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		<title>Military - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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					<title>Elegy for the Royal Navy</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/05/elegy-for-the-royal-navy/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/05/elegy-for-the-royal-navy/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Defense</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Peter Hitchens]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['In an era when soldiers were often despised, or even feared, sailors were not.' (Alkis Konstantinidis/Pool/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Peter Hitchens</strong> is a columnist for <em>The Mail on Sunday</em> and author of <em>A Revolution Betrayed</em>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ClarkeMicah</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a columnist for <em>The Mail on Sunday</em> and author of <em>A Revolution Betrayed</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 24 May 2026 23:03:17 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 25 May 2026 16:45:37 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cinema]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Royal Navy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Second World War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1060727</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Britain has gone down with its ships]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>I do not think there has ever been a naval dictatorship. Hungary’s Admiral Horthy, though a sort of dictator, lacked an actual navy, or even any sea, by the time he came to power. So he doesn’t count. Why might this be? Seamen tend to be wary of authority, unless it is wisely exercised. For they know a bad captain is more likely to kill them than to kill the enemy. And while warships may in theory be used to overawe civilian uprisings, this can only work in seaports and is rather hard to do even there. Winston Churchill parked the cruiser HMS Antrim in the Mersey in 1911, during a violent transport strike. The great ship lurked menacingly, but her guns remained silent. Ashore, by contrast, mounted soldiers opened fire on rioting crowds and killed two men.</p>
<p>The same Winston Churchill, always longing for a fight, and in love with Dreadnoughts, was probably involved in the crazy decision to send two giant battleships, HMS Barham and HMS Ramillies, to the same estuary during the General Strike of 1926. Again, they never actually did anything. Merseysiders are, I would guess, quite proud at having been taken so seriously, though there is no evidence that the tactic made any difference. One has to wonder what would have happened if their ships’ companies had been ordered to open fire on Liverpool. I guess it would have gone badly for whoever gave the order. The famous Kronstadt sailors, who helped out in Lenin and Trotsky’s Petrograd putsch of 1917, may have been fooled by the Bolsheviks at the start. But they rebelled against them in 1921 when they found out what Lenin was really like. And it was to Trotsky’s lasting shame and disgrace that he massacred them that March.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1060784" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1060784" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1060784 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="563" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg?resize=300,165 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg?resize=768,422 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg?resize=267,147 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg?resize=253,139 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg?resize=250,137 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg?resize=660,363 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-3335762-e1779454440603.jpg?resize=480,264 480w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1060784" class="wp-caption-text">Kronstadt sailors guarding a Petrograd palace in 1917. (Hulton Archive/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Our own Royal Navy is famous for its mutinies, in HMS Bounty in 1789, at Spithead and the Nore in 1797, and most recently at Invergordon in 1931. It is a curious organization, its hammocks once filled by the cruel Press Gangs kidnapping innocent men and forcing them to sea and possible death, its discipline for many years enforced by the cruel cat o’ nine tails and the occasional shooting of an admiral to encourage the others. But it stood between us and the world, without trying to take over the state, and it was very beautiful, and many of us loved it. In London and the big seaport cities, bluejackets in their Edwardian uniforms were still a common sight in my childhood. They were reassuring, not overbearing. Since 1901, when horses failed at the task, Navy men have pulled the gun carriage on which Royal coffins (and Churchill’s) have rested at state funerals, an extraordinarily moving sight. These were our defenders, upon whom, as Charles II’s Articles of War first proclaimed, “under the Good Providence of God, the safety, honor and welfare of this realm do chiefly depend.”</p>
<p>In an era when soldiers were often despised, or even feared, sailors were not. Think of Kipling’s 1890 poem “Tommy”, intended to change the drunken delinquent reputation of Queen Victoria’s redcoats:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px"><em>For it&#8217;s “Tommy this, an&#8217; Tommy that, an&#8217; Chuck him out, the brute!&#8221;</em><br />
<em>But it&#8217;s “Saviour of &#8216;is country&#8221; when the guns begin to shoot.</em></p>
<p>In George Orwell’s perfect novel <em>Coming Up for Air</em>, Edwardian civilians are appalled when a young man signs up for the Army: “‘Well now! Listed for a soldier! Just think of it! A fine young fellow like that!’ It just shocked them. Listening for a soldier, in their eyes, was the exact equivalent of a girl’s going on the streets.”</p>
<figure id="attachment_1060789" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1060789" style="width: 810px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1060789 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg" alt="" width="810" height="620" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg 810w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg?resize=300,230 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg?resize=768,588 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg?resize=267,204 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg?resize=253,194 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg?resize=250,191 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg?resize=660,505 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-1227159242-e1779455163231.jpg?resize=480,367 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 810px) 100vw, 810px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1060789" class="wp-caption-text">A contemporary cartoon celebrating Nelson&#8217;s victory at the Battle of the Nile. His triumph at Trafalgar guaranteed British prosperity throughout the 19th century. (Heritage Images/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>But sailors, possibly because they were at sea so much, were idealized as “hearts of oak” manning the wooden walls (and later the steel walls) of England. And the same was true for officers, credited above all with the great victory at Trafalgar in 1805, which secured national safety and prosperity for the rest of that century. They had a reputation for taciturnity and bluffness, which never does anyone any harm, and they often lived up to it. The fictional Jack Aubrey, in Patrick O’Brian’s witty and clever books about the Napoleonic wars, is a perfect rendering of this type. They tell terrible jokes. They don’t say much, just “Kiss me, Hardy” (Nelson as he died); “There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today, Chatfield” (Beatty at Jutland, as British warships repeatedly blew up under German fire); and “Continue to engage the enemy” (Warburton-Lee at Narvik, dying on his bridge after smashing up Hitler’s destroyer fleet and so making a cross-Channel invasion impossible).</p>
<p>And so the word “Navy” had, for many years, a useful commercial magic if you were selling something a bit manly and bluff, such as Navy Cut tobacco and Navy Rum, or even Senior Service cigarettes. But it did not have the yelling, martinet character of the Army. I have never yet seen a naval officer’s uniform that fits properly, and when sailors are marched aboard their ships (does this still happen?), the drill is far from pernickety. Close contact with the Navy — both my parents were in it, and so were most of their friends, some of my schoolteachers and many of the parents of my schoolfellows — revealed a dry, faintly sarcastic view of the outside world which had never been to sea. Even my mother, an ocean-going snob who would die of shame if she heard me use the word “toilet”, had mastered the sarcasm of the fleet. More than once I jumped with surprise when I heard her icily remarking about some inadequate if feeble attempt at recompense. “Well, that’s damned nice of him”, she’d say, which, for a Fifties married middle-class woman in a respectable suburb, was going it a bit.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1060785" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1060785" style="width: 640px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1060785 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg" alt="" width="640" height="401" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg 1720w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=300,188 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=768,481 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=1024,642 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=1536,963 1536w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=267,167 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=253,159 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=250,157 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=660,414 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=480,301 480w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-22-at-13.55.44.jpg?resize=800,500 800w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1060785" class="wp-caption-text">Like Captain Jack Aubrey, Royal Navy officers &#8216;had a reputation for taciturnity and bluffness&#8217;. (Master and Commander/IMDB)</figcaption></figure>
<p>This reputation was kept alive just a little longer by two films. The first, <em>The Cruel Sea</em>, is one of the best movies ever made and shows, among other things, how the spirit of the Navy, stretching back through centuries, embraces and takes hold of ordinary men and turns them into something very nearly heroic. The other,<em> In Which We Serve</em>, features a speech by Celia Johnson, playing a naval wife, and explains the privations of this role. It can reliably reduce me to tears, and not just because of the way she says “sloop”, so upper-middle-class that nobody could get away with it nowadays. During one scene, at a 1939 Christmas dinner, she is wearing a small brooch, in a shape worn by my mother and known to her as the “Crown of Neptune”.</p>
<p>Few will ever notice this, but the little shiny badge betokened membership of a secret society. It was a sign to other such navy wives of a great unknown sisterhood, familiar with the grim features of married quarters and rented lodgings in glum seaports or remote colonial stations, the endless disruption of life by emergencies and distant postings, the miserable pay, and the infuriating tussle with their great permanent love rivals: their husbands’ ships.<em> In Which We Serve</em> also features the glorious Navy Prayer, one of the Church of England’s “Forms of Prayer to Be Used At Sea”, written when the Navy was recognized as an indispensable part of the nation. It is a plea for a safe return from danger, and opens with the words, “O Eternal Lord God, who alone spreadest out the heavens, and rulest the raging of the sea, who hast compassed the waters with bounds until day and night come to an end…”</p>
<p>And this is one of the beauties of the Navy which once endeared it to so many. For it was beautiful. Great warships, which we no longer possess, are beautiful, as such engines of destruction should probably not be. The boxy, enclosed modern vessels of today’s piddling navies lack this magic, as do the two giant car parks we call aircraft carriers. But in the early Sixties, I couldn’t get from my home in the village of Alverstoke to Portsmouth without crossing the harbor by ferry, under the immense 15-inch guns of the last British battleship, HMS Vanguard. There is something uplifting and thrilling about great guns, and the swooping lines of the ship itself, 814 feet long, that expressed power as few other works of man can do. It made our hearts swell a bit, to know we possessed such an instrument. And many hearts, including my own, have shriveled, as that lovely fleet has melted away.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1060787" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1060787" style="width: 640px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1060787 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg" alt="" width="640" height="455" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg?resize=300,213 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg?resize=768,546 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg?resize=267,190 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg?resize=253,180 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg?resize=250,178 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg?resize=660,469 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-515513034.jpg?resize=480,341 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1060787" class="wp-caption-text">The big guns on HMS Vanguard. (Bettmann/Getty)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Of course, all this is also wrapped in England’s deep love of the sea. One sign of this can be found in Arthur Ransome’s books about children sailing in the Lake District. It is now impossible to imagine the hold these stories had on hundreds of thousands of English childhoods, lived far from the shore. Michael Frayn, who grew up in the Surrey suburbs, has confessed that he read them over and over again, and tried to write one of his own. Eventually, the children in the series escape from their lake and actually go to sea, in reality and in fantasy. Towards the end of <em>Peter Duck</em>, one of the strangest of these remarkable novels, the children sing their way up the Channel to the words of the sea shanty “Spanish Ladies”, a favorite of my naval father, marking the ancient landmarks known to homecoming Englishmen since the time of Grenville and Hawkins:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px"><em>And the First land we made, it is called the Dodman,</em><br />
