’s plans for Europe have grown louder on both sides of the Atlantic. And now, just last week, Polish and Lithuanian leaders have both separately <a href="https://apnews.com/article/poland-russia-ukraine-nato-baltics-drones-rockets-818fe48227ee28d60fe86d8fe6485f5c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> to have intelligence that Russia is planning “accidental” rocket and drone strikes on pro-Ukrainian members of Nato, a conclusion <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/20/baltic-spy-chiefs-warn-moscow-is-preparing-for-more-decisive-action-in-europe" target="_blank" rel="noopener">corroborated</a> by Emmanuel Macron. Together with CIA chief John Ratcliffe’s unannounced visit to Moscow last month, among other things to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-john-ratcliffe-warned-russia-not-to-attack-nato-moscow-trip/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warn</a> Putin off attacking Nato, the atmosphere feels worryingly similar to the months leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1075502" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1075502" style="width: 640px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1075502 size-large" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg?w=640" alt="" width="640" height="427" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-657172686.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1075502" class="wp-caption-text">Narva marks the border between Estonia and Russia. (Sean Gallup/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p dir="ltr">Yet if a flashpoint on Nato’s borders appears increasingly likely, we equally shouldn’t expect a shooting war to start tomorrow. If he does indeed choose to throw his armies westward, Putin’s aim will first be to break the alliance’s internal cohesion, and to exploit its central weakness in an age of hybrid warfare: that the cost of actually honoring Nato’s self-defense clause is too much for most members to contemplate, until it’s too late anyway. It helps, here, that just like in Ukraine, Putin’s goal wouldn’t really be recovering lost territories. As always, rather, it’d be about control. Removing Nato as a cohesive bloc would allow Russia to once again dictate terms to its European neighbors, a generational shift in the balance of power on the continent, and marking the apotheosis of Putin’s decades-long political project. And, if all went to plan, the Russian premier could plausibly achieve all of this without triggering the world war many in the West have feared.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-bulgaria-putins-next-target/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-bulgaria-putins-next-target/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/84312625-Edited.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-bulgaria-putins-next-target/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-bulgaria-putins-next-target/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is Bulgaria Putin&#039;s next target?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-bulgaria-putins-next-target/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The first phase of any Russian provocation campaign would likely start with a strike on a border crossing between Poland and Ukraine. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/poland-says-it-expects-russia-will-target-its-border-crossings-with-ukraine-2026-09-10/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned</a> of just such an attack, claiming that one has already been foiled via a joint Polish-Ukrainian operation. Russian forces have already been <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/powerful-explosion-occurs-near-polish-border-amid-russian-drone-attack-on-western-ukraine-tusk-says/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">striking targets</a> mere kilometers from the Polish border, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy5zg41dkqwo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">attacked</a> a civilian Warsaw-Kyiv train not long after European officials including Boris Johnson had traveled along the line. Hitting border crossings would benefit Russia from several standpoints: Putin could plausibly claim attacks were accident; could make weapons shipments to Ukraine via Poland more logistically difficult; and crucially, could broaden the “acceptable” field of operations of the Ukraine war.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Now is where things would start to get really dangerous, with drones of the sort that were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjx2zgk7edlzo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shot down</a> by Nato jets over Lithuania this week finally starting to find their targets, striking critical energy or security infrastructure close to the border with Belarus. Such strikes may start innocuously enough, with drones “accidentally” hitting unmanned border watchtower or rural power lines. But then, one might damage an oil pipeline in Latvia; or a critical LNG terminal in Lithuania; or even a section of Poland’s Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport, which serves as a logistics hub for transferring Western arms to Ukraine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Ultimately, though, the real aim of such attacks would not be material damage — but instead making low-level air assaults a regular part of European life. Poles, Germans, and Lithuanians alike have already become inured to headlines about Russian-sponsored arson attacks or drone incursions, and it’s not a huge stretch to imagine they’d do the same with this new wave of provocations. That matters: for despite the alliance’s tough talk, no one, including Putin, realistically expects that Nato would go to war with Russia over a damaged pipeline, no matter how important it might be. We already have clear proof of this: Nato failed to act even after a Russian drone <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c93x4nxlkjeo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">struck</a> a residential building in the Romanian city of Galați in May, injuring two residents. The trouble with the alliance’s intentionally defensive framework is that there is no clearly stated middle ground; war and peace are the only two options available. And, within such binary parameters, Nato will almost always choose an insecure peace over a highly disruptive total war.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1075501" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1075501" style="width: 640px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1075501 size-large" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg?w=640" alt="" width="640" height="427" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1399201837.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1075501" class="wp-caption-text">British troops on manoeuvres in Estonia. (Jeff J Mitchell/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p dir="ltr">All the same, European Nato states would have to send a message to Moscow sooner or later. Rather than striking at Russian soil directly, however, they’re more likely to give Ukraine the intelligence and hardware to hit drone-launching sites on their behalf. In the end, though, politicians in Nato’s east would still have to signal to their citizens that they were willing to take decisive steps to protect them and their infrastructure, and would finally take a leap into the unknown: shooting down Russian projectiles heading toward their borders. This is something Polish leaders <a href="https://ukranews.com/en/news/1174882-following-russia-s-strikes-near-polish-border-sikorski-stated-that-nato-should-have-shot-down" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have been discussing</a> for years, and within such a volatile threat environment, it would be the obvious next step for the alliance short of full-scale war.</p>
<p dir="ltr">At this point, for Putin, all the pieces would be in place for the final step in the escalation ladder. The Russian leader, and the Russian public for that matter, have considered themselves to be in a <em>de facto</em> state of war with Nato for quite some time now. Not only would all of these developments make this even clearer, but would also fit squarely within the foundational push of Putin’s national narrative. Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2022, and the West in 2026 has always been justified by the politics of grievance — and, by becoming directly involved in Ukraine, Nato will have crossed a red line. Coming off the high of a <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/09/21/russians-vote-in-final-day-of-parliamentary-elections" target="_blank" rel="noopener">record win</a> in Russia’s latest State Duma elections, Putin’s party would gladly use these events as fuel for another, much-anticipated mass mobilization, adding <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/08/23/europe/zelensky-ukraine-russia-mobilization-intl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">some 300,000 new conscripts</a> to his armed forces. Russian authorities would still face plenty of resistance, but much less than if the drive had been solely framed around the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">With Europe besieged but complacent, Putin could then make his biggest gamble: a direct missile or drone strike against a Nato battery involved in aerial combat in Ukrainian airspace. Poland’s Small Narew surface-to-air missile system, stationed in the quaint city of Zamość near the Ukrainian border, would make a perfect target. And this time, there would be no beating around the bush: Russia would own the attack, framing it as a retaliation for Nato intrusion in Ukraine, and demanding that the alliance reverse course to safeguard Russia’s “legitimate security concerns”.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“What’s crucial to understand here is that, in a Nato-Russia shadow war, there wouldn’t be some single event, like the 1939 invasion of Poland, that suddenly snaps Europe from its lethargy.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">A tired Europe would finally consider Article V at Poland’s request. But the outcome would be a foregone conclusion: the appetite and social cohesion necessary for a war of this scale simply isn’t there, especially in Washington. What’s crucial to understand here is that, in a Nato-Russia shadow war, there wouldn’t be some single event, like the 1939 invasion of Poland, that suddenly snaps Europe from its lethargy. This is what lies at the core of Putin’s strategy: even if the frog finally realizes it’s being boiled, things will be too far-gone for it to gather the strength to jump out the pot.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Far from Nato’s frontline, meanwhile, publics in both Western Europe and the US would hardly be willing to leap headfirst into a conflict with Putin: the strike on Zamość would hardly be shocking at this point. More than that, Putin’s rhetoric of victimhood would play well with both MAGA and Left-wing campists, who’d probably see the circumstances of the Zamość strike as yet another reason to disengage from both Ukraine and Europe. With the Iran war still unresolved, meanwhile, Trump would see no reason to commit troops to a European theater he has long seen as marginal — especially if Pete Hegseth’s “force posture review” ends with the withdrawal of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/trumps-pressure-nato-is-reshaping-europes-defenses-will-it-break-alliance-2026-09-17/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">up to 25,000 American soldiers</a> from Europe later this year.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1075500" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1075500" style="width: 640px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1075500 size-large" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg?w=640" alt="" width="640" height="427" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1254740589.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1075500" class="wp-caption-text">Like the aftermath of this Russian strike in Ukraine, Putin may target Nato infrastructure before sending his troops against Poland or Estonia. (Sergey Bobok/AFP/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p dir="ltr">Though the US might acquiesce to an Article V declaration, in short, it would likely also use the Treaty’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/collective-defence-and-article-5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">open-ended language</a> around mutual-assistance obligations to weasel its way out of fighting. Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-robert-fico-casts-doubt-over-nato-mutual-defense-clause/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">already stated</a> he would do exactly that if Article V were ever invoked. Of course, no one will miss Slovak troops in the event of a conflict with Russia, but the lack of American involvement would surely dissuade many smaller countries from sending help. So Article V or not, make no mistake — American apathy would break the alliance, something Putin himself is well aware of.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Nato structures may remain strong on paper, in this scenario, but the organization would actually resemble a malleable “coalition of the willing” — far more than an all-encompassing defensive alliance. That would be a massive blow for the bloc’s frontline states, and with dramatically lower stakes and a broader field of movement, Putin would act accordingly. Any strike against Poland likely wouldn’t lead to an actual invasion, but it would keep its forces locked in a cross-border standoff. That leaves Estonia. Though Britain, France, Germany and Poland, perhaps alongside Denmark or Canada, are likely to send troops or ships to defend a threatened Tallinn government, US indifference precludes a broader campaign. Even nearby Sweden and Finland would likely be cautious about overextending themselves too early, mobilizing their populations but then remaining holed up for whatever comes next.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2252937217.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West is losing two wars at once</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">What would come next? Certainly, whatever the limitations of the Russian military machine, victory for the new anti-Putin coalition would be far from guaranteed. Yet even if, to borrow our scenario, the Neustrashimy’s commander relented off Hiiumaa, or else engaged HMS Duncan, lost, and rendered Russia unable to enforce a blockade, Putin might still hope to carve a new European order from the chaos — especially if he felt he still enjoyed Trump’s good graces.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Alongside what we might call the “Belarusification” of Ukraine, that would surely include attempts to disarm the Baltics, while keeping heavyweights like Poland contained and self-interested. To be clear, Putin would likely be unsuccessful in meeting all of his goals here. Indeed, surrounded by sycophantic generals, he may well stumble. But like in Ukraine, after suffering an initial loss in Estonia, the Russians could yet regroup, adjust their strategy, and lock Nato’s rump in a fresh quagmire, turning border cities like Narva into Bakhmuts on the Baltic. Whatever happens, Putin will understand that, without America, the old equation in Europe has gone, while his new opponents will hardly have time to react.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Some might see these hypotheticals and conclude that the only way out for Nato is to disengage completely from Ukraine. But this would simply kick the can further down the road — Russia at this stage sees Ukraine as merely one theater within a much greater war over the future of Europe. Even if Trump decides to unilaterally welcome Russia back into America’s embrace, Putin’s steadily escalating gray-zone war with European Nato would anyway likely continue, regardless of events in Washington or Kyiv. The choice facing the Europeans, then, is not simply between peace and war, but between accepting Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe — and opposing it. Exactly how they do that remains the challenge of our time.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1075452</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Mark Carney&#039;s EU delusion</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/mark-carneys-eu-delusion/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/mark-carneys-eu-delusion/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2295115232.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Political dinosaurs</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Blue-thumbnail-example-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Characters without qualities. (Jean-Christophe Verhaegen/AFP/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 23:03:40 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 23:03:40 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1075355</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[His globalized world is dead and buried]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>One of the greatest works of Central European literature is <i>The Man Without Qualities</i>. Set in the lead up to the First World War, Robert Musil’s unfinished novel depicts a society sleepwalking into catastrophe. The main character is Ulrich, who became involved in what Musil called the “Parallel Campaign”: a doomed pre-war initiative to plan the Austrian Emperor Franz Josef’s 70th jubilee, scheduled for 1918. The campaign gathered intellectuals and aristocrats engaged in deep discussions about culture, philosophy and national glory — but history intruded on their plans. Austria-Hungary was about to enter a war it was eager to fight, but for which it was not prepared. Franz Josef died in 1916, and the First World War ended with the break-up of his ancient empire.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>In Musil’s writings, I see parallels with today’s Europe. Our time, too, might one day be known as a pre-war era. After all, if Germany was the up-and-coming power in 1914, China is today. The UK was then the biggest global power, like the US today. The equivalent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 2026 is Russia: a once-great power in terminal decline.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>In hindsight, one of the omens of the First World War was the emergence of political and military alliances that were intended to protect but which ended up becoming conduits of war — such as Germany’s alliance with Austria, Russia’s with Serbia, and France’s with Russia. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The alliance between the EU and Canada — which was strengthened last week, when the EU proposed that Canada somehow become its first &#8220;associate member” — is militarily not as consequential as those that led Europe to the killing fields. Yet it has something of their essence. It has a certain Musil-like quality too — just another parallel campaign in a world soon to be extinguished.</p>
<p>Mark Carney likes giving spine-stiffening speeches in defense of the passing multilateral order, while Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, poses for as many photos with Volodymyr Zelensky as possible. But surely, like Musil&#8217;s dreamers, both Carney and von der Leyen have more important things to do? For the EU is not a global power, but something much more down to earth: a customs union and a single market, plus a monetary union among most of its members. These three functions are the only ones that ever mattered. Yet instead of focusing on the EU’s core economic problems, where she has the power to bring about change, von der Leyen is engaged in a performative dance with Carney.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Our time, too, might one day be known as a pre-war era.&#8221;</div>
<p>The Canadian prime minister, too, has unresolved problems at home. Canada’s biggest trade barrier is not the one with the US, but its own internal system. Canadian provinces are like medieval European fiefdoms, imposing trade barriers against each other. It is a vast country, but it is not a single market. Why not solve that problem first? <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>So the issue with the EU-Canada pact is not so much that it is wrong, but that it is vacuous, or, as, Musil would put it, without qualities. In 2014, the EU and Canada signed a trade deal, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or Ceta, which took provisional effect in 2016. Ten years later, this treaty is still not formally approved, because 10 EU countries, including France and Italy, have refused to ratify it. If you are really interested in solidifying the EU-Canada relationship, would you not start there? My theory is that von der Leyen and other politicians are simply bored with the single market, and find a G7 or G20-type set up far more glamorous. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The UK-based European Council on Foreign Relations, together with the Netherlands-based European Cultural Foundation, recently published a poll that found 70% of Europeans were euroskeptic. I was not in the least surprised by this result, but it came as a shock to the authors, who subsequently recommended that the EU engage in even more performative stunts. They wrote that to foster pro-European attitudes, Brussels should harness “the power of future nostalgia, or a longing for a time when a better future seemed within reach”. In other words: keep your eyes off the ball for a little while longer, while appealing to our glorious past. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2252937217.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West is losing two wars at once</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The stunt with Canada is about exactly that — nostalgia for the age of globalization that has now vanished. Canada and the EU entered the new era of globalization as second-rate powers, led by third-rate politicians, but they ended up being the big winners. I still recall the uncritical British deference to Carney when he arrived as governor of the Bank of England. He was the highest-paid central banker in the world at the time: apparently he needed the money to send his children to a private school. This all happened in 2012, an age when non-doms, now an extinct species, roamed the streets of Mayfair. This is the world Carney wants to return to — the world he knows.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The obvious problem with Canada’s aspiration to become an “associate member” of the EU is that no such membership exists. Veterans of the Brexit debates may recall that the EU only offers a fixed number of external relationships — and Canada currently has the same deal as the UK (except with more maple syrup).</p>
<p>Nor is full Canadian EU membership possible, since membership is limited to European countries only. The 10 member states that refused to ratify the Ceta trade deal will almost certainly not ratify that EU-Canada association agreement. So what are Carney and von der Leyen even discussing?<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>There are ironies here too. I found it deeply comic when I recently heard Carney speaking about sending a special envoy to the EU to discuss co-operation on areas including AI and defense. There is practically no AI work going on in Europe — except for lots of people hyperventilating about US tech companies. Besides, Nato, the defense alliance that ties Canada and most EU countries together, already exists. In other words, there is absolutely nothing in this hot-air balloon of a “pact” that could not be had down here on Earth. (And no, you don’t need an alliance to relax restrictions on freedom of movement.)</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-cult-of-ai-armageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-cult-of-ai-armageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/image-34.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-cult-of-ai-armageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-cult-of-ai-armageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The cult of AI armageddon</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-cult-of-ai-armageddon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Kathleen Stock</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If the EU and Canada were really serious about safeguarding their waning global influence, perhaps they should start by addressing their joint dependencies on the US in a more strategic way. Canada and Europe both run large and sustained current-account surpluses against the US. The two nations have built industrial structures on the assumption that the Americans would forever tolerate the trade deficit and global imbalances that sustain them. Even in the highly unlikely scenario that Canada were to gain full EU membership, this would not reduce its dependence on the US for imported goods.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>On my list of the 10 most important initiatives the EU needs to take right now, in other words, a closer relationship with Canada doesn’t even feature. Instead, my top suggestions would be for the EU to reopen the closed diplomatic channels with Moscow to ensure that it plays a role in the governance of post-war Ukraine; to recognize the dangers of a financial crisis that over-indebted European countries like France have exposed themselves to; to ditch the anti-tech regulation and many other bureaucratic hurdles the EU has imposed on business in the last decade; and to create a fledgling capital-market union, so that Europe’s large pool of savings are channeled into domestic investments. I can think of many more ambitious things, but that would be a good start. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Besides Canada’s “associate membership”, fast-tracking Ukrainian EU membership is the other delusion of European politics. The EU does not have the money for it. And Ukraine is moving further away from meeting the formal criteria for joining, sinking deeper and deeper into corruption. Neither von der Leyen nor Zelensky are doing the work to change things. Instead, they are content merely to act upon the world stage. And that’s what this is really about: acting.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> I</span>f only Musil were alive today: he would have a lot of fun with these characters without qualities, and their mystifying parallel universes.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>9/11 could happen again</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/9-11-could-happen-again/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/9-11-could-happen-again/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1161128.jpg?w=537</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[William T. Vollmann]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Blue-50-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[New Yorkers watch the 9/11 attacks. (Spencer Platt/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>William T. Vollmann</strong> is an American novelist, journalist, war correspondent, short story writer, and essayist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an American novelist, journalist, war correspondent, short story writer, and essayist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 23:05:21 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 12:13:37 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[9/11]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[President Bush]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1073328</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[America is still hated]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When I visited the trenches of northern France a century after the First World War ended, I found farmers’ plows still turning up munitions and dead men. Like little children who enjoy tasting the sweetness of ant poison, we harm ourselves out of ignorance of past causes. Unexploded ordnance may or may not hurt us — better to stay clear. In cases of foreign policies deployed by variously zigzagging administrations, we lose sight of which boobytraps were buried where and why. Even when there is continuity in government, we forget our own doings until they detonate.</p>
<p>Thus 11 September, 2001, that dire shock whose collision momentum irresistibly knocked us out of reality as we had understood it — perhaps because we had failed to understand it accurately — and into something terrifying, agonizing, unformed. Maybe Pearl Harbor felt like this, at least to isolationist homebodies who ignored developments in Poland and Manchuria; the American Civil War, calamity though it was, had telegraphed itself for years; sad John Quincy Adams intuited its approach though he died before it came.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1073510" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1073510" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1073510 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="677" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg?resize=300,198 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg?resize=768,508 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg?resize=267,177 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg?resize=253,167 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg?resize=250,165 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg?resize=660,436 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-524835556.jpg?resize=480,317 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1073510" class="wp-caption-text">The rubble of the World Trade Center, 12 September, 2022. (Porter Gifford/Corbis/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>And then the little child got a stomach ache; the bomb went off; the South seceded and a pair of hijacked planes slammed into the Twin Towers. At first we were bewildered. We could not understand “why they hate us”. But in its own time, the new reality grew distinct. It was necessarily grimmer than the old, because we were at war with shadowy murderers to whom we had paid too little attention.</p>
<p>If this were a happier essay, I would write that the shock improved our comprehension of the world, but that isn’t so. Not long after we invaded Iraq in 2003, to confiscate imaginary weapons of mass destruction and punish Saddam Hussein for 9/11, with which he had absolutely nothing to do, the Iraqis whom we were impoverishing, torturing and shooting very naturally began killing ever more of us and each other. In 2004, I was in California’s Imperial Valley, a poorish, agricultural, fairly pro-military place, when I heard people say: “We liberated them, but they don’t appreciate it. We’re trying to help them, but they’re <em>mean</em>.” And why had the 9/11 hijackers been mean? Well, “they hated us for our freedoms.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-man-who-made-bin-laden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-man-who-made-bin-laden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-man-who-made-bin-laden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-man-who-made-bin-laden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The man who made bin Laden</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-man-who-made-bin-laden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tam Hussein</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>We the Americans (never mind the politicos who got us into this) were the little children who maybe or maybe not should have known better, and 11 September was the ant poison left over from the Cold War. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, that was a vicious atrocity; hence we were right and just to support the Afghan resistance. However, we should not have collaborated with the Saudis on bankrolling, arming and letting loose Islamic extremism. We thought we could stir up the Mujahideen to bleed the “Evil Empire” — which they did — Roger, Wilco, over and out! — but what then? Spent, the Russians withdrew in 1989, while we rested on our laurels.</p>
<p>Right then, when the Afghans were still grateful to Reagan and the CIA, we could have spent a pittance on mosques, hospitals, running water and girls’ schools, and maybe helped to build peace. In Yemen, I have seen schools and clinics labeled “A GIFT FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY”. In 2002, at least (I have not been back since), the Yemenis remembered those gifts. They did not hate the Europeans as they hated us. As for us, buttoning up our wallets, we walked away from the Afghan warlords we had enabled. Once the power vacuum grew literally murderous, the Taliban sprang up, promising to replace robberies, kidnappings and rapes with a literalist Muslim society — an awfully persuasive response to the atheists who had burned women alive and drowned “reactionary feudal elements” in Marxist-Leninist cesspools. What tune were we whistling then? The Afghans had served our turn, so about them we no longer cared a rat’s ass. Now we could crow about a “peace dividend”.</p>
<p style="text-align: center">***</p>
<p>Osama bin Laden was a brave and effective <em>Mujahid</em>. Maybe he took our money, or possibly he sucked entirely on<em> Saudiya</em>’s tit. When did leaving him alone with his toys and zealots become imprudent? This ordinary citizen cannot say. But once he commenced uttering explicit threats, meanwhile appearing implicated in terrorist acts, why wasn’t he stopped? Much has been written about the cavalier indifference of the Bush administration, which preferred to look for excuses to “take out” Saddam. The intelligence community itself blamed “the wall” imposed by Congress in the Seventies, after revelations of FBI-CIA collusion in various abuses, including widespread illegal surveillance of American citizens. This partition between spookish entities, we are plausibly told, prevented FBI and CIA cadres from sharing enough information to “connect the dots” and stop the hijackers in time. As the 9/11 report told it, “the wall” now “regulated the manner in which such information could be shared from the intelligence side of the house to the criminal side. These procedures were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied.” So down came “the wall,” and, to the government’s credit, I will say that there have been no 9/11-sized attacks on American soil since 2001.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1073500" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1073500" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1073500 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="741" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg?resize=300,217 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg?resize=768,556 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg?resize=267,193 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg?resize=253,183 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg?resize=250,181 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg?resize=660,478 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1861143.jpg?resize=480,347 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1073500" class="wp-caption-text">An American soldier tears down a poster of Saddam Hussein, shortly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. (Chris Hondros/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Of course, thousands of Middle Eastern civilians have been killed to further that outcome. How many died for no good reason? How many were justifiably tortured? (My answer is none, because I disbelieve that torture is ever justified. But in my magisterial objectivity let me now quote a “CIA veteran” from the other side, circa October 2001: “A lot of people are saying we need someone at the agency who can pull fingernails out… The only question then is, do you want to have CIA people in the room?”.) How many suitcases of hundred-dollar bills have passed out of oversight? What cost have we paid in civil liberties to achieve our tenuous tranquility? I remember the so-called PATRIOT Act, one of whose provisions was that librarians must on request turn over a list of books checked out by a specific patron, and then keep secret from him or her that the list has gone to the government. Ah, freedom; oh, democracy! We citizens gave in and gave up; we left PATRIOTic tricks up to our protectors, because by definition they knew best. But did they? Has the War on Terror been making us more or less safe?</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Has the War on Terror been making us more or less safe?&#8221;</div>
<p>This August, I was reporting from Kuwait, where I found significant hatred of America and Israel. Our stupid, vicious bully of a President goes on exacerbating Muslim hostility with his Iran war, which in Kuwait has increased food prices and triggered retaliatory Iranian drone casualties to people and infrastructure. One man told me that while he did not support Iran “even 1%”, he stood against America “more than a thousand percent.” His position requires a fairly lofty will-to-hate. That is why I see another 11 September coming. Maybe this time it will entail swarms of drones. Meanwhile, we go on making enemies and strengthening their accusations against us. I guess that’s the American way.</p>
<p>As the 11 September report admitted: “Coalition warfare also requires coalition policies on what to do with enemy captives. Allegations that the United States,” to take just one instance, “abused prisoners… make it harder” — who would have thought it? — “to build the diplomatic, political and military alliances the government will need.”</p>
<p>The victims of 9/11  were innocent, and their murderers evil. I am grateful to the intelligence community for killing the killers. As for the waterboarders and blithely careless shooters and detonators (doubtless they are still at it in some “black site”), how can they not make war into a perpetual motion machine? We citizens never know what well-intentioned cruelties they are up to today and tomorrow. And how can we imagine what we cannot see? From Yemen I remember rectangular windows and round windows like kaleidoscopes of multicolored glass, and, in the old city of Shibam in Hadramawt, a cluster of gingerbread or halvah blocks very occasionally ornamented with satellite dishes. My friends and neighbors will likely never go to Yemen. If they ever hear that we dropped a Predator drone over there, that will mean as much to them as learning that we did something classified on Saturn.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1073498" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1073498" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1073498 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="649" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg?resize=300,190 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg?resize=768,487 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg?resize=267,169 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg?resize=253,160 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg?resize=250,158 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg?resize=660,418 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-93329444.jpg?resize=480,304 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1073498" class="wp-caption-text">Yemen&#8217;s &#8216;halvah blocks&#8217; are a mystery to most Americans. (Khalid Fazaa/AFP/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>The US, we are told, has a representative government. Abe Lincoln called himself our servant, as well he might. Although King Donald takes furious exception, our representatives are supposed to be temporary servants. (Just wait until he makes terrorism great again in his illegal third term!) In Congress and the judiciary branch, decisions made on our behalf are least supposed to be public. As for the executive branch, its purpose, wrote John Adams, is to do whatever must be done with secrecy and dispatch. Obviously, when the Twin Towers fell, the American masses remained in and of themselves unqualified to decide how to react. How many could have distinguished Iran from Iraq, or located Yemen on a world map? How many could say that Saddam was or was not a 9/11 kingpin? So the chief executive decided for America: get Iraq! I do wish he had worked with other world leaders to map out al-Qaeda targets, instead of dragooning his “coalition” into an unjust war based on a lie.</p>
<p>As for his war with Afghanistan, was it effective? Did it gain its purpose? With our military out, and the Taliban inevitably as strong or stronger than before — Americans go on disbelieving in their populist appeal — I can’t exactly applaud Bush’s victory. But maybe we killed a lot of bad guys, and not so many good guys as to create more bad guys than before we started. How can I know? Doubtless he’s proud of his accomplishment.</p>
<p style="text-align: center">***</p>
<p>Yes, we Americans remain blind to Yemen, though even an ill-educated ISIS cadre may possess an excellent visual understanding of his sector of Target America; thanks to the internet he might even have soared up the 405 past the Getty Center, exiting at Mulholland Drive to ascend the green coastal hills and then roll down across stone canyons and round the moist green hills with the San Fernando Valley below; there are the enemy’s white houses; perhaps he hates the more expensive ones most; let’s say that he sees Los Angeles as we cannot see Hadramawt, but does he see <em>us</em>, the ones whom he would kill? I remember chatting with some Talibs about Americans. That was how I learned that we are all prostitutes, gang bangers, homeless addicts, perverts pornography addicts; because these men had all worked in the United States, and therefore thought that they knew us; of course the only work they could get was pumping gas in the red light district, selling cheap liquor to alcoholics or manning the counters of “adult” bookstores. No wonder they had a bad notion of us. And no wonder, too, that my neighbors can’t tell a Talib from a Shi’ite from a Sikh. (“Come on, Bill; they’re all ragheads!”) What turban-wearers do they ever see on their screens but America-hating evildoers?</p>