<em>Next Rame Head off Plymouth, Start, Portland and Wight; </em><br />
<em>And we sailed by Beachy, </em><br />
<em>By Fairlight and Dungeness,</em><br />
<em>Until we brought to by the South Foreland Light. </em></p>
<p>Those who still savor the “inshore waters” part of the Shipping Forecast, as I do, were probably brought up in a maritime Britain, where there was still a bit of salt in everything and the sea was a friend and fortification, not, as it seems now, a door left wide open. Modern Britain is now so turned away from the sea that it brings to mind a passage in C.S.Lewis’s <em>Prince Caspian</em>, one of the Narnia books. The new rulers of Narnia fear the sea and what might come over it, and have deliberately allowed thick woods to grow along the coast. Lewis, who also grew up in more naval days, though he lived far from the sea, understood, like any British person of his time, that the ocean is a source of power and inspiration and a great highway to the world and all that is in it. But only if you have a Navy.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>Why Britain can’t rearm</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/04/what-the-anglo-gaullists-get-wrong/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/04/what-the-anglo-gaullists-get-wrong/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War economy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Jonny Ball]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Blue-34.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Keir Starmer speaks to soldiers at the RAF base in Cyprus. (Kirsty Wigglesworth/ Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DespoticInroad</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:03:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 08:07:53 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Starmer]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1054483</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Albion has lost its industrial base]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Sir John Bagot Glubb was a sturdy Lancastrian by birth — but, unsurprisingly for a soldier named “Glubb Pasha” by his men, you sensed his heart was in the desert. Leading the Arab Legion against Axis forces in Iraq, he then fought the Israelis in 1948. From there, he faced accusations that he was, in fact, the de facto ruler of the newly independent Kingdom of Jordan, leading to his dismissal by King Hussein, the latter forced to prove his seniority before the British imposter. By the late Forties, as the postwar order settled around new spheres of influence, Glubb put away his saber and took up his pen, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/260484?read-now=1&amp;seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents" target="_blank" rel="noopener">arguing</a> that since the US “hasn’t invited us to share her influence in Panama”, it would only be right to promote a British version of the “Monroe Doctrine in the Arab countries” — without any interference from Washington.</p>
<p>Such was the pre-Suez balance of power that these ideas were seriously entertained: not as idle reveries but as genuine strategic debates, with the outcomes backed up by the hard power of Britain’s military-industrial strength. Nor was this thinking the preserve of public-school soldiers and jingo adventurers; it was common in the Labour movement. Clement Attlee himself <a href="https://history.blog.gov.uk/2022/01/07/whats-the-context-the-decision-to-build-a-british-atomic-bomb-8-january-1947/#_edn1">remarked</a> that “we ought not to give the Americans the impression that we cannot get on without them”, while Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1948-01-22/debates/bec9601c-299e-4d5e-9875-6e97390226a9/ForeignAffairs" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> the Middle East a “lifeline” for the Commonwealth.</p>
<p>Today, such confidence has passed into history. The idea of a mighty Albion projecting her influence in the Gulf is laughable — whatever Donald Trump <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/donald-trump-oil-strait-of-hormuz-uk_uk_69cbab54e4b0763aa4f0652c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">might now</a> demand. Such is the state of our armed forces, indeed, that we are unable even to play the supplicant role afforded to us two decades ago during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Instead, Britain looks on in horror as Trump adds his own forever war to America’s growing list. Meanwhile, our prime minister makes a virtue of necessity. For once, his anti-interventionist position chimes with the public mood, even if it has been forced upon him by the ascendancy of Labour’s soft Left and the impotence of a mostly ship-free Royal Navy.</p>
<p>Common to many national disgraces, these embarrassments become an opportunity for a kind of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palingenetic_ultranationalism" target="_blank" rel="noopener">military palingenesis</a>: a rebirth of national prowess like a phoenix from the ashes. From the humiliations of the last decades, and with Britain confined to a spectator role as the “rules-based order” burns, a new political tendency is gaining popularity in the more intellectual corners of the Labour Party. A substratum of “Anglo-Gaullism” is now concentrated among the Left’s self-proclaimed realists, hawking a message of salvation-through-defense spending, with rearmament presented as a catalyst for national renewal.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/ed-miliband-patriot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/ed-miliband-patriot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-1715739302.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/ed-miliband-patriot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/ed-miliband-patriot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ed Miliband: patriot</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/ed-miliband-patriot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonny Ball</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Already last year, the government’s <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68bea3fc223d92d088f01d69/Defence_Industrial_Strategy_2025_-_Making_Defence_an_Engine_for_Growth.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Defense Industrial Strategy</a> promised military spending would become an “engine for growth”, creating a “strong industrial base” and a “defense dividend” for “every nation and region”. Starmerism’s media outriders <a href="https://futuresofwork.co.uk/2022/02/10/for-a-new-political-economy-of-defence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have demanded</a> a “new political economy of defense” that integrates “Labour’s goals of economic, social and climate justice”. A defense-industrial “securonomics” will, they claim, reindustrialize Britain’s left-behind regions. If Glubb Pasha’s British Monroe Doctrine is no longer available, at least the hardware of defense-industrial capability can be restored, not least as it offers the kind of secure manufacturing work that makes nostalgic Labourites dewy-eyed.</p>
<p>The Iran War has turbocharged this new thinking, which sees war-like preparedness as the panacea for a policy trilemma: the solution to low growth, persistent regional inequality, and our newfound irrelevance on the global stage. Learned essays in the <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2026/03/dont-let-britain-decline" target="_blank" rel="noopener">house journal</a> of Labourism have lamented the unsustainability of the welfare bill, while bemoaning a Treasury orthodoxy for which “reindustrialization through defense spending will never meet a value-for-money test”. The argument has found fertile ground among Blue Labour types, with Maurice Glasman <a href="https://observer.co.uk/news/politics/article/labours-trump-card" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declaring</a> upon the invasion of Ukraine that the return of war to Europe’s periphery “has given us the possibility of an industrial strategy”.</p>
<p>As far as it goes, this argument is appealingly simple. As the transatlantic alliance falters, now is the time to reallocate capital away from the benefits bill — and towards gleaming new arms factories, cyber war labs, drone swarms, frigates and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-space-commander-speech-on-defence-in-the-space-domain" target="_blank" rel="noopener">new domain</a> of space. The New Jerusalem, in short, will be built with a bomb factory in every drab provincial town.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The New Jerusalem will be built with a bomb factory in every drab provincial town.&#8221;</div>
<p>But the new military Keynesianism is based on a delusion. It refuses to confront the fact that defense spending is, in strictly economic terms, one of the very worst ways to promote broad industrial rejuvenation. The <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/false-promise-defence-prosperity#:~:text=Just%20as%20defence%20contracts%20are,education%2C%20healthcare%20or%20green%20energy." target="_blank" rel="noopener">growth multipliers are weak</a> and the long-term productivity gains are <a href="https://x.com/DEhnts/status/2036076593014002166" target="_blank" rel="noopener">non-existent</a>. Unlike, say, investment in large-scale capital projects, building things, creating new fixed assets in energy, transport or digital infrastructure, there’s little diffusion of defense spending through the wider economy. While the construction of new roads, power stations or tram networks might provide decades of cheaper inputs, rearmament has a severe opportunity cost. An arms factory might create demand for steel and provide jobs for workers in much the same way as a high-speed rail link — but the former produces few positive spillovers, while the latter can regenerate whole regions. Rather than building the lifeblood of work, jobs and economic activity for the next century, in short, this khaki-clad Keynesianism sacrifices domestic prosperity for a real or perceived threat from without, or else because of an illusory attachment to the idea of Britain as a “global player”.</p>
<p>In truth, building and maintaining a world-class military exists downstream of a serious level of industrial capacity that Britain now sorely lacks. In the days of Bevin and Glubb, Britain built <a href="https://www.regtransfers.co.uk/content/the-british-motor-industry" target="_blank" rel="noopener">over half the world’s</a> exported cars. Today it’s around <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/cars/reporter/gbr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">4%</a>. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the UK was second only to the US in its steel production. Today, it manufactures less than <a href="https://www.buymetalonline.co.uk/steel-industry-statistics/?srsltid=AfmBOop-UgKaFCe7kMSyVFXl9XPJXC6Ynh9chvQqtf-bi6qOERaho0Bm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Iran and Brazil</a>, not enough to satisfy <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/steel-strategy/the-uk-steel-strategy-web-version" target="_blank" rel="noopener">even half</a> our own national demand. For all Labour’s rhetoric about a manufacturing renaissance, we simply don’t have the basic foundations of a durable industrial ecosystem: steel production; petrochemicals; plastics and advanced materials; energy independence and abundance; and a self-reliant productive base that isn’t subject to the whims of international oil shocks or geopolitical wrangling.</p>
<p>Each, in turn, has been allowed to atrophy. Against this backdrop, the notion that Britain can will itself back into great-power status through defense investment alone is incoherent at best and fanciful at worst. You simply can’t build a credible military in an industrial void, and military spending is a terrible option for closing our yawning productivity gaps. If the opposite had been true, the Soviet Union would have been buoyed by the Politburo’s excessive commitment to the Cold War arms race — rather than brought low by system-wide sclerosis.</p>
<p>Bevin’s Britain was able to take a seat at the Potsdam conference as a global military superpower because postwar Britain was a great industrial exporter, not vice versa. Today, by contrast, we are a country disastrously unsuited to a deglobalizing, dog-eat-dog, protectionist age of competitive national production; a poor country by OECD standards, with Eastern European levels of GDP in some regions, but with a rich capital city that distorts our more dismal averages. If resilience is the watchword of our age, it is surely economic, not military, resilience that should take priority. This is a country facing its second major energy shock in less than a decade, and without any significant per-capita growth in the last two.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/can-keir-starmer-trust-his-generals/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/can-keir-starmer-trust-his-generals/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-74138045.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/can-keir-starmer-trust-his-generals/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/can-keir-starmer-trust-his-generals/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Keir Starmer trust his generals?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/can-keir-starmer-trust-his-generals/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Simon Akam</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Then arises the question of which war we are preparing for: a counter-insurgency; a neo-imperial intervention in the Gulf; a standoff with China in Taiwan; or a continental land war with Russia? Given the <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/127/public-accounts-committee/news/158463/mod-defence-equipment-systems-broken-and-repeatedly-wasting-billions-of-taxpayers-money/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">parlous state</a> of procurement at the Ministry of Defense, are we to spend billions building yet more faulty hardware? Will we make the common mistake of every general, fighting the last war, building old-fashioned ships that can be destroyed by a naval drone costing a few thousand dollars in an age of asymmetric warfare?</p>
<p>If the principal threat today comes from Putin’s revanchist nationalism, it will be up to the new military Keynesians to explain why Britain must stomach yet more years of belt-tightening to prepare for war with a country that has failed to occupy even the Russian-speaking territories of a poor, dysfunctional, non-Nato country in which many voters habitually plumped for Russophile oligarchs. Having turned its nation into a pariah, and almost suffering a palace coup after attacking perhaps the most propitious place on Earth for a Russian invasion, is the Kremlin really about to attack Nato? That uncertainty is shadowed by the societal challenge here at home. In the dilapidated high streets of Britain’s regions, it is doubtful whether a beleaguered public see our capacity for military deployment, let alone the protection of some far-off military base, as an urgent daily concern.</p>
<p>Rather than busying ourselves with the dead end of Gaullist posturing, in short, perhaps we should start thinking of ourselves as the developing country that, in many ways, we so obviously are. Certainly, financial analysts have already begun tempering their investments in Britain, a country now displaying the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/09/britain-is-becoming-an-emerging-market-country-analyst-says.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dysfunctional</a> features of an “emerging market”. Rather than Anglo-Gaullism, then, surely a far better model is Anglo-Dengism. Echoing the Chinese example, Britain today should look inwards, focus on problems closer to home, build, develop, reform, innovate, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_get_rich_is_glorious#:~:text=%22To%20get%20rich%20is%20glorious,and%20reform%20and%20opening%20up." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Make Britain Rich Again</a>, before finally concerning ourselves with the global status games beloved of men-of-a-certain-age who played too much Risk as a child.</p>
<p>As the pro-market reformers of the Chinese Communist Party understood, following the privations of three decades of peasant communism, to project yourself abroad, you must “hide your strength, bide your time”. Before sending aircraft carriers to reopen faraway straits or threatening foreign regime, we must first become a country capable of raising real wages and living standards for our own British citizens.</p>
<p>Ernest Bevin once demanded a nuclear bomb “with a bloody Union Jack on top of it!”. The Anglo-Gaullists fancy themselves his heirs. But Bevin — and Glubb before him — knew that power had to be consistently built at home before it could be brandished abroad. Today, we are attempting a reverse Bevin: indulging in a fantasy of power without the necessary foundations, painting the flag onto imaginary weapons we no longer have the means to sustain.</p>
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					<title>Xi Jinping’s private army</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/02/xi-jinpings-private-army/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/02/xi-jinpings-private-army/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>CCP</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rana Mitter and Chris Li]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[‘A new generation of generals is rising.’ (Jia Fangwen/VCG/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rana Mitter</strong> is S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations at Harvard Kennedy School and the author of <em>Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II </em>(2013) and <em>China’s Good War: How World War II is Shaping a New Nationalism </em>(2020). <strong>Chris Li</strong> is a Technology and Geopolitics Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations at Harvard Kennedy School and the author of <em>Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II </em>(2013) and <em>China’s Good War: How World War II is Shaping a New Nationalism </em>(2020). <strong>Chris Li</strong> is a Technology and Geopolitics Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 00:01:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 00:01:16 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1048683</guid>
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								<![CDATA[He has remade the Chinese military in his image]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Foreign analysts tend to watch China’s military reshuffles through a narrow lens. Every promotion or purge is scrutinized for signals about Taiwan or clues as to how China is modernizing its army. When senior generals fall, the instinctive conclusion is often that turmoil at the top must weaken China’s capacity for war, at least for a while.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>President Xi Jinping’s removal last month of General Zhang Youxia, until recently the most senior uniformed officer in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has been interpreted in precisely this way. Western commentators have described the move as destabilizing, even self-defeating — and in the short term, that judgment may be valid. Yet by focusing only on the immediate disruption, they risk missing the bigger story: Zhang’s fall marks not the unraveling of Xi’s control over the military, but his success in remaking it in his image.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The PLA has never been an apolitical military. From its foundation as the Red Army, it has always combined military tactics with extensive political indoctrination, deepened during formative events such as the Long March (1934-5). It remains, at its core, a Party army, embedded in the institutional structures, political norms, and — perhaps most importantly — ideological doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Power runs formally through Party mechanisms.</p>
<p>Yet the PLA has always had its own mythology. And for decades senior officers have enjoyed a level of discretion. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), generals, like other elites, had little room for maneuver, but that all changed when Deng Xiaoping set about modernizing the military in the Seventies. Military leaders were given more space to make their own choices about tactics and spending (which in turn led to increased corruption). Careers and promotions came to follow relatively conventional and foreseeable routes. Patronage mattered, but so did experience.</p>
<p>The new system left senior officers with a degree of institutional confidence and professional standing, which allowed them to inform and advise decisions made by the Party. The PLA’s leaders have as a result played a crucial role in developing China’s military strategy since the Nineties, a period that has seen its focus shift from land warfare to naval and air power.</p>
<p>After his rise to power in 2012, Xi Jinping moved fast to rein in military autonomy, becoming both the general secretary of the Party and the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). (The two roles are often but not always held together: a reminder that the CMC is a separate power base.) One of his first targets was General Xu Caihou, the former vice chairman of the CMC, who was arrested in 2014 on charges of massive corruption. Only his death from cancer in 2015 prevented him from being court-martialed. In the years since, Xi has sought to tighten his control over the armed forces. But, until now, there still seemed to be some officers who were untouchable.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/keir-starmer-cant-resist-beijing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/keir-starmer-cant-resist-beijing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2258620837.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/keir-starmer-cant-resist-beijing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/keir-starmer-cant-resist-beijing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Starmer&#039;s surrender to Beijing</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/keir-starmer-cant-resist-beijing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Zhang was one of them. As first vice chairman of the CMC, he sat at the apex of China’s armed forces, second only to Xi himself. He had been unscathed by earlier purges that toppled officers of similar rank, protected by longstanding family and personal ties; Zhang’s father served with Xi’s during the Chinese Civil War of the Forties, making both men “red aristocrats”. His reputation for competence and rare combat experience — he fought in China’s 1979 war with Vietnam — gave him unique authority. He was too big a figure to be felled in the name of party discipline, anti-corruption, or factional housekeeping.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Zhang stood strong while Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns uprooted the military system, demolishing entrenched networks and hollowing out senior ranks. Commanders have been investigated, removed or disappeared since 2012 at a rate unseen since the Cultural Revolution. Yet Zhang appeared to sit slightly outside this logic. Foreign observers often described him as one of the few officers who could speak frankly about readiness, logistics and the real costs of conflict. Former Pentagon official Drew Thompson, who <a href="https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-demise-of-zhang-youxia-hits-different" target="_blank" rel="noopener">met Zhang</a>, remarked on his seriousness, his detailed questioning, and his respect for professional expertise. “I assessed that Zhang Youxia’s combat experience, his self-confidence, intellect and lifelong commitment to the defense of China and the Communist Party would protect him,” he wrote on his Substack after the arrest. In an increasingly disciplined system, that combination of wartime credibility and personal influence gave Zhang the rare ability to say “no” — or at least “not yet”.</p>
<p>In another world, that arrangement might have faded away gently. Zhang might have retired quietly at the next Party Congress, or else seen his influence diluted as other figures around him were promoted. Instead, Xi ordered his public downfall. His message was unmistakable: no rank, relationship, or history protects an officer from scrutiny. Corruption, disloyalty and failure to uphold the Party’s authority over the military are existential threats — even if, in Zhang’s case, the basis for those charges is murky at best. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Chinese state media has framed the purge in unusually vitriolic moral and political terms, accusing General Zhang — as well as Chief of the Joint Staff General Liu Zhenli, who worked closely with him — of “undermining the Chairman’s authority”, “endangering the Party’s ruling foundation”, and “exerting vile influence on the Party”. Meanwhile it has exhorted the Party to “cleanse the institution of rot”, “eliminate ideological toxins”, and “promote organizational healing”. Translation: Zhang was not only corrupt but threatened the Party’s, and Xi’s, rule. As such, the Party needed to restore ideological discipline and reassert firm control over the armed forces. The implication is that Xi saw a generational reset of the military as unavoidable.</p>
<p>In the short term, this could all prove highly disruptive. A military leadership unsettled by investigations is unlikely to launch the most complex military operation in its history, which an assault on Taiwan would certainly be. Major campaigns require trust up and down the chain of command, confidence in delegation, and officers willing to exercise rapid judgments under pressure and amid uncertainty. These conditions are difficult to sustain when senior officers are acutely aware that missteps — especially political ones — carry heavy consequences.</p>
<p>But if Zhang’s downfall is the coup de grâce to the old order in the PLA, then the question is: what replaces it? It won’t be a vacuum. A new generation of generals is already rising. They have come up through an era of reform and modernization, with joint theater commands, new war‑fighting doctrines and a far more capable arsenal than their predecessors ever had. They have also spent their careers under Xi’s political campaign of “self‑rectification”, in which internal discipline is constant and the safest way to get promoted is to avoid standing out. For them, the lesson of Zhang’s downfall will be clear: personal advancement depends not just on competence, but on never looking like an independent pole of authority.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A new generation of generals is already rising.&#8221;</div>
<p>This is less about ideology than incentives. Officers who are conditioned in this environment are likely to be intensely attentive to the preferences of the Party center and acutely aware of the personal risks of deviation. So when the Party’s small civilian circle reaches a decision, there will be fewer internal brakes, a smaller chorus of voices with the confidence or legitimacy to push back. A system that constantly tests loyalty tends, over time, to narrow the range of views that ever reach the top.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Systems built around discipline often hesitate in ambiguous situations, which can itself be dangerous when ships and aircraft are operating at close quarters. Yet once a clear order is given, those same systems can move with disturbing speed, because dissent has been driven out in advance. The danger, in other words, may lie less in deliberate aggression tomorrow than in miscalculation later, when decisions are made by a tighter circle who succumb to groupthink.</p>