<figure id="attachment_1073501" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1073501" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1073501 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="727" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg?resize=300,213 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg?resize=768,545 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg?resize=267,190 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg?resize=253,180 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg?resize=250,177 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg?resize=660,469 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-1645120.jpg?resize=480,341 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1073501" class="wp-caption-text">An Afghan youth and passing US troops, 2002. (Amel Emric-Pool/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Again I propose that we set aside a fraction of what we burn on surveillance and drone strikes, and spend it on what will benefit people, and make them friendlier toward us. After years of careless carnage and brutality, it will take more years to soften their hearts. But why <em>not</em> build schools? If the Islamists blow them up, build them again. The locals will take eventual note of who seems to be addressing their interests. Otherwise we can “shock and awe”, but then what? We believe in our own kindness, so why not convince them of the same?</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;After years of careless carnage and brutality, it will take more years to soften their hearts.&#8221;</div>
<p>At home, meanwhile, we are now proving the Talibs right by spreading libels about non-white, non-Christian immigrants. Texas politicos fulminate about clearing their state of Muslims. Well, then, why shouldn’t Muslim countries cleanse themselves of American military bases?</p>
<p>I wish, here, that American Muslim organizations would more clearly distance themselves from extremists. I wish there could be a place (or, as post-9/11 Americans would say, “a <em>safe</em> place”) for Muslims and non-Muslims to meet, possibly to share food or practice calligraphy (illuminated Qurans are some of the most beautiful works I have ever seen). You see, I am a lucky man. I can wish away without responsibilities, and keep blaming others.</p>
<p style="text-align: center">***</p>
<p>The UK has endured a heartbreaking number of high- and low-level terrorist attacks. From my possibly outsider perspective, it seems that many Muslim immigrants have integrated into British society sufficiently to live anonymously, but not enough to feel accepted. Perhaps it is like that in the Algerian neighborhoods of France, the petri-dishes of Belgium and Germany.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1073504" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1073504" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1073504 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="698" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg?resize=300,204 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg?resize=768,524 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg?resize=267,182 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg?resize=253,172 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg?resize=250,170 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg?resize=660,450 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2213941979.jpg?resize=480,327 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1073504" class="wp-caption-text">“I wish there could be a place for Muslims and non-Muslims to meet”. (Geoffroy van der Hasselt/AFP/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>My conclusion — an impractical one in my country now that the Bigot-in-Chief is deporting people right and left — is that immigration ought to be managed mindfully. It should benefit both the hosts and the new arrivals. In a better America, a municipality with a shortage of workers might bid to take, say, 1,000 people, in exchange for infrastructure grants or tax breaks. If the new arrivals are Muslim, then an organization such as the Committee on American-Islamic Relations (which somebody in Texas has pronounced terrorist; for my part I am fond of it and its members) could arrange a meet-and-greet, perhaps with some church volunteers, to teach the respective parties that in our country women can wear short skirts (or have sex with other women) and that no one should be forced or tricked into consuming pork and alcohol. Whenever I go to a foreign place, I feel more at ease once I have found a big brother or big sister to teach me the local mores and help me make friends. Why wouldn’t a new immigrant feel the same?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/you-cant-steal-a-cossacks-soul/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/you-cant-steal-a-cossacks-soul/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/cossack.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/you-cant-steal-a-cossacks-soul/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/you-cant-steal-a-cossacks-soul/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>You can’t steal a Cossack’s soul</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/you-cant-steal-a-cossacks-soul/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> William Vollmann</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, one thing I can do right now (as can you) is to reach out to those who seem “other” or even positively alien, before their feelings of rejection render them isolated and estranged. It is the grinding little quotidian incivilities that irritate us into resentment.</p>
<p>Consider the possibilities. We could close our borders, abandon our global capitalist empire to China and Russia and devolve into an autarky. Without cheap imported plastics, rare earths for their cell phones and a committed export market, even the most radical Trumpeter Swans might grow disgruntled then. Or we could isolate and surveil immigrants in hopes of precipitating out the haters. My suspicion is that this treatment would defeat its own purpose. (In 2004, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, 70 to 90% of Iraqi detainees “had been arrested by mistake.”) Or, thirdly, we could welcome them into our community and treat them according to the Golden Rule. Which of these would be easiest, cheapest and kindest?</p>
<p style="text-align: center">***</p>
<p>The Pentagon Papers proved that American Presidents were willing to escalate an ever-more-obviously unwinnable war in Vietnam to look tough in elections. As for our 9/11 goon squad — Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice and that bunch — it might despite warnings from the intelligence community have truly believed that Iraq was behind the attacks Or, perhaps, they simply felt impelled to “do something”, with Iraq already on the “to do” list. Who can say? The executive branch’s necessary Adamsonian qualities of secrecy and dispatch protected it from oversight and embarrassment long enough for Bush II to steer the country into disaster and then step down without fear of punishment.</p>
<p>One of the most serious deficiencies of our rotating representative system is that any chief executive’s theory of foreign policy can suddenly be contradicted and undone by his successor. Just consider the sharp transition from Carter to Reagan, or Clinton to Bush II. And so, returning to the matter of the Afghan Mujahideen, who drove out the Soviets in 1989, we can if we like blame Bush I, who as a former CIA supremo should have understood the necessity for maintaining ties with his proxies and their weapons;.ut we could also point a finger at Clinton, in whose time Afghanistan grew more volatile — why didn’t he re-engage with the people who were still our friends? (A year before 9/11, the Talibs were still in my hearing expressing gratitude to America.) Did anybody in Washington care?</p>
<figure id="attachment_1073506" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1073506" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1073506 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2266243698.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1073506" class="wp-caption-text">The aftermath of a US attack on Tehran, 2026. (Majid Saeedi/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>It would be lovely had there been some sage at State and Defense to assure us: “We’ve been following this issue ever since we ramped up the Mujahideen in 1979. Here is how events have evolved, and so our current national interest can be served as follows…” But with the Soviets beaten, and still more so with the collapse of their system in 1991-92, Afghanistan became irrelevant, which is another way of saying that our Afghan policy was ultimately incoherent, like our current Venezuela policy (kidnap the head of state, blow up random fishing boats) or our Iran policy (threaten, bomb, declare victory and repeat).</p>
<p>Our Vietnam policy continued until the Pentagon Papers got leaked. Then it finally began to founder. If and when we are ever relieved of President Trump, some new politician can end the Iran war, or else continue it in some way that is the same only different; then my neighbors will be satisfied, and forget all about it. But the Iranians, Turks, Saudis, Kuwaitis, Omanis, Qataris and Emirates will not forget. Someday we’ll wonder <em>why they hate us</em>.</p>
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					<title>Get ready for the Trump Slump</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Economy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Rapley]]>
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							<![CDATA[It may be time to call off the strikes on Iran. (Kent NISHIMURA / AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Rapley</strong> is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>jarapley</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 23:03:10 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 10:30:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[donald j trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oil and gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[recession]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1073210</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Iran strikes could burst the AI bubble]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Improbable though it may seem, a bombing raid on Iran may, like the proverbial Chinese butterfly flapping its wings and causing faraway chaos, trigger disparate distant ructions. Not only could the US’s November elections be upended, and the political honeymoon of Andy Burnham brought to a halt. The chaos could also trigger a fall in global stock markets and possibly a slide into recession.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Donald Trump’s latest attempt at escalating to de-escalate in the Middle East conflict has not had the desired effect. Since the bombing began over the weekend, bond yields have been rising across the world, the price of oil has shot back up and stock markets have turned shaky. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">On Tuesday, the conflict deepened further, with Iran launching missile and drone attacks at multiple American bases in the region. </span>On Wednesday, Iran accused America, whose strike was reported to have hit a wedding party, of a “war crime”. <span style="font-weight: 400">If the exchange continues, with neither side making a show of retreating, the effects could multiply in severity. That’s because all of this is happening at a time when financial strains are beginning to become visible in the world economy — in both stock and bond markets, and in economies where growth is slowing but inflation remains stubborn. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The AI bubble had already moved into a delicate phase. The hyperscalers who have driven the investment boom sustaining the US economy — counting among their number Anthropic, OpenAI, Amazon, Google and Microsoft — have burned through their ample reserves of cash and, to maintain the massive build-out of data centers and infrastructure, have now started turning to credit markets. They’ve been able to borrow on favorable terms because the rapid rise of their share prices has provided them with ample collateral. Those rising share prices have, in turn, been swollen by huge profits, creating a virtuous upward cycle which makes the new debt being taken on appear eminently manageable.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Unfortunately, though, all is not as it appears. A</span> <a href="https://bobeunlimited.substack.com/p/the-shit-returns-coming-on-all-this?utm_campaign=email-half-post&amp;r=59u5y&amp;utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">close look</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> at the numbers reveals that tech leaders are making big money only because they’re spending big money. The actual rate of return on their investments is so far barely sufficient to cover the cost of depreciation of their assets, and from a long-term perspective they are essentially breaking even. Meanwhile, to justify their current very generous share valuations, the hyperscalers would need to see continued rates of profit growth that would amount to more than a doubling every year. This may be too much to ask: </span><a href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/in-ai-revenue-just-caught-up-with?utm_source=post-email-title&amp;publication_id=192845&amp;post_id=206486485&amp;utm_campaign=email-post-title&amp;isFreemail=true&amp;r=59u5y&amp;triedRedirect=true&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">total revenues</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> (not profits) from global AI sales have only just begun to surpass depreciation costs, which suggests that margins remain very tight</span><span style="font-weight: 400">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Most importantly, the hyperscalers’ ascent has been underwritten by a massive expansion in the US national debt, with federal fiscal deficits expanding </span><a href="https://atlantic-books.co.uk/book/icarus-economics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">faster</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> than the economy itself. </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/362ccc0a-d6e5-40df-817f-64aea4717cc8?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">More than half</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> of US corporate profits have been funded by these deficits. Further flattering profit growth is that many more companies are today </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/362ccc0a-d6e5-40df-817f-64aea4717cc8?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">private</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> than was the case a few decades ago, funded by private equity and venture capital, where creative accounting can keep weak performance “off the books”. But as depicted in Warren Buffett’s famous analogy of skinny dippers being exposed by a retreating tide, that sort of sleight of hand gets quickly exposed in a downturn.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Copy-of-lead-images-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Euro elite helps Trump</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Samuel Rubinstein</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Two things could bring the blistering AI rally to halt: a drop in demand for its products, or a drop in the supply of the credit sustaining the boom. It is the latter which may now be coming into play. The fundamental driver of rising bond yields is falling bond prices, since the two move in opposite directions to one another: as bond investors demand lower prices on the bonds they buy, the effective rate of interest paid by the issuer goes up.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Over the last few years, Western governments have issued so many bonds to fund their spending that investors are getting stuffed to the point they can take no more. It began during the Covid pandemic, when governments borrowed an average </span><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/313711/why-empires-fall-by-heather-john-rapley-and-peter/9780141991160" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">fifth of GDP</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> just to keep their economies from collapsing. It then continued during the recovery phase, and in the US was turbocharged by a bipartisan consensus to thereafter throw caution to the wind. Through both the Biden and Trump administrations, the US government ran large fiscal deficits in order to fund an investment boom, the former directly through government programs and the latter through tax cuts. But the end result is a national debt that has doubled in just the last ten years, and whose growth shows no signs of slowing down.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Add to that mix, then, the shift of hyperscalers from investing their savings to raising money in corporate bond markets, and the global demand for credit now exceeds its supply by a significant margin. Central banks could plug the gap by “monetizing” the debt — essentially, printing new money and then using it to buy government bonds — but are reluctant to do so because inflation remains above their target rates. And inflation has remained so sticky in large measure because of the same fiscal stimulus that is pumping money into the economy without producing equivalent growth.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Inflation had, however, shown signs of moderating over the summer, in part because the ceasefire between the US and Iran had allowed energy prices to fall back down. Had that continued into the autumn, we might have seen central banks lower interest rates further. Instead, due to the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East, oil prices are once again rising. Although this will raise gas prices, the greater damage will come through the prices of distillates like diesel, which are driving up transportation and farming costs just as the northern harvests are coming in. So the fertilizer shortages caused by the war are now starting to turn up in food prices on store shelves.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2287045125.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The great Net Zero showdown</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This price resurgence comes at a most inopportune time. If it persists, the autumn inflation readings could prod central banks to further raise interest rates, raising credit costs for everyone. No G7 country will feel the weight of this expense more acutely than Britain. UK gilts have carried a premium for the last few years, imposed initially after the 2022 Liz Truss moment and then worsening after the 2024 election, when the incoming Labour government’s implausible tax and spending commitments caused investors to doubt the financial acumen of the British Treasury. The impact of perceived British mismanagement is that UK gilt yields are now the highest of any G7 country, and each day’s inching further upwards makes the government’s difficult situation even worse.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">So pity the Chancellor, John Healey, who at the end of October will deliver his first Budget. Healey’s fiscal headroom, the gap between revenues and budgeted expenditure that he can “play with”, was tight to begin with and is now narrowing towards zero. At this rate, come Budget day, he will have to deliver bad news — either further spending cuts or tax increases. Either would probably bring an end to Andy Burnham’s honeymoon period, which has seen his </span><a href="https://yougov.com/en-gb/articles/55382-political-favourability-ratings-august-2026" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">net approval rating</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> rise steadily since he became Prime Minister.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">And if Andy Burnham faces a cold new reality, Donald Trump may become a lame duck. The odds of a Democratic sweep of Congress in the November elections, currently tilted slightly in their favor, will probably lengthen if gas prices go back up, inflation rises and credit card costs become more burdensome. Inflation that has been running over 3% has now begun to erode the incomes of ordinary Americans, and the bottom half of the economy can be forgiven for thinking there’s already a recession.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">What has kept the economy from contracting has been the heavy consumption of the top half, fueled by the wealth effect of the stock market rally. So, if interest rates were to choke off the supply of credit and slow that growth, the market might fall as prices realign with the new reality. In that event, the reversal of the wealth effect could tip the US economy into recession, accelerating slowdowns elsewhere.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“It seems unlikely that the rise in bond yields we’ve seen over the last week could continue much longer without something cracking.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Worryingly, the capacity of Western governments to tackle recessions is not what it once was. As the Bank for International Settlements noted in its </span><a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2026e.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">annual report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, recent years have seen government debt rise during downturns, but without a concomitant decline during economic recoveries. The rainy-day funds of Western governments have then been further depleted by the rising demands of defense expenditure, aging populations and adaptation to climate change.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">It seems unlikely that the rise in bond yields we’ve seen over the last week could continue much longer without something cracking. As debt-laden governments are forced to commit ever more of their revenues to interest payments — in the UK, they now suck out more money than the defense and Home Office budgets combined — they will have to either cut spending or raise taxes. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In the US, such fiscal austerity would drain the supply of money that has kept the economy revving. That, in turn, would hit the profits of the tech companies inflating the bubble just as their access to credit dries up. In short, the scale of the recession could stand in direct proportion to the scale of the boom which preceded it, at a time western governments would be more constrained in their ability to engage in counter-cyclical policies. </span>With the American economy already slowing and the job market at a virtual standstill, a slide into negative territory could deepen the hardship already being felt by many working people, strengthening the wind now filling the sails of political populists.</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Thus, between the limited fiscal firepower of Western governments and the chariness of their central banks, reluctant to stimulate amid persistent inflation, this is not the time for a recession. Let us hope that Trump soon finds a different way out of his Middle East quagmire.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1073210</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>How the Euro elite helps Trump</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Samuel Rubinstein]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22jul22.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[In 2025, Trump lined up European leaders like schoolchildren. (White House)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Samuel Rubinstein</strong> is a writer and historian.</div>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>si_rubinstein</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a writer and historian.</div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 23:03:01 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 23:03:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[donald j trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1072927</guid>
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								<![CDATA[They are more obedient than the Right]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Donald Trump has always got a kick out of humiliating people who suck up to him. That was the entire premise of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">The Apprentice</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">, and a running theme in his two non-consecutive terms as president. His career is littered with the hunched skeletons of discarded lackeys. His current lackeys know this, of course: it is a risk they knowingly incur, and a small price to pay for power. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Trump is such a natural at this, though, that he can have a similar effect on Europe’s elite. There’s the spectacle of Emmanuel Macron massaging his ego and Mark Rutte </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/c1e0nnx60q6o" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">calling</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> him “daddy” — but however unedifying this may be, it is just diplomacy. Stranger still is the way they often seem to cede to him, unforced, a kind of moral authority. Trump brings out their masochistic streak; they become eager participants in his hobby of Europe-bashing. What pathetic little leeches we are, they cry out, when the President attacks them for being defense freeloaders, exploiting American goodwill: he has us bang to rights.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">They do not take this line on other aspects of the White House’s critique of European policy. They do not say that Trump has them bang to rights on free speech or trade or energy or immigration — to say this would be to admit the defeat of an entire moral worldview. But on the specific subject of defense their usual reflexes are suspended. All of a sudden they turn MAGA. We have been free-riding for decades, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckg6v0pk964o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">they say</a>; Trump is <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/uk-politics-live-farage-hits-085447758.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&#8220;simply right&#8221;</a> that Europe should spend more. It was only a matter of time, one can almost hear Mark Rutte suggest, before somebody intelligent and manful enough would catch on.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This is not the posture of MAGA’s European outriders. Europe’s insurgent Right-wing parties tend to take a more hard-headed view of American objectives. The nationalist Right in France, Italy, and Germany has a long tradition of anti-Atlanticism: they never subscribed to the view that American support for European defense was an act of supreme, selfless benevolence. Indeed, they increasingly appear to recognize that MAGA is an albatross around their necks. Giorgia Meloni recently had a public </span><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cze962pgk27o" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">falling-out</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> with Trump; she knows, in a country where only </span><a href="https://yougov.com/en-gb/articles/55363-how-popular-is-donald-trump-in-europe-july-2026" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">8%</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> have a favorable opinion of the President, that some distance from the White House can only be a good thing. Beatrix von Storch of the AfD may have a “Make America Great Again” cap on her </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f12c330e-bed7-4f9d-9b37-c301ffd78b03?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">desk</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> in the Bundestag; but, at the same time, her party and its base tends to</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">look</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> at Trump’s America with <a href="https://spectator.com/article/why-the-afd-has-fallen-out-of-love-with-trump/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a certain coolness</a>. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/GettyImages-2286277155.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The case for de-escalation with Russia</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">They are well aware that Trump is extremely unpopular in Europe. His reckless statements and interventions, and his encroachments on the sovereignty of other countries, can be a major liability for Right-wing politics internationally — as the cautionary tale of Pierre Poilievre in Canada goes to show. One wonders sometimes whether MAGA understands the toxic effect it can have on “sovereigntist” Right-wing parties in the rest of the world, and even exploits this in order to keep the establishment parties in charge.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For Europe’s establishment parties are the real marks for Trump’s rhetoric on defense. They are the lackeys whose humiliation Trump craves and enjoys. They are used to taking their orders from Washington, and defense spending is an easy concession for them to make to Trump, in word if not in action — easier, anyway, than accepting his counsel on immigration, energy, or other areas of policy that he is wont to berate them about. So somehow, in this single instance, the Trumpian line has become a piece of European elite consensus. Sanna Marin, the former prime minister of Finland and now a strategic counselor for the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, </span><a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2025/02/19/now-is-the-time-for-europe-to-show-strength-not-division-argues-sanna-marin" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">wrote</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> for the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Economist </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">last year commending the American taxpayer for having aroused from his slumber to question “why they should shoulder more of the cost of European security than Europe itself”. Alex Younger, the late chief of MI6, </span><a href="https://x.com/JensOdlander/status/2013201684055372198?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">said</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> similarly: “We have been infantilized and it hasn’t been healthy… we should be extraordinarily grateful to America for its generosity.” He likened Europe to a spoilt child on a “trust fund”, a spoilt child which now has to toughen up, get wise, and make its own way in the world. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">A belligerent Russia, the argument runs, is Europe’s problem, not America’s — and so it’s high time that Europeans take matters into their own hands. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Defense spending is an easy concession to make to Trump, in word if not in action — easier, anyway, than accepting his counsel on immigration and energy.” </div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">That Europe should spend more on defense</span><span style="font-weight: 400">, and on containing Russian aggression,</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> is a fair proposition, and one which many previous American presidents have supported. “</span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/europe-force-posture-review-and-transition-nato-30" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">Nato 3.0</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">”, where Europe assumes principal responsibility for its own defense, could indeed be a good thing for Europe — and, perhaps especially, for Ukraine. This is a message which Britain badly needs to hear, especially now that John Healey has conveniently </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/aug/28/john-healey-uk-defence-spending-target-budget" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">forgotten</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> the national security imperatives that caused him to resign as Defense Secretary less than three months ago. None of this means, however, that Europe’s leaders should accept the framing that American support for European defense was motivated by “generosity”, which Europeans have been greedily exploiting and for which we should now be “extraordinarily grateful”. If Europe has been “infantilized”, then that is something that the Americans deliberately engineered, over the course of many decades. Trump is not meting out “tough love”; he is not Matron making the medicine go down, or a wealthy father cutting off his pampered, profligate children “for their own good”. The “trust fund” was always an investment, and quite a profitable one at that. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The Americans realized, after being drawn into two world wars, that isolationism was a risky and unworkable strategy. They had an interest in preventing future war in Europe. They were anxious to prevent nuclear proliferation, and to stop countries like France and Italy from falling into Communist hands. The end of the Second World War left them in a fortuitous position in Western Europe, and one they were in no hurry to relinquish. They got — and still enjoy — a military foothold in Europe, which can come in handy when, say, they want to direct logistics and communications from somewhere within striking distance of Iran.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/suicide-is-a-tragedy-not-an-argument/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/suicide-is-a-tragedy-not-an-argument/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/GettyImages-2290729936.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/suicide-is-a-tragedy-not-an-argument/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/suicide-is-a-tragedy-not-an-argument/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Suicide is a tragedy, not an argument</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/suicide-is-a-tragedy-not-an-argument/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Samuel Rubinstein</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">It was a good arrangement, while it lasted. America got fat off </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Pax Americana</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">. We in Europe got a lot out of it too: a “holiday from history”, the luxury to spaff billions on welfare; billions which, in a previous age, would have been spent on dreadnoughts and munitions. Not that we Europeans were </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">totally</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> useless on military matters: we tended to accept that our obligations were a two-way street. If the Americans were footing the bill, then it was only fair for them to expect what little military assistance we could offer during their moments of need. That guided the decision made by many European countries to join the American-led coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq. One reason Trump’s Greenland gambit earlier this year left such a bitter taste in many European mouths is that Denmark was one of America’s more devoted European allies. Denmark had the </span><a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2026/01/07/denmark-bled-alongside-american-troops-iraq-and-afghanistan-now-trump-wont-rule-out-taking-greenland.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">third-highest</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> per-capita casualty rate among Nato nations in Iraq and Afghanistan, behind America and Britain. Trump’s obsession with gratitude</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">could easily be turned on its head. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">The Americans </span><span style="font-weight: 400">could say thank you for our help in the War of Terror; </span><span style="font-weight: 400">the Americans </span><span style="font-weight: 400">could say thank you for Ramstein, Lakenheath, and Fairford.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The European country which has come closest to implementing Trump’s advice is of course France. France clears its Nato target of 2% of GDP on defense, and seems to spend it </span><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/03/11/britain-billions-france-defence-military/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">more effectively</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> than other countries do, including Britain. Earlier this year this caused Britain some embarrassment when French warships, rather than British ones, sailed to Cyprus after the RAF base at Akrotiri was hit in an Iranian drone strike. France pulls its weight. And France, to the chagrin of George W. Bush’s White House, did not join the war in Iraq. Nor does it host US bases on its soil: General de Gaulle chased all of them out in the Sixties. Because France has tended to pull its weight, it has also enjoyed more strategic independence from America in foreign policy. The two go hand-in-hand. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Suppose, now, that the rest of Europe were to follow Trump’s admonition to the letter. Suppose that the rest of Europe were to become truly “sovereigntist”, perhaps under the aegis of MAGA’s sister movements on the populist Right, and to figure out what the French figured out long ago. Is that an outcome that Trump and his coterie would actually want to come about? Recall Trump’s</span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/80d6b1e1-e17c-4ed4-aa3e-b9a50196eb72?syn-25a6b1a6=1"> <span style="font-weight: 400">fury</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> earlier this year when the Kingdom of Denmark moved a few dozen troops to another part of the Kingdom of Denmark; or his rage that European countries did not fall immediately into line when he embarked on his Iran adventure. Those countries would be a lot less</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">pliable than they currently are if they really did get their defense spending in order. Nor is it the case that Trump is that invested, in general, in the sovereignty of his European allies. He routinely makes demands about how they should direct policy on fossil fuels and immigration, and with whom they <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c80gvz3l7n2o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">should and should not </a></span><span style="font-weight: 400">trade</span><span style="font-weight: 400">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Europe’s leaders should, as ever, be careful not to take Trump’s words at face value. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">But even</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> if they </span><span style="font-weight: 400">do</span><span style="font-weight: 400">, they are unlikely to put them into action: as John Healey’s recent U-turn reveals, welfare spending must always come first. Their hope is that Trump is succeeded in the White House by someone with a less capricious attitude toward their allies, someone who understands the upsides of the postwar arrangement, and thinks that it is still worth paying for. The alternative — slashing welfare to fund defense — is somewhat more conceivable under parties on the nationalist Right; but the practical consequences of that</span><span style="font-weight: 400">, a Europe composed of sovereign states capable of pursuing their own interests as they define them,</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> would not be to Trump’s liking. Trump claims to want Europe to stand on its own two feet, but he does not want Europe to be strategically independent. He should, perhaps, be careful what he wishes for. </span></p>