<p>Seen in that light, Taiwan is part of the story but not its whole. Many Western military analysts have posited that China wants to be ready for a military capture of Taiwan by 2027, although that doesn’t mean this will happen. Over the next year or two, turmoil at the top of the PLA will probably lower the appetite for a high‑risk assault across the Strait. By the early 2030s, however, a reconstituted high command — greener in combat experience but fully socialized into Xi’s remade system — could make the region more volatile. A leadership that believes it finally has “its own” military, and faces fewer internal doubts, may calculate risk differently.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the global zeitgeist is changing. Gone is the old language of the “rules‑based order”; today, large powers talk more about spheres of influence and less about restraint. In Washington, President Donald Trump has embraced a more transactional view of raw power, codified in a National Security Strategy that treats dominance by the “larger, richer, stronger” as a “timeless truth” of geopolitics, and as a simple fact of life. The United States should not be surprised, then, if China comes to a similar conclusion. Social Darwinism was central to the thinking of China’s 20th-century elites, and their successors have not forgotten it.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>A fully Xi‑controlled PLA, operating in this cutthroat new world, may reduce the risk of an overeager wayward general — perhaps raised in the spirit of the Wolf Warrior diplomats — dragging China into a conflict Xi doesn’t want. But it also increases the risk that, in the event that the civilian leadership is inching toward using force — over Taiwan, in the South China Sea, or in a crisis we have not yet foreseen — there will be fewer people in the room with the standing to say that the costs are too high.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Mao Zedong said that the Party must always control the gun. For over a decade, President Xi has sought to do just that. He may finally have succeeded.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
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					<title>Will Putin call Nato’s bluff?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/09/will-putin-call-natos-bluff/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/09/will-putin-call-natos-bluff/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Rearmament</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[He doesn't seem worried. Sasha Mordovets/Getty Images. ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2025 23:03:57 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 26 Sep 2025 11:24:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conscription]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1029938</guid>
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								<![CDATA[European militaries are a paper tiger]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“Paper tiger”. That is how Donald Trump described Russia during his UN speech on Tuesday, but judging by their performance, that put-down could equally be applied to most of America’s own allies. That became clear enough earlier this month, when 21 Russian drones flew into Polish airspace, triggering a Nato air-intrusion alert, the closure of Polish airports, the scrambling of fighters to intercept them — and a hard look at combat readiness right across the alliance.</p>
<p>Dutch F-35 fighters bagged four of the drones, and the others went down by themselves: they were not bombardment drones, just plastic decoys without explosive warheads. Debris aside, in fact, the only damage was the destruction of a house near Lublin, caused not by the Russians, but by a sophisticated $1.9 million US air-to-air missile. It had been launched by a Polish F-16 fighter at a drone — and missed.</p>
<p>Poland’s prime minister, Donald Tusk, was quick to use the Russian incursion to call for more defense spending, urging Nato members to spend 5% of their GDPs on defense. This week’s latest apparent drone incursion, this time over Denmark, has raised the pressure even further: especially now that Scott Bessant, the US Secretary of the Treasury, is warning that Trump has no plans to send more troops to help out his European allies.</p>
<p>But simply raising defense spending will not turn Europe’s states into genuinely effective military powers. For one thing, the GDP criterion is much too vague to mean much. Finland, for instance, spends only 2.4% of its GDP on defense and yet can mobilize some 250,000 determined soldiers. Other Nato members, which spend much more than the Finns, obtain far less for their money.</p>
<p>Moreover, focusing on GDP instead of force requirements — so many battalions, artillery regiments, fighter squadrons — is nothing but an invitation to cheat, an opportunity lustily taken up across the continent. The latest Spanish submarine, for instance, is not imported for €1 billion or so from Thyssen-Krupp, which supplies navies around the world with competent, well-proven submarines. Instead, it was proudly designed and built at the Navantia state-owned Spanish shipyard: for €3.8 billion, roughly the cost of a much bigger French nuclear-powered submarine. As a feeble justification for that absurdly high cost, Spain&#8217;s defense minister cited a supposedly advanced air-recirculation system — so greatly advanced, in fact, that it is not actually ready, and will not be installed even in the submarine’s next iteration.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2199580218.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe needs a new Great Power</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Soon, though, Italy will outdo Spain&#8217;s platinum submarine: by including a new bridge to Sicily, set to cost some €13.5 billion, into its 2% of GDP Nato spending quota. The government’s excuse is that some 3,000 Italian troops may need to cross the Strait of Messina were the Italian army ever to be fully mobilized. But it would be much cheaper to fly them individually, each trooper in his own luxurious private jet. Even without the bridge, meanwhile, Italy’s cheating on the 2% target is bad enough. Most notably, much of the Italian Navy’s spending goes towards warships made by Italy<span style="font-weight: 400;">’</span>s state-owned Fincantieri shipyard. But there is not enough money for the fuel and maintenance expenses to operate more than half of them, meaning another industrial subsidy is camouflaged as defense spending. All the while, Italy refuses to increase its defense budget beyond the very modest target of 2% — which it has yet to meet.</p>
<p>As for Germany, three and half years since the start of the Ukraine war, with ever more ambitious rearmament plans loudly promised, the total number of personnel in uniform has actually slightly decreased. And, aside from beginning a multi-billion euro purchase on an Israeli missile-defense system, nothing much has happened. Despite its high demand in Ukraine, even the battle tank, that German specialty, is being produced in very, very small numbers: so low that the annual output could be lost in a morning of combat. In May 2023, indeed, a meager 18 Leopard tanks were ordered to replace older models lost in Ukraine. The expected delivery date? Between 2025 and 2026! Then, in July, Germany purchased a further 105 advanced Leopard 2A8s. That is the number needed to equip a single brigade, the German force stationed in Lithuania — and they are expected to arrive in 2030!</p>
<p>The sad truth, then, is that Germany has yet to start working in earnest to correct the extreme neglect inflicted on its armed forces during the long Merkel premiership, when she kept saying that “even if we had the money we would not know how to spend it”. All the while, German helicopters lacked rotors and tanks lacked engines. The exceedingly slow recovery of the German army is especially frustrating because Nato is not actually short of air or naval forces. What it lacks are ground forces, soldiers more simply, or rather soldiers actually willing to fight. Having added Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the alliance, tiny countries with outsized defense needs, the alliance faces a severe troop deficit across the entire Baltic sector. The troops so far sent by Nato allies, such as visiting Alpini battalions from Italy, cannot improve the maths.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The sad truth is that Germany has yet to start working in earnest to correct the extreme neglect inflicted on its armed forces during the long Merkel premiership&#8221;</div>
<p>With its 38 million inhabitants, Poland could certainly raise an adequate army to defend its two borders with Russian Kaliningrad and Russian-dominated Belarus. But its governments have persistently chosen not to do so, rejecting conscription followed by reserve service along Finnish or Israeli lines. In November 2021, just four months before Ukraine&#8217;s invasion but with every sign that Russia was on the move, Poland had just 42,000 combat-ready soldiers. That is more or less the right number for a country of 38 million — if, that is, Poland were located somewhere between Fiji and Tonga.</p>
<p>And now, even after the drone attack, Prime Minister Tusk still refuses conscription, the only way to generate the large forces Poland needs to defend two fronts. The official explanation is that conscription under communism subjected 18-year-old recruits to humiliation rituals, which all too often slid into torture and even rape. Those are practices which the Poles like to explain are caused by the infiltration of the Red Army&#8217;s notorious “<em>dedovshchina”</em> (“reign of old-timers”) system of abuse by older soldiers. But the reputation of Poland’s pre-communist army was no better here, and indeed for Belorussian, Jewish and Ukrainian conscripts things could be much worse.</p>
<p>The truth, then, is simpler: Polish youth are just as post-heroic as their peers across Europe. Unlike their predecessors, they do not feel the urge to prove themselves in combat, let alone to serve as long as it takes to defend their countries. The many young Ukrainians in Poland, who fled their own country to avoid being conscripted to defend it, do nothing to induce patriotic attitudes. Nor does it help that Warsaw constantly talks up the few thousand US combat soldiers foolishly deployed in Poland. As Bessant’s latest comments imply, this is a force that will be evacuated rather than reinforced if there is a major Russian offensive, but which now induces young Poles to say that if <span style="font-weight: 400;">“</span>Nato<span style="font-weight: 400;">”</span> wants more troops, let them send more Americans.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-73737298.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West can beat the rest</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In Britain, for its part, the post-heroic refusal is irrelevant. His Majesty has only 73,847 full-time soldiers at his disposal, most of whom are recruited from the small subset of British families with strong military traditions. Foreign recruits with similar backgrounds make up the remainder, most notably the 4,127 Gurkhas, but also some from Fiji. The French Foreign Legion has fewer than 9,000 soldiers — self-selected aspiring warriors from everywhere, and whose French officers are just as atypical. But the rest of the French Army is so far gone that even among the 11,000 supposedly elite Troupes de Marine, less than half are willing and able to fight.</p>
<p>As for the other European armies, the less said the better. The Danes and Swedes announced with great fanfare that they were joining Finland in introducing conscription: only to accommodate so many demands for exemptions that in 2024 they enrolled some 10,000 troops between them, as compared to 77,000 Finns 18 year olds drawn from a far smaller population. The Belgians and Dutch, who used to provide three armored divisions to Nato, might now field a tenth of that: a mere three battalions. The Italian, Spanish, Portuguese armies do not even train in earnest anymore. Their exercises are bored drills, their maneuvers theatrical displays scripted to look good, instead of being deliberately disrupted by supervisors to test the mental and physical agility of officers and men as in real maneuvers. As total numbers shrink, moreover, those armies did not reduce the number of officers anywhere near proportionately, meaning many Nato armies have plenty of generals but very few combat-ready troops for them to lead.</p>
<p>All of the above explains why Putin<span style="font-weight: 400;">’</span>s motley army — home-grown mercenaries from Russia’s poorest backwaters, convicted criminals and North Korean slave soldiers — can nevertheless frighten European governments into rearming at great expense. As for Donald Tusk and his Poles — they would do well to learn the lessons of another Russian incursion in September. Not in 2025, but in 1939, when the French army did not move, and the Royal Air Force did not bomb. The difference now, of course, is that Poland really could defend itself, if it emulated the Finns across the Baltic and conscripted 18-year-olds, while continuing to add trained soldiers to its reserve units. Fail, however, and Putin will only keep pushing.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1029938</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>How the West can beat the rest</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-73737298.jpg?w=523</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Battle Plan</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Less talk, more action. Tom Stoddart/Getty Images. ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 23:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 23:03:43 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restofworld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=690958</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Armies must learn from their mistakes]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Why did so many insist that regime change <em>had</em> to be the aim of any war against Iran? They paid no attention when Washington and Jerusalem both denied any intention of trying to change Iran’s government — and some persisted in pointing out the severe pitfalls of “regime change” even after Trump’s ceasefire order had abruptly ended the fighting.</p>
<p>The answer is not that complicated: the naysayers desperately longed for an Israeli defeat. Some, including Tucker Carlson, even wanted an American defeat, a thing only possible if either Trump or Netanyahu had been foolish enough to send an army all the way to Tehran through a vast country 80 times the size of Israel. The overlooked implication is that, absent a lunatic attempt at regime change by ground invasion, Iran’s defeat had to be a foregone conclusion: Israel is a very modern Western state, whereas Iran is only a superficially modernized theocracy.</p>
<p>For a generation brought up on “post-colonial” grievance studies, taught to despise and revile the Europeans who set out in their fragile little ships to conquer the world, it is distressing to think that so little has changed when it comes to the balance of military strength. Hating the West as they do, especially “settler” states like Australia, Canada, the US and more loudly Israel, they want to see their homelands humiliated.</p>
<p>But everybody now understands that Israel controlled the skies over Iran for just as long as it wanted, even though it did not have even a single long-range combat aircraft nor adequate refueling tankers. Rather, it simply had a Western air force. In practice, that means its pilots and commanders are not mere chancers, but rather earnest professionals who accept the limitations of their equipment and strive to overcome them — for example with unique air-launched ballistic missiles used as range extenders.</p>
<p>The essential Western quality that wins wars is the willingness to acknowledge errors and defeats, and so avoid repeating them. Hezbollah’s now-dead founder Hassan Nasrallah openly admired Israel’s investigative report on the 2006 war he himself had started, a report which respected no military secrets nor reputations in harshly criticizing both Israel’s prime minister and his military chief. Both subsequently resigned for the conduct of the war.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1245740406.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How rearmament can make us rich</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Given the surprise October 7 attacks, which cost the lives of so many, there will no doubt be many uncomfortable revelations this time too. Together, they will most certainly end Netanyahu’s political career, in spite of his undeniably victorious strategy, if only because of his inherent and undeniable prime-ministerial responsibility. Nor should he be surprised: after the 1973 war, which also started with a surprise attack, this time on the Suez Canal, it was Prime Minister Golda Meir who had to resign and leave politics, despite having just led her country to victory against Egypt and Syria.</p>
<p>By contrast, Ayatollah Khamenei opened his first post-combat speech by warmly congratulating the people of Iran on their “very great” victory and the brilliant successes of their armed forces, including their magnificent “True Promise IIII” missile offensive. Perhaps readers of the <em>Tehran Times</em>, who had just seen major buildings in their own city reduced to ruins, were consoled by reading that Iran’s formidable missiles had ravaged both Haifa and Tel Aviv. More emphatically, they are told that Iran’s missiles destroyed Israel’s ministry of defense in the heart of Tel Aviv, and the Mossad headquarters just north of the city, both of which passing Israeli commuters can still see are perfectly intact every day.</p>
<p>Unmentioned in Iran’s media was the very prudent conduct of the country’s pilots: not one dared challenge the Israeli aircraft overhead. That is unfortunate, for though their planes are certainly outdated, a dogfight could have ensured the IDF pilots ran out of fuel before they could return to base.</p>
<p>Nor is this an exclusively Middle Eastern problem. Neither India nor Pakistan has acknowledged its air combat losses in the fighting of two months ago. On the contrary, each side has proudly recounted how many enemy fighters its brave pilots shot down, even as their respective medias have duly broadcast fantasy videos of great victories.</p>
<p>That inevitably means that errors are never exposed nor corrected, even as the malpractice of strictly-by-the-book routine drills, instead of real combat training, continues unabated. This is hardly a new phenomenon. A Pakistani pilot who flew with the Jordanian air force as far back as the Six-Day War is still a celebrated ace in local media. Even now, it breathlessly recounts how terrorized Israeli pilots could not survive his deadly shooting — even as the historical record shows that Jordan lost every one of its combat aircraft on the very first day of fighting.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Errors are never exposed nor corrected&#8221;</div>
<p>To be sure, neither the West nor the rest is homogenous. When it comes to military professionalism and truth-telling, Japan was certainly a Western power by 1905 when it defeated the Russians in the Far East. Even ten years earlier, in fact, Japan’s fleet of older and smaller vessels had already defeated China’s modernized navy of European-built ships. By contrast, there are, and have always been, European military forces that can neither fight in earnest nor acknowledge their crippling deficiencies in combat morale and leadership.</p>
<p>In recent years, some of their troops have even managed to participate in the occupations of both Afghanistan and Iraq — without achieving anything, of course, but without being found out either. The US officers in charge did their part by assigning their allies to the least dangerous areas, but they themselves came up with their own creative remedies, including paying the enemy to allow them to pretend-patrol without being attacked. US and British officers higher up the chain of command were happy to indulge these tricks, studiously avoiding any inquiries that might have uncovered the truth.</p>
<p>The Biden administration did the same thing when Houthi attacks in the Red Sea disrupted global commerce. Though the Mediterranean ports in France, Italy and Spain were severely impacted, the three countries refused to intervene. Nevertheless, Biden dutifully sent the US Navy to join British warships in fighting the Houthis, while RAF aircraft flying out of Cyprus bombed Yemen too. Their French, Italian and Spanish allies, however, were nowhere to be seen, despite the fact that defeating the Houthis should have been a strategic priority for them.</p>
<p>But when Trump found out that the Mediterranean navies were entirely absent from the fight — despite boasting hundreds of combat vessels, including aircraft carriers — he abruptly ordered the US Navy to withdraw completely. With each US missile sent against the cheap drones and missiles of the Houthis costing $2.5 million, the White House refused to follow Biden in defending European economic interests without even asking them to join the fight. And, yes, there is a European Union naval mission. But its two small vessels are prohibited from cooperating with US or British forces, and are very carefully stay out of trouble in the upper Red Sea — ultimately achieving nothing.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2199580218.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe needs a new Great Power</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>China, of course, is the great unknown when it comes to combat. The country’s vast accomplishments of the past two millennia, in every realm of human creativity, were accompanied by an unending series of defeats at the hand of grossly outnumbered invaders, well documented since the Xiongnu of the 2nd century BC. Things continued like that until 1945, when the badly outnumbered Japanese troops who garrisoned much of the country could not be dislodged by either Nationalist or Communist troops, in spite of the ever-diminishing supplies they received from Japan under bombardment. Nor could the Chinese prevail against Vietnam in 1979, when they tried and failed to protect their Khmer Rouge allies in Cambodia from Vietnam’s advancing troops.</p>
<p>After failing to advance, and suffering some 26,000 dead, the People’s Liberation Army simply withdrew, abandoning the Khmer Rouge to its fate. Since then, China has become far richer, acquiring much more advanced weaponry in every category. But it is still unknown if Chinese units will actually fight. This is especially given the legacy of the one-child policy — now abrogated, but whose effects will linger for two decades — which means that every soldier is the only child of two whole families: both of which will be extinguished on his death.</p>
<p>Xi Jinping likes military parades and greatly celebrated Colonel Qui Faobao, who started the June 2020 fight with Indian troops up at the Galwan river in remotest Ladakh. But no army composed of single sons has ever fought in history, and the death of four Chinese soldiers at Galwan remained undisclosed for eight months, while the CCP made extraordinarily elaborate preparations to soften the blow once the announcement was made. And if there is even a minor clash over Taiwan, it is unlikely that only four will die.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">690958</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Trump’s military takeover</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/06/trumps-military-takeover/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/06/trumps-military-takeover/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-632865944.jpg?w=541</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Birthday Parade</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malcom Kyeyune]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Thumbnail-Example-1-1.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malcom Kyeyune</strong> is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 12 Jun 2025 23:01:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 13 Jun 2025 05:45:13 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Republic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ice]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LA Riots]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=684072</guid>
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								<![CDATA[His politicized army is un-American]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>24 October 1789 could have been the most extravagant day of George Washington’s career. The hero of the American Revolution entered free Boston on the back of a handsome white horse. But as it turned out, that was the only hint of glamour the new commander-in-chief allowed himself. Rejecting the pomp and circumstance of Old World kings, and the parades, feasts and fireworks his young country was keen to bestow, America’s first president instead entered Boston in plain civilian dress — even refusing to review the militia he once led.</p>
<p>This weekend, the city that bears George Washington’s name will witness something different. On Saturday, Donald Trump will oversee a large military parade through the streets of DC, commemorating both the 250th birthday of the US Army and the 79th of Trump himself. The spectacle isn’t entirely unprecedented — the end of the Gulf War also saw an ostentatious military parade through the streets of the US capital. Yet, as the comparison with the 18th century implies, it is not exactly central to the American tradition either.</p>
<p>No wonder, then, that the parade, with its thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks and aircraft, is causing a noticeable sense of unease in America — not least because it is unclear exactly what it is meant to celebrate. If there is anything central to the self-conception of the military, after all, it is that it is different and better compared to the rest of the world, an institution that stands above and apart from the rest of society. Large military parades to celebrate the birthday of the Dear Leader are fairly common elsewhere, but never in the land of the free. Now, though, those old republican certainties are slipping away, implying a military that’s less the guardian of liberty and more the tool of a coercive state. Dovetailed by Trump’s actions elsewhere, notably around deploying the National Guard in California, and the United States suddenly feels very far from Washington’s ideal.</p>
<p>It’s easy to attack Trump’s parade on practical grounds. After all, it comes at a moment where America’s finances are a mess, and the military itself is declining. The Navy recently announced that it is scaling back plans to purchase new ships, cutting its shipbuilding budget for the coming years by nearly half. The hope is that Congress will find supplementary money somewhere to make up for these cuts, but it’s a signal that things are still going in the wrong direction, and that the US is in fact losing readiness in the Pacific theater rather than gaining it. All that obviously makes Saturday’s $45 million festivities hard to justify, especially when DC isn’t built to handle the massively heavy M1 Abrams tank, potentially damaging the city’s roads.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-1880726.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America’s military humiliation</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malcom Kyeyune</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In truth, though, the real impact here is theoretical. As George Washington so vividly showed, America has always prided itself on its soldier-citizen ethos, where service inside the military was a civic duty that transcended party or faction. In this, the US modeled itself on Rome. The Roman Republic, just like its American successor, was proud of keeping the generals out of politics. In the Roman case, that ethos was slowly undermined from within, as the growth of the city’s nascent empire caused the military to shift in both size and social makeup. The Marian reforms, meant to make the Roman army more effective, also had the effect of making military service a career for a certain social strata of Roman society rather than a civic duty for every citizen. Thus transformed, the military quickly became just another tool to be used by ambitious politicians like Caesar, who used legions personally loyal to him to overthrow the Republic.</p>