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					<title>Somali pirates are back</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/08/somali-pirates-are-back/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/08/somali-pirates-are-back/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Iran War </unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rose George]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/LADY.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The hostages aboard MT Honour 25. (nayyssny/TikTok)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rose George </strong>is a British journalist and author. An expert on shipping, her most recent book is <em>Every Last Fish: What Fish Do for Us And What We Do To Them</em>.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a British journalist and author. An expert on shipping, her most recent book is <em>Every Last Fish: What Fish Do for Us And What We Do To Them</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 23:02:29 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 10 Aug 2026 10:45:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[seafarers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1069328</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Navies are distracted by Hormuz]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It’s Groundhog Day in the Gulf. I use an American reference as it’s an American-made calamity. After weeks of stop-start progress, 14,000 of the estimated 20,000 seafarers who had been stuck in the Strait of Hormuz since Donald Trump began bombing Iran have made their escape. Having heard that good news, you could be forgiven for thinking that things had been on the up, at least as far as shipping is concerned. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But with the Trump versus the Mullahs show, nothing is guaranteed. Earlier this month, the International Maritime Organization affirmed the right to freedom of navigation for shipping. But it did so in a very IMO way — formally and a bit pointlessly — prompting Sal Mercogliano, a professor of maritime history, to respond: “Doesn’t do crap. You have to impose freedom of navigation with military force.” In the meantime, the situation for the seafarers who remain in the Strait is perilous — mines, drones, shallow waters — with militias and pirates among the dangers for those who choose to take a different route.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The blunt truth is that no nation has enough seapower to police the ocean. Back in 2010, I went to sea for five weeks on the container ship Maersk Kendal. It was research for my book about international shipping, <em>Ninety Percent of Everything</em> — so named as 90% of, well, everything you own arrives to you on a ship just like it. The mostly Filipino seafarers would greet me each morning with “SSDD, Miss Rose”. Same shit, different day. Now they will probably say, “Different shit, every day.” But even then, they were contending with Somali piracy, which was in full flow. China, the US and a combined EU taskforce had ships patrolling the ocean, but as one admiral told me, the ocean is so huge, it was like having a single police car for all of Western Europe. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When Kendal passed through the Indian Ocean, I was uncomfortably aware that 544 seafarers were being held hostage not far away, just off Somalia. Everyone knew where they were: it’s tricky to hide a ship in the age of satellites and drones. I wondered at the time whether 544 bus drivers or 544 airline pilots being held hostage would get as little attention. But that was naive. The sea is different. You can do things at sea that you can’t do on land. By 2012, Somali piracy had been tamed. At shipping conferences you will hear that this was done by “best management practices” — zig-zagging and such — but that is nonsense. It was because ships started carrying armed guards. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“This is the shocking thing about these multimillion pound ships with their multimillion pound loads of oil and containers. They are unarmed.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is the shocking thing about these multimillion pound ships with their multimillion pound loads of oil and containers. They are unarmed. In 2010, the only protection we had on Maersk Kendal was a dummy on the poop deck — as if the Somali skiffs would turn back if they thought there were 22 people on board, not 21 — and a crew member standing on the bridge wings with binoculars. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Hormuz, ships have no protection either. They are easy prey. With the Western navies preoccupied, the Somalis have opportunistically reappeared in the Arabian Sea and western Indian Ocean and now hold hostage four ships and 67 seafarers. The pirates have issued a £3 million demand for the release of </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">MT Honour 25</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and released </span><a href="https://www.thesoutheastasiadesk.com/p/somali-piracy-returns-asean-seafarers-honour25"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a chilling photo</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the crew sitting on the floor of the bridge, with masked pirates and AK-47s as a backdrop. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When Honour 25 was first taken hostage, one of its crew managed to send a voice note to his family in Karachi, Pakistan. His son Muzammil Ahmed Ansari told Al Jazeera what his father, 53-year-old Mehmood, had managed to say. “He said, ‘We are hijacked, reach out to the company, to people, to the government.’ He said there were pirates on the ship, all armed. He panicked, but he said, ‘Don’t worry, ask the government to deal with it.’&#8221;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That was in May. Mehmood is still a hostage. Chirag Bahri, who was held hostage by Somali pirates for nearly eight months in 2010, is not surprised Somali pirates have surged. “They are criminals and they want easy money.” With Trump’s catastrophic war against Iran taking all the attention, pirates have taken advantage of the distraction. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/image-10.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hormuz: Iran’s dire Strait</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Frankopan </a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If that weren’t enough, the Houthis, a Yemeni militia, popped up again after months of peace, threatening Saudi Arabia-linked ships that pass through the Red Sea. They don’t even have to actually attack: the threat is enough. Already container giants such as the French firm CMA-CGM have told ships to seek shelter, and have canceled transits through Suez. Suddenly if you’re a group or a state with a grievance, maritime chokepoints are a fashionable lever to pull. The Ukrainians are now attacking what they call Russia-linked ships in the Black Sea, although many ships do not carry Russians. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The broader picture is that the Gulf is static and hardly anything is moving. Now the Suez Canal is risky again, as is Bab-el-Mandeb strait, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. These all make up the main highways of cargo movements. Where are ships supposed to go? The long way round, probably. It hasn’t yet come to that, but when the Houthis last issued shipping threats, ships began to travel around Africa instead. It’s longer — by 10 to 14 days — and more expensive, but the premiums that insurance companies insist on increasing in war wouldn’t apply and your ship could probably arrive at its destination with both crew and cargo intact. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Meanwhile it’s the seafarers — the truck drivers of the sea — who suffer most. On 11 July, marine engineer Herambh Karmarkar, a 30-year-old man from Pune, wrote to his family in India: “Our ship has safely crossed.” His ship, the Cyprus-flagged CFS Galaxy, was making its way out of the Strait using the Oman route: this way hugs the Omani coastline and is supposedly protected by the US, though it is very difficult to find out what this protection actually consists of. Herambh was wrong. Hours later, Iranians attacked his ship, probably to terrify other ships into taking the northern route near Iran, and paying for the privilege. Herambh was killed.</span></p>
<figure id="attachment_1069860" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1069860" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1069860 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="681" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg?resize=768,511 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg?resize=566,376 566w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg?resize=253,168 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg?resize=250,166 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg?resize=660,439 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-103759205.jpg?resize=480,319 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1069860" class="wp-caption-text">Shipping is once again threatened by armed thugs. (Roberto Schmidt/AFP/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A glance at the </span><a href="https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incidents"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Recent Incidents section</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on the UK Maritime Operations Centre (UKMTO) website confirms this sort of thing is now routine: Attack 8 August. Attack 7 August. Another attack 5 August. The UKMTO is careful to report when all crew are safe, but still, the media usually report that ships are being attacked. What if we rephrased it? Civilians are being attacked. Ships do not drive themselves, and although a couple of ships have recently been abandoned, about 6,000 seafarers — who are, remember, civilians — are still stuck on their stationary ships, because stopped ships still need maintenance. And they are targets. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">How many seafarers have already been killed in this war? Currently the estimate is 17 non-Iranians. Iranians, meanwhile, say they have lost 44 men, including 16 fishermen. If the category of seafarers were to include naval personnel, the number is much higher: when the US nuclear submarine USS Charlotte torpedoed the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena in early March, 104 sailors were killed, according to Iran. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2207620148.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How shipowners are getting rich off Hormuz</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rose George</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But we expect naval personnel to die in a war. That’s what they signed up for. There is no such commitment in merchant seafarer contracts. Of course merchant seafarers can fight: during the First and Second World Wars, the merchant navy lost more personnel than the Royal Navy, proportionately, and showed astonishing bravery. But in the modern world, merchant seafarers are civilians, and they should get protection. The broader picture, though, is that the proportion of civilian deaths in conflict has been rising for decades. In 2024 alone, according to the UN Human Rights Office, civilian conflict deaths rose 40% globally. So perhaps the deaths of the men who are bringing you your gasoline and cornflakes should be acceptable. You would think so, given how long it took the media to start noticing that ships attacked by drones and missiles had people on them. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The latest surge in violence means most transit attempts have stopped. Figures from the maritime intelligence agency Windward AI show 11 inbound transits and seven outbound, a tiny fraction of the pre-war 140 or so transits a day. However, there are now credible reports of companies offering huge financial incentives for crews willing to undertake a transit. Before the latest attacks, the Sinkor Group, the world’s largest operator of supertankers, offered seafarers six months’ salary for one round trip. Other companies are adding 60 days’ salary to what should be a 30-day round trip. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So has Hormuz changed shipping? Shipping faces constant crises and usually bounces back. But it is hard to see that happening now. For a start, dark transits are way more common than they were before this war began. Russian ships were always good at going dark: this means switching off their AIS (automatic information system), or flying a false flag or inputting false data about their cargo or destination. Now everyone is at it. Since the Houthis decided to threaten Saudi Arabian ships, Saudi ships carrying oil from Yanbu, the port at the end of the Saudi oil pipeline, have gone missing from ship tracking sites: eight turned back, reported Lloyds List, but 11 went dark. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This won’t affect consumers, necessarily — the oil will still be transported, and so will the iPhones and Lego bricks and Toyotas and sugar. But it will affect life at sea. Not everyone at sea is a criminal, but there is no better place to be a criminal than at sea.</span></p>
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					<title>Trump can still win the Iran war</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/07/trump-can-still-win-iran-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/07/trump-can-still-win-iran-war/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The White House is more willing to dispatch bombers than put boots on the ground. (Leon Neal/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 23:01:46 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 23:01:46 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[donald j trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1068775</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Spare the bridges, crush the IRGC]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As the war in Iran enters its fifth month, President Trump is growing increasingly frustrated. He sees few good options to end the war and talks of “lunatics” and “revenge mode”. As I write, he is meeting Netanyahu to add credibility to his implicit threat to the Revolutionary Guards, who now run Tehran very much as the SS did once Hitler died, with no plan other than to keep fighting, and a readiness to hang anyone who disagrees. (On Sunday they publicly hanged 18-year old Erfan Esfandiari in Isfahan, an exemplary victim precisely because of his youth and innocence.)</p>
<p>But there is a way. And to discover how, it is important to recall how this latest bout of warfare started: with June’s botched “Memorandum of Understanding”. This was hurriedly negotiated in chronically treacherous Pakistan by Vice President Vance — whose many talents do not include any expertise about the millenarian ideology of Iran’s current rulers — and Trump’s two favorite businessmen: his son-in-law Jared Kushner, and the real estate lawyer, Steve Witkoff, who habitually closes deals very rapidly by not being too obsessive about the details.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, then, the MOU was so loosely worded that it could be read as surrendering the Persian Gulf to Iran — as well as its direct opposite. And it was also inevitable that the surviving Revolutionary Guard officers who now rule Iran would go for the maximum; all along they have boasted about their glorious victories, so they were hardly going to stand down and let America’s Arab and Sunni friends ship out their oil, liquefied natural gas, and fertilizers undisturbed.</p>
<p>So they made an unprecedented and plainly illegal claim of sovereignty over the whole Gulf, together with a demand for transit fees. When Iran started attacking ships to assert its claim, the Trump administration imposed a total embargo on the Islamic Republic’s oil exports, both from their major Persian Gulf terminal on Kharg Island, and from a much smaller terminal at Jask, out on the Indian Ocean coast beyond the Gulf.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1068780" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1068780" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1068780 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285289455.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1068780" class="wp-caption-text">How loyal is the Iranian public to its rulers? (Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Because Iran’s usable foreign exchange reserves are very small, Trump’s oil export embargo had an immediate impact. Not only did it hamper Iran&#8217;s ability to import rocket fuel, drone motors and other such urgent necessities from China, it also slowed its money transfers to Shi’a allies in Iraq, to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to Yemen’s Houthi militia that controls the country’s Red Sea ports.</p>
<p>Not that this prevented the Houthis from faithfully serving Iran’s interests, and opening up a new front in the war, by threatening ships attempting to pass through the Bab-El-Mandeb straits in the Red Sea. Up to five million barrels a day of Saudi oil exports — almost half of the total Saudi capacity — pass through that waterway, via a pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yambu, itself activated after Hormuz was closed. If the Houthis succeed, it is inevitable that the price of oil will jump even higher than its current $100-a-barrel rate.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2267672215.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America has lost the will to fight</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, in Iran itself, the stop to oil exports has collapsed the value of the rial. It now costs 1,900,000 rials to purchase one US dollar in Tehran; a year ago it was 590,000 rials. This is the best illustration of the runaway inflation currently being suffered by Iranians.</p>
<p>The inflationary pressure is landing acutely on the salaried of Iran’s two biggest cities, Tehran and Mashad, including the military personnel of the Artesh (the regular armed forces), the Revolutionary Guards, the employees of government ministries and the <em>Bonyads</em> (the Islamic charities that control much of the economy), and the Basij paramilitary security forces. Essential items are unaffordable. In the latter days of each month, these workers and their families must depend on heavily subsidized bread for all their meals.</p>
<p>But for its rulers, as we now know, Iran’s continuing immiseration means nothing at all. Behind the hollow pretense of a ghostly Mojtaba Khamenei, who is equally powerless whether he is alive, dead or comatose, the Revolutionary Guards and Basij auxiliaries are now in sole control, and it is the invocations of their paid “eulogists” (<em>Maddahan</em>), who are not trained clerics but rather but inspirational orators, who spell out their victory plan.</p>
<p>Their message is simple: if the war is pursued vigorously enough, the Twelfth Imam, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan, who has remained hidden from Sunni killers since the year 874, will return as the redeemer, the <em>Al Mahdi</em>, to install Shi’a Islam as the world’s only religion. They insist that Iran is on a path to certain victory. And this, they assert, is simply because its enemies are no better than spoiled children, unwilling to accept any diminution of their sinful and luxurious lives, while Iran’s rulers for their part will accept any hardships, and any number of casualties, to simply resist. And to resist is to be victorious, in their telling.</p>
<p>Since the White House remains infected by its “no-boots-on-the-ground” syndrome, President Trump refuses to risk deploying even a small number of troops to the desert islands in the Persian Gulf to secure its transits, so it might seem that Iran must win.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;In every war, each side has its center of gravity — the one asset that cannot be sacrificed.&#8221;</div>
<p>But in every war, each side has its center of gravity — the one asset that cannot be sacrificed. For Iran, it is the Revolutionary Guard leadership. Since the latest round of fighting began, Iranian missiles and drones have targeted Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates, but, strikingly, not Israel. The Revolutionary Guards could easily draw Israel in by launching missiles towards it, or ordering its Houthi auxiliaries to do so. They have chosen not to.</p>
<p>The reason why is no mystery. The bombing capacity of the United States is far greater, but only the Israelis have demonstrated a consistent ability to find and kill Iran’s top leaders — and a willingness to do so. In Washington&#8217;s foreign affairs and intelligence bureaucracies, by contrast, there is a dogmatic opposition to attacks against political leaders. This is a principle valid enough in almost all cases; in all the decades of Arab-Israeli warfare there was no attempt to attack state leaders by either side. But when a leadership is willing to impose unlimited sacrifices on its own population, it is no use inflicting more hardship on that same population — and the leaders are the only valid targets. The argument recently advanced, that US negotiations were hampered by the killing of Iran’s more experienced leaders, is spurious; experienced or not, they had publicly and loudly refused any real solution: as they had to, in fear of the Revolutionary Guards.</p>
<p>Yet American strategy continues to target the country&#8217;s economy and infrastructure rather than the regime itself. The very latest word from Trump is that he will order the destruction of a major bridge — and highly mountainous Iran depends on its bridges — for every ship that is hit in the Persian Gulf. But destroying bridges would only raise the cost of war; removing the Revolutionary Guard leadership could end it. It would immediately comfort the desperate, oppressed population, and might sooner or later bring to power new leaders less eager to enjoy the luxuries of Islamic martyrdom.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1068775</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Israel doesn&#039;t need friends</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/07/israel-doesnt-need-friends/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/07/israel-doesnt-need-friends/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-83960845.jpg?w=541</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Great Power</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[An Israeli soldier near West Beirut, 1982. (John Downing/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 23:01:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 08:00:17 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1067531</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Foreign threats breed self-sufficiency]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>The classic definition of a Great Power is a country that can wage war without allies. Unbeknownst even to its own leaders, Israel must have been a Great Power from the very day of its birth, when it had absolutely no allies and was invaded by Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and the volunteer Arab Liberation Army. Worse still, the new Jewish statelet had to face the very active hostility of the British and US governments, which used their then-pervasive influence to close every Mediterranean port to shipments of weapons and ammunition.</p>
<p>For the roughly 650,000 Jews of the new mini-state, who sang and danced that day in May 1948, the very strict embargo was much more than an inconvenience. The British had already supplied their best fighter aircraft and tanks to the Egyptians, and armored cars with cannons to Transjordan&#8217;s Arab Legion, the best Arab army and still led by British officers. All the while, the British rulers of what remained Mandate Palestine until midnight on 14 May 1948 had done their best to stop any attempt to smuggle weapons into the future Israel with full US support — a number of Las Vegas Jews, not necessarily accountants, doctors or lawyers, went to jail for sending mere hand guns to their coreligionists. The intent, clearly, was to guarantee an Arab victory, the exact opposite of the myth of Anglo-American help for Israel which is taught as fact across the Muslim world.</p>
<p>President Truman did recognize Israel immediately, at the urging of his Great War comrade and best friend Eddie Jacobson. But the Secretary of State, the retired five-star general George Marshall who had led the US to victory against Nazi Germany, was immensely more authoritative than ex-Vice President Truman. He simply ignored Truman&#8217;s recognition, flatly refusing to receive the new state&#8217;s first envoy, who was bound to ask for weapons Marshall was determined to deny.</p>
<p>Focused on keeping the Russians from overrunning Europe, Marshall had no time for an ephemeral micro-state that would soon vanish in defeat. American interests in the Arab world were not yet that important — Saudi Arabia’s giant Ghawar oil field had just been discovered — but Arab oil mattered while the Jewish statelet could never amount to anything. That the State Department was run by antisemites was true but at that point irrelevant, because Marshall was no antisemite: his solution for the Jewish refugees still in European camps was to waive anti-immigration laws and bring them all to the US.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2267672215.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America has lost the will to fight</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The determined Anglo-American attempt to strangle Israel at its birth was partly foiled by newly liberated Czechoslovakia, which had plenty of leftover machine guns and ammunition, as well as some Spitfires and other fighter planes that it was eager to sell. The Jews, for their part, had some transport aircraft and pilots, but they could not reach Israel without a refueling stop. The State Department and the Foreign Office knew all about this desperate attempt to circumvent their embargo, and they moved to deny Israel’s use of every single European airfield. Only Tito’s Yugoslavia allowed the use of a single runway in Montenegro, at the insistence of Mosa Pijade, a Sarajevo Jew and close wartime comrade of the Marshal.</p>
<p>In the end, that minuscule cargo was enough to secure Israel its independence. Yet even after the Jews defeated their Arab enemies, the State Department did not give up, strenuously and successfully opposing any US arms sales to Israel, even after the Soviet Union started sending hundreds of aircraft and thousands of tanks to Arab governments. The US only relented after Israel defeated the Arabs in June 1967, again without any US-supplied weapons and instead relying on second-hand British tanks and new French fighters sold for cold hard cash.</p>
<p>This history matters because it puts paid to the idea that Israel is entirely dependent on US largesse. There are people, including some in the Trump administration, who imagine that cutting American aid would irreparably damage the Jewish state. Israel’s population today is not 650,000, but nine million, including two million loyal Arab citizens who supply one in four of its doctors and a great many engineers.</p>
<p>And precisely because of that long history of denials and embargoes, those nine million are enough to support disproportionately large and diverse military industries. They would mitigate any would-be restrictions on US support, especially because Israel neither has nor needs the biggest items, whether aircraft carriers or the B-2 bombers that flew all the way from Missouri to bomb Iran’s vast nuclear installations at Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Those nine million Israelis are enough to support disproportionately large and diverse military industries&#8221;</div>
<p>That raises the old question of Israel’s own nuclear weapons, which have long been known to exist as bombs, as well as tactical and ballistic missile warheads. But it also raises a major mystery: why did the US have to bomb three different centrifuge installations? Just one of these, the Natanz centrifuge-enrichment plant, had an immense 2,500 square-meter hall at ground level, and two similarly sized subterranean halls with space for up to 50,000 centrifuges, far more than enough to separate the uranium needed for a number of bombs.</p>
<p>Moreover, while Natanz alone dwarfs Israel’s nuclear-weapon center on the Dimona road, fully visible to passing travelers, Iran built another large centrifuge hall under a mountain in Fordo near Qum, and then yet another, triplicate installation south of Isfahan. Adding up those sites — alongside other large workshops at Parchin — one can tell that Iran has spent many times more than Israel, without completing even a single bomb. Then there is the question of time. Israel acquired its first bomb by 1967, nine years after the project started with a small 24-megawatt French research reactor, when it was still an agricultural country of 1.8 million with no industry to speak of. By contrast, Iran bought its first centrifuge from Pakistan in 1989, to then spend increasingly vast amounts of money for 37 more years, all without acquiring a weapon.</p>
<p>In the Middle East, there is always one and the same explanation for all such mysteries: corruption, in which fanatics engage with equal enthusiasm. One glimpse suffices. On 27 November 2020, the Revolutionary Guard’s top nuclear expert was assassinated by a satellite-aimed machine-gun when returning to his villa in Absard, a swanky hill town some 45 miles from central Tehran. That luxuriously long commute, to sleep well away from Tehran’s pollution, proves nothing in itself. But its sheer largesse hints at why the centrifuge installations were triplicated, and the entire centrifuge effort duplicated by a 40-megawatt heavy-water nuclear reactor. With their priority access to Iran’s revenues, at the expense of much-needed water, gas and electricity works, the Revolutionary Guards can afford to do everything on the largest scale, including monumental headquarters in Tehran and several other cities.</p>
<p>Compare that to Professor Ernst David Bergman. Born in Karlsruhe, he headed Israel’s bomb nuclear project with Germanic discipline from start to finish, living with his family in two bedrooms and an eat-in kitchen on the premises of his laboratory, allowing him to commute on foot. That too explains how a state of nine million can research, develop and manufacture the world’s heaviest battle tank, a full range of tactical and strategic missiles, and the interceptors that inaugurated humanity’s first instance of space warfare two years ago.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-73737298.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West can beat the rest</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Israel became an enthusiastic military ally of the US when it received its first-ever combat aircraft specifically built for its air force in October 1968: a large two-engine, two-seat, McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom. Its arrival at a remote desert base was supposed to be a state secret of the highest order, but I heard about it that very day, from a taxi driver whose base-refueller son heard a just-landed pilot exclaim, again and again, “what an aircraft! I would marry it if I could.”</p>
<p>Having survived until then on war-surplus and a few French aircraft, Israelis reacted to the start of US military aid with deep, genuine gratitude, eagerly pursuing any opportunity to reciprocate. Israel’s Mossad was inside the Soviet Union, which the CIA could only watch from afar, and offered up all it uncovered. After its October 1973 tank-warfare victories, Israel also supplied the US Army’s Fort Monroe tacticians with every bit of data for their, and Nato’s, revolutionary “fight outnumbered and win” manuals, explicitly based on the desperate Golan Heights fight in which 200 Israeli tanks destroyed four times as many Soviet-built Syrian tanks.</p>
<p>Israel’s enemies always present it as cynical about its US alliance, but in my many encounters over the years, extending to the current war, that is not what I have heard. Rather the opposite: deep concern at any sign of American weakness in facing the Chinese, Russians or anyone else, including Iran’s self-destructive fanatics. Deep satisfaction when the United States suddenly spurts ahead, as it always does, after seemingly being on the verge of being overtaken, as happened with AI and the Chinese most recently. And, of course, a great eagerness to contribute Israel’s research and development talents, whose fruits are now built into some of the most capable US weapons, most conspicuously in the F-35 fighter jet, whose innovative helmet-mounted piloting system was entirely developed in Israel.</p>
<p>Just recently, I heard White House voices claim that Netanyahu’s tenacity has become obduracy. This is a fair comment — but what is not are the suggestions by the same voices that Iran’s new leaders are very reasonable, and that Revolutionary Guard liaison officers should be received at US Central Command forward headquarters, to clear up any misunderstandings, face to face. Iranian attacks on passing tankers duly ensued, followed by more US bombing. By contrast, while it was very much also their fight, Israel’s pilots sat in their cockpits for hours to reach and bomb Iran’s distant missile launchers, which were attacking US bases and US allies, as well as Israel itself.</p>
<p>In Nato, it has long been understood that the US Navy must rely on European minesweepers and mine-hunters for its possible Persian Gulf needs, because it cannot fit such short-range vessels in its perpetual inter-oceanic transfers. But not one European Navy even tried to obtain permission to join the US Navy in the Gulf when that help was much needed. Israel, on the other hand, would never refuse any military help it could provide, as countless US officers have known for decades. That counts for much in a world where US allies give ingratitude a bad name.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1067531</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Iran has humiliated America’s military</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/06/iran-has-humiliated-americas-military/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/06/iran-has-humiliated-americas-military/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2281815277.jpg?w=529</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[The US is no longer willing to sacrifice soldiers. (Brendan SMIALOWSKI / AFP via Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 23:02:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 01:37:41 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Netanyahu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1064354</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Donald Trump is afraid to deploy troops]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Both those who criticize and those who loyally support Trump’s “deal” — it is hardly a sufficiently explicit agreement, indeed it remains vague on the key points — are carefully avoiding any mention of the critical factor that caused the abandonment of what could have been the last US-Iran war.</p>
<p>When the latest but probably not last Iran war started on 28 February 2026, the first victims, for once, were not innocent bystanders but rather Iran’s rulers and executioners, the supreme dictator Ali Khamenei; the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Staff_of_the_Armed_Forces_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chief of the General Staff</a> and head of Iran’s armed forces, General <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdolrahim_Mousavi" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Abdolrahim Mousavi</a>; the Minister of Defense, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aziz_Nasirzadeh" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Aziz Nasirzadeh</a>; the head of military research &amp; development, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hossein_Jabal_Amelian" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Hossein Jabal Amelian</a>; his predecessor Brigadier General <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reza_Mozaffari_Nia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Reza Mozaffari Nia</a>, Esmail Khatib, the Minister of Intelligence; his deputy for Israel affairs, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yahya_Hosseini_Panjaki&amp;action=edit&amp;redlink=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Yahya Hosseini Panjaki</a>; some other officials, and also the private citizen <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mojtaba_Khamenei" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mojtaba Khamenei</a>, son of Ali Khamenei but utterly unqualified for the emphatically non-hereditary supreme leader position. Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen nor heard since the bombing, and is certainly mutilated if still alive.</p>
<p>Iran’s furious response to this mass decapitation was the launch of ballistic missiles — not just against Israel and US bases in the region but also against mere bystanders. Of the 1,471 launched missiles from the start on 28 February until 20 April, some 650 were aimed at Israel, 563 landed in the territory of the United Arab Emirates that has long helped Iran’s wrecked economy, 265 landed in Kuwait, where some US aircraft are based but which has always aided Iran, 215 attacked Qatar, which shares its vast natural gas field with Iran, a country that Qatar has never harmed, 194 struck Bahrain, the main regional base of the US Navy, and 135 were aimed at Saudi Arabia, in spite of its complete neutrality.</p>
<p>Iran’s very primitive missiles have been much less lethal than the German V2s of 1944 — some 3,225 of which killed more than 7,000 people in England and Belgium — but with their huge mass of metal they inflicted much property damage even if their warheads did not explode. The older and more abundant Kheibar Shekan weighs 17 metric tons with its 750kg warhead, the newer and larger Khorramshahr weighs close to 20 tons and delivers multiple warheads weighing up to 1,500kg.</p>
<p>What Iran achieved with its 650 missiles aimed at Israel was to damage many buildings and kill 27 civilians and one off-duty IDF soldier, though some 3,000 more were injured across the country, some of them seriously.</p>
<p>While Iran attacked civilians with its very inaccurate missiles, both the US and Israel relied on extreme precision to destroy underground missile assembly plants, detected missile launchers, rocket fuel depots and mixing plants. This entire subterranean industry was the result of many years of very high spending, largely funded by the diversion of the funds urgently needed to provide water supplies for Iran’s second city Mashad, historic Yazd and other cities but for Tehran above all, which may even have to be evacuated, according to Iran’s only elected leader, president Masoud Pezeshkian.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2265130479.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Spycraft will decide Iran&#039;s fate</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Reuel Marc Gerecht</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The dam-building and water supply budgets were not enough, so the nation-wide electrical generation funds were also diverted to the Revolutionary Guards’ missile industries, and also the funding needed to pipe the country’s unlimited natural gas supplies to every city. As a result, last winter and into March when the war started, horribly polluting <i>mazout</i>, residual oil, had to be burned to keep Tehran’s people from freezing, because neither electrical nor gas heating was sufficient in the winter months, even with global warming.</p>
<p>The regime was thus on the edge of systemic failure on the eve of the war, but has now been saved by the way the war was fought — and not fought. The mass decapitation of 28 February allowed surviving Revolutionary Guards officers to take over in Tehran, very much as the SS did in Berlin after Hitler’s death on 30 April 1945, eagerly killing anyone who wanted to surrender until Russian troops arrived two days later.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;No such invasion plan had even been suggested by anyone, so there was no justification for the pre-emptive &#8216;boots on the ground&#8217; hysteria.&#8221;</div>
<p>But this time no troops were approaching Tehran, truly mission impossible because of geography alone if nothing else. Nobody in his right mind could contemplate an advance over 800 miles of desert and mountains on the only road from the Bandar Abbas on the Gulf coast to Tehran, with its 13 million people. If only a tenth still support the regime — that many are salaried in the army, police, part-time militia, Revolutionary Guards and the <i>Bonyad</i> foundations that own much of the economy — it would be enough to start a long season of urban warfare.</p>
<p>No such invasion plan had even been suggested by anyone, so there was no justification for the pre-emptive “boots on the ground” hysteria loudly manifest from isolationist backwaters and White House Vice Presidential staffers alike. As it turned out, however, the hysteria generated by wholly imaginary invasion plans had very real consequences, which in fact determined the outcome of the war till this day.</p>
<p>To understand how fears over a non-event brought about a veritable defeat, one must return to the other military action that occurred just before the start of the bombing, on 28 February. This already seems a long time ago, because everybody in the White House would have laughed at the suggestion that President Trump would ever come to terms with the Revolutionary Guards. Some 3,000 paratroopers of the rapid-response force of the 82 airborne division were sent to the Gulf, to join the 5,000 Marines of the 11th and 31st Marine expeditionary units already there.</p>
<p>They were more than enough to counter the entirely predictable — and predicted — Revolutionary Guard response to the bombing, which was to try to stop the flow of tankers and bulk carriers delivering crude oil, liquefied natural gas and fertilizer down the narrow seaways in the mostly shallow Persian Gulf from Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and — partly — from Saudi Arabia, which can send half its oil by pipeline to the Red Sea, and the United Arab Emirates, which has a pipeline to the Indian ocean for half its oil.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Untitled-design-49.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Britain&#039;s military be saved?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Revolutionary Guards and Iran’s navy could not attack the tankers and bulk carriers with their warships, armed motorboats or submarines, all of which were efficiently sunk soon after the bombing started. But they could endanger navigation by dropping sea mines from any traditional dhow or fishing vessel, and even by attacking passing tankers with their anti-tank missiles. That would be enough to cause insurance companies to suspend their coverage, thereby stopping Persian Gulf supplies to the world economy.</p>
<p>That is where the airborne troops and Marines could be highly effective. With ample helicopter transport to take up positions for hours or days on uninhabited Persian Gulf islands and deserted coastal tracts to secure nearby navigable channels, and with strong tactical air support only minutes away to minimize combat risks, they were fully capable of defeating any interfering enemy forces.</p>
<p>By sending them into action, the US could have denied any oil shipments from Iran’s oil terminal at Kharg Island and from lesser terminals at Qeshm and Jask on the Indian Ocean beyond the Gulf, thus cutting off most of Iran’s oil export revenues. At the same time, those ground and air forces could minimize any interference with the tankers and fertilizer bulk carriers transiting from Iraq, Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia into the Indian Ocean, minimizing the war’s impact on global commodity markets.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1064384" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1064384" style="width: 640px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-1064384" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg?w=640" alt="" width="640" height="431" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg?resize=300,202 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg?resize=768,517 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg?resize=267,180 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg?resize=253,170 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg?resize=250,168 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg?resize=660,444 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2270887432.jpg?resize=480,323 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1064384" class="wp-caption-text">Kharg Island and nearby Khargu Island have been left unmolested by American troops. (Satellite image from Maps4media via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu had asked only for assured resupplies of aerial munitions when it came to the pre-emptive bombing of Iran’s ballistic missiles, hoping to avoid the danger of an all-out attack that could overwhelm Israel’s defenses. He was surprised and pleased by Trump’s decision to join in and take command of the offensive. He did not pause to consider the possibility that he was forming an alliance with a weaker power, which would let him down.</p>
<p>By then, 28 February 2026, a total of 1,150 Israeli soldiers and local security officers had been killed since the war started on October 7, 2023, the equivalent of 39,100 dead US soldiers given the 1:34 population ratio.</p>
<p>Netanyahu, who was widely unpopular even before the war, was politically unaffected by the loss of more than 1,000 soldiers, but 1,150 killed in action — let alone 39,100 — would have quickly ended the Trump presidency via a fast impeachment with enough Republican votes, among vast coast-to coast mass protests. In other words, Netanyahu’s exclusive reliance on his personal dialogues with Trump, which left Israel’s Foreign Ministry and Intelligence a mere bystander, blinded him to the great change that had transformed the United States into a post-heroic country, no more willing to engage in combat than our NATO allies. Nor is it a political or even a cultural transformation that might be undone by strong leadership, but rather the unavoidable consequence of the collapse in female fertility, now down to 1.6. It means that very few American families have two or more boys, such that one might fall in combat without the family’s extinction. Almost every US combatant is now a “Private Ryan”.</p>
<p>That is why a prudent opposition to more wars in pursuit of quixotic aims — such as the 2003 Iraq war that I testified against before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seeing no chance of bringing democracy to Baghdad, and the Afghan war to modernize unwilling populations — has been transformed into a “boots on the ground” psychosis. Also present within the White House, it equates small-scale and short-lived commando actions with another endless war, nullifying the tremendous strength of US air power, allowing the Revolutionary Guards to win with very few fighters and very few small boats.</p>
<p>So this war fought by an irresolute President has not only allowed America’s worst enemies to come out the winners in spite of their utterly disastrous national policies, primitive missile engineering and clumsy military operations, but has also degraded US military strength down to European levels, because troops that cannot be risked in combat even for great gains are of little military value.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1064354</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Can Britain&#039;s military be saved?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/06/how-britain-maimed-its-military/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Untitled-design-49.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Defense spending</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[What would Denis say? (Max Mumby/Indigo)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 23:02:33 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:13:59 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defence investment plan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[John Healey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1063615</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Will government heed the wake-up call?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Britain&#8217;s armed forces have undergone a very long recessional. In 1945, the Army alone had some three million men under arms, with millions more in the navy, air force and various colonial forces. At the start of this year, by contrast, the &#8220;trained strength&#8221; total of the Royal Navy, RAF, Marines, and Army came to just 126,440, a figure that has actually fallen since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. But it was not just that very low figure that explains John Healey’s dramatic resignation last week.</p>
<p>Until relatively recently, British defense secretaries were much envied by their European counterparts — because they were allowed to conserve as much real combat strength as possible by cutting everything else to conserve money for training and realistic exercises, as well as the continuous maintenance it requires. Typical in that regard was Healey’s namesake Denis, a fiery socialist and decorated beachmaster at Anzio, who served as Labour’s defense secretary from 1964-70. No relation to his 21st-century successor, this elder Healey worked closely with his cabinet colleagues to cut costs on buying warships, aircraft, bases and the like, to focus instead on what really matters: training, munitions and maintenance.</p>
<p>That may seem like mere common sense. But since the post-Cold War drawdown that was underway by 1991, almost every European defense ministry has wasted increasing proportions of their diminishing defense spending to keep increasingly empty bases open — often just to preserve civilian janitors and ground-keepers in a job, and retired NCOs in their attached housing. Also bloated are the officer corps of most European forces, increasingly disproportionate to their shrinking personnel totals. The Spanish army is perhaps the leading champion here. Despite shrinking from 280,000 men in 1990 to just 75,000 today, it has preserved every formation command, and every regional headquarters and geographic command, including one for the Canary Islands, headed by a three-star army general and flanked by navy and air force counterparts.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/britain-is-not-ready-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/britain-is-not-ready-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/gettyimages-2211089295-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/britain-is-not-ready-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/britain-is-not-ready-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain is not ready for war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/britain-is-not-ready-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Altogether, these commands absorb a remarkable percentage of the total armed force personnel: all just to keep up appearances, and jobs for generals and admirals. Nor is the Spanish army unique in this self-sabotage; Madrid’s wasted defense spending, which may even reflect the policy preferences of its pacifist government, is merely an exaggerated version of knowingly wasteful policies across Europe. By a remarkable coincidence, for instance, every branch of the Italian armed forces — as well as the civilian police, the customs police, and the <em>carabinieri</em> military police present in every town — buy almost all of their pistols, rifles and machine guns from privately owned Beretta. The French are arguably even worse offenders: all their combat aircraft are slated to come from the privately-owned Dassault Aviation, and for all the lobbying of British firms they are not allowed to become monopolies.</p>
<p>The root cause of John Healey’s complaint is that to preserve those envied British defense practices, to retain a disciplined focus in using taxpayers’ money to buy actually usable combat capabilities, there are minimum funding levels which must be respected. All concerned know perfectly well that spending on &#8220;combat readiness&#8221; is like buying cut flowers: which must be bought anew each day, at the expense of furniture that can last for decades or even centuries. In other words, doing defense for real is, much more than anything else a government does, like running a restaurant open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. This is true even when compared with health care, in which the vast majority of patients do not require round-the-clock intensive care.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“All concerned know perfectly well that spending on &#8220;combat readiness&#8221; is like buying cut flowers: which must be bought anew each day, at the expense of furniture that can last for decades or even centuries.”</div>
<p>The real thing, the upkeep of true combat capabilities, has also required other forms of institutional discipline: including avoiding service in UN peacekeeping forces which never in fact carry out their mission to protect civilians if they have to use their weapons. The longest-lived such specimen, UNIFIL in Lebanon, has failed to execute its mission — of keeping Hezbollah from Israel&#8217;s border — even for a single day. Yet that has not prevented the participation of numerous Nato officers in over the years, including Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Karremans, the commander of the Dutch battalion meant to protect thousands of Bosnian Muslims gathered in the UN-declared “safe zone” of Srebrenica in July 1995.</p>
<p>We know how that turned out. Yet despite Karremans failing to follow orders and defend the enclave, ultimately allowing Serb fighters to kill some 8,000 men and boys, he was still promoted to full colonel upon returning to the Netherlands. Nato armies continue to retain a great many generals whose only &#8220;field&#8221; experience was in UNIFIL, to which the British Army formerly sent a single officer, and who was very soon withdrawn (it currently contributes exactly two personnel to the mission).</p>
<p>What have the British people ever obtained from their expensive &#8220;cut flowers&#8221; armed forces — that cost twice as much to operate as their European counterparts? Well, when asked to fight, they fight. A very recent example was the bombing of Houthi anti-ship missile and drone-storage sites in Southern Yemen by RAF Eurofighters. They flew out of Akrotiri, Britain&#8217;s sovereign base in Cyprus, despite being over 1,500 miles from Yemen in the Eastern Mediterranean.</p>
<p>When I asked the chief of another European air force — one that also flies Eurofighters — if his pilots could fly the same mission, he said “no” without a moment&#8217;s hesitation. To strike targets at those distances, he explained, you would need an aircraft with a sleep cot and a toilet; a cramped fighter cockpit is apparently not enough. And, in any case, you also need air-sea rescue continuously available along the way. Without it, he said, any flying mishap becomes a death sentence. That is also true of the RAF, of course, but its pilots crave the opportunity to fly real combat missions far too much to indulge their fears.</p>
<p>At the same time, British reluctance to get involved in the Ukraine war has not prevented SAS troopers from helping Zelensky’s government — officially just with training, but in practice with likely more. In sober strategic terms, there is nothing especially important about these examples. But think of the alternative: 3.5 million active Nato personnel, from Canada to Turkey, who eat breakfast, lunch and dinner in uniform every day — almost none of whom is ready to fight in earnest for any reason whatsoever.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-1282838606.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Inside Britain’s broken war machine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/inside-britains-broken-war-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>John Healey&#8217;s predecessors could count on cabinet support to maintain the British difference, but things are now changing. Not only are many modern cabinet ministers in charge of ever-expanding social and healthcare spending — inevitable with an aging population — they are also increasingly attentive to Britain’s defense industry. The latter generally hates cut-flowers &#8220;combat readiness&#8221; spending just as much as any pacifist. Why? Because it takes many millions of pounds from their preferred weapon-system &#8220;programs”, which are comfortably long in duration, and which can last even longer if they are multinational in nature.</p>
<p>That is the case with the current British-Italian-Japanese jet-fighter project, which will keep many in stable employment — before its inevitable dissolution, when the British will defect to the American jet on offer once their bargaining chip becomes useless. The competing Franco-German fighter project has just died, after Berlin belatedly discovered that Dassault meant to control every part of the project, as befits the French Beretta of combat aviation.</p>
<p>Compared with all this, the first Healey had an easy time of it. The House of Commons was still full of war veterans, many of them working-class talents like himself, who entered the army as privates but soon rose through the ranks. They all knew what combat readiness meant, and were ready to defend it from industry as well as the social-welfare crowd. Evidently, the second Healey chose to resign to issue a wake-up call, because he could not obtain the funding needed to preserve a critical mass of competence in each branch of Britain&#8217;s Armed Forces. I well remember the day when my own regiment — the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry in which I learned to shoot, carefully, to make each bullet count — was amalgamated into the Green Jackets to preserve funds for &#8220;readiness&#8221;. If Healey&#8217;s sacrifice of his high ministerial position remains unheeded, unpleasant consequences will ensue sooner or later, as they always do.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1063615</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Spycraft will decide Iran&#039;s fate</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2265130479.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Warfare</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Reuel Marc Gerecht]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/blued-1-300x300-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['Iranian counterintelligence outfits are undoubtedly working overtime.' (Ahmad Al-Runaye/AFP/ Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Reuel Marc Gerecht </strong>is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ReuelMGerecht</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 23:00:05 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 23:00:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mossad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spycraft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1062362</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Mossad is fighting a duel to the death]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">After four months of war, Israel still has targets to hit. The latest IDF raids, in this increasingly fictional ceasefire, smashed Iranian missile-defense systems and a petrochemical plant in the south of the country. Yet looming behind these physical symbols of the Islamic Republic are human targets too. Israeli officials give the impression that they could still kill senior IRGC leaders and even Mojtaba Khamenei, the new supreme leader. If true, it’s an unrivaled ongoing intelligence operation.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Demands on American and Israeli intelligence will increase regardless of whether the war stays cold or heats up once more. Donald Trump obviously doesn’t want to fight the battle to open the Strait of Hormuz. This means that Tehran, sensing victory, will probably be emboldened elsewhere, perhaps even trying to reactivate terrorist operations against American and Israeli targets. Iranian terrorist operations, which have ebbed and flowed through the years, haven’t been well run for some time. Some recent assassination attempts against Iranian expatriates have been awkwardly if not incompetently planned and executed. But when there is a will, ways improve. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Beyond protecting against this possible resurgence, US and Israeli satellite surveillance of the bombed sites with buried enriched uranium will obviously continue. Ditto the bombed underground military facilities and factories involved in missile and drone production. According to Israeli intelligence officials, the Iranian regime is using the current ceasefire to clear access to crucial conventional weaponry. After the 12-Day War, and up to the start of the current conflict, Israel didn’t seem particularly worried by the state of Iran’s bombed nuclear plants. That may be because their long-distance assessment of the damage done was severe, or because they had reliable intelligence assets providing them with reassuring information.  </span><span style="font-weight: 400"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In either case, it’s doubtful that Tehran can now sprint to the bomb: the damage is far too great, both to personnel and the country’s uranium-enrichment facilities. The same may also be true of the stockpiles of centrifuge parts unaccounted for by Barack Obama’s nuclear deal. Counterintelligence concerns alone may well paralyze Iran’s ambitions for some time, as the intelligence ministry and IRGC try to figure out if Israel penetrated their nuclear inner sanctum. The conspiracy-addled nature of Iranian officials will incline them towards taking a counterespionage buzzsaw to a lot of innocent people, further convulsing what’s left of the country’s nuclear establishment.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The Iranian regime, if it lasts, will eventually get around to testing Israeli and American intelligence. It wouldn’t be surprising to see it do this slowly through a small reconstituted nuclear program, perhaps by building another facility for turning uranium hexafluoride into metal, or by building new, advanced centrifuge cascades: then see whether anyone notices. If the regime managed to actually detonate a crude nuclear device inside Iran, the blast would likely guarantee the Islamic Republic’s immunity from further attacks. For Mossad and Aman, Israel’s military intelligence wing, the need to penetrate and report on what’s left of Iran’s nuclear program remains paramount. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">There are other focuses too. Assessing how many and what kind of missiles and drones the Islamic Republic will be able to build — and how quickly, given the damage to factories and supply lines — will surely consume a lot of Israeli attention. Another question will be whether the Russians and Chinese are meaningfully supporting these efforts. An Iranian victory at Hormuz might well have a decisive impact on Beijing, which could become far less circumspect in how it supports Tehran. If, months from now, the United States is still dueling with Iran over the Strait, then the CIA and other initialisms of US intelligence certainly won’t redirect resources to other foreign challenges. Surging intelligence capabilities on a target rarely produce a bonanza — unless information can be gleaned through technical means. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-iran-is-right-to-be-paranoid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-iran-is-right-to-be-paranoid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2271729046.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-iran-is-right-to-be-paranoid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-iran-is-right-to-be-paranoid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Iran is right to be paranoid</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-iran-is-right-to-be-paranoid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Frankopan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Fortunately for the US, satellites and intercept are two strong suits, while the Islamic Republic’s chatty ruling elites often have a hard time being disciplined about secure communications. Before the current war, Israel obviously had a network of local agents, all of whom aided military operations. Maintaining secure communication with these agents after all hell has broken loose and the internet has gone down could be hard, especially if timely communications are still needed for active operations. Another challenge is that information in wartime can degrade quickly, not least if it’s needed for assassinations. On this, Iranian counterintelligence outfits are undoubtingly working overtime, trying to figure out what Israel did and block its future actions. For the moment, it’s a good bet Israel is using some form of encrypted satellite-based system to reach its spies — and Iranian counter-intelligence officers are surely doing their best to locate those transmissions.  </span><span style="font-weight: 400">  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">That hints at broader challenges. Future recruitment efforts by either Israel or America will likely be more challenging; contacting IRGC officers will simply be harder than before. Both Americans and Israelis “cold pitch” Iranian officials: that is, walk up to a target and, with little chit-chat, ask him to work for them. Such pitches don’t have a great track record and IRGC officers don’t usually travel to places where either American or Israeli operatives can safely reach them. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">It’s possible that Israel’s recruitment of so-called “covert-action” agents — whose primary task would be to give logistical or tactical intelligence support to an Israeli military operation (imagine Iranian Kurds or Azeris helping Israel launch drones) — has also allowed some access to important Iranian officials. Really talented agents can occasionally recruit others without having direct contact with their foreign case officers.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But developing these contacts indirectly would be devilishly risky. As a rule, intelligence services don’t like mixing covert-action agents — who in Iran would be easier to recruit given the disgruntled minorities living on the country’s borders — with “foreign-intelligence” assets who report on government policy and suchlike. Covert-action agents often work in teams; foreign-intelligence agents almost never do. If Israel has been able to mix the two successfully, these operations would be serendipitous.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Developing new assets in Iran with Iranian counterintelligence services on high alert will be daunting — unless internal dissent leads to waves of Iranians, especially ethnic Persians, eagerly ratting on the theocracy and the Revolutionary Guards. Israeli officials sometimes give the impression that this is exactly what has happened, with average Iranians somehow getting information out to the Israelis about the whereabouts and movements of senior Iranian officials, allowing the IDF to target them. If this is happening in the way Israeli officials suggest, then untrained Iranians and Israeli intelligence have found a means of communication that allows for almost real-time targeting irrespective of whether the internet is working. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2203980497.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Revenge of the Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A sign that the Iranian regime might be cracking would be more IRGC volunteers to Western intelligence services. Mass defections don’t appear likely — the regime’s spiritual and financial hold on its hardcore supporters has always been impressive. As average Iranians have fallen away from the regime by the tens of millions, loyalists, seeing themselves as the guardians of Islam and a nation besieged by disbelief, depravity, and Satan’s paladins, have only grown more determined. Throughout this war, we’ve seen the IDF or Mossad attempt to intimidate or turn senior military commanders and officials via threatening telephone calls. It’s still too soon to have a scorecard on what happened, but it appears Israel hasn’t so far reaped the desired results. Even so, we might yet see more senior officials having serious doubts. Iranian memoirs, leaked conversations, and intrepid Western scholarship conducted inside Iran over the last 30 years suggest that doubt is infecting ruling families.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Intelligence success is inevitably tied to how much risk clandestine services and their political overlords are willing to endure. The Islamic Republic is an existential threat to the Jewish state; to the United States, the clerical regime is surely not. Despite murderous Iranian machinations, since 1979, Washington has been reaching out to Tehran, under both Democrats and Republicans, both openly and secretly. This quintessentially American disposition to say “Hi!”, hoping for a reset of the regime’s enmity towards the United States, has affected, sometimes seriously, how the White House, and therefore the CIA and the Pentagon, have approached Iran policy. No such hope has ever altered the fundamental Israeli analysis of the Islamic Republic. The regime’s lethal antisemitism, present since its birth, is tightly tied to how it sees and reacts to the world.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">These differences help explain why the Israelis have had the patience and fortitude to work the Iranian target in ways that have been impossible for American or European intelligence services. Even today, after numerous deadly Iran-orchestrated terrorist strikes against Americans; after kidnapping plots against US citizens; after planned assassinations against senior US officials; after the deadly Iranian covert action in Iraq, which cost hundreds of lives — Americans who didn’t have doubts about assassinating members of Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State can still feel a bit squeamish when Washington helps Israel off Iranian officials. To that extent, the clerical regime has always benefited from Iran’s cultural magnetism and historical preeminence.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Besides, major American intelligence operations against the Islamic Republic will require bipartisan support in both the House and Senate intelligence committees. That seems unlikely. Democrats have been trying to find a less hostile modus vivendi with the Islamic Republic since Bill Clinton. With Obama and the nuclear negotiations, it became a passion. This passion has since been deflated, especially in January when the theocracy savagely attacked its own people. But the reflex to engage, and to feel guilty about American actions — especially the now-mythologized coup in 1953 against Mohammad Mosaddegh, and basically everything Trump has done since 2017 — seems set in stone.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The intelligence war against Islamic Republic will therefore likely remain overwhelmingly an Israeli mission, with the US in a supporting role. Mossad now has an Iran regime-change desk. The Israelis hadn’t traditionally been fond of regime change in the Islamic world, primarily because they had such a low regard for the possibility of salubrious political evolution among Muslims. Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles altered this calculation. So too did the realization that “mowing the lawn” in Iran isn’t the same as cutting the grass in Lebanon and Gaza. It requires US approval from the get go, which even under Trump may not be forthcoming.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Mossad now has an Iran regime-change desk&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In a long-term clandestine campaign, Mossad and Aman don’t have many options available to them beyond continuing assassinations and sabotage. These actions can possibly fly under the American radar — that really depends on their size, targets, and whether Washington could envision blowback. Israel could also try to feed Iran’s simmering ethnic tensions, where violence is already common, especially among the Kurds and Baluch. Both have established armed opposition groups, making weapons deliveries easier and less of a counterintelligence headache; these groups internally police themselves and, as they are often tied together by blood, are less open to Iranian intelligence penetration. Netanyahu supported, likely drove, a joint Israeli-American operation to support an armed Kurdish uprising in Iran during the current conflict; it appears that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan learned of the plan and called Trump, who aborted the operation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">These actions cannot bring the regime down — and the Israelis know it. But they could be seriously annoying to Tehran. Especially if armed with shoulder-fired missiles or heavy machine guns, these groups certainly could harass the IRGC more effectively. And if Israeli-aided ethnic irruptions happened while larger protests occurred elsewhere in Iran, this might seriously strain the regime’s mobile internal-security forces. Certainly, this ethnic route, operationally, seems like a better option than trying to get significant quantities of weaponry to the confused, leaderless Persian opposition, which could take years to organize and risks simply giving supplies to the IRGC.&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Minority-targeted operations do run the risk of alienating Persians, who whatever their views of the Islamic Republic almost universally believe that minorities don’t have the right to secession and must not challenge the supremacy of Iran’s Persian identity. Iranians who want to topple the Islamic Republic could cheer, or anyway be apathetic towards, rebellious minorities being crushed by the theocracy.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Despite all the difficulties involved, the Israelis still may try to arm, or protect from the air, an Azeri or Persian insurrection. Rebellions within these two groups would give the regime pause. Given their numbers and how important they are within the regime, Azeris are the only ethnic minority, if they were to rebel en masse, that could collapse the Islamic Republic. The Israelis may recall, however, that while armed opposition to the Shah by the late Seventies was certainly frustrating for his SAVAK intelligence service, it didn’t ultimately challenge the monarchy’s survival. In 1979, the army collapsed for entirely unrelated reasons.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The key then was the ability of Ruhollah Khomeini’s people to piggy-back on and guide the anger of what eventually became a widespread revolutionary movement, where the military and civilian elites no longer supported the monarchy. When it mattered, Mohammad Pahlavi was unwilling to kill his countrymen in large numbers; the theocracy has shown no such hesitation. Any armed struggle against the Islamic Republic would have to defeat a far more determined foe.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For the Israelis, getting payback against the Islamic Republic may nonetheless make the ethnic card compelling, overcoming the objections of Persian expatriates and internal dissidents who worry about Persians losing their primacy in the country — to say nothing of the ugly internecine strife that could result. Meanwhile, the Israelis will certainly keep collecting intelligence on all Iranian personnel involved with the nuclear and missile programs, with the aim of eventually eliminating them. Knocking off the occasional Iranian politician could also become standard practice, regardless of possible American objections, since such operations would continue to convulse Tehran’s counterintelligence establishment, cast doubt on the integrity of Iranian communications, and discombobulate the daily life of the ruling elite.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Though many Americans and Europeans might want to believe that only diplomacy offers a solution to the current conflict, Mossad, Aman, and the IRGC know better. For them, it’s a duel to the death. </span></p>
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					<title>Israel can’t kill the Hezbollah hydra</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/06/israel-cant-kill-the-hezbollah-hydra/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/06/israel-cant-kill-the-hezbollah-hydra/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2248226000.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Middle east</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mitchell Prothero]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Screen-Shot-2026-06-02-at-15.53.48.jpg?w=62</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Women mourn the Hezbollah commander Haytham Ali Tabatabai in Beirut, Lebanon. (Adri Salido/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mitchell Prothero</strong> has worked as a foreign correspondent across Europe and the Middle East for over two decades, with a focus on transnational crime and terrorism.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ has worked as a foreign correspondent across Europe and the Middle East for over two decades, with a focus on transnational crime and terrorism.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 23:01:26 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 23:01:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel-Lebanon conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1061949</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Cheap drones have changed the battlefield]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">For 900 years, Beaufort Castle has dominated the villages and olive groves of South Lebanon. Yet even before its recent capture by the IDF, this crusader stronghold was far more than a medieval relic. For almost two decades, Beaufort became a symbol in stone of the futility of Israeli occupation. IDF troops first dislodged Palestinian militants from the fortress back in 1982, but then spent the next two decades trapped behind its walls, its tiny garrison often little more than prisoners of the Hezbollah fighters beyond. The steady stream of Israeli casualties at Beaufort helped spark the country’s peace movement, while movies and books vividly depicted what soon became known as the IDF’s very own Vietnam.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Now, this ancient castle has reprised its role: in what has become Israel’s largest incursion into South Lebanon since its 2000 retreat from the region. With IDF forces pushing past the Litani River, a natural barrier that’s played a major role in military operations dating back centuries, Benjamin Netanyahu seems intent on occupying South Lebanon once more. Yet with Hezbollah showing no sign of surrender, the risk is that Beaufort once again becomes emblematic of Israeli hubris.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Hezbollah has long been Israel’s more effective opponent. But after exploding pagers and airstrikes gutted the group’s leadership in September 2024, both Tel Aviv and Washington dismissed the Shia militants as a spent force. Following a ceasefire that autumn, giving IDF Northern Command a much-needed break, Netanyahu finally had the confidence to launch a ground invasion of Hezbollah’s stronghold in South Lebanon — especially after the cold war with Hezbollah’s patron in Tehran went hot. “There was an earned sense of satisfaction after decades of frustration in dealing with the most dangerous terrorists Israel has ever faced,” says Avi, a former Israeli intelligence operative specializing in Hezbollah, and who continues to consult the IDF as a reservist.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And so, in March 2026, IDF tanks rolled north once more. To be sure, Hezbollah retained significant military capabilities, not least thousands of rockets. Yet after eviscerating its leaders, Israel thought it would take years for the group to rebuild, particularly given a distracted Iran, and when the end of the Assad regime robbed the militants of strategic depth. As Avi now admits, however, “our enemies in Lebanon regrouped”. That’s something of an understatement. Now in its fourth month, Israel’s latest Lebanese incursion is proceeding far more slowly, and much more bloodily, than Tel Aviv expected. Over two-dozen IDF troops have been killed in South Lebanon since early March, with one medical captain dying near Beaufort just the other day.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-1246128056.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is Belgium a narco-state?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mitchell Prothero and Max Daly</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Israel’s problems are largely a matter of strategy. While IDF forces, backed by heavy armor and relentless air strikes, have made physical progress, pushing some 15 kilometers into Hezbollah’s rugged stronghold, two new tactics by the militants have greatly increased the cost.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The first is a flatter organizational structure, focused on small-unit guerrilla tactics. The second is an expanded campaign of cheap-but-deadly drones, ideal for harassing the Israelis at every turn. Beyond the human toll, this approach has damaged or destroyed dozens of tanks and other armored vehicles, while also targeting sophisticated radar, intelligence gathering, and missile-defense systems on Israel’s northern border.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Speaking by encrypted messenger last month, Has’n, a veteran Hezbollah commander based in Beirut, speaks with open confidence about the conflict. Technical innovations aside, he seems bullish about leading the enemy deep into Lebanon. Grudgingly respectful of IDF operations in Israel itself — they fight, Has’n says, “for their land” — just 500 meters across the border “the resistance” and its hit-and-run tactics are paying off.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This didn’t happen overnight. After the 2024 debacle — which saw Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s famous leader, killed alongside dozens of other commanders — the group didn’t attempt to restore its conventional military capacities. Instead, according to Israeli and Lebanese security officials, as well as Hezbollah commanders interviewed by <em>UnHerd</em>, the group pivoted back to its roots as a guerrilla group: deploying the same tactics that caused Israel grief back in the Eighties and Nineties.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This reorganization was directly led by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which sent hundreds of operatives to Lebanon, and which for the first time in decades appears to directly command Hezbollah fighters in the field. “The IRGC sent officers to take a much more hands-on approach in the wake of the ceasefire,” says Nick Blanford, an analyst at the Atlantic Council. “And they’ve streamlined the group.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">The relationship between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime has always been public: Tehran funds Hezbollah, by some estimates to the tune of $700 million a year, and supplies much of its advanced arsenal of weapons. But the command and control structure of the group — the extent to which Iran directly runs its operations — has historically been less clear.</p>
<p dir="ltr">“Hezbollah has always been free to operate in Lebanon as it sees fit,” says one Lebanese security official. “Iran didn’t have any interest in micromanaging Hezbollah, and both leaderships had close personal relationships for decades. There’s no need to command when everyone is on the same page.” Avi makes a similar point, noting that there’s always been “a level of compartmentalization” between the Lebanese and Iranian wings of the operation.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Hezbollah has always been free to operate in Lebanon as it sees fit.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">But, by all accounts, this formerly opaque relationship changed after September 2024. As Blanford explains, the group’s earlier decimation offered opportunities, with the Revolutionary Guards replacing various aging commanders with younger alternatives, battle-hardened from fighting rebels in Syria.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Of course, Israel hardly missed these developments. IDF airstrikes have habitually targeted hotels and apartment blocks suspected of housing Iranian officials in Lebanon, ceasefires be damned. But these don’t seem to have disrupted Hezbollah’s transformation; both Iran and the militants showing an uncanny ability to replace slain leaders, highlighting the perils of equating organizational decapitation with reduced military capacity.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Competent institutions, particularly militaries, can easily account for casualties among both the leadership and the rank-and-file. To put it another way, competent institutions can heal. And even their enemies agree Hezbollah and Iran are competent — especially after more than 40 years of on-off conflict with Israel and the West. “Hezbollah has surprised Israel with its resilience,” Blanford says, “and is fighting much harder in South Lebanon than anyone, including the Israelis, expected.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">What of the future? Frustrated by Hezbollah’s drone campaign, Netanyahu this week threatened to expand military operations to Beirut — and Lebanon’s already creaky civilian infrastructure. Iran, for its part, promised to resume its operations in the Persian Gulf, alarming a Trump administration desperate to finally reopen the Strait of Hormuz. In an apparently angry phone call between Trump and Netanyahu, all sides have agreed to a renewed ceasefire. But few in either Beirut or Tel Aviv trust the deal, and expect fighting to continue for as long as the IDF remains in Lebanon.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Untitled-design-13.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Lebanon implode?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jacob Russell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">A longer campaign in the country would likely end in stalemate, as Hezbollah and Iran work together to bleed the IDF. As the Israeli reoccupation of Beaufort so vividly implies, this also would raise the ghosts of history. In 1982, at the height of Lebanon’s sectarian civil war, IDF troops invaded the country to combat the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and similar factions ensconced in the country. And if the result was 20 years of quagmire, Hezbollah’s evolving tactics imply a similar outcome today.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Even Israeli insiders now seem to accept this. “Obviously the fighting has been harder than expected,” says Avi, “but maybe it should have been predicted considering Hezbollah’s long history of resilience. They’ve rebounded quite impressively.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">And with Israel expressly stating it plans to reoccupy much of South Lebanon, just as they did through 2000, when it was finally driven out by Hezbollah’s resistance, it’s no wonder that militant commanders are increasingly optimistic — especially after a string of surprising defeats. “This occupation will be a gift to the resistance,” says Has’n. “It’s much easier to kill Israeli soldiers on our own land than in Palestine. We will fight like in the Nineties, and send them back their dead sons until they leave. We did it before and, God willing, we will do it again.” Expect more fighting at Beaufort — and soon.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1061949</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Nato is a dangerous grift</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2061692449-e1778520510445.jpg?w=659</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Norwegian troops practising manoeuvres in the Arctic Circle. (Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP/Getty) ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 23:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 12 May 2026 07:39:21 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1059318</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[America is milking Europe]]>