<p>The risk of following down the same route occupied the minds of America’s Founding Fathers, and they had a healthy distrust of standing armies as a result. Well, America’s military has now undergone the exact same transformation that Rome’s military once did: starting as a small, ad hoc citizen-soldier militia, then growing in size to deal with larger and larger battles, only to become a permanent institution staffed by career soldiers with very little understanding of the vicissitudes of civilian life.</p>
<p>Thus, rather than being a simple celebration of America’s vaunted military, the parade being planned for this weekend is a source of some cultural unease. That the Founding Fathers themselves wouldn’t have liked it all that much is probably a foregone conclusion, but the fact that it coincides with the President’s own birthday further blurs the line between the Republic and the leader at the top of it. It’s ominous, too, that the anti-Trump protests being planned to coincide with his parade are now billing themselves not as being against wars, or against the US military, but against the coming of any American <em>kings</em>.</p>
<p>Here, too, there is a resemblance between Rome and America. Rome, in its early days, saw a rejection of kings as one of its most foundational aspects; to be a true Roman was to be a member of a republic, not merely a member of an ethnic tribe on the Italian peninsula. The same sort of identification has been equally important to Americans: to be an American monarchist is a contradiction in terms, in a way that an Italian or Serbian monarchist wouldn’t be. As Republican senator Rand Paul recently put it: &#8220;We were always different than the images you saw from the Soviet Union or North Korea. We were proud not to be that.&#8221; Now, though, as political polarization increases, and Americans lose trust in their own institutions, these once obvious differences seem to be vanishing.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;To be an American monarchist is a contradiction in terms.&#8221;</div>
<p>None of this is helped by the military’s actions elsewhere. That’s especially true in California, where anti-ICE riots have led the President to nationalize parts of the state’s National Guard, taking away control from Governor Gavin Newsom. Even more strikingly, the White House also announced that it would both deploy thousands of Guardsmen to the streets of Los Angeles, to be joined by active duty Marines.</p>
<p>To say that this is controversial would be a massive understatement. It’s long been accepted convention that the National Guard shouldn’t be deployed over the heads of sitting governors. The last time this happened was roughly 60 years ago, at the height of America’s desegregation crisis, when President Eisenhower used the military to enforce school integration. And even then, civil rights represented a truly monumental political crisis. That’s in stark contrast to the unrest in LA — which doesn’t appear serious even compared to the George Floyd protests. No wonder Newsom has taken to the airwaves, essentially saying that the constitutional order of America is being broken by Trump’s arbitrary use of America’s military, and suggesting that the country is now devolving into tyranny.</p>
<p>These are heated words, to be sure, but they do get at something real. There is, after all, something quite strange about the way in which these troops are being used. Quite aside from the lack of historical precedents, the actual riot in the City of Angels doesn’t seem to be especially severe. After being theatrically mobilized, California’s guardsmen are now sitting about doing nothing: the Pentagon couldn’t handle the paperwork needed to <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/06/11/guard-soldiers-deployed-trumps-la-crackdown-arent-getting-paid-yet.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">actually</a> pay them. The 500 Marines, for their part, were called up in equally dramatic fashion. But then they failed to even appear in LA, pending several days of extra training. In a sense, that’s unsurprising. Marines are combat troops, unsuited for domestic policing. Yet, rather than sending out a detachment of military police, Trump instead went with the bruisers.</p>
<p>Just like in Rome, then, what were once America’s citizen-soldiers are now increasingly becoming mere pawns for grubby power plays. And if Trump’s antics have sparked a political storm, with other Democratic governors signing an open letter in support of Newsom, what’s to say Trump won’t employ similar tactics elsewhere? With the anti-ICE protests spreading to New York and other cities, and Texas already calling up its own National Guard to deal with its own protests, using troops to settle domestic law enforcement issues is about to become the new norm.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/trumps-gorbachev-moment/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/trumps-gorbachev-moment/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/GettyImages-2207385984-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/trumps-gorbachev-moment/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/trumps-gorbachev-moment/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s Gorbachev moment</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/trumps-gorbachev-moment/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malcom Kyeyune</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>That matters — if nothing else for the Army’s own character. One of the strongest political traditions inside America is the very clear line between the military and partisan politics. That line is clearly being blurred by these deployments, and they’re not the only example. In a recent visit to Fort Bragg, for instance, Trump gave a speech to an audience of soldiers where he managed to whip up audible boos against Governor Newsom. At first, this might have appeared as a completely organic show of support, a sign that the troops were so exhausted of liberal politicians that they were willing to break decorum.</p>
<p>But as <a href="http://military.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">journalists</a> reported later, the entire event was in fact a stage-managed ploy. Internal memos from inside the 82nd Airborne show that Trump’s audience was screened in advance. People who, for whatever reason, didn’t agree with his policies were told to talk to their unit commander, and request to excuse themselves from participating. Fat soldiers were apparently also banned from participating, presumably because they didn’t look photogenic enough. In ordinary times, a soldier cheering or booing a politician for any reason would be harshly punished: the Pentagon has long-standing rules against that sort of thing. The fact that indiscipline was not only indulged by encouraged is therefore remarkable, particularly given Trump was accompanied to Fort Bragg by a vendor hawking MAGA merchandise to the assembled troops.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, that in and of itself broke many internal Pentagon rules aimed at preventing open displays of partisanship. But once again, the real shift is in mindset. To anyone unfamiliar with the US military, soldiers cheering, jeering, and booing a politically partisan speech might not seem like a big deal. But the US military, and especially its officer class, was — until recently anyway — sincerely proud of its detachment from politics and its dedication to civil service without fear or favor.</p>
<p>To be fair, Trump isn’t the first president to try to entangle the US military in partisan political fights. Joe Biden did so too, delivering a fiery speech in late September 2022, attacking Donald Trump as a budding authoritarian while flanked by two Marines in dress uniform. But those Marines, at least, were mercifully silent, while Republican criticisms of Biden’s actions were scathing. Today, less than three years on, Trump himself is now envisioning a role for America’s servicemen that goes far beyond what Biden ever dreamed of. Combined with Saturday’s parade, one thing is clear: America’s traditional relationship with its own military is slowly crumbling. What that means for the future of Washington’s republic is anything but good.</p>
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					<title>America’s military humiliation</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Defense</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malcom Kyeyune]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The generals know that the jig is up.' Mario Tama/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malcom Kyeyune</strong> is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 25 May 2025 23:03:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 26 May 2025 09:20:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Biden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=679980</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Houthis exposed its waning power]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When, in reaction to the war in Gaza, the Houthis of Yemen started imposing their blockade on the Red Sea, it was seen as a sure sign of waning American power: a global hegemon was allowing its control over a vital sea route to be contested. In their rush to fathom why this might be happening, d<span style="font-weight: 400;">etractors of the then president claimed <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/joe-bidens-failed-strategy-against-houthi-threat-red-sea-211607" target="_blank" rel="noopener">he was simply too weak</a>, too much of an appeaser to use the full width of America’s military might to quash the problem. </span></p>
<p>In fact, in response, Biden authorized not one but two military campaigns. The first was Operation Prosperity Guardian, which aimed to combine US naval power with a coalition of willing states to protect shipping and break the blockade. That fast turned into an embarrassing debacle, as most of the coalition partners walked away and ships kept getting hit by Houthi missiles. And so, in January 2024, Operation Poseidon Archer was launched, which involved British as well as American aircraft attempting to bomb the Houthis into submission. Here again, the operation was unsuccessful, doing almost nothing to dent Houthi attacks or open up the Red Sea to shipping. But even then Biden was blamed; the mighty US military was being held back somehow. Thus, the natural conclusion was that once Trump was in office, the gloves would come off.</p>
<p>Biden’s critics were actually half right. Once Trump came in, the gloves did come off. Operation Poseidon Archer was followed by Operation Rough Rider, in March of this year, which attempted to show a new, much more muscular American military response against Houthi targets in Yemen — for all of six weeks. For six weeks, US warplanes pounded Yemen around the clock, with rare and expensive stealth bombers flying missions out of Diego Garcia in support of carrier-based aircraft. Yet once those six weeks were up, Trump proudly announced that Yemen had “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cglxl67g28no" target="_blank" rel="noopener">surrendered</a>” and that there was no more need for the US to keep up the bombing. A ceasefire had been brokered by Oman. This was trumpeted as a glorious victory for the US military, with the Houthis finally promising to not attack US ships anymore, and America graciously returning the gesture.</p>
<p>Of course, Trump didn’t mention the terms of the “surrender”. The Houthis only had to stop attacking American ships in exchange for America stopping the bombing; they were free to continue blockading the Red Sea or firing missiles at Israel. America, in other words, had given the Houthis carte blanche to carry on the behavior that was the reason America had gone to war in the first place. Thus, to call this deal a surrender was entirely appropriate; it’s just that it wasn’t the Houthis hoisting the white flag.</p>
<p>It is very commonplace to blame reversals and even defeats in America’s various wars of choice as merely a matter of lack of will. If America really wanted to win, it would win, the story goes; the failure of the US is just one where it never commits the force necessary to finish the fight. But today, that excuse rings hollow. Trump’s Operation Rough Rider, unlike Biden’s operations, utilized many of America’s most limited, expensive, and advanced weapons to try to bring the Houthis to heel. And still it surrendered. The lessons here are thus quite bleak. America’s preferred and increasingly only viable method of warfare — aerial warfare — is no longer cost-effective nor practical. But the US has no alternative modes of warfare to fall back on, which means that its days as a military hegemon are probably coming to a close.</p>
<p>To understand just how big a mess the air war against the Houthis has turned out to be, it’s important to understand a very basic rule to US military inventories. For while, on paper, America has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, an impressive figure that far outstrips any other country on the planet, that top line figure is barely relevant in practice.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-71556606.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The fantasy of British defence</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For comparison, look to the United Kingdom. The UK has two large aircraft carriers, putting it near the top of the international leaderboard when it comes to the ability to project military force. But as anyone with any familiarity with the Royal Navy can tell you, that number does not tell the real story. The number of carriers the UK can actually deploy is far lower, a number which is fairly close to zero. For while the ships exist, the Royal Navy lacks the crew, the planes, the escorts, and the logistical capacity to actually put them to use for any length of time in a real war. The UK Navy has become something of a Potemkin village, where superficial on-paper strengths hide a catastrophic reality of deferred maintenance, insufficient budgets, and lack of personnel.</p>
<p>Though the situation for the US Navy isn’t quite as dire, in practice, the problem is the same: it cannot realistically put more than two to four carriers to sea at any given moment. The ability to surge capacity in times of crisis is limited, because the various reserve components of the US armed forces have catastrophically atrophied. If you discount the American carriers that are slated for the scrapyard, or those currently lacking a functional nuclear reactor, or those which are tied up in deep maintenance, the number of active, usable carriers is roughly a third of the on-paper number. Half of those carriers were being used against the Houthis.</p>