							</description>
												
																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Trump has once again sent Europeans scrambling. This time, he has announced the withdrawal of around 5,000 soldiers from Germany as part of a </span><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/03/europe/germany-trump-troops-europe-intl" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pentagon decision</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> triggered by the president’s public dispute with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over the Iran war. The cut amounts to roughly 14% of the approximately 35,000-36,000 American troops currently stationed in Germany, and is expected to unfold over six-to-12 months, returning US force levels to where they stood before Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Trump has hinted that further cuts may follow. He has framed the move as a “punishment” for Merz’s criticism of Washington’s handling of the war — including Merz’s claim that Iran had “humiliated” the United States. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is part of a broader offensive Trump has waged against NATO allies in recent weeks, for their refusal to send naval forces to help open the Strait of Hormuz. He </span><a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116323481956698353" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">told</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> NATO members that they will “have to start learning how to fight for yourself” because “the USA won’t be there to help you anymore, just like you weren’t there for us”. Trump has also threatened to withdraw troops from Italy and Spain, and has once again raised the prospect of the US leaving NATO altogether. Asked in a recent </span><a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/01/middleeast/trump-nato-us-withdrawal-intl" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">interview</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> whether he would reconsider US membership in the alliance, Trump replied: “Oh yes, I would say [it’s] beyond reconsideration”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In this context, Germany’s sweeping rearmament program is widely presented as a positive step in the right direction — Europe finally taking charge of its own security. But does this narrative hold up? And how seriously should one take the US’s threat of leaving NATO? A closer look reveals a very different picture. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Last month, Germany published its first-ever official military strategy, presented by Boris Pistorius, the country&#8217;s defense minister. Its core ambition is to transform the Bundeswehr into “Europe’s strongest conventional army” by 2035, and a “technologically superior” force by 2039, with the Federal Republic positioned as the continent’s leading military power and the primary partner for its European allies. To achieve this, the strategy envisages massive rearmament with long-range weapons, extensive deployment of AI, automation and autonomous systems, and a total force — including reserves — of 460,000 soldiers. The reserve is explicitly framed as a bridge to civilian society, signaling an intent towards broader social militarization. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2235495933-e1773756881551.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain’s chance to escape America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The strategy has drawn sharply divergent reactions. Some hail it as a long-overdue step towards freeing Germany — and by extension Europe — from American military tutelage, given the US’s apparent “disengagement” from NATO. Others view it as a dangerous revival of German military nationalism, one that evokes the darkest chapter of 20th-century European history. Both readings miss the point. Germany’s rearmament is not designed to make the country more militarily sovereign — for better or worse. It is designed to elevate Germany’s role as the “vassal-in-chief” within the US-controlled NATO command structure. In this sense, the Trump-Merz spat should be seen as little more than political theatre. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The document itself makes this plain. One of its key sentences reads: “NATO must become more European to remain transatlantic”. Germany’s role is conceived not merely as that of a frontline military actor, but as NATO’s logistical and strategic hub — the node linking Eastern, Central and Western Europe while maintaining the transatlantic connection to North America. In other words: Germany must rearm in order to sustain American hegemony on the continent. To paraphrase a famous line from the Italian novel </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Leopard</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">: “Everything has to change so that everything can stay the same”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This was made explicit in a </span><a href="https://x.com/USWPColby/status/2047815123654361354" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent post on X</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by Elbridge Colby, the US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Colby welcomed Germany’s new military strategy as a vindication of Trump’s pressure on European allies to rearm, framing it as a step towards what he calls “Nato 3.0”. His core argument is that Europe, led by Germany, must now convert the Hague Commitments — where Europeans committed to a landmark defense investment pledge, aiming to spend 5% of their GDP on defense by 2035 — into concrete military capability. He quoted Nato Secretary-General Rutte approvingly: “Air defense systems, drones, ammunition, radars, space capabilities — that is what will keep us safe”. On Germany specifically, Colby presented the new military strategy as proof that Berlin was finally stepping up after “years of disarmament”, noting that rechristened Department of War was already working closely with the Germans to accelerate the transition. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The strategy itself, as Colby quoted it, acknowledges that Washington “is increasingly shifting its strategic focus towards its Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific” and is demanding allies “step up their efforts to safeguard their own security”. Germany, in this framing, must become “an even stronger military ally to the United States” precisely because the US is repositioning elsewhere. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is simply a restatement of the “division of labor” that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced at the very outset of the Trump administration. He made clear that the US needed to pivot elsewhere — we now know that meant Iran, and ultimately China — and that Europe would therefore have to assume responsibility for “managing its own security”, meaning the maintenance of pressure on Russia through Ukraine. Europe duly obliged: it has increased its defense spending and has doubled down on support for Kyiv, including through the recently approved €90 billion loan. We are now watching the natural progression of that logic, as Europe assumes the full financial burden for the continuation of the proxy war against Russia. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In short, the US is not “disengaging from Europe”; it is simply demanding that Europe contribute more to Nato, while remaining firmly embedded within the Alliance’s command structure — in short, that it pays more for its own subordination. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This requires a reassessment of Trump’s broader strategy towards Russia. Though he is routinely accused of “appeasing Putin” — with critics citing his cut-off of US funding to Ukraine and his (failed) attempts to broker a peace deal — the reality is more complicated. Washington has long sought to force Europe to decouple from Russian gas and replace it with American LNG, and the war in Ukraine has allowed them to achieve just that — so much so that one has to wonder if America&#8217;s decades-long strategy in Ukraine, from helping topple the democratically elected government in Ukraine in 2014, to drawing the country firmly into Nato’s informal orbit, wasn’t designed precisely to lure the Russians into war. The bombing of the Nord Stream pipeline should always be understood as part of this strategy. This becomes even clearer in light of the latest US National Security Strategy, published in November 2025, which designates “American energy dominance” across oil, gas, coal and nuclear power as a top strategic priority, explicitly framing the expansion of American energy exports as a means to “project power”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This logic illuminates not only the US’s military campaigns against Venezuela and Iran, but also why, in order to keep Europe dependent on American energy and severed from Russian supplies, Washington has a structural interest in keeping the proxy war going. It’s therefore easy to conclude that the US was never genuine about its intentions to make peace with Russia. The only difference today is that the war is now being waged not only through Ukraine, but through Europe itself. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In this light, the ostensible US “threats” to leave Nato — and the European establishment’s rearmament program, Germany’s above all — are revealed as components of the same strategy: keeping Europe subordinated to American geopolitical priorities. The new German military strategy is nothing more than Berlin fulfilling the role Washington has assigned it: holding the line against Russia while the US turns towards the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. This is not nationalism, military or otherwise, but its opposite: the undermining of German and European core interests at the hands of a transnational elite.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In this context, Germany should be understood as the anchor of a new Europeanized Nato core, comprising Germany, France, the UK — and Ukraine itself (even if formally outside of the alliance). This too reflects a longstanding American design. In his 1997 book </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Grand Chessboard</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the influential Polish-American diplomat Zbigniew Brzezinski predicted that “Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian political collaboration&#8230; could evolve into a partnership enhancing Europe’s geostrategic depth”, adding that “America’s central geostrategic goal in Europe can be summed up quite simply: it is to consolidate through a more genuine transatlantic partnership the US bridgehead on the Eurasian continent”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This should dispel any remaining notion that what we are witnessing amounts to a move towards German or European strategic autonomy. It is no coincidence that Germany’s new military strategy identifies Russia as “the most serious and immediate threat” to European security — a claim that forms part of a broader European narrative warning of an inevitable war with Moscow in the coming years. At face value, this anti-Russian posturing might appear to reflect a distinctly “European” stance, one seemingly at odds with Washington’s public position. But this is largely an illusion. Not only has the European transatlantic establishment thoroughly internalized America’s strategic priorities, but the Nato command hierarchy makes the real chain of authority plain. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-1734144833.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Paris Agreement was a fantasy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Real operational control of the proxy war against Russia remains firmly in Anglo-American hands. At the top sits the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, which translates political decisions into military objectives. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) — always an American general, dual-hatted as commander of US European Command — runs it alongside a British deputy. A German general coordinates staff work as Chief of Staff, but effective decision-making stays with the top two. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Below SHAPE, operational command splits into two tracks: three Joint Force Commands (JFCs), the true theater commanders for large-scale operations, and three Component Commands covering air (Ramstein, Germany), land (Izmir, Turkey) and sea (Northwood, UK). MARCOM, the maritime command, has traditionally been UK-led, but the US recently took control of it, placing all three Component Commands under US command — a significant consolidation that has gone largely undiscussed. Even when a European officer commands a JFC — such as the leadership of JFC Naples, which recently passed from the US to Italy — the overall strategic direction remains under American control; JFC commanders implement objectives set by SHAPE. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Two further structural dependencies reinforce American dominance. The first is the C4ISR concept of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: European allies are almost entirely dependent on US satellite, aerial and maritime platforms for real-time intelligence, surveillance and targeting — which together represent the backbone of Nato warfighting. Indeed, it has been </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-to-provide-ukraine-with-intelligence-for-missile-strikes-deep-inside-russia-ca7b2276" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">acknowledged</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> even by the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Wall Street Journal</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that Ukraine’s deep-strike operations inside Russia — including, recently, against several oil production facilities — could not be conducted without American intelligence and satellite capabilities. The second dependency, less visible in public debate but potentially more consequential, is the dense presence of American staff officers embedded throughout Nato’s command structure at every level of the hierarchy, giving Washington an institutional grip that no change in command titles can easily displace. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">All of this should dispel any notion that the US is not deeply involved in the Ukraine war — or that it intends to leave Nato and truly “disengage” from Europe. Beyond the command architecture, the United States operates numerous bases and military installations across the continent, both within the Nato framework and under exclusive American control, which are indispensable to its global power projection. Ramstein Air Base in Germany — home to around 16,000 troops — functions as the hub controlling military drone traffic on a global scale, while coordinating American air operations across Europe, Africa and the Middle East. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-quietly-playing-a-crucial-role-in-the-iran-war-aad34a00" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Wall Street Journal</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> investigation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> confirmed that, despite the public protestations of European leaders, US bases across the continent have functioned as the essential infrastructure for the American war on Iran. As the article put it, “Europe remains the bedrock of US force projection in the world”. Even Nato Secretary-General Rutte recently </span><a href="https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/cg/date/2026-04-08/segment/02" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">described</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the purpose of Nato as being a “platform of power projection for the United States”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another element is what analysts call the “hidden dividends” of Nato: contracts and orders for American defense industries. This web of 1,300 agreements among the 32 member states that set standards for Nato weapons and equipment — covering everything from ammunition calibers to fuel-tank diameters — were originally imposed by Washington and overwhelmingly favor the American military-industrial complex. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Another element are the so-called &#8216;hidden dividends&#8217; of Nato: contracts and orders for American defense industries&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">German and European rearmament, then, in the context of a supposedly more “European” Nato, is not strengthening European autonomy, but further eroding it. Not only does it make Europe complicit in Washington’s increasingly reckless military adventures, as the Iran war demonstrates, but more gravely still, it is pushing the continent towards a potentially catastrophic confrontation with Russia. Moscow is watching and responding accordingly. In a recent </span><a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2099030/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">speech</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Foreign Minister Lavrov stated openly: “A war against us has been openly declared. The Kyiv regime is being used as the tip of the spear. However, everyone is aware that this tip is unusable without Western supplies of weapons, intelligence data, satellite systems, training of military personnel and much more”. Lavrov added that Western leaders are actively preparing their publics for war with Russia — using Ukraine to buy time — and that Russia takes the threat very seriously. One cannot overstate the dangers of the path we are treading. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A final observation is warranted. The French historian Emmanuel Todd has </span><a href="https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16511707?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">argued</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that much of what passes for nationalism in the West today — from Germany to Japan — is in fact a form of “imaginary” nationalism: vassalage towards the US dressed up as sovereignty. He contrasts this with “real” nationalism, a genuine sovereignty-oriented politics that is today largely absent. German neo-militarism, as argued here, falls squarely into the former category. But this does not mean that a “true” German nationalism — with its attendant aspirations towards continental hegemony — could not resurface. The militarization of German society and the hardening of anti-Russian sentiment are real and deepening phenomena. There is a historical precedent, after all. A century ago, the Anglo-American establishment tolerated the Nazi military build-up as an anti-Soviet bulwark — only for the German monster to eventually slip its leash. The domestic German context today is obviously very different — and of course one may argue, and hope, that a “true” German nationalism would recognize that the country’s genuine interests lie in peace rather than war. Even so, the parallels are impossible to ignore. </span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1059318</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>America has lost the will to fight</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2267672215.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Iran war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The US Marine Corps War Memorial. (J. David Ake/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 23:02:19 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 08 May 2026 09:43:41 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Heroism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1057303</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Its heroic age is over]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>At the outset of the war, Iran’s grand missile offensive had long been planned to wreck Israel and US installations across the region, from Erbil in northern Iraq down to Qatar. Iran could call on some 2,500 ballistic missiles weighing between 15 and 26 metric tons as well as many drones. But these plans were successfully pre-empted by US and Israeli aircraft. After that, the US war against Iran had a second act ready to go. It was difficult to imagine that Tehran would escape, as it now might, with a favorable peace deal.</p>
<p>The US could assure victory even if the regime survived the decapitation it had suffered on the war’s first night. Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed, along with his defense minister, his chief of staff, and the Revolutionary Guards chief, among others. Subsequently, the US launched an unimpeded bombardment of missile factories, stored missiles, missile launchers, and the Revolutionary Guard headquarters in Tehran, Mashhad and lesser cities.</p>
<p>Act I, therefore, ended swiftly. As for Act II, the US deployed thousands of Marines and 82nd Division Airborne troops to Qatar and nearby bases. But nothing happened. Tehran came to resemble Berlin after Hitler’s death, with the SS guards left in sole control, still able to hang anyone who wanted to stop the fighting, but with no plans at all to avert imminent defeat. In 1945, it was the arrival of Russian troops that finished off the last SS holdouts, just as the arrival of American troops mopped up the last Nazi holdouts in Bavaria.</p>
<p>Nobody expected an American army to advance to Tehran from the nearest port of Bandar Abbas on a single highway, across 800 miles of mountains and deserts, to venture into a city of more than ten million, to drive the <i>Pasdaran </i>Revolutionary Guards out of town, and scare the <i>Basij </i>militia into changing back into civilian clothes. It would have made for a very arid quagmire, with plenty of incidental US casualties even if there were no concerted and determined resistance.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/europe-should-secure-the-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/europe-should-secure-the-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/gettyimages-2238614075-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/europe-should-secure-the-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/europe-should-secure-the-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe should secure the Strait</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/europe-should-secure-the-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But the arrival of thousands of Marines and Airborne troops offered an altogether more realistic, far quicker and definitely very much safer path to victory. And when, as a defense contractor, I heard of the deployment, which occurred along with the far more publicized air campaign, I assumed that it had that rather obvious purpose, which arises from the geography of the Persian Gulf — hardly <i>terra incognita</i> in the Pentagon, which has been dealing with the Gulf and its recurrently threatened oil tankers for decades.</p>
<p>By now everyone at all interested knows that the Persian Gulf varies in width from roughly 180 miles opposite Bahrain to the 35-mile width of the Strait of Hormuz, but the navigable channels of the mostly very shallow Gulf are much narrower.</p>
<p>Most relevant for the US Marines and 82nd Airborne troops are the islands in the Persian Gulf, from which it is possible to secure safe passage for friendly tankers by denying them to Iranian anti-ship missile teams, by precluding minelaying attempts, and by detecting all manner of other threats with low-altitude helicopter patrols. Unlike the current American plan to give tankers military escorts, taking the islands deals with the problem closer to the root.</p>
<p>Some islands are closer to Iran’s mainland than others, but all can be denied to Iran’s ground forces from nearby shores. There is abundant close air support available from Al Udeid base in Qatar and elsewhere. Only one Island, Qeshm, is at all large, at 580 square miles, almost twice Manhattan’s 305 square miles. The rest are much smaller, and none could be overrun from the mainland as any coastal outpost might be.</p>
<p>To avert further damage to the global economy, everyone’s oil and gas exports — from Iraq and Kuwait up north down to Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura and Qatar’s liquefied gas — must be secured. (The Emirates have their Fujairah terminal on the Indian Ocean, out of danger.) If the islands are used as bases for highly mobile US units, it is eminently feasible for them to keep the exports secure.</p>
<p>As for the denial of Iran’s oil exports, it is already accomplished; its Kharg island principal oil export terminal has been disarmed, and in any case the US Navy is stopping any attempts to ship out Iran’s oil by tanker.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/what-iran-means-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/what-iran-means-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/gettyimages-2262963508-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/what-iran-means-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">What Iran means for Putin</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/what-iran-means-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What Iran means for Putin</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/what-iran-means-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Stopping Iran’s oil export revenues is enough to reduce the country’s power day by day. Iran entered the war with minuscule foreign exchange reserves for a country of ninety million, and the government receives very little hard currency from traditional exports. The merchants who sell carpets, pistachio nuts, saffron and pomegranate juice do not repatriate the foreign exchange but use it for luxury imports. Iran’s economy is now wrecked. The Rial has collapsed to 1.3 million for $1. That inflation means that many can only have plain bread with their water</p>
<p>The Chinese have supported Iran politically, but they are not sentimental, and will not ship missile fuel precursor chemicals, or anything else, without payment. Hezbollah’s surviving leaders might be sentimental, but their men depend on their salaries and must search for other employment if unpaid. The Houthi leaders, too, might be sentimental, but in the misery of Yemen they really need their pay to buy flour.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;When mothers habitually had three or more children, one might be lost in combat but the family lived on. Now, few women have two children.&#8221;</div>
<p>Russia is a very important supplier for Iran, with fast Caspian shipping routes from Astrakhan in the Volga delta to Amirabad only 750 miles away, or even less from Russia’s closest port in Makhachkala. But again, Russia is itself at war and cannot be generous. In other words, the power of the regime must diminish day by day without oil exports — which can be denied indefinitely, if all others can export their oil.</p>
<p>Given all this, why the inaction? Why do the fine troops remain idle? I fear that the answer is the arrival to the United States of what I have called the &#8220;post-heroic” syndrome. It is the historically unprecedented but now widespread refusal to accept the risk of casualties, even if very few, even if warranted by the most important interests. It is not a matter of ideology, for it originates in the drastic decline of female fertility. When mothers habitually had three or more children, one might be lost in combat but the family lived on. Now, few women have two children, let alone three. Average fertility in the US is only 1.6, well below the 2.1 replacement rate — and most combat losses result in the extinction of a family.</p>
<p>Hence the political tolerance of the casualties of war has drastically declined. On 9 November, 2022, President Macron abandoned <i>Opération Barkhane</i>. With just over 5,000 French troops, the operation had long protected the immense territories of five Sahel ex-colonies, but Macron feared that a small number might die. Putin fights in Ukraine with mercenaries without a single Russian conscript. The mere suggestion that Nato troops might guarantee a Ukraine ceasefire, if one were ever negotiated, was enough to trigger sheer panic in Italy, where on 1 April, 2025, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani and Defence Minister Guido Crosetto stood side by side in front of TV cameras to rule out &#8220;any possibility whatever&#8221; that Italian soldiers might be deployed in Ukraine, <i>even after a cease-fire</i><i>. </i></p>
<p>For the United States, the post-heroic syndrome means that if, say, a thousand US troops were killed while finally defeating Iran’s very dangerous rulers, President Trump’s reward could be a swift removal from the White House by impeachment, with the help of Republican votes. If that is why US Marines and Airborne troops remain idle, the time has arrived to turn to contractors who need not fear elections or impeachments.</p>
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					<title>The uniparty media’s pro-war twins</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/05/the-uniparty-medias-pro-war-twins/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/05/the-uniparty-medias-pro-war-twins/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/image-16.jpg?w=622</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Pulitzer Prize</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Nikos Mohammadi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/blue__83__720.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Nikos Mohammadi is an academic fellow at <em>UnHerd </em>US.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>Nikos_Mohammadi</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Nikos Mohammadi is an academic fellow at <em>UnHerd </em>US.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 23:11:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 13 May 2026 12:13:18 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Journalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[M. Gessen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marc Thiessen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pulitzer Prize]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The New York Times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[the washington post]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1058824</guid>
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								<![CDATA[M. Gessen and Marc Thiessen push the same line]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">America boasts the world’s largest media market, and even in this age of shrinking attention spans, strained ad budgets, and declining circulation, it offers something for everyone. But does this diversity extend to the nation’s prestige outlets? On the surface, the answer would seem to be yes. </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The New York</span></i> <i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Times </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">plays to the post-woke-but-still-kinda-woke establishment Left, while </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Washington Post</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> editorial page, under Jeff Bezos’s increasingly heavy-handed leadership, is going for Trump-friendly free-market conservatism.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The contrast is exemplified by two of the papers’ most prominent writers: the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Times</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">’ Russian-born columnist Masha Gessen, who just won the Pulitzer for commentary, couldn’t be more different from the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Post</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">’s Marc Thiessen, who’s gaining a lot of attention these days as President Trump’s favorite print columnist. Gessen is a cosmopolitan progressive; Thiessen is a conservative Catholic and former Bush administration official. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The two should be at odds, and in some ways, they are. But when it comes to foreign policy, they sing almost exactly the same hawkish, pro-empire song, albeit in slightly different keys.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Start with Gessen. There’s a pattern of immigrants coming to America, then asking the US government to start wars with their native lands. In 2022, for example, the Russian chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov</span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kasparov-calls-world-powers-throw-russia-back-into-stone-age-2022-03-03/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">called on the West</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to throw Russia “back into the Stone Age.” Or take Masih Alinejad, the Iranian-born human-rights defender who spent recent years calling for a Western military attack on her homeland — only to retract her endorsement once that happened and produced predictably disastrous outcomes. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Standing at the summit of this genre is Masha Gessen — or “M. Gessen,” as she now prefers to be called. (Gessen, who was born female, identifies as both non-binary and trans — I won’t explain how that works because I really don’t know.) Her Pulitzer</span><a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/m-gessen-new-york-times"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> citation this week lauds </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">her</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for an “illuminating collection of reported essays on rising authoritarian regimes that draw on history and personal experience to probe timely themes of oppression, belonging and exile.”</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/the-groyper-who-would-be-governor/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/the-groyper-who-would-be-governor/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Photo-Jan-23-2026-7-41-59-PM.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/the-groyper-who-would-be-governor/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/the-groyper-who-would-be-governor/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Groyper who would be governor</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/the-groyper-who-would-be-governor/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nikos Mohammadi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Four of Gessen’s seven prize-winning essays compare the Trump administration to Russia and Vladimir Putin. In these “illuminating” essays, Gessen</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/07/opinion/supreme-court-trump-passports-gender.html"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">argues</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the Supreme Court ruling allowing Trump’s executive order to only list two sexes on US passports is just like a Russian bureaucrat who wouldn’t allow her to reclassify her ethnicity from Jewish. In another, she </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/21/opinion/trump-kirk-trans-people-russia.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">alleges</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that Federal Communications Commission Chairman Brendan Carr’s overzealous targeting of Jimmy Kimmel was parallel to Putin’s seizure of power in Russia. And in still another, she</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/28/opinion/trump-danger-normalization-shock.html"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">asserts</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that we are entering a specific authoritarian “moment” in America that recalls Putin’s abolition of elected governorships of oblasts, the war in Georgia, and killing of Alexei Navalny. Finally, Gessen compares Soviet Russia to today’s United States,</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/08/opinion/trump-power-surrender.html"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">contending that</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “it was, apparently, possible to maintain a sense of facts and values — not only not to obey in advance but not to obey at all. If that was possible in the Soviet Union half a century ago, then it is certainly possible in the United States today.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is true that Russia is not the most “inclusive” country in the world for LGBT people like Gessen. It’s a society operating on a totally different set of mores — a reminder of the vaunted “cultural differences” respected by liberals in the case of nations they like, and only anathematized for nations they don’t like. Add to this Gessen’s fearmongering that the United States is becoming totalitarian, like Russia, and she is offering classic, 2016-style Trump Derangement Syndrome, rallying the liberal base to fight absolute evil in order to vindicate absolute good. Ironically, this bankrupt, hate-baiting approach comes at a time when there are legitimate and even bipartisan reasons to be disappointed with President Trump — the economy, the war in Iran.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Gessen-ism, then, goes something like this: </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Russia is terrible because it denies that I’m trans; America and liberal democracy are great because they let me be trans; Trump is turning America into Russia; so we should arm Kiev and send more Ukrainian men into a meat grinder so that I can be trans. </span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such an approach ignores the plentiful evidence of Western provocation of Russia, not to mention a pre-Trump consensus to do so: NATO’s</span><a href="https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2008/04/03/bucharest-summit-declaration"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">official stance</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> since 2008 that Ukraine will join the alliance; the fact that the late Sen. John McCain traveled to Ukraine during the 2013-2014 Maidan Revolution and</span><a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/12/15/251303709/sen-john-mccain-addresses-anti-government-protesters-in-kiev"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">promised that Ukraine’s future would be with Europe</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and thus the West; Obama diplomat Victoria Nuland’s</span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoW75J5bnnE"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">infamous leaked phone call</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> boasting that Washington would be in charge of the Ukrainian transition and “fuck the EU.” There has always been a clear Washington objective to turn Ukraine, a neutral buffer state, into an American client. For Gessen, this is not relevant. The world is a big battle between Putin-style authoritarianism and Democratic Party-style social progressivism, and the latter must triumph — popular will and the realities of foreign policy be damned.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The foreign-policy bottom line at the new ‘Washington Post’ is remarkably similar to the one at the ‘Times’.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Gessen’s is a pro-war flavor that appeals to the progressive, trans-rights absolutist, still woke-ish readership of the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Times</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">. But the incredible power of the American media’s system for “manufacturing consent” — if Epstein-obsessives will forgive the Noam Chomsky reference — is that it does so in ways that are appealing to partisan sensibilities, while enforcing the same bottom line: an expansive American empire is good; war is necessary; the economic status quo should go unquestioned and unchallenged. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Which brings us to </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Washington Post</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — a paper that is now markedly different from </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The New York Times</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Since Bezos took active interest in the paper he bought years ago, and influenced by his alliance with the Trump White House, the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Post </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">has become noticeably Right-coded. In a</span><a href="https://x.com/JeffBezos/status/1894757287052362088?lang=en"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">post on X (formerly Twitter)</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on Feb. 26, 2025, Bezos announced that &#8220;we are going to be writing every day in support and defense of two pillars: personal liberties and free markets. We’ll cover other topics too of course, but viewpoints opposing those pillars will be left to be published by others.&#8221; Since then, the</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Post </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">has staffed </span><a href="https://nypost.com/2025/10/03/media/washington-post-hires-three-conservative-opinion-columnists/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">its editorial-page with lots of establishment conservatives</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, while</span><a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/washington-post-staffers-take-swipes-bosses-announce-departure-from-battled-paper"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">more progressive-minded staff have quit or been ousted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet notwithstanding these partisan and ideological differences, the foreign-policy bottom line at the new </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Washington Post </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">is remarkably similar to the one at the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Times</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Behold Marc Thiessen. Unlike Gessen, Thiessen is a native-born American, a devout Catholic, and a rock-ribbed conservative: he served as George W. Bush’s director of speechwriting between 2007 and 2009 and joined t</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">he</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Post </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">as a columnist shortly thereafter. Put another way: while Bezos has made the aims of the publication narrower and more explicit, the</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Post </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">was pushing a hawkish line even before Bezos’s acquisition in 2013 and his editorial interference beginning in 2025. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-my-liberal-friends-disowned-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-my-liberal-friends-disowned-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-670146708-e1753980962162.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-my-liberal-friends-disowned-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-my-liberal-friends-disowned-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why my liberal friends disowned me</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/why-my-liberal-friends-disowned-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Valerie Stivers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 2014, Thiessen</span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-thiessen-george-w-bush-was-right-about-iraq-pullout/2014/09/08/6ddd91b2-374e-11e4-bdfb-de4104544a37_story.html"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">argued</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the United States should not have pulled out of Iraq. Recently,</span><a href="https://x.com/infolibnews/status/2046939976814756241"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">he went on Fox News</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to recycle Iraq War talking points for use in Iran, insisting that America should just kill any leaders who don’t want to make a deal. Even more bizarrely, in early March, Thiessen</span> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/03/03/iran-strike-venezuela-military-trump-doctrine/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">wrote an op-ed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> stating that the “Trump Doctrine” — expressed via the war in Iran — somehow ends forever wars, perhaps in a vain attempt to sell this war to a New Right that has grown skeptical of foreign entanglements. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But Thiessen is not against forever wars — he loves them, and he’s even</span><a href="https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2011/10/former-bush-speechwriter-defends-waterboarding"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">defended torture by the CIA</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. He’s obviously overjoyed that Trump, who ran on a largely antiwar and populist platform, has ended up reverting to the old ways of the Republican Party and effectively destroyed, at least for the time being, any New Right governing agenda embracing restraint abroad. For instance, Thiessen declared in a</span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/01/02/donald-trump-accomplishments-2025-marc-thiessen/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Trump-lauding piece</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that Ukraine was one of the president’s great accomplishments in 2025. He had in mind not Trump’s early attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict, mind you, but the president’s willingness to maintain and even expand arms transfers: “He is doing more to help Ukraine than Biden ever did.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Browse</span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/marc-a-thiessen/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Thiessen’s </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Post </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">profile</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and you will find that almost every single article is about how Trump took a hawkish stance and why it was so great. While engaged in a journalistic enterprise that looks like the diametrical opposite of Gessen’s — not Trump-bashing, but Trump-praising — he is, in fact, reinforcing the same policy agenda.  Unfortunately, the Thiessens of the world have understood just how well Trump responds to flattery. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Because of that, Thiessen is now a frequent mention on the president’s Truth Social posts. On April 23, Trump</span><a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trump-approves-column-arguing-doesnt-151942268.html"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">commented</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on a Thiessen op-ed about how he didn’t need a deal with the Iranians: “Very true!!! President DJT.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Thiessen and Gessen represent opposing American political ideologies, and wholly different reads on Trump. But to the hawkish uniparty, that doesn’t matter. The goal has always been a Pride Parade, whether in Tehran or Moscow (preferably both). That, we are told, is freedom. It’s why you must shut up about gas prices. Heads they win, tails you lose.</span></p>