<p>But carriers are not the only example we ought to look at. For Operation Rough Rider, the US Air Force contributed some six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, arguably the most advanced (and by far the most expensive) airframe in the US arsenal. At first blush, this seems like only a fraction of America’s power, because it has some 20 such bombers in its inventory. But a closer look at these planes suggests that those six used in Rough Rider very likely represent the entire working inventory of US stealth bombers. Because B-2s haven’t been built for decades, the only way to keep them operational is to cannibalize other B-2s for spare parts: as a result, a large number have been functionally scrapped and cannot ever hope to fly again. Only half of US bombers even qualify for so-called “mission capable” status on an average day, a status which doesn’t actually mean that the plane works; it simply means the plane isn’t completely broken and inoperable. Only two thirds or fewer of those mission capable planes can hope to qualify for what the US military instead classifies as “full mission capable” status. “Full mission capable” is your standard Pentagon-speak; it means the plane is in working order, has nothing broken that’s really important, and can realistically be used for what it was built for.</p>
<p>From carriers to stealth bombers, the pattern here is fairly clear, and it is further corroborated by testimonies from inside the Pentagon itself. America essentially pulled out <em>all the stops</em> to attack the Houthis, waging an extremely expensive and intensive air war against a militia controlling most of Yemen, the fourth-poorest nation in the world. The cost to operate a B-2 stealth bomber is extremely high on a per-hour basis; and their fragile stealth coating is not particularly fond of the warm, salty sea air at Diego Garcia. You don’t send in all of them unless you really mean business. America also committed roughly half of its active carriers, spent a fortune in land attack and air defense missiles, and it even cannibalized ammo stores and air defense systems from the Pacific theater of operations for the sake of the operation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2199580218.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe needs a new Great Power</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But as the stories of the campaign start <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/04/us/politics/us-strikes-yemen-houthis.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">leaking to the press</a>, it’s clear that none of this effort did anything good. The US couldn’t establish air supremacy, meaning it couldn’t risk flying its older, non-stealth planes for fear of losing them. This itself might seem like proof that America was once again just not trying very hard; for what kind of war is it when you’re not ready to accept losses? But the problem is, America can’t afford to replace planes that get lost and pilots that get killed. This is not a problem of cowardice, but of force generation: even if the US military suffers zero losses due to enemy fire in the years ahead, it is still slated to shrink precipitously. This shrinkage and loss of capacity is just due to America’s planes and ships wearing out, with not enough workers, dockyards, engineers, and dollars to replace them. As America burns through its massive military inheritance bequeathed by Ronald Reagan and the Eighties arms race, there is no plan to replace it. For the US military, avoiding casualties is not a matter of caution or cowardice; it is the result of a total inability to replenish the force.</p>
<p>The result of this American Achilles’ heel has been an extremely expensive reliance — when it has come to defending the Red Sea — on so-called &#8220;standoff&#8221; weaponry; cruise missiles, for example, that can be launched from far enough away that anti-air fire won’t be a threat. But even then, there were problems: according to <a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/news/f-35-houthi-missile-close-call/#:~:text=Houthi%20rebels%20in%20Yemen%20fired%20on%20a%20U.S.,a%20U.S.%20official%20confirmed%20to%20Task%20%26%20Purpose." target="_blank" rel="noopener">leaked reports</a>, even the vaunted F-35 stealth fighter had to dodge incoming anti-air missiles on at least one occasion. In Operation Rough Rider, the US deployed many of its most rare and bespoke weapons, such as the AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Missile) as well as heavy, specialized bunker-buster bombs. Again, by all accounts, this had little effect. Partly, this was because the US kept losing so many of its MQ-9 reaper drones, which come with a price tag north of 30 million dollars apiece, and which were supposed to provide the intel to ensure the bombing campaign found its targets.</p>
<p>When Biden first lost interest in defending the Red Sea against the Houthis, people were aghast. Not doing enough was akin to telling the entire world that the US was too weak to keep the Suez channel open. But Trump, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-houthi-airstrikes-biden-b2477705.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">after berating his predecessor</a>, has also walked away, and de facto recognized the Houthi’s control of the channel. It would seem that the US doesn’t actually have many cards to play.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;As America burns through its massive military inheritance bequeathed by Ronald Reagan and the Eighties arms race, there is no plan to replace it.&#8221;</div>
<p>Trump could have sent another carrier to the region in support of his operation, bringing the total up to three. But this would hardly have made much difference to the air campaign because the problem with this offensive wasn’t lack of deck space or fighter sorties — US planes were too wary to go anywhere near Yemen’s air defense, and even stealth jets were reportedly not entirely safe. The problem was the lack of standoff munitions which can be deployed from a point of relative safety. But these are so expensive and so limited that there is no budget to replenish them when stores are depleted (a single JASSM with a 450 kilogram explosive warhead comes in at slightly under a million dollars). <a href="https://features.csis.org/preparing-the-US-industrial-base-to-deter-conflict-with-China/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20results%20of%20a%20series%20of,than%20one%20week%20in%20a%20Taiwan%20Strait%20conflict." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Wargames</a> show the US running out of most or all such critical munitions in a matter of weeks or even days in a real conflict against a peer enemy such as China.</p>
<p>Even worse, much of the US military’s most advanced weapons systems are dependent on components and materials such as rare earths from China, which has already started imposing harsh export restrictions in order to slowly choke the life out of the US military industrial complex. In practice, the US does not have the economy to produce the weapons used for aerial warfare at any sort of scale, and this has only been hidden from full view because the military has coasted along on an aura of invincibility.</p>
<p>As the appetite for ground warfare has waned, the allure of quick, cheap and easy air campaigns has grown. But air warfare is no longer what it once was. Operation Rough Rider was supposed to be a decisive show of force against an under-equipped, internally divided third-world nation. Instead, it ended up looking like the last hurrah of a truly antiquated form of warfare, unable to cope with cheaper and better anti-air weapon systems.</p>
<p>All of these limitations make the current talk about a new bombing campaign against Iran utterly surreal. Iran is far bigger than Yemen, with a much more robust air defense network. Moreover, the distances involved are such that carrier-based aircraft, even when launched from the very shores of the Persian Gulf, can’t actually reach places like Tehran and return on a single tank of fuel. Fighter-bombers will need aerial refueling over the Iranian interior, and tanker planes are slow, easy to spot on radar, and pretty much defenseless. Even attempting to destroy the Iranian air defense network will take huge amounts of precision standoff weaponry, which the US cannot practically replace, even if it weren’t struggling with a massive fiscal crisis and soaring bond yields. The critical parts of Iran’s nuclear program are kept under hundreds of feet of solid mountain; the US, using the heaviest and most advanced weapons in its entire arsenal, did not succeed against the much shallower Houthi bunkers and missile storage facilities in Yemen. All of the problems that forced America’s tacit surrender of the Suez canal would be writ large — and be far more lethal — in any campaign against Iran.</p>
<p>With exploding deficits, a growing internal political crisis, and a slowly collapsing military, America is a leopard that lacks the wherewithal to even attempt to change its spots. The generals know that the jig is up: the old model is broken, there is no new model coming, and nobody has the energy left to do much about it all. And so, this massive crisis of US military power is playing out in the vein of Ernest Hemingway’s comment about the course of his own bankruptcy: gradually, then suddenly.</p>
<p>Once upon a time, there was always a bigger plane, a more advanced high-tech future weapon, yet another trick up the Air Force’s sleeve that you could point to in order to silence the doubters. But those days are over. The gravity of what happened in Yemen will only assert itself once the political class is ready to deal with the new world we are now living in: one in which the US has no new military rabbits to pull out of its hat, and those that it does have simply aren’t enough to get anywhere close to victory.</p>
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					<title>Europe&#039;s great delusion</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/03/europes-great-delusion/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/03/europes-great-delusion/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/comp.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>defense</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tom McTague]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Tom-McTague-Website.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The memories of our dreams of Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill cannot guide us forever.' Photo: Benjamin Girette/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Tom McTague</strong> is UnHerd&#8217;s <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>TomMcTague</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is UnHerd's <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 13 Mar 2025 00:03:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 13 Mar 2025 18:03:10 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Keir Starmer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=662447</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Britain and France are stuck in the past]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Wars, it is said, make people conservative, since they are fought for an idea of home under threat. And yet their innate tragedy is that, even in victory, they usher in a world transformed. We are seeing this revolutionary fable playing out once again in Ukraine, reshaping Europe in ways that we cannot yet comprehend.</p>
<p>The world of February 2014, when Vladimir Putin’s “little green men” began popping up in Crimea has now — beyond doubt — irrevocably disappeared. That was the world of Barack Obama and Angela Merkel, European demilitarization and global interdependence. Back then, Russia provided Europe its gas and the United States its defense, while China provided the entire world with the raw materials needed for the technologies which would drive the future. All these assumptions now lie in tatters; that era finally brought to a cataclysmic end by Russia’s attempt to finally subjugate Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<p>Three years on from that fateful decision, a million men at arms are still battling it out in trenches, hunted by drone armies powered by artificial intelligence. Imperial carve-ups are taking place in the marbled halls of Saudi Arabia while the transatlantic alliance teeters on the brink of collapse. And a new trade war is threatening to send the world economy into recession, risking not only the future of NATO but Europe’s entire social-democratic model. Yet behind the scenes in Europe’s capitals, a dispiriting refusal to abandon the dogmas of old still lingers. And among the worst offenders are those who are performatively leading Europe’s response to Donald Trump: the British and French.</p>
<p>Beyond the warm words over the past few weeks, London and Paris are largely sticking to the tired national strategies they have clung to for much of the past 50 years: the French talking of European autonomy but in reality pursuing national autonomy; the British pretending they are a mini America but, instead, becoming an ever cheaper imitation. The irony is that, as much as it might pain either side to admit, each would be stronger if it became a little more like the other.</p>