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					<title>A new Iraq war is coming</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/04/americas-next-battlefield/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/04/americas-next-battlefield/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2133941949.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Militiamen linked to the Popular Mobilisation Forces. (Murtaja Lateef/AFP)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 23:01:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 06:26:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Baghdad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1057132</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Tehran is rallying its proxies]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">After her base was hit by an Iranian missile, Ghazal Molan stood a chance of surviving. But the 19-year-old Iranian Kurdish fighter — exiled from her native land and now living in Iraqi Kurdistan — was repeatedly turned away by local hospitals. The doctors were afraid of reprisals by Iran’s network of allies within the fractured Iraqi state. And so, as Molan’s ambulance raced from one shuttered hospital to another, the teenager succumbed to her wounds.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Molan’s fate, and the Iranian missiles that continue to strike targets across northern Iraq, encapsulates the grave threat faced by Kurds and their political representatives. <a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1777027038500000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0dnwCj8pIj1GqGcNUYLqJa">Rumored US support</a> for a cross-border Kurdish assault on Iran has failed to materialize, leaving the Kurds exposed on the frontlines of a war they didn’t start. Three more Kurdish fighters were injured in a fresh strike just hours after Donald Trump announced the extension of a fragile ceasefire.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet beyond the Kurds and their unending fight for self-determination, Molan’s death also points to a broader crisis, one rapidly reaching boiling-point right across Iraq. Compared to Iran’s well-publicized ties to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, Tehran’s network of Iraqi Shia militias receive relatively little attention abroad. But amid missile strikes and the high-profile <a href="https://www.cjr.org/analysis/shelly-kittleson-iraq-abduction-middle-east-kidnapped-journalist.php" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cjr.org/analysis/shelly-kittleson-iraq-abduction-middle-east-kidnapped-journalist.php&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1777027038500000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2bDZ2hcb89GA3yitFnIR7C">kidnapping</a> of a US journalist, US-Iraqi relations are now at their lowest ebb since 2003. Just this week, Washington cut Iraq off from dollar shipments altogether, demanding its nominal partner sever ties with Tehran and arrest militia members accused of attacks on US bases. As Trump’s standoff with the Revolutionary Guards continues, his war on Iran looks set to spill over onto yet another country.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), established following the Gulf War, has long been a loyal partner to the West. One street in the capital Erbil was recently renamed after John Major, honoring Britain’s own role in establishing the safe haven in Iraq’s mountainous north, today home to around six million Kurds. So when the American press started leaking news that the US and Israel were looking to “arm the Kurds” in the early days of the 2026 war, it seemed a repeat of that same partnership could be on the cards in neighboring Iran, itself home to some 10 million Kurds. The Islamic Republic has killed tens of thousands of its own Kurdish population over the years, including during 2022’s “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising and in response to massive protests this January.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But according to Hoshyar Siwaily, the head of foreign relations for the KRI’s governing Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), reports of an imminent US-backed cross-border operation were fake news. “Even when the KRI is facing continuous missile and drone attacks, from both Iran and our neighbors in Iraq, the West has not provided the KRI with the means to defend itself,” Siwaily tells <em>UnHerd</em>. “We’ve been asking the US and our European partners to provide us with air defense systems, which we think they would be willing to provide — but Baghdad’s position hinders that kind of direct assistance.”</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2203980497.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Revenge of the Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">US forces stationed in Erbil operate their own air-defense system at the city’s airport. That means some protection for locals; busy shopping streets are peppered with falling shrapnel more than direct missile impacts. Still, it’s better than Kurdish regions outside the capital, which have no such shield. That includes the camps housing the various exiled Iranian Kurdish parties, sheltering under the wing of their more successful Iraqi brethren, and where most of the Kurdish casualties have been concentrated.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Hassan Sharifi is a senior representative of the KDP-I, the largest and oldest Iranian Kurdish opposition party. “We don&#8217;t have any role in starting this war between Iran and Israel and the USA, and we don&#8217;t have any role in it continuing or stopping,” he says, wearing a military-green version of the traditional Kurdish cummerbund as he speaks in his party’s Erbil headquarters. “And yet Iran continues to strike us, all day every day.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Both domestically and abroad, scapegoating the Kurds has long been an <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/irans-kurds-are-out-of-friends/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://unherd.com/2025/07/irans-kurds-are-out-of-friends/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1777027038500000&amp;usg=AOvVaw30AFmxO4ybCg_SxeJwohl5">attractive</a> option for Iran, as it fights its asymmetrical war with the West. Washington’s careless hints at a partnership between the Kurds, the US and Israel have only poured oil on the fire. Adib Khaladyan, a political representative for another Iranian-Kurdish opposition group, counts members of his own small party among the dead. “We have refrained from any attacks on Iran since 2005, but they have never ceased attacking us,” he tells <em>UnHerd</em> in the lobby of an Erbil hotel included on an Iranian hit list for allegedly sheltering US and Israeli intelligence agents. Khaladyan, for his part, denies this charge. “There’s no concrete evidence Israel is supporting any Iranian Kurdish party,” he says, adding that the Islamic Republic nonetheless targets Iranian Kurdish parties and the houses of their members.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In any case, decades of political exile and internal repression by Tehran mean their scope for action within Iran itself is relatively limited, with the Iraqi-Kurdish authorities pragmatically keeping their Iranian guests on a tight leash. “We are not willing to let these [opposition] political parties use Kurdistan as a base to launch their attacks against Iran,” Siwaily says, pointing to a 2023 agreement between the KRI, Baghdad and Tehran aimed at disarming the Kurdish-Iranian opposition. But though the Kurds haven’t fired a single bullet against Iran throughout the two-month conflict, the war has reached their doorstep anyway. As well as contending with over 700 Iranian strikes since the war began, Iraqi Kurds have faced fire from their Arab compatriots.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Though the Kurds haven’t fired a single bullet against Iran throughout the two-month conflict, the war has reached their doorstep anyway.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">As the leading force of the Shia Muslim world, Tehran has long sought influence in majority-Shia Iraq, home to both Shia Islam’s most sacred sites and the seminaries that honed the Islamic Republic’s religious leaders. While the US was busy backing Kurdish aspirations in the north during its wars with Saddam Hussein, Iran supported militias in the Shia south. Iran-backed insurgents went on to resist the post-2003 US occupation, before growing in strength and influence as they joined the fight against ISIS. Scores of militias, grouped under the banner of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), can today field hundreds of thousands of fighters. More than that, they regularly launch missile attacks at US bases and assets across the region — including, of course, the Kurds.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Tehran has a well-known policy financing and training regional proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis, enabling them to attack common foes in Israel and the US. But Iran’s Iraqi allies are arguably more valuable still, providing not just military cover, but billions of dollars in cash. These militias dominate Iraqi politics through the “Coordination Framework” of Shiite political parties, helping Iran achieve massive control over Iraq’s political, economic and legislative apparatus. To that extent, “militia” is a misnomer for a network that may still engage in checkpoint-level corruption at the grassroots, but which at the state level runs vast construction, agriculture, real estate and infrastructure enterprises. Especially as it struggles with sanctions and now a blockade, Iran is more reliant than ever on billions of dollars arriving from Iraq via shell companies and informal transfers, with the PMF for instance deploying a complex scheme to make $1.5 billion from Iraq’s black-market exchange rate.</p>
<p dir="ltr">While Washington and Tehran continue their will-they-won’t-they dance over a ceasefire, meanwhile, another set of highly significant negotiations is taking place in Iraq. The Baghdad political establishment is currently struggling to overcome a five-month deadlock and elect a new prime minister. A candidate elected with heavy Iranian backing has already been directly vetoed by President Trump under threat of US sanctions — but the pro-Iranian bloc is now trying to advance another pick, himself already sanctioned by Washington. US Special Envoy Tom Barrack this week stopped in Erbil before flying down to Baghdad, arriving in the capital to lobby for US interests to be respected. A senior member of the Revolutionary Guards was elsewhere in the city, making the opposite case for Iran. Hezbollah may be decimated, and Tehran in turmoil, but in Baghdad the US-Iranian struggle continues on an equal footing.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/i-was-detained-by-greeces-migrant-police/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/i-was-detained-by-greeces-migrant-police/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/border.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/i-was-detained-by-greeces-migrant-police/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/i-was-detained-by-greeces-migrant-police/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>I was detained by Greece’s migrant police</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/i-was-detained-by-greeces-migrant-police/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Since the 7 October attack and Israel’s bloody reprisals across the Middle East, the Iraqi front has remained relatively quiet, as Iran’s proxies concentrated on consolidating and institutionalizing their power. The PMF’s penetration of Iraq was underscored this month when they plucked US journalist Shelly Kittleson from the streets of Baghdad and fired drones at a US diplomatic convoy from within the capital. All the same, US and Israeli strikes killing scores of PMF militiamen have not yet been met with an aggressive response.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Now, however, the hour of reckoning may finally have come. This week, the US has stopped all dollar shipments to Iraq’s central bank, and <a href="https://alhurra.com/en/18854" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://alhurra.com/en/18854&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1777027038500000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2P_fetfh4HJinqbH3N5oA_">suspended</a> all security coordination with the Iraqi government. Besides the Kurds, the US has its allies in Iraq’s formal security forces. Unfortunately for Washington, the PMF is larger and better-financed than Iraq’s actual army. If, in other words, the US and Israel ramp up their strikes, this political and economic struggle could yet devolve into outright civil conflict, pitting the PMF against Iraq’s beleaguered armed forces plus Sunni and tribal armed groups. Such chaos would, of course, create room for militant Islamists of all stripes — an especially concerning scenario given the US has just airlifted nearly 6,000 ISIS detainees from Syria and deposited them into Iraqi custody.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The shock-waves would certainly extend to Kurdistan, the USA’s last solid ally in Iraq, where political parties are struggling to plot a course through a sea of historic enemies. Even the pro-Western KDP has fostered a pragmatic alliance with the pro-Iranian presidential candidate in Baghdad. Iran, for its part, continues to exert deeper influence across Iraqi-Iranian borderlands controlled by the KDP’s historic rivals in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). It was here that Kurdish hospitals turned away the wounded Kurdish fighter, fearing Iranian reprisals.</p>
<p dir="ltr">“Although we are partners of the USA,” says the Kurdish politician Siwaily, “we would like to stay neutral, because this war is bigger than us.” But though Trump has now extended his ceasefire deadline, missiles continue to fly over Kurdistan, and the drums of war are sounding in Baghdad. Staying neutral might well be wishful thinking.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1057132</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>How shipowners are getting rich off Hormuz</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2207620148.jpg?w=526</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Blockade</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rose George]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/LADY.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[In ship shape? (CN-STR/ AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rose George </strong>is a British journalist and author. An expert on shipping, her most recent book is <em>Every Last Fish: What Fish Do for Us And What We Do To Them</em>.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a British journalist and author. An expert on shipping, her most recent book is <em>Every Last Fish: What Fish Do for Us And What We Do To Them</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:02:29 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 10:01:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hormuz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shipping]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1056758</guid>
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								<![CDATA[They have the world over a barrel]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">“We have no idea what on earth will happen,” admits one shipping expert. It’s a common response if you ask anyone in the industry about the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. How will it impact trade? Will there be long-term damage to oil routes? Will terrified seafarers leave their jobs? Nobody has a Scooby.</p>
<p dir="ltr">People still think shipping is an old-fashioned business. After all, even giant container ships usually travel slower than your grandparent drives. But overseas trade has increased fourfold since 1970 and it is still growing. Today, 90% of everything we consume comes to us by 100,000 ships and 1.5 million seafarers, though you wouldn’t know it until a crisis comes along. When the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull erupted in 2010, and all aviation stopped, supermarket shelves didn’t empty. That’s because we rely on shipping: but just don’t realize it.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In this latest crisis, there are thought to be more than 800 ships stuck on either side of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway that Iran has essentially invaded — the Strait’s waters belong half to Iran and half to Oman — with threats of mines and drones. Despite Donald Trump’s dubious claim that 34 ships had gone through the strait on Monday, and despite muddled talk of closures and reopenings, for now hardly anything is moving. Before the crisis, after all, traffic through the Strait averaged 100-150 vessels a day. On Saturday, it was less than 20.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Only a fifth of the world’s oil supply is at issue here — but from the noise you’d think it was all of it. In fact, the blocked supply disproportionately affects nations that get most of their oil from the Gulf. South East Asia and Japan are suffering most. Even so, this is a problem that affects us all. As the International Energy Agency recently warned yet again, this is the largest disruption in history, adding that demand for oil is likely to fall by 88,000 barrels per day, as buyers adjust to a depleted supply and find alternatives. In economics, this is known as “demand destruction”, and it’s the surest outcome in a very unsure situation. At the worst point so far, the price of a barrel of oil surged to $150.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-1250649650.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will I ever escape the Strait of Hormuz?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Anonymous Seafarer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">All the while, the crisis is expensive in other ways too: idle ships still cost money to run; crew members have to be paid, sometimes double their wages as hazard pay; charterers (who rent ships) have to pay rental even if the ship is going nowhere fast. Factor in port rates — several thousand dollars a day  — and ships can cost thousands of dollars to operate, even when they are idle. Cruise ships face higher costs because while a modern tanker can operate with a crew of a dozen, cruise ships employ thousands of people, and they all need to be fed and paid.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Nor does anyone know when this will end. In its latest World Economic Outlook released last Tuesday, the International Monetary Fund stated that in an “adverse scenario with larger and more persistent increases in energy prices”, global growth will slow to 2.5%, compared to a 3.4% growth rate in 2024-5.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As is always the way, the pain would not be distributed evenly. Of richer countries, the UK gets the worst forecast, with a growth rate of 0.8%, down from the IMF’s January prediction of 1.3%. (The IMF pointed to Britain being a net energy importer and therefore being more exposed.) In its very worst scenario, the Hormuz crisis might push the world into recession.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What is less widely reported, however, is that, for some, this crisis is actually good for business. Consider freight rates, which for ships operating away from the warzone have increased dramatically. Some tankers now cost $100,000 a day to charter. That’s some 10 times the average — but they’re still being chartered. “No shipowner is going through a slump as such,” says Willmington. “It’s actually been beneficial for ship owners.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">It helps, too, that global sea lanes are very much a seller’s market. While shippers can offload cargo safely away from the war region, they’ll struggle to transport it overland. Modern container ships can carry some 20,000 containers — and no one has 20,000 trucks at hand to transport that much cargo. Local rail services are also poor.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Modern container ships can carry some 20,000 containers — and no one has 20,000 trucks at hand&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">A <em>Reuters</em> investigation into how 17 containers of two-by-four planks of timber were sent to their destination is sobering. The Austrian wood should have left Croatia by ship, then traveled straight to Dubai. Then, a smaller feeder ship would have taken it to Qatar, making the total journey time about 45 days. The war has wrecked these arrangements, with the Austrian timber now not expected to reach Doha for another month. Meanwhile, each container was surcharged $3,600, on top of usual freight costs, another boon for owners.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Another option is to pay for expensive storage, with no idea of how long the situation will last. Oxford Economics, a think tank, suggests that the crisis will last two months. “We assume that traffic levels will rise to around 50% in May and June,” it’s stated, “before gradually recovering to normality over the following six months.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Then there’s the human element: tankers, after all, don’t drive themselves. On those 800 trapped ships are an estimated 20,000 seafarers. Most come from the developing countries that supply shipping’s labor pool: largely the Philippines and India. They are stuck on their ships, with no end to their sentence in sight. Some but not all crew are on double “hazard” pay. Shipping managers can in theory change crews, as most ships are anchored on either side of the Strait and are therefore accessible. But there are very few people willing to sign up to sit in waters where drones fly overhead and they can hear explosions, yet another challenge for hard-pressed industry accountants.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To be fair, the shipping industry has weathered crises before, though with varying success. It took nearly two decades for shipping to fully recover from the 2008 financial crisis, and only then because Covid increased consumer demand massively, helping shipping too. During the years of awful Somali piracy, when hundreds of seafarers were taken hostage in the Indian Ocean, one of the most common shipping routes, ships began to pass around the Cape of Good Hope instead: it took longer and cost more, but there were no attackers in small boats.</p>
<p dir="ltr">For Hormuz, though, geography limits options. Two large pipelines, in Saudi Arabia and the UAE respectively, can send oil to ports on the Red Sea. But their much smaller capacity can’t replace the pre-crisis 20 million barrels a day that transited the Strait. That, at least, leaves one certainty: business as usual is not returning for a very long time.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1056758</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Britain’s chance to escape America</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2235495933-e1773756881551.jpg?w=616</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Starmer has been in hock to Trump since the latter's re-election. (Leon Neal/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:03:03 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:03:03 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Starmer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1052686</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Iran crisis is our opportunity]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>A moment comes in everyone’s life when they first perceive their father as old and frail. We see, perhaps before he does, that he is unable to do what once came so easily; his strength is fading and his judgment often lacking. So it is with the United States, which has become increasingly erratic and aggressive in the dotage of its empire. Given the European handwringing which greeted Trump’s threats to annex Greenland from Denmark, his threats to intervene in our internal politics and the bullying over tariffs, there is something pathetic in the desperation with which the Trump administration now alternately cajoles and pleads for our help with <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/03/16/trump-iran-war-escalation" target="_blank" rel="noopener">its current mess</a>. America has stumbled while undertaking an unwise course of action in which we were not consulted, which will negatively impact us all, and its evident frailty and feebleness of mind is a rightful source of concern. Even at the height of its powers, the American empire did not countenance such a risky and self-destructive gamble. When it does so now, at this late stage, it is hard not to feel the end approaching.</p>
<p>For all the genuine and awe-inspiring might of America’s war machine, geography has given Iran an advantage in the Strait of Hormuz to which there is no obvious military solution. It is difficult to imagine what the Marine Expeditionary Unit, <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/marine-expeditionary-unit-ordered-to-the-middle-east/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">currently steaming</a> toward the Gulf from the Pacific where it had been deployed to deter China, can do to unblock the Strait. Even <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/14/us/politics/marines-iran-war.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">if the 2,500 deployable Marines seize Qeshm island</a>, on the Iranian side of the strait, they and the shipping they are being sent to guard will still be within range of weapons systems located within the mainland city of Bandar Abbas — and among its half-million population — and in the craggy and desolate mountain ranges behind. Senator Lindsay Graham’s proposal of <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/03/16/trump-iran-hormuz-strait-kharg-island" target="_blank" rel="noopener">seizing Kharg island</a>, more than 300 miles away at the other end of the Persian Gulf, would still require the taskforce to sail through the very same strait from which, fearful of losses, the US Navy chooses to steer well clear.</p>
<p>It is all very well for Trump to demand that European, or even Chinese, warships escort oil tankers through the narrow waterway, but there is a reason that the US Navy has refused the same task. What America cannot do without bearing politically unsustainable risk, and very little prospect of success, <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/tanker-escorts-strait-of-hormuz-too-risky-says-admiral-iran-mines-flwbjwsh9?utm_term=Autofeed&amp;utm_medium=Social&amp;utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1773503826" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Britain certainly cannot</a>, and it is petulant and ultimately risible of Trump to demand we try. As Germany’s defense minister Boris Pistorius <a href="https://x.com/clashreport/status/2033529827790037111?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rightly observed</a> this week, “What does Donald Trump expect from a handful or two handfuls of European frigates to achieve there in the Strait of Hormuz, which the powerful American Navy cannot manage alone?”</p>
<p>In these inauspicious circumstances, the idea that Britain should be doing more to help does not seem compelling, whatever confused and rambling outbursts emanate from the imperial center. The single drone that hit the American hangar in RAF Akrotiri may have been an embarrassment for Whitehall, but it was hardly a catastrophe. The seeming absence of a ground-based air defense system may be a mysterious oversight, but as Israel and the Gulf kingdoms show, even the most modern and extensive GBAD installation does not provide total defense. The carrier that many Fleet Street hawks demanded should immediately sail for Cyprus is already busy in the High North. Indeed, its current deployment, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-carrier-strike-group-to-deploy-to-north-atlantic-to-keep-uk-safe" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced last month</a>, came after Trump’s own declarations that Europeans were paying such insufficient attention to Arctic security that America has the right to seize Greenland, and perhaps Canada too. It is not Britain’s responsibility to chase after every military whim, reasonable or otherwise, of our imperial patron. In any case, the whole purpose of Britain’s Sovereign Base Areas is to act as our unsinkable carrier in the Levant: in Cyprus, and in the skies over Jordan, Iraq and the Gulf states, the RAF is already active shooting down missile threats to regional allies, and there is no obvious logic in seeking to do more.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-reverse-suez/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-reverse-suez/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2254687746.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-reverse-suez/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-reverse-suez/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump&#039;s reverse Suez</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-reverse-suez/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Macron’s European flotilla, led by France, and assembling in the Eastern Mediterranean, displays more than a touch of overkill: for the level of threat it faces, Cyprus must now be the best-defended country in the world. It is <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/03/12/frances-mediterranean-armada-signals-clout-as-middle-east-may-rethink-alliances/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">certainly an impressive sight</a>, and a galling one for British observers of our own naval decline — yet competing with France is not in itself a vital national interest. Rather than being driven by strict military necessity, this is an act of political theater in which European leaders can signal both their capacity to act decisively in concert when one of their number is threatened, and their willingness to maintain a certain distance from the United States in doing so. <a href="https://x.com/FrenchResponse/status/2032904420552261902?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dismissively quashing</a> Trumpian suggestions that it might sail eastwards to the arena of America’s muddled war, Macron’s government clearly sees the deployment, coming so soon after <a href="https://icds.ee/en/macron-adds-european-flavour-to-french-deterrence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the announcement</a> that France will expand the defensive umbrella of its independent nuclear deterrent across vast swathes of Europe, as tangible proof of the latent power that a French-led Europe, independent of Nato, can muster in defense of its own interests. We are less weak than we tell ourselves, the flotilla says, and our erratic overlord less strong.</p>
<p>Politically, the implications of all this for Britain are unclear. Starmer’s government has, correctly, chosen not to commit itself to this war, which is unfortunately not quite the same thing as remaining entirely detached from it. There is not, after all, much difference between Britain’s Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, unwillingly hosted by Cypriots for use in wars of no interest to them, and the notional RAF bases here in Britain from which American long-range bombers set off to and return from their missions over Iran. For the Greens and Scottish Nationalists to condemn the use of these bases is entirely expected. Yet when we see the keen populist bellwether of liberal centrist opinion <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0dz1k0rr4o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ed Davey demand</a> a fully independent British nuclear deterrent, something has surely changed. It is hard, now, not to palpably feel the tide of empire retreating, though this time round with us as the natives observing, with mixed feelings, the crumbling power of their imperial master. Living through a time of historic changes is a more disorienting and ambiguous experience than the confident hindsight of historians later pretends: we can expect our politicians to struggle with the new realities struggling to be born.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;We can expect our politicians to struggle with the new realities struggling to be born.&#8221;</div>
<p>It is reassuring then, at a moment in which Britain’s Right-wing parties have not covered themselves in glory, that Reform’s initial gung-ho enthusiasm for America and Israel’s war was so swiftly backtracked by Robert Jenrick, a long-standing skeptic of foreign entanglements. If his colleague Andrea Jenkyns remains keen to commit British boots on the ground, this is at least beyond the power of the Mayor of Greater Lincolnshire to effect. Yet the spectacle of Reform’s headlong advance to war, and the party’s hurried retreat when faced with polling data, has perhaps obscured the Conservative Party’s own, and perhaps worse, stance on Iran, a position seemingly derived equally from recklessness and a shaky grasp of detail.</p>
<p>Badenoch’s insistence, perhaps extrapolating from <a href="https://www.jaccusepaper.co.uk/p/is-kemi-badenoch-addicted-to-world" target="_blank" rel="noopener">her experience of <em>World of Warcraft</em></a>, that Britain should  “stop the archer” by joining in strikes on Iranian underground missile bases, rather than merely “catching the arrows”, would seem an odd and escalatory response to a UAV launched from Lebanon. Bombing an entirely different weapon system in an entirely different country would not prevent any recurrence of such attacks, presumably undertaken by Hezbollah, unless Badenoch also intends to bomb Lebanon. Yet doing so would require deconflicting and therefore coordinating with the Israelis in a bombing campaign that even the United States is steering clear of, against UAVs launched from mobile and most likely civilian vehicles, in the wooded and heavily-populated landscape of southern Lebanon. The moral, legal, and political risks of accidentally killing civilians, in an aerial campaign that has already killed hundreds, would be unacceptably high for little obvious gain, the product of a soundbite in search of a strategy.</p>
<p>In its latest and even more confusing iteration, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-15648421/KEMI-BADENOCH-Keir-Starmer-wants-believe-Britain-merely-observer-conflict-fantasy.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">published in the <em>Daily Mail</em></a>, Badenoch’s stance on the American-Israeli campaign is that she is “clear that Britain shouldn’t have joined in – I remain concerned that there isn’t a clear plan behind the strikes – but Britain should also not be neutral” and should “strike the missile and drone sites at source”. The Conservative Party’s apparent position on this urgent question of national security is that Britain should conduct its own entirely independent retaliatory bombing campaign, in the same airspace as American and Israeli jets and against much the same targets. Given the American aircraft losses already to friendly fire, we must presume that Badenoch intends the RAF to coordinate and deconflict with its American and Israeli counterparts, as well as, given Britain’s military shortcomings, leaning upon their support for surveillance and targeting data. How this is considered “not joining in” is hard to discern: the advantage for the nation, even harder.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-1711917308.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Farage is a Burkean</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It seems unnervingly clear that, rather than starting “from first principles,” according to her characteristically high estimation of her own intellectual rigor,  Badenoch had settled on a political strategy of marketing herself as stronger on defense than Starmer, in which the outbreak of war initially seemed a useful backdrop. That the war she initially chose to back proved both chaotically mismanaged and domestically unpopular has now led her to defend, alone, this tenuous and isolated political outpost. On a matter of the utmost gravity, the only principles apparent seem to be feeding the needs of the Westminster media grid, and a desire to cosplay the Iron Lady for her dwindling audience.</p>
<p>If we are to truly start from first principles, they must be that Britain has its own interests, distinct from those of our allies in Europe and the United States, and it is only to those interests British leaders should attend. If the Iran War is an American party to which we have been invited but do not wish to attend, so is it the case that the European effort is something Starmer may wish to join, but to which we have not been invited. Greece did not send its jets and frigates to Cyprus to defend Britain’s SBAs, as British commentators affected to believe, but to reassure and protect its ethnic kin, maximizing the country’s political influence. In the same way, the broader, European effort has its own French political rationale, of advancing a Macronian vision of strategic autonomy, in which Britain serves little if any role. Rather than joining the war at arm’s length, as Badenoch may wish, our current refusal to take part is itself carried out with a certain insular detachment.</p>
<p>Yet the European consensus on this war’s regretful pointlessness, now uniting even the most Trumpian of continental governments, like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/13/trump-meloni-unpopular-war-europe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">those of Italy</a> and Hungary, with the liberal center, provides Starmer with the political cover to stay out. At the beginning of this conflict, it was a contrarian position in the British press to unequivocally state that joining the fight is not in our interests: now it is, correctly, the mainstream political opinion in Westminster as across Europe as a whole. What a few weeks ago appeared an unusually bold stance from Starmer now seems boringly, obviously sensible: Trump’s increasingly erratic jibes to the contrary now inspire pity rather than deference. There may well be a case, when the shooting stops, for taking part in convoy escort and minesweeping duties in the Strait of Hormuz, but we and other Europeans should demand a reasonable price from this most transactional of American administrations. Above all, surely, we should require that Trump firmly and publicly commit himself to the territorial integrity and self-determination of both Greenland and Canada, the New World extensions of our European civilization: he may be a boomer, but Trump has no right to consume our rightful patrimony.</p>
<p>At this moment of historic American weakness, so swiftly following Trump’s intimidation of our home continent, we Europeans must be a little more ambitious in renegotiating the terms of our relationship. Yet instead, the Conservative and Reform politicians who <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/opinion/article/conservatives-trump-iran-time-true-leadership" target="_blank" rel="noopener">would have blindly leapt into war</a> now tie themselves in knots justifying arcane and incoherent positions, isolating themselves from both domestic opinion and the broader European Right. That they find themselves in this position seems almost more pathetic than lamentable, so devoid is it of any political or strategic sense. Like parents, all empires age, wither and then eventually die. Filial loyalty does not generally extend to jumping into the grave alongside them.</p>
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					<title>Trump is trapped by the logic of war</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/03/trump-is-trapped-by-the-logic-of-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/03/trump-is-trapped-by-the-logic-of-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Iran</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Iran trumps Russia in the President's concerns. (David Ramos/Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:03:57 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:03:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Invasion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1052433</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Boots on the ground might become inevitable]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">It starts with a big bang. You&#8217;re on a roll. Then, unforeseen events intrude. You make mistakes, and get sucked into a war you can no longer control. Napoleon and Hitler did not want to fight the wars they ultimately lost, but one thing led to the other. They succumbed to the logic of war. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Ukraine — each of these was much the same. So too is Donald Trump’s war against Iran, which has turned out to be much tougher than he and his advisers imagined.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Right now, Trump has three choices. In scenario one, he sticks to his four-to-five week timetable, flattens the place, declares victory and gets out without destroying the Islamic Republic. The Strait of Hormuz would at this point not be truly secured. Scenario two is that he continues his campaign until the Strait is open, and he’s assured it’ll stay that way. That might involve using a limited number of ground troops to secure the Iranian coastline abutting the Strait. There would be no regime change in this scenario — but at least Washington would have reopened the Persian Gulf.</p>
<p dir="ltr">There’s also a third scenario: Trump concludes that, for as long as the existing Iranian regime is in power, the Strait cannot be secured. To get the job done, he must launch a full-scale invasion. Yet as Condoleezza Rice, national security advisor and later secretary of state under President Bush just reminded us, it took his administration a full year to prepare for the occupation of Iraq. There are currently no signs that an equivalent operation is being planned for Iran.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Scenario one would be the ultimate defeat, on the scale of Vietnam. It would stand as the greatest political and military misjudgment of our time — and for that reason alone, I would rule it out.</p>
<p dir="ltr">We are currently in the midst of scenario two. The difficulty commentators have during wars is that they’re not privy to classified information. Trump may have information that gives him the confidence to think America can totally destroy the Iranian regime’s military capabilities. I therefore can’t exclude the possibility that he is right, and that his critics are wrong.</p>
<p dir="ltr">History, however, would suggest otherwise. During the build up to the Iraq War, George W. Bush and Tony Blair wanted to believe the briefings they received from officials. Officials, for their part, delivered the briefings their political masters wanted to hear. I was a newspaper editor in Germany at the time, and attended one such high-level briefing. Unfortunately, the information I heard turned out to be completely wrong. The big conclusion I drew then is that privileged information doesn’t necessarily mean leaders make wise decisions.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Untitled-design-3.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>On Iran and the Left</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/on-iran-and-the-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis </a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">And certainly, based on what’s happening so far in Iran, it&#8217;s clear that the Trump administration misjudged the power of asymmetric warfare. It also misjudged the changed nature of military supply chains. Twenty years ago, military power was all about weapons of mass destruction, missiles, warplanes and tanks. And, to that extent, I do believe that the US has indeed succeeded in destroying a large portion of Iran’s conventional military infrastructure.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But the regime’s most potent weapons are mines and kamikaze drones, each costing just a few tens of thousands of dollars. If one of these were to hit an oil tanker, and cause an oil spill in the Strait of Hormuz, the effect would be devastating. No ship would be able to pass until the waters are cleared. And even if the US were somehow able to reopen the Strait, it would still have to protect every single ship — whereas the Iranians only need a single successful hit to close the Strait once more.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That’s asymmetric warfare: and the Iranians are leveraging their one and only strategic advantage for all it’s worth. They have already carried out drone and missile attacks on ships on oil installations in the Gulf states, and may also have laid mines in the Strait. The strategic objective of the Revolutionary Guards is very similar to strategies employed by both Russia and Ukraine: to come out on top in a prolonged war of attrition. The Iranian calculation is that the US will ultimately fold under economic and political pressure.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That may be the best strategy available to them, but it is not guaranteed to succeed. Scenario three, a full ground invasion, still looms in the background. If chickening out is politically catastrophic for Trump, and the current air campaign fails, what else can he do but prepare for scenario three? It is not what he wanted. But at the point when he finally makes the decision, it may be the obvious thing to do. If you have no other options left, the impossible becomes the inevitable.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A full ground invasion still looms in the background.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Clearly, this would clash with what Trump long promised: no more wars in distant lands. Nor do I doubt that he meant it when he said it. But when you’re in the hot seat in the White House, your job is to manage conflicting objectives. When faced with a choice to unseat the Revolutionary Guards in a six-months ground war, or suffer a humiliating defeat, we should not automatically assume that Trump would choose the latter.</p>
<p dir="ltr">We should also not underestimate the role of Israel. I know that many inside the Israeli government expected Trump to force regime change in Iran at some point during his second term. And now, if Trump were to chicken out without getting the job done, he’d leave Israel humiliated and exposed. To be clear, the US is clearly the senior partner in the relationship, but Israel had at least some influence in Trump’s decision to go to war. Why, then, wouldn’t Netanyahu exert similar influence in how to end the conflict?</p>
<p dir="ltr">Of course, I am not predicting anything here. Unexpected events intrude. They already have. But based on what is publicly known, and on conversations I had ahead of the invasion, I would want to keep an open mind on any of those options. And since few people expect scenario three, I would call it the “underpriced” option. It is not necessarily likely, but a lot more probable than many think. Besides, an extended air campaign and boots on the ground are hardly mutually exclusive, and could overlap for a time.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Another factor here is how the Iran war interacts with Ukraine. For Europe, the rise in oil prices that resulted from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a geopolitical disaster. Why? Because it destroys the continent’s strategy to starve Russia of its oil revenues. The price of Urals oil, the benchmark for the oil sold by Russia, has risen from under $40 per barrel to almost $90 — and lately peaked at over $100. In February, before the Iran war started, Russian oil tax revenues had fallen to around $4 billion per month, after oscillating between $6-10 billion per month since 2022. If Urals oil stays at this price, meanwhile, Russian oil tax revenues would jump to around $10 billion a month: enough to fund Putin’s war.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/why-trumps-epic-fury-is-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/why-trumps-epic-fury-is-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2264198963.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/why-trumps-epic-fury-is-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/why-trumps-epic-fury-is-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Trump&#039;s Epic Fury is doomed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/why-trumps-epic-fury-is-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">It’s obvious, then, that Europe’s strategy rested far too much on oil prices staying low, something I always thought was naive. Even before this month’s shock, Russia wasn’t running out of money, and now it definitely won’t. The truth is that Europe has no strategy for a Ukrainian victory — and never did. It’s just that now, this reality is becoming impossible to ignore.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As for the future, the oil markets are ominous. After initially taking a relatively optimistic view, they now expect a longer war. The Russians themselves believe that the oil prices will remain elevated for another year. And if Trump were to pursue his war for a longer period, he would really need to force Ukraine and Russia to cut some kind of deal. No wonder he’s already piling up pressure on the beleaguered Kyiv government. As Trump told NBC: &#8220;I’m surprised that Zelensky doesn’t want to make a deal. Tell Zelensky to make a deal because Putin’s willing to make a deal.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Certainly, I don’t think it is possible for the West to fight two wars at once: against Russia in Ukraine and against Iran. The US is already running low on some supplies, while Ukraine itself is facing an acute shortage of air defense missiles. One war has to end for the other to proceed. And for Trump, Iran is the priority.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It would be comforting to know that a strategic operator is pulling the strings in the background, someone like Colin Powell, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first Gulf War. Trump, unfortunately, has surrounded himself with sycophants. The image of Marco Rubio, secretary of state and national security advisor, being forced by Trump to wear shoes that are too big for him, tells us all we need to know. All I can say, then, is that the logic of war has taken over — and it’s driving America on.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1052433</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Trump&#039;s reverse Suez</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-reverse-suez/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-reverse-suez/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2254687746.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[(Alex Wong/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 07 Mar 2026 00:20:21 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 07 Mar 2026 00:20:21 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regime change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Starmer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1051455</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Iran war is an obvious quagmire]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As we approach the 70th anniversary of the Suez Crisis, from which France’s political class learned to never again let their country’s security become subject to America’s veto, and Britain’s to never again distinguish between its own national interests and Washington’s whims, it is worth remembering that — judged purely as a military operation — the seizure of the Canal Zone was highly successful. The Canal itself, and a buffer zone around it, were captured within days, with limited casualties; the operation’s technical proficiency was praised by the First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten, even as he <a href="https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/336072/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">twice attempted to resign</a> in protest at the political folly of it all.</p>
<p>Yet success or failure will be a harder judgment to make for historians of Trump’s own latest Middle East adventure, which is already starting to look like a reverse Suez: its exposure of the limitations of pure military power; the domestic and international hostility; the fragility of alliance systems lazily assumed to be solid; and the wider overtones of an empire wildly overreaching in an attempt to stave off terminal decline. The difficulty in ascertaining, when this ends, whether or not Trump has achieved his war aims rests simply in the fact that the aims so far put forward <a href="https://x.com/StewartWood/status/2028581817016885434?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have differed wildly</a>, and are often mutually contradictory. The Suez Operation possessed a clearly defined military goal which succeeded, and a wider political one, which failed. As it stands, the Trump administration appears in possession of neither.</p>
<p>The broader arguments against the current conflict were most memorably made by Trump himself, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-campaign-endless-wars-iran-no-end-date-rcna261323" target="_blank" rel="noopener">campaigning as an anti-war candidate</a> who would keep the United States out of costly and unmanageable Middle Eastern entanglements. His Vice-President, JD Vance, once articulately made the case against <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPlqID3zv4k&amp;t=2540s" target="_blank" rel="noopener">this very war</a>. Having successfully demolished his own policy platform, it is difficult to determine what would now count as victory for Trump. The desired outcomes given, at the time of writing, have ranged from the maximalist deliverance of “freedom” to the Iranian people through full regime change in Tehran, through to inspiring an ideal &#8220;Venezuela solution” in which more amenable military figures launch an internal coup, then perhaps installing a Shah, ruling Iran remotely from the more stable comfort of Maryland. Or else simply destroying Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity (which Trump <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/02/24/politics/nuclear-program-iran-trump-strike" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed to have “obliterated” in June last year</a>). This <a href="https://emmamashford.substack.com/p/last-ride-of-the-neoconservatives?triedRedirect=true" target="_blank" rel="noopener">scrambling for post facto rationales</a> appears to derive from the fact that Iran did not immediately fold, as Trump apparently assumed it would, with the assassination of its leadership: unlike today’s America, it is not a personalist regime.</p>
<p>Yet if America’s war aims are nebulous from a lack of preparation, Israel’s appear haphazard by design. Summing up Netanyahu’s goals, the Israeli strategic analyst Danny Citrinowicz <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/dd070ee7-7021-4f90-86ec-690fe6aa34e6?shareType=nongift" target="_blank" rel="noopener">observes</a> that “If we can have a coup, great. If we can have people on the streets, great. If we can have a civil war, great. Israel couldn’t care less about the future [or] the stability of Iran.” Whatever Netanyahu’s aspirations, a heavily armed but leaderless Iran, <a href="https://x.com/Hoffman8Jon/status/2028896281695858706?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">engulfed in chaos</a>, represents a strategic threat rather than a victory for the wider West. In this, it appears that America has launched a war alongside, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/02/us/politics/trump-war-iran-israel.html?unlocked_article_code=1.QFA.YM9D.MI4XlhcDpKI6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">and at the behest</a> of, a notionally junior partner with wildly divergent goals, and which Washington has already admitted it is unable to rein in. For British politicians, all the warning lights should now be blinking red: even the Iraq War, a historic disaster, was vastly better conceived, planned and resourced than this.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Even the Iraq War, a historic disaster, was vastly better conceived, planned and resourced than this.&#8221;</div>
<p>And if America’s war aims are vague and contradictory, their proposed means of achieving these desired outcomes are too — including Iranian submission through aerial bombing alone — a result which has never yet been obtained in the century-long history of air power — through launching a peripheral revolt in which Kurdish and perhaps Baluchi separatists act as America and Israel’s boots on the ground. The best that can currently be said for Trump’s gamble is that the desired end-state is so nebulous in its imagining, and the approach so scattergun, that almost any off-ramp can be spun as a victory by his imperial court and its attendant sycophants. With no single, coherent outcome proposed, Trump can claim, as he already has, that the war has already succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of planners. This is even as he is warning his base that victory may yet take some weeks, and <a href="https://x.com/defense_civil25/status/2028691299180609733?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cautioning</a> Congress that “it is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that may be necessary”.</p>
<p>The war was, it seems, resourced for a few days of intensive bombing, with <a href="https://x.com/NatashaBertrand/status/2029185428553597425?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">little anticipation</a> of Iran striking back against Gulf states, and <a href="https://x.com/amanpour/status/2029264936065523977?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">American early-warning facilities</a>, with its arsenal of low-cost drones. Policy is now being made on the hoof, with senior administration officials <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/tensions-soar-hegseth-and-rubio-feud-over-us-troops-iran" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“at each other&#8217;s throats”</a> on <a href="https://x.com/disclosetv/status/2028955919854227825?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the need for ground troops</a>. CENTCOM, overseeing the war, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/04/evacuation-middle-east-iran-war-00812898" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has requested</a> an increase in military intelligence analysts “to support operations against Iran for at least 100 days but likely through September”. The spectacle of a days-long special military operation, entered into with an over-confident faith in hard power achieving a swift political solution, then dragging on interminably, is all too familiar. For Vladimir Putin, certainly, America’s unforced error of embroiling itself in a quagmire US presidents have spent a half-century studiously avoiding is a godsend, depleting Western munitions stocks, replenishing the Kremlin’s coffers through rising oil and gas prices, and weakening Europe’s negotiating power.</p>
<p>Judged on strict military terms, though, the operation has chalked up <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-underground-missiles-59b3492c?st=NcECRt" target="_blank" rel="noopener">notable successes</a>. Iranian ballistic missile launches have slowed, and no doubt the aerial onslaught is depleting Iran’s arsenal of both munitions and launchers. The looming switch from stand-off munitions to less sophisticated bombs implies that air superiority has already been achieved, as <a href="https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2028166853130858936?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Israel declared last weekend</a>, or will soon be achieved, as the White House <a href="https://x.com/ClayTravis/status/2029193088602665286?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">more cautiously claims</a>. Whether or not Israel, the US and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-stonewalling-requests-gulf-states-replenish-interceptors-sources-say" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Gulf states</a> will run out of interceptor munitions before Iran runs out of missiles <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/04/us-iran-air-defense-missile-burn-rate/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">is a matter of speculation</a> for even the best-informed analysts. Even as Pentagon sources brief concern over <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-stockpiles-iran/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">their dwindling arsenal</a>, the Trump administration, for what it is worth, <a href="https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/2028698690228019697?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claims</a> that it possesses “unlimited” stocks of munitions for a war that could last “forever” — while <a href="https://x.com/clashreport/status/2029267889329721562?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">simultaneously blaming Ukraine</a> for running down its weapons stockpile.</p>
<p>The most recent American attempt to exert its will in the region through air power alone, against Yemen’s Houthis, who are vastly weaker than Iran, entirely failed. The Houthis have not yet joined the war, as Hezbollah now has in response to Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon: the prospects for escalation grow wider by the day. As for boots on the ground, the much-briefed claims that Iran’s Kurds are willing to join in the war against Tehran remains <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/03/kurds-see-opening-yet-remain-wary-trump-seeks-help-oust-iran-regime" target="_blank" rel="noopener">debatable</a>. The Kurdish Regional Government of Northern Iraq, which hosts exiled Iranian Kurdish militias, has been warned by Iran that their entry into the war will invite an Iranian response, and has <a href="https://x.com/RudawEnglish/status/2029159618086060364?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stressed its neutrality</a> as a result. It has not even been a month since Washington abandoned its last Kurdish partners: they must now judge whether this time round America will prove a more dependable ally.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/britain-cant-escape-its-imperial-master/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/britain-cant-escape-its-imperial-master/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1243947398-e1764330718142.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/britain-cant-escape-its-imperial-master/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/britain-cant-escape-its-imperial-master/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain can&#039;t escape its imperial master</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/britain-cant-escape-its-imperial-master/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For all the military risks involved, it is very possible, though far from certain, that US and Israeli bombing can bring about the collapse of the Iranian state, though what happens next is anyone’s guess. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dan Caine, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/02/25/politics/caine-iran-hegseth-trump" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reportedly cautioned</a> before the strikes began &#8220;about the potential downsides of launching a major military operation targeting Iran&#8221;, citing &#8220;the scale, complexity and potential for US casualties of such a mission&#8221;, and asserting he was &#8220;​​unable to predict what the result of a regime change operation would be&#8221;. Both <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hylyslbfzx" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Iranians</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/04/us/politics/trump-iran-intelligence-leaders.html?unlocked_article_code=1.QlA.7mss.YU1d6D855xKr&amp;smid=url-share" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Americans</a> have already claimed to have received, and rejected, the other’s request for a ceasefire, with Israel <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/03/04/iran-netanyahu-trump-white-house-talks" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reportedly seeking assurances</a> Washington is not already seeking private talks. In any case, the Iranians have good cause to be wary of negotiating with Trump, given that their previous rounds of negotiations ended in American and Israeli bombing. Indeed, the current war began with <a href="https://x.com/DanDePetris/status/2028865436863943144?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Israel’s aerial assassination</a> of the country’s political leadership in the middle of negotiations which, the Trump administration later boasted, were merely a ruse. Some of America’s intended new rulers of Iran, <a href="https://x.com/atrupar/status/2028878021583679991?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Trump has claimed</a>, have already been killed by Israel. Having launched a war of choice, at a time convenient to him, Trump may now find ending it a far less simple affair.</p>
<p>As it stands, it is in Iran’s interest to drag out the war for as long as possible, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/03/world/europe/iran-war-strategy-trump-israel.html?smid=tw-share" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expanding it across the wider region</a>, increasing the economic disruption to American allies, and capitalizing on the widespread hostility to the war. As both Trump’s anti-interventionist base and the Democrat opposition rightly proclaim, this war has been entered into <a href="https://x.com/AFP/status/2028767350934110696?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">without any coherent plan</a>, seemingly through Israel’s <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/43292#:~:text=Christensen%20and%20Snyder%20(1990)%20argue,of%20either%20promises%20or%20interests." target="_blank" rel="noopener">chain-ganging</a> of the United States into military action it would not otherwise have chosen, an observation <a href="https://forward.com/opinion/809611/israel-marco-rubio-iran/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed as antisemitic</a> <a href="https://x.com/speechboy71/status/2028658188296278136?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">by Israel’s </a>advocates in the United States yet which has nevertheless also — bafflingly — been offered as proof of the war’s necessity by America’s<a href="https://x.com/Acyn/status/2028573242173366282?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Secretary of State Marco Rubio</a>, <a href="https://x.com/atrupar/status/2028600947048391131?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the House Speaker Mike Johnson</a>, Senate Intelligence Committee chair Tom Cotton, and most recently by <a href="https://x.com/atrupar/status/2029291321450545637?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Trump himself</a>.</p>
<p>As for Netanyahu, he exultantly <a href="https://x.com/ShadowofEzra/status/2028162845557297261?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claims</a> that bringing America into the war is something he has “yearned to do for 40 years”. The Democrats, <a href="https://x.com/The_NewArab/status/2028861670919995900?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">repeatedly briefing</a> <a href="https://x.com/lrozen/status/2029000306177056979?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the attack line</a> that Trump was “the first president stupid enough” to be cajoled by Netanyahu into war with Iran, have now been <a href="https://x.com/MarcoFoster_/status/2029227912264667381?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">gifted a path to success</a> in midterm elections which may yet overlap with the conflict itself. When as cynical a politician as Gavin Newsom feels safe <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/04/newsom-israel-apartheid-state-questions-future-military-support-00811441" target="_blank" rel="noopener">questioning</a> future military support to the “apartheid state” Israel, <a href="https://x.com/PamphletsY/status/2028590301393350948?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">demanding from the podium</a> “Why did we help Israel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/04/pete-hegseth-denies-responsibility-iran-school-strike" target="_blank" rel="noopener">kill little girls</a>?”, we see the cracks in America’s only true special relationship widening into a gulf. This war was, most probably, Netanyahu’s last chance to enlist the fading superpower against his decades-long foe. Whether it improves Israel’s long-term strategic position is <a href="https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2028619754135834853?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">doubtful in the extreme</a>  — but none of this is Britain’s problem.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/dangerous-martyrdom-of-khameini/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/dangerous-martyrdom-of-khameini/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2263951117-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/dangerous-martyrdom-of-khameini/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/dangerous-martyrdom-of-khameini/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The dangerous martyrdom of Khamenei</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/dangerous-martyrdom-of-khameini/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Arta Moeini </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It goes against instinct to praise the Prime Minister for his lawyerly prevarication. Yet given all the risks and uncertainties inherent to this war the arguments against joining America and Israel’s wild gamble are as strong as can be imagined. Just weeks ago, the same Trump administration which now chides us for our caution was threatening to annex European territory, and mocking our participation in its previous disastrous wars. Even if we exclude, as the Prime Minister does not, the moral factors, Starmer is entirely <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/starmer-pushes-against-uk-intervention-in-iran-war-without-lawful-basis-or-viable-plan-13515122" target="_blank" rel="noopener">correct</a> to say that this is a war with “no viable plan”. It appears that the Prime Minister, through his twin flaws of excessive deference to both European opinion and international law, may yet be dragged, unwillingly, towards the national interest. We already have our own war to worry about, in which the desire or <a href="https://x.com/lrozen/status/2029063521896464787?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ability</a> of the United States to negotiate a satisfactory conclusion looks as doubtful from London as Washington’s reliability as a negotiating partner must look from Moscow. American realists may be correct in stating that the Ukraine war, in which Britain is already dangerously over-exposed, is not a core Washington interest — but neither is Netanyahu’s latest war of choice a British or European interest. Simply put, there is no advantage for Britain in joining this distant conflict, and the national interest, as in the Gaza War of which this is a vast escalation, remains in <a href="https://thecritic.co.uk/the-case-against-war-in-iran/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">staying out of the affair </a>as far as possible.</p>
<p>It is absurd, then, to watch Reform politicians, so recently bemoaning Britain’s political enmeshment with distant Middle Eastern conflicts and diaspora grievances, <a href="https://x.com/TiceRichard/status/2028162877585072283?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">caper onstage</a> with Israeli and Iranian monarchist flags, demanding our involvement in this mess. Farage’s hiring as foreign policy adviser of the neoconservative lobbyist <a href="https://x.com/alanmendoza/status/2029305658403594486?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Alan Mendoza</a>, who has never <a href="https://thecritic.co.uk/reform-should-ignore-the-drums-of-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">yet seen</a> a disastrous war he did not wish to join, was a rare deviation from his sharp political instincts, and a warning of the major strategic risks inherent in a Reform government, however much their domestic agenda may appeal. The Greens will rightly benefit from this misstep, as will, on Reform’s Right, Restore, <a href="https://x.com/RestoreBritain_/status/2028514136678674889?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">edging towards</a> a Powellite <a href="https://x.com/Oli_RestoreWSM/status/2028543244238201280?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">indifference to distant wars</a>. If he holds his course, so will Starmer too.</p>
<p>The dilemma now for the Prime Minister is whether or not to join the emergent European policy of defensive neutrality, <a href="https://x.com/POLITICOEurope/status/2029523103726854558?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">protecting national and continental interests</a> while <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/us-strikes-on-iran-outside-international-law/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">refusing involvement in the wider campaign</a>. Yet the almost wholesale capture of the British security establishment by an Atlanticist ethos indistinguishable from vassalage, along with the <a href="https://x.com/TomCotterillX/status/2029197035203608920?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">looming American usage</a> of British bases for offensive purposes, will complicate this. Starmer initially <a href="https://x.com/clashreport/status/2028499157107822632?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">refused to permit offensive raids</a> to launch from British territory, a policy which, in Spain’s case, has seen Trump threaten to use its bases anyway. Such threats would appear less stark, no doubt, if Britain had not already placed the sovereignty of Diego Garcia under question, but we cannot all boast the strategic wisdom of David Lammy’s <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/chagos-islands-deal-trump-85kqgfgp3" target="_blank" rel="noopener">former</a> brain. If allowing British bases to be used cannot be prevented, Starmer can either explain why, or — politically more likely — spin a plausible rationale for active involvement, attempting to make a virtue out of compulsion.</p>
<p>Yet there is another path, the one shown by Emmanuel Macron, now expanding across the continent <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20260302-macron-outlines-french-nuclear-strategy-as-europe-negotiates-shifting-security-sands" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the French-led defense axis</a> initially trialed with Greece. At the same time, Macron is drawing a sharp dividing line between the interests of Europe and her many nation states, and of the erratic empire which alternately threatens and cajoles us. Seventy years ago, a misadventure in the Middle East saw Britain and France adopt opposing positions on American domination, which led us to this impasse. Through an accident of British politics, it falls to as unlikely a figure as Starmer to make just such another historic choice.</p>
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					<title>Revenge of the Kurds</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/03/revenge-of-the-kurds/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Regime change</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Three Peshmerga recruits of the PDKI pose for the camera while holding their AK-47s in Erbil, Iraq. (Credit: Keiwan Fatehi / Middle East Images via AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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										<pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 00:00:27 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 11:35:20 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurdistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Minorities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regime change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1051001</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Can they make a new Iran?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>All Iranians have good reason to fear death from above — but the country’s Kurdish opposition faces a more complex calculus. For if Israeli strikes are pummeling the Islamic Republic at large, leaders of the country’s Kurdish opposition parties must also contend with their own government, as their bunkers are targeted by regime missiles and drones. These Kurdish-Iranian forces could soon help build a new Iran — or face worsening violence as the Middle East is engulfed in a bloody regional war. “We have been preparing for this for almost five decades,” says a spokesperson for the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), speaking from a tunnel complex just across the Iraqi-Iranian border. “Our role is clear: to support and protect our people in the new Iran.”</p>
<p>To this end, a new big-tent grouping, known as the “Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan”, has united the PAK with other parties in the broader Kurdish-Iranian opposition. As Tehran smolders, that’s led to overtures from both Tel Aviv and Washington. Donald Trump has signaled his willingness to back armed factions on the ground in Iran, in <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-israel-us-strikes-2026/card/trump-open-to-supporting-armed-militias-in-iran-u-s-officials-say-nydkWoLgSs641jEV68Dg?gaa_at=eafs&amp;gaa_n=AWEtsqcj7kWXFN-srNMGKXYLDQC22sVeJGTlBdlXH9hDpePCxsWryG_KW0rAWO84l1Q%3D&amp;gaa_ts=69a71513&amp;gaa_sig=D97SYPNCO67SwnzeTxWiZ_axbAk77RuGufeGQVTyc_GmyFRE1j0JwgdRvQh1Ja9raGfG0vXQI5vZuje67kmauA%3D%3D" target="_blank" rel="noopener">comments with implications</a> for the Kurdish umbrella organization which is now Iran’s most numerous and combat-ready opposition force. But there’s still some way to go before these forces can challenge Tehran on the ground — while the Kurds know from bitter experience that their autonomy can easily be sacrificed at the altar of Western strategy.</p>
<p>Iran’s estimated seven to 15 million Kurds share deep links with the country’s Persian majority, including closely related languages, a shared cultural and mythic background, and dynastic ties stretching back millennia. Yet the Kurds have also suffered long-term repression under successive Iranian regimes — as suggested by the lack of clear census data.</p>
<p>Iran’s Kurds first declared autonomy back in 1946, but that Soviet-sponsored project was crushed by the regime of the young Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Western-backed Shah of Iran. Three decades later, Kurdish forces and protesters contributed to the nation-wide uprising which ousted the Shah in the 1979 revolution. But they were rapidly excluded as power centralized around the new Islamic order. A Kurdish bid for greater autonomy was bloodily crushed as over 1,000 Kurdish political activists were executed by the new regime, setting the scene for five more decades of repression.</p>
<p>Kurds have been systematically tortured, imprisoned and executed by the Iranian authorities, with Tehran hanging hundreds of Kurds in recent years. That’s amid a broader climate of cultural repression and economic exclusion. To eke out a living on the margins of Iranian society, thousands of Kurds have lost their lives working as illegal cross-border porters in the country’s rugged border regions.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-syria-break-its-sectarian-cycle/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-syria-break-its-sectarian-cycle/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-675002228.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-syria-break-its-sectarian-cycle/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-syria-break-its-sectarian-cycle/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Syria break its sectarian cycle?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/can-syria-break-its-sectarian-cycle/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Repression has also seen the development of a complex Kurdish opposition landscape. Iran’s short-lived 1946 Kurdish Republic was spearheaded by a traditional nationalist force called the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (KDP-I). Though it retains political cachet on the ground, its armed strength has dwindled in recent decades. Founded in 1991, by the scion of a well-known Iranian Kurdish militant dynasty, the smaller PAK was trained by the US and gained combat experience in the war against ISIS, but is largely reliant on its sponsors in Iraqi Kurdistan rather than an organic domestic base of support.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, other Kurdish regions in Turkey, Syria and Iraq have seen the rise of an alternative political project spearheaded by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which claims to reject Kurdish nationalism in pursuit of the novel goal of a region-wide democratic federation, marked by a prominent role for women. The PKK’s Iranian affiliate, PJAK, has been responsible for the bulk of attacks on Iranian forces in recent years, claiming to have killed hundreds during hit-and-run cross-border attacks, such as a 2018 raid that killed 10 Revolutionary Guards. Iran’s most effective opposition force, the PJAK can field an estimated 3,000 fighters, while drawing on the PKK’s broader network of well-trained, well-resourced militants.</p>
<p>All these forces have generally been pushed back into camps and tunnel complexes in neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan, limiting their ability to act on the ground. In 2022, Kurdish women were at the forefront of nation-wide protests after Jina Mahsa Amini, an Iranian Kurdish woman, was beaten to death by the morality police for an alleged hijab infringement. Yet though the demonstrations brought the PKK’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” slogan to the world’s attention, Iranian-Kurdish parties themselves kept a cautious distance, apparently assessing it was unlikely the popular rage could be translated into an organized opposition movement.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;These forces have generally been pushed back into camps and tunnel complexes in neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan, limiting their ability to act on the ground&#8221;</div>
<p>But following two years of Israeli attacks on Iranian assets across the Middle East, the balance of power has permanently shifted. This February, five of Iran’s leading opposition groupings put aside ideological and historic differences to form the new Coalition of Political Forces — just one week before the bombs began to fall on Tehran. In its first statement after the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Kurdish Coalition laid the blame for the conflict at Tehran’s door, <a href="https://www.theamargi.com/posts/in-their-first-statement-iranian-kurdish-alliance-signals-readiness-for-regime-change" target="_blank" rel="noopener">describing</a> a “domino effect” leading Iran towards its “most decisive days”.</p>
<p>Perhaps. For now, the Kurdish Coalition is yet to announce any intended or actual military operation on the ground. Rather, the Kurdish Coalition struck a cautious note, calling for defections from the armed forces, the protection of public and administrative institutions, and restraint as a potential new order takes shape. Significantly, the group’s statement sought to present the US-Israeli operation as targeting the Iranian regime rather than the Iranian people, claiming: “This war is not between Iranian society and [its constituent] peoples and the United States, Israel and the international community”.</p>
<p>But though hundreds of political leaders and combatants have been killed in the US-Israeli strikes, so too have hundreds of civilians, including a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1l7rvqq51eo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> 153 people in a strike on a girl’s school. Iranian military installations in the country’s western Kurdish regions have been first in the firing line, adding a fresh layer of terror and uncertainty to the experience of ordinary Iranian Kurds — even as Iranian Kurdish political detainees are reported to be escaping prison amid the chaos.</p>
<p>While making it clear that “we support the intense attacks of the US and Israel against the tyrant regime of Iran,” the PAK spokesperson stresses that “we haven’t been in touch with either Israel or the US”, a point <a href="https://thenewregion.com/posts/4680/exclusive-iran-s-kurdish-opposition-has-no-relationship-with-us-says-pjak-co-chair" target="_blank" rel="noopener">repeated</a> by the representatives of other, larger Iranian Kurdish opposition groups within the coalition. All the same, there were phone calls earlier this week between Donald Trump and the senior leadership of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region, while <a href="https://x.com/Rudawkurdish/status/2028906915103756693" target="_blank" rel="noopener">breaking reports</a> confirm Trump has indeed been in contact with the Iranian Kurdish leadership. “US interests differ from our own,” the PAK spokesperson tells me. “Sometimes they might align, and sometimes they might be perpendicular to one another.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Women-take-up-arms-in-Qamishlo-in-the-face-of-the-invasion-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West has abandoned the Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Reza Pahlavi, the son of the exiled Shah who styles himself Iran’s new leader-in-waiting, has shown himself hostile to his Kurdish rivals in the Iranian opposition, even as he makes use of the Kurdish “Women, Life, Freedom” slogan to lobby for US support. Pahlavi dismissed the Kurdish opposition as “separatists” and collaborators with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein just this week, in comments slammed by the new Coalition as “hysterical and hateful”.</p>
<p>In any case, rather than Pahlavi Jr swooping in to take the reins after a lifetime in luxurious exile, the more likely outcome appears to be a takeover by elements in the Iranian security apparatus more amenable to US interests. Any such rump state would itself rely on authoritarian measures and a reformulated nationalist ideology to secure a chaotic post-conflict Iran, meaning there would be little reason for the Kurds to expect better treatment than under the deposed Islamic regime.</p>
<p>Nor can the Kurds trust one another. Other Iranian Kurdish Leftist opposition groups remain outside the fold of the new Coalition. More significantly, the Iraqi Kurdish region, which has long housed the Iranian Kurdish opposition, itself maintains close ties with Turkey, and could be unwilling to antagonize Ankara by facilitating further Kurdish gains in Iran. Turkey itself may well enter the fray if Iran’s security apparatus crumbles further, deepening links with the country’s millions of Turkish-speaking Turkmen, and preventing any Kurdish gains on the ground as an absolute priority.</p>
<p>Whether the current regime stands, falls, or is reduced to a shadow of its former self, Kurdish civilians and political actors could be first in line for retributive violence. That’s what happened after 2025’s 12 Day War, when Kurds and other minorities were <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/middle-east-center/punishing-vulnerability-irans-minority-crackdown-after-the-12-day-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rounded up in their thousands</a> in apparent retribution for prior Israeli and US airstrikes. Trump and Netanyahu may well seek to make use of the Kurdish fight for self-determination on the battlefield, but this doesn’t mean they’ll guarantee Kurdish interests at the negotiation table. This long-term reality was made apparent once again in January when the US <a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pulled the rug out</a> from under their Syrian-Kurdish partners, exposing yet another set of Kurds to deadly, retributive violence by a centralized Islamist state.</p>
<p>For now, the Iranian Kurdish opposition forces remain pinned down in their bases by the Iraqi border, peppered by Iranian missiles as Tehran continues to take pot-shots at targets across the region. Locals describe mass electricity blackouts and panic as Iranian missiles soar overhead, while the PAK share images of Iranian munitions that have struck their mountain base. If they are able to overcome their internal differences and a hostile geopolitical environment to cross the border back into their homeland, these forces could see their numbers swell — as they give unified, armed, political voice to the long-overlooked grievances of millions of Iranian Kurds. But that won’t happen overnight. “This regime is still strong,” says the PAK spokesperson. “It can hold its breath for a long time.”</p>
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					<title>How the Ukraine war ends</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Can a transition to a genuine multipolar order occur without catastrophic confrontation?' (Drew Angerer/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 00:01:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 11:17:41 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1050298</guid>
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								<![CDATA[A multipolar world is coming]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Yesterday, Russia, Ukraine and the US met for yet another round of peace talks in Geneva. At around the same time, scores of missiles and hundreds of drones pummeled Ukrainian infrastructure, causing chaos across eight regions and injuring dozens of people. And, in a sense, both these events are connected: as the war in Eastern Europe enters its fifth year, a peaceful resolution seems no closer than it did a year ago, when Trump began his second term promising a swift end to the conflict. If anything, in fact, peace seems to be receding ever further from reach.</p>
<p>On the surface, the explanation appears straightforward: Russia and Ukraine remain deadlocked over territory. Moscow insists on full control of the eastern Donbas region — of which it holds only a portion — as well as of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. On both counts, Zelensky has refused to budge, despite Russia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwng25114ro" target="_blank" rel="noopener">relentless</a> attacks on Ukraine’s dwindling power grid.</p>
<p>But framing the impasse as a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia obscures a deeper reality: this has always been, at its core, a proxy war between Russia and the United States — one which can only be resolved through an agreement between the two powers. The Ukrainian military, after all, is effectively kept on life support by Washington, particularly through the satellite intelligence that has become indispensable to modern drone warfare. Both Moscow and Washington are aware of this, which is why over the past year they have repeatedly privileged bilateral talks from which Ukraine and Nato allies were excluded.</p>
<p>Last August’s summit between Putin and Trump in Anchorage marked the high point of the new US-Russia détente. It was the first face-to-face meeting between the US and Russian presidents since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, and the first such encounter on American soil in nearly two decades. The substance of the talks was never officially disclosed, but the symbolism was unmistakable. From the red-carpet welcome, to Trump calling Putin warmly by his first name, everything was choreographed to signal a turning point in relations, which, since 2022, had sunk to levels of hostility not seen since the Cold War.</p>
<p>Since then, Russian officials have frequently invoked the “spirit of Anchorage” to describe the framework of understanding purportedly reached between the two leaders. In practice, we can surmise that this sought to reconcile Trump’s transactional instincts, in the form of economic arrangements beneficial to US companies and Trump’s own prestige, with Putin’s insistence on the need to address the “primary roots of the conflict”: namely the need for a new security arrangement in Europe. This agreement, however, always rested on very shaky grounds, precisely because the two parties invested Anchorage with two very different meanings. From Moscow’s standpoint, what is at stake is nothing less than a fundamental renegotiation of the rules underpinning European and global security; Washington, by contrast, sees the matter in narrower terms: a specific conflict to be managed and contained, without disturbing the broader structure of international power that suits Washington just fine.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/gettyimages-1216662360-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Trump keeps Europe weak</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Russia has sought to manage this tension through what might be called a double-track approach. On the one hand, it has tasked Kirill Dmitriev — the Harvard-educated financier who heads Russia’s sovereign wealth fund — with negotiating a large-scale economic deal with the US. Meanwhile, senior diplomats, above all the veteran foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, have worked in parallel on the broader geopolitical settlement. This approach has so far failed to yield concrete results, prompting the diplomatic track to ratchet up its rhetorical pressure on Washington. The clearest sign of this came in a <a href="https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2078196/?lang=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent interview</a> in which Lavrov spoke of the Trump administration in unprecedentedly harsh terms.</p>
<p>Lavrov openly challenged the idea that the US is working towards the cooperative framework meant to emerge from the Anchorage talks. He claimed that Russia had accepted Washington’s proposals on resolving the war in Ukraine, only to find the US backing away from them in practice. “They made an offer, we agreed — the problem should have been resolved. Having accepted their proposals, we believed we had fulfilled the task of resolving the Ukrainian issue and could move on to full-scale, broad, mutually beneficial cooperation. But in practice everything looks the opposite”.</p>
<p>Lavrov accused the US of not only failing to take concrete steps to rein in Kyiv — most likely an implicit reference to Ukraine’s continued drone strikes on Russian territory, which could not be carried out without US intelligence and satellite support — but, more fundamentally, of actively intensifying its economic war on Moscow. He cited new sanctions, Washington’s campaign against Russian tankers in international waters, and efforts to pressure India and other partners into abandoning Russian oil. “This is pure ‘Bidenism’”, Lavrov remarked, offering it as proof that the US’s true objective remains that of “achieving economic domination”.</p>
<p>At the same time, Lavrov framed all this as part of a broader “neo-imperial” strategy on Washington’s part that extends well beyond Russia. “The West,” he said, “is reluctant to relinquish its formerly dominant positions… With the arrival of the Trump administration, this struggle to constrain competitors has become particularly obvious and explicit” — a reference to the White House’s hyper-bellicose posture over recent months, including the capture of Nicolás Maduro, the escalation of US <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/02/18/americas/cuba-us-trump-oil-tourism-intl-latam" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pressure</a> on Cuba, and the growing threats against Iran.</p>
<p>It remains unclear whether Lavrov’s remarks signal a genuine rift — within the Kremlin’s corridors of power and more broadly between Moscow and Washington — or whether they are simply a manifestation of the double-track approach: pairing backroom diplomacy with calculated public pressure. What is clear, though, is that the current deadlock is emboldening the more hawkish elements within the Russian security establishment.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The current deadlock is emboldening the more hawkish elements within the Russian security establishment.&#8221;</div>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://karaganov.ru/en/middlegame-and-a-strategy-for-the-day-after-tomorrow/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a>, Sergey Karaganov, who heads the influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy think tank, openly criticized the Kremlin’s “muffled responses to open aggression” by the West: especially the Europeans. Karaganov argues that Russia’s excessive restraint to date — its refusal to retaliate against Nato for Western-backed attacks on Russian territory, or to launch decapitation strikes against Kyiv’s political and military command centers — has in fact increased the risk of all-out war between Russia and Nato, by emboldening the West to keep escalating, in both practical and rhetorical terms.</p>
<p>Karaganov’s prescription is stark. Europe, he argues, is preparing for a future confrontation with Russia, and will likely deploy the reconstituted remnants of the Ukrainian army to prosecute it. The only way to stop this, in his view, is for Russia to demonstrate a genuine willingness to strike the command centers, infrastructure and military bases of those European countries most actively involved in operations against Russia. Should conventional strikes prove insufficient, he argues, Russia must be prepared to escalate to strategic nuclear weapons. His conclusion pulls no punches: “At present, [the Europeans] only give the appearance of fearing us, so as to build up their military strength. But they should <em>actually</em> fear us. They should be in terror of us. They should understand that escalating or even continuing the conflict risks their immediate physical destruction, and that a military buildup is pointless, as it will entail an obliterating nuclear response”.</p>
<p>One might dismiss this as mere sabre-rattling — and it is quite possible that such options would never be seriously entertained by the Kremlin — but the mere fact that these scenarios are being openly debated in Russia ought to send a shiver down the spine of every European. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Ukraine war, fringe ideas have a way of becoming mainstream when conflicts drag on and frustration mounts; the longer this one continues without end, the louder and more influential radical voices are likely to become.</p>
<p>There is, moreover, a deeper danger that operates independently of any deliberate choice Russia might make. By allowing tensions with Moscow to keep rising, we are constructing a situation whereby a single miscalculation — an errant strike, a misread signal, an escalatory move that spirals beyond anyone’s intentions — could set off a chain of events that no single actor would be able to arrest. How long, for instance, before the Russian Navy starts providing armed escorts to its oil fleets, and treating any seizure of its tankers as an act of war? Or taking similar action against Western tankers? The gravest wars in history have not always begun with conscious decisions; they have begun with incidents that spun out of control. That possibility grows more real with every week the conflict remains unresolved.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2254358804.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Europe ever wake up?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yet if that&#8217;s partly true of Russia itself — what with the hawkish language of its outriders, and its continued assaults on Ukrainian soil — European leaders appear reckless themselves. At the recent Munich Security Conference, the assembled Brussels elites and their attendant apparatchiks took turns stoking the drumbeat of war, ramping up their own hawkish rhetoric while offering little in the way of serious strategic reflection. <em>Politico</em> captured the prevailing mood with uncomfortable precision. “Western countries see World War III coming”, it <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/world-war-iii-defense-spending-europe-poll/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>, a headline that glossed over the inconvenient fact that many of those sounding the alarm are themselves among the most vigorous advocates for continued escalation. As Nato’s Secretary General Mark Rutte <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-mark-rutte-says-europe-must-prepare-for-scale-of-war-our-grandparents-endured/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recently</a> put it, Europeans “must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents and great-grandparents endured”. There is something deeply troubling about a European political class that cultivates war hysteria while remaining seemingly indifferent to where that hysteria might lead.</p>
<p>The situation is particularly disconcerting when set against the backdrop of Europe’s ongoing industrial decline. One might expect a weakening continent to seek accommodation and de-escalation; instead, European leaders continue to think in rigidly unipolar terms, dismissing Russia’s security concerns as illegitimate while remaining blind to the material reality of a world that is rapidly becoming multipolar — a shift that is already translating into Europe’s own economic and geopolitical marginalization. In this, however, they are simply mirroring Washington’s broader posture.</p>
<p>As the Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan recently <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/multipolar-delusion-mohan" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argued</a> in <em>Foreign Affairs</em>, we are living through a hybrid and deeply unstable geopolitical moment: one marked by growing multipolarity in economic terms, yet remaining largely unipolar in military terms, with the United States still uniquely capable of projecting force across the globe with impunity. The consequences of this asymmetry, Mohan suggests, have been paradoxical. Rather than ushering in a more balanced international order, the rise of economic multipolarity has, if anything, emboldened Washington to shed the constraints that once tempered its behavior and to project its power ever more aggressively — a dynamic that the Trump administration has made more explicit than ever.</p>
<p>This raises difficult questions. Can a world in which the US remains free to engage in repeated acts of military and economic aggression — unchecked by other powers — truly be called multipolar in any meaningful sense? And can a transition to a genuine multipolar order, one in which unrestrained US military primacy gives way to a world based on sovereign equality for all, occur without the world first passing through a period of acute and potentially catastrophic confrontation? These are not abstract theoretical puzzles. Given the trajectory of events in Ukraine and beyond, they are among the most urgent questions of our time.</p>
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					<title>Putin can’t survive without war</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Anniversary</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
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							<![CDATA[A Kremlin-approved Orthodox Christianity is bound up with worship of the fallen in past wars. (Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff / AFP via Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 24 Feb 2026 00:02:33 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 24 Feb 2026 09:06:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anniversary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1049810</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Death has become a political religion]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Final victory over Napoleon elevated the Russian Empire to the heart of European politics. Yet reformers were eager for more. How, they asked, could a depleted Russia, still utterly agrarian and with little culture of its own, build on its triumph and march into the future? The answer, in the short term anyway, was that it couldn’t. Following the botched Decemberist Revolt of 1825, the country returned to ideological rigidity. The new tsar, Nicholas I, embraced a reactionary doctrine: “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality”. In response, the philosopher Pyotr Chaadaev penned an excoriating criticism of his country and its politics. Signing his letter from “the Necropolis” — the city of the dead — Chaadaev suggested that the nation’s perpetual cycle of war, revolt, and repression had left it moribund. The author was promptly declared insane and placed under house arrest.</p>
<p>Two centuries on, Vladimir Putin has framed his crusade against Ukraine as the path to recovering Russian vitality once more. Putin has repeatedly invoked memories of the Westernizing 18th-century Tsar Peter the Great, and of the Soviet Union, to equate expansion with renewal — and war as a method of national rejuvenation. Through its battle against Ukraine, Putin promised, Russia would reshape the international order, overturn Western dominance, and forge itself as a stronger, more unified society. A new, vibrant Russia could emerge from a conflict in which its army has slaughtered thousands of Ukrainians and faced death and destruction itself.</p>
<p>For years, state propaganda has ceaselessly pushed this vision. Occupied cities such as Mariupol are <a href="https://zenodo.org/records/15714770" target="_blank" rel="noopener">presented</a> as showcases of a coming “new Russia”: rebuilt, modernized, and cleansed of European influence. A rash of new school textbooks describe a rising power reclaiming its historical destiny. Official imagery projects motion born of war: construction sites, patriotic festivals, soldiers as founders of a renewed nation. Even diplomatic theater — including the Russian media <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/russians-are-laughing-at-the-peace-talks/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reception</a> of Putin’s red-carpet welcome in Alaska — reinforces the impression of restored prestige, of a country returning to its rightful place at the center of global affairs. The war serves as the engine of historical revival; it is the catalyst for life renewed.</p>
<p>Exactly four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, of course, Russia’s war has failed. Endless casualties have bought barely a fifth of Ukrainian territory. The world has not reorganized itself around Russian power, while the promised internal renewal has failed to materialize. Behind the spectacle of official optimism, meanwhile, death has moved to the demographic, economic and cultural heart of public life. The mechanisms meant to restore national strength are instead consuming the human and institutional resources on which that strength depends. Russia’s leaders set out to escape the Necropolis. Now, though, the country is addicted to war, and entrenching itself as a land of the dead.</p>
<p>Wherever Russians live, death has found a burrow. Each month, some 30,000 new recruits depart from country towns and industrial outskirts, and another stream of wounded traipses back the other way. Official promises of rehabilitation, employment, and social prestige often dissolve into bureaucratic delay and indifference. Despite promises of grand new veteran support centers, <a href="https://dzen.ru/a/ZDQnzKwNOVL8fmgD" target="_blank" rel="noopener">complaints</a> rumble on social and even state media about the difficulty of actually accessing them. Still, the wounded are the lucky ones. As many as 325,000 soldiers have been killed since the full-scale invasion began. The life expectancy of a Russian soldier in some places may be as <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/stepnohirsk-zaporizhzhia-putin-russia-ukraine-war-tzjj6vqgz" target="_blank" rel="noopener">low</a> as 12 minutes. No major power has sustained losses on this scale in a single conflict since the Second World War, yet on and on the cycle of recruitment and casualty is repeated.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2213589148.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia’s veterans are bringing violence home</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The consequences are already visible far from the battlefield. Across provincial Russia, amputees hobble over icy streets; families reorganize themselves around absence; cemeteries spill over their old boundaries as the dead are put to rest. In one tiny village in far-flung Kamchatka, almost all the young men are gone: of 39 who <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce8n4l8elpgo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">signed</a> contracts to fight in Ukraine, 12 are missing or dead already. Life is more brutal in other ways too. Domestic violence is up and veterans, accustomed to the amorality of the front, have committed a spate of murders. Just this week Rustam Nogmov, a former soldier, was <a href="https://oc-media.org/ex-soldier-who-fought-in-ukraine-sentenced-for-brutal-nalchik-murder-of-elderly-woman/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">jailed</a> for the apparently motiveless murder of an 86-year-old woman.</p>
<p>Russia’s leadership makes no attempt to conceal this creeping presence of the funereal. A Kremlin-approved blend of Orthodox Christianity is today bound up with worship of the fallen from the Second World War and the casualties of the present struggle. Death in Ukraine, the Orthodox Patriarch Kirill has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-patriarch-kirill-dying-ukraine-sins/32052380.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a>, “washes away all sin.” Images of fallen soldiers proliferate across everyday space, as if imitating icons of Orthodox saints. Roadside billboards bear uniformed portraits; official websites praise the young dead; memorial plaques fixed to school walls hang over children who sit at “heroes’ desks” commemorating the dead. Enrolled in state-sponsored youth organizations that <a href="https://yandex.ru/images/search?from=tabbar&amp;img_url=https%3A%2F%2Fshkola52saratov-r64.gosweb.gosuslugi.ru%2Fnetcat_files%2F45%2F255%2FIMG_20230222_104752.jpg&amp;lr=10472&amp;pos=14&amp;rpt=simage&amp;text=%D1%8E%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%20%D0%B3%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%B2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">teach</a> military skills and the inevitability of battle, Russia’s youth are being fed into the same pipeline that is killing their elders.</p>
<p>Older Russians are roped in too. In carefully staged media stories, parents declare pride at their children’s death at the front. One mother from Stavropol <a href="https://stavropol.media/news/2300461/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> that, after her son died, she had dedicated herself even more fully to patriotic activities. “I focus,” she said, “on teaching lessons about bravery in schools, visiting museums, and attending exhibitions related to the special military operation.” The state’s commemorative machinery absorbs individual tragedies into a pantheon of sacrifice, where ordinary citizens, through death, can be elevated into symbols of national heroism — even as their living relatives are obliged to prostrate themselves before the very machinery that brought annihilation. The boundary between the living and the dead has begun to erode; participation in national life is parsed through the language of sacrifice and loss.</p>
<p>Thanks to the war, meanwhile, household finances across Russia’s shabby provinces now too contend with death. Enlistment, for all its risks, has become one of the few reliable paths to economic stability available to young men outside major cities. Recruitment bonuses, combat salaries, compensation payments to families of the dead — some of these bonuses, if the sometimes-reluctant state bothers to pay them, reach figures of $60,000 and more — have funneled vast sums into pockets after years of stagnation. Provincial towns that struggled to sustain small businesses now see <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/03/30/2025/ukraine-war-boosts-economies-of-russias-industrial-towns" target="_blank" rel="noopener">new</a> cafés, gyms, dog groomers, and other big-city amenities.</p>
<p>This influx of money creates the impression of renewal, but the new prosperity depends on citizens turning themselves into “human capital” out there on the western steppe. Without the war, there would be no boom. This is, as one analyst has put it, “<a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/papers/deathonomics-social-political-and-economic-costs-war-russia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">deathonomics</a>”. And where local economies go, so too the federal government has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-russian-economy-in-2025-between-stagnation-and-militarization/">created</a> a wartime overheating effect. Yet as the economist Alexandra Prokopenko starkly <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/02/16/russias-economy-has-entered-the-death-zone">put it,</a> the economy is destroying itself in its pursuit of war by “metabolizing its own muscle tissue.” Military expenditure absorbs an ever larger share of state resources, sustaining defense industries while weakening civilian sectors that depend on long-term investment. Factories linked to arms production operate at full capacity, but labor shortages intensify elsewhere as workers enlist, migrate, or are redirected toward wartime production. State spending — as much as 40% of it is now linked to the war effort — desperately prioritizes military needs over infrastructure, healthcare, and education, narrowing the foundations from which future development might come.</p>
<p>Output rises in sectors connected to the war effort, but the money is running out. All that is left is consuming more human capital — flesh-and-blood boys from Buryatia and Belgorod and Tatarstan. Skilled workers vanish from local economies. Younger cohorts face increasing incentives to exchange long-term prospects for short-term financial security at the front. Deprived regions in the provinces have become increasingly dependent on transfers that cannot exist without continued fighting: even as their men perish in the so-called “meat grinder,” the system demands ever more sacrifice. Economic stability begins to rely on conditions that steadily erode the society meant to benefit from it. And at the bottom of it all, “deathonomics” draws individuals into sacrificing themselves in the name of war.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Deathonomics draws individuals into sacrificing themselves in the name of war.&#8221;</div>
<p>Peace, under such circumstances, is all-but impossible. Demobilization would remove income streams that can sustain entire communities, while returning veterans would require medical care, employment, and social reintegration on a scale the state has rarely managed. Indeed, the history of Russia’s modern wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya suggests that this latest venture will not see troops integrated peacefully into society. Ending the conflict would expose weaknesses that wartime spending conceals — a paradox that the Kremlin has no plan to avoid. Death has not just become central to Russia as a visible category and a political religion. Today, it&#8217;s at the very heart of the Kremlin’s self-destructive economic program.</p>
<p>All the while, Russian culture, which has given birth to some of the greatest works in human history, has slipped into a coma. The Kremlin’s wars have often produced music and books of genuine import, their authors forcing Russians to confront what violence does to a society. Tolstoy’s early sketches from Sevastopol repudiated the bombastic heroism of official propaganda; Isaak Babel turned the Civil War into a record of cruelty, racism, and moral disintegration; Vasily Grossman produced the great tragedy of the Second World War in <em>Life and Fate.</em></p>
<p>Each of these works bears witness to the ways that leaders justify their wars through sacrifice — and how, for ordinary people, morality can be corrupted by the temptations of death. Yet this distinguished tradition of war writing depended on the ethical insights of an intelligentsia willing to frankly confront corrosive wartime violence. Today, though, Russia’s most popular and insightful artists have mostly <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/08/leaving-russia-four-artists-forced-into-exile-a81421" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fled</a> the country. Alla Pugacheva, perhaps the country’s most beloved singer and a familiar face for half a century, has been an outspoken critic from abroad, slamming the war as “terrible” and declaring that “to tell your homeland that it is wrong, that is patriotism”. But voices like these are barely heard in the motherland. Most of those that remain acquiesce to a state that now uses culture to promote its cult of death.</p>
<p>Russia in 2026 certainly doesn’t want for cultural production. Indeed, it produces a great deal. Unfortunately, what passes for culture here is increasingly administered with bureaucratic tedium. Patriotic grants, competitions, publishing initiatives, and a constant stream of “heroic” content optimized for online circulation — all comprises the most visible output. What the state’s organs desire, above all, are odes to soldiering and sacrifice. “Fan art” competitions and children’s poetry contests fill social media with images of soldiers in battle and death. Soldiers crop up on light entertainment shows on television. The state hands out <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/feb/22/russia-cultural-liberal-elite-putin">awards</a> to aging producers and writers who beat the drum of war most loudly.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2252159204.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What the Russians taught Epstein</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Seva Gunitsky</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A constant stream of identikit, state-funded (and mostly ignored) Second World War movies clog up movie theater screens. The greatest state praise today is reserved for the purveyors of so-called “Z Literature”: the war veterans who write of their own experiences in Ukraine, meditating as they go on the necessity of bloodshed in crude and gruesome doggerel. A line in a poem by Alexander Pelevin, a veteran in his thirties whose writing has been awarded and praised by state media, <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/9783032176851" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sums</a> up the genre: “‘Alive’ means only ‘not yet dead’. / I am the abyss; the one that reigns supreme.” Defined by the moment of death, the soldier’s life exists in limbo. He is morally empty — an abyss — yet by fighting and dying, he can become “supreme”. State commissions seek out such writers and lavish them with prizes.</p>
<p>But in a bitter twist, the state breaks even those it praises. Pelevin recently posted on Telegram about his own poverty: “Your Russian writer is broke, ruined, and in debt.” He begged for financial help from subscribers. The same state that fills public spaces with heroic portraits, sanctified language, and everyday rituals of death — this state struggles to provide stable support even for the poets who reinforce its narrative. Individuals, whether soldiers or writers, remain instruments in the hands of the state. Their cultural value lies only in what can be extracted from them: death.</p>
<p>The state insists that war generates new life. The longer the war continues, however, the more the Kremlin and society as a whole cannot escape its clutches without economic and social collapse. Yet all the while, the war itself is a burden, dragging Russia into an economic and cultural morass. This country stuck in its own moral stagnation, just like the Russia of the 1820s, is the inescapable necropolis of late Putinism.</p>
<p>A decade from now, Moscow may continue to glitter, sustained by media spectacle, distance from the front, and economic support from China. But elsewhere, the necropolis will surely have taken hold. Imagine a typical small town. The war memorial has been renovated again, its granite polished and its list of names extended. Across the street, the roof of the school — now named after a local dead military “hero” — still leaks. A café opened during the wartime boom stands all but abandoned, its prices beyond what most residents can afford. Recruitment notices take up space on a bulletin board alongside funeral announcements and pleas for money for wounded veterans. The faces of the dead look down from the local church. The living cling to the hopes of a new war to inject more money into their ailing town and empty bank accounts, even as they know it will take yet more sons and brothers from them. More war — more death — is the only way out of the catastrophe. In attempting to destroy Ukraine, Russia has not revived itself: it has turned itself into the land of the dead.</p>
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