<p>As the former French ambassador to the US, Gerard Araud, has repeatedly pointed out, the Gaullist insistence to retain some national independence from America has proved more farsighted than Britain or Germany would like to admit. While the British military has long prioritized obtaining the latest shiny piece of American military kit available — even at the cost of becoming ever more dependent on the States — the French have prioritized retaining national autonomy, even at the cost of paying more for less.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/are-we-all-gaullists-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/are-we-all-gaullists-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/hero.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/are-we-all-gaullists-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/are-we-all-gaullists-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Are we all Gaullists now?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/are-we-all-gaullists-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>One such example is the French insistence on a sovereign space policy. They spend around three times more than we do on space programs, but end up with an inferior product to the one we access courtesy of the Americans, according to those I spoke with. Another example is the French satellite communications operator Eutelsat, which now wants to replace Elon Musk’s Starlink in Ukraine in order to protect European autonomy. But Eutelsat has far fewer satellites operating at far higher altitudes resulting in slower connections. European autonomy, in other words, means paying more for a worse product — at least in the short term.</p>
<p>The upside of this French insistence on national resilience is that in the event of a genuine American withdrawal from NATO — and, perhaps, even an alliance with Russia — the French would at least have the foundations upon which to construct a genuinely independent military. Britain, in contrast, has built its entire strategy around the principle of interoperability with the United States, and so would be sent into a crisis, forcing it to question everything from scratch.</p>
<p>Yet, the corollary of the French insistence on national resilience is that, for all their talk of European autonomy, they cannot bring themselves to do what is necessary to genuinely move in this direction — since it would inevitably undermine their own independence. The most obvious example of this paradox is the fact that in Ukraine’s great battle for survival against Russia — a war Emmanuel Macron has held up as an existential test of European security — France has fallen far behind the UK and Germany in supplying the necessary arms for Kyiv to prevail. Why? The answer, it seems, comes in two parts: first, France continues to prioritize national self-reliance over European solidarity; and, second, as one analyst put it to me, France appears “more genuinely broke” even than Britain.</p>
<p>In total, Britain has <a href="https://x.com/POLITICOEurope/status/1897589545413087411" target="_blank" rel="noopener">contributed</a> around €10 billion in military aid to Ukraine, compared with just €3.5 billion from France. As part of this, Britain has been prepared to run down its military stocks. “We’ve given it all away,” said one official I spoke to. By one estimate, Britain has just 14 pieces of heavy artillery left in Estonia, I was told. The French would never entertain this level of exposure. The result, however, is that in the fight for Ukraine’s national survival, Britain has shown more European “solidarity” than France.</p>
<p>Talking European but acting French is the straitjacket Paris seems unable to escape, limiting its ability to lead the Continent into the European revolution it has long championed. Again and again this conundrum plays out. Twenty EU states — including Germany — have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b51365f9-a58b-497d-919b-9c5c279f75a4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called for</a> greater coordination with the UK defense industry to boost the Europe’s resilience, but the French rejected the proposal. Britain has sought a defense pact with the EU in recent months, the process has been held up by the French insistence on negotiating access to Britain’s fishing waters. The inevitable result: French autonomy, European weakness.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Talking European but acting French is the straitjacket Paris seems unable to escape.&#8221;</div>
<p>A similar story has played out on the biggest question of all: nuclear weapons. In France, the independence of the country’s deterrent is sacrosanct. There is understandable pride — especially today — that it is less dependent on American cooperation than British equivalent. Yet, for this very reason the French have proven unable to move beyond the Gaullist doctrine which states that its nuclear deterrent serves only its vital national interests. Yet, this means it cannot be extended to Europe. And so it is stuck.</p>
<p>Britain, in contrast, has always been much more willing to be dependent on American cooperation, but also to place its deterrent at the service of NATO. In the event of full-scale American isolationism, the cost for Britain of maintaining its nuclear deterrent would be prohibitive. As such, the lack of interest in strategic national autonomy has left it in the similarly invidious position of being tied to a superpower that increasingly fails to hide its contempt for its supplicant partners. Whatever happens over the coming months and years, Britain will at some point be forced to confront the question it does not want to answer: what will it do when the Americans are gone and there is no NATO?</p>
<p>The costs of real independence from the United States, then, remain too high for either Britain or France to seriously entertain. The scale of our dependence was revealed by the former head of British intelligence, Alex Younger, this week when he <a href="https://x.com/itvpeston/status/1899219360054387016" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a> there were “no circumstances” under which European troops could be sent to Ukraine without a peace deal — and that even with an agreement it would be “irresponsible” to do that without strategic support from the US. According to one senior military adviser I spoke with, Europe needs to spend around 3.5% of its GDP for the next decade simply to get its armies into a position to independently deter Russian aggression. Until then, Europe’s collective forces would be vulnerable to a Russian incursion into the Baltics without the Americans.</p>
<p>Yet, even at this level of spending, Europe would still have to remain under the American nuclear umbrella. Without it, military advisers believe, Europe remains vulnerable to nuclear coercion. “We don’t have the answer to tactical nukes,” as one official put it to me, bluntly. An answer would cost Britain and France more like 4.5% of GDP — unless the Germans finance it. But while nuclear autonomy remains “the big play” for France and Britain in the coming years — the grand offer reshaping the continent for the 21st century — neither seems capable nor willing to make it.</p>
<p>In Ukraine, as many as two million drones are now produced each year, an increasing number of which are being controlled by artificial intelligence. Ukraine now trains its soldiers to launch combined operations with drone armies at land and sea, while its traditional military is dependent on high-end American intelligence and technology that Europe does not have. The nature of war itself is changing, which in turn, will force the armies of Europe and the United States to revolutionize themselves irrespective of the outcome.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-71556606.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The fantasy of British defence</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In turn, both Ukraine’s drone production and America’s military might are dependent on the supply of critical minerals — including rare earths — which are sourced via an extraordinarily complicated global network which must be protected, in the end, by military power. Strip away everything and there is a Leviathan holding a sword and a scepter — the only question is who that is.</p>
<p>If Europe is serious about its autonomy, then, it will need not only its own militaries, but its own supply of critical minerals, artificial intelligence, semiconductor plants and reliable sources of energy. It is for all these reasons that neither Britain nor France today is rushing to grasp the opportunity presented by Trump of “independence” from the United States. Neither can afford it.</p>
<p>Here is the rub. Britain and France are far too poor to play the role they want. Last year, the French government ran a deficit of more than 6%, far outside the limits demanded by the European Commission. Yet it has so far proved impossible to assemble a majority in the National Assembly to pass a budget to bring this under control. Instead, Paris has relied on constitutional powers to enact the budget <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/france-passes-2025-budget-but-fiscal-consolidation-remains-challenging-10-02-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">without a parliamentary vote</a>. In Britain, meanwhile, which has similar levels of national debt, the Government has a large majority, but is gearing up for a Spring Statement which most analysts believe will contain fanciful forecasts of undeliverable spending cuts.</p>
<p>The painful truth facing both London and Paris is that while Britain will need to become more French to thrive in a world of American withdrawal — and France will need become more British in its willingness to rely on others — both countries will need to become something new if they are ever to become truly independent in this new world. Henry Kissinger did note that Donald Trump may be “one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretences”. The trouble is, neither Britain nor France seems willing to stop pretending.</p>
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					<title>How Britpoppers killed patriotism</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-britpoppers-killed-patriotism/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/03/how-britpoppers-killed-patriotism/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-91139577.jpg?w=506</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>End of history</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mary Harrington]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/mary.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[JMEnternational/Redferns]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mary Harrington</strong> is a contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>moveincircles</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 2025 00:03:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 04 Mar 2025 14:26:28 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Britpoppers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Patriotism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=660111</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The kids won't fight for Starmer]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Are the <a href="https://tsaekasith.substack.com/p/what-is-and-is-not-britpopper" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Britpoppers</a> okay? Britain’s distinctive post-boomer bulge generation, they of Jamie Oliver, the 00s London property boom, Posh Twee and “proper chips”, Bloasis and floral shirts and gentrifying Hackney, have gone bananas <em>en masse</em>.</p>
<p>Over the weekend, Trump and Vance <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-rare-earth-minerals-trump-zelenskyy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ordered</a> Ukraine’s President Zelensky to “make a deal with Russia or we’re out”. In the ensuing international pandemonium, Keir Starmer stood up and <a href="https://x.com/krassenstein/status/1896256639310901634" target="_blank" rel="noopener">promised</a> that Britain would step into the breach, along with a “coalition of the willing” and perhaps even with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-army-troops-ukraine-defence-b2701635.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">all 25 of our tanks</a>. Now, Britain’s well-fed Gen X commentariat is working itself into a bipartisan militaristic frenzy, all Churchill, Union Jacks, and “standing up to bullies”.</p>
<p>From the Right, Julia Hartley-Brewer <a href="https://x.com/JuliaHB1/status/1896139421080228284" target="_blank" rel="noopener">encouraged</a> everyone to watch the Second World War movie <em>Darkest Hour</em> to “learn something about how you should deal with the threat from dictators like Putin”. From the Left, Dan Hodges <a href="https://x.com/DPJHodges/status/1895902816000180484" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggested</a> that anyone who supported Trump’s ceasefire plan over Zelensky’s desire to continue fighting was no better than the Nazi propagandist “Lord Haw-Haw”. And LBC’s Matthew Wright <a href="https://x.com/lbc/status/1896145572588871698?s=46&amp;t=pxEeR2NvdlCdYmdd0fCoPw" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lectured</a> John, a 70-year-old Cockney, on the lessons of Munich in 1938.</p>
<p>This generation came of age in the End of History era, in which the kind of hard-edged patriotism that inspires young men to enlist in armies seemed obsolete, hopefully for good. In its place emerged something softer: a vision of nationhood as without enemies, only friends we hadn’t met yet. Now, though, the world is changing. Can this kind of inclusive patriotism still awaken the fighting spirit, in an emergency? The Britpoppers have, until now, presided over a world sufficiently peaceful that this question never really came up. But as the world has grown more dangerous, the shrillness of their bellicosity suggests they’re worried the answer might be “no”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/donald-trump-is-the-end-of-hilarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/donald-trump-is-the-end-of-hilarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/don-juan-.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/donald-trump-is-the-end-of-hilarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/donald-trump-is-the-end-of-hilarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Donald Trump is the end of Hilarity</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/donald-trump-is-the-end-of-hilarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Starmer himself is arguably himself a post-national Britpopper par excellence. He declares himself “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-53902845" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proud of being patriotic</a>”, though the Tories demur; for example Robert Jenrick recently <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/badenoch-jenrick-starmer-traitor-chagos-b2692785.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called him a “quisling”</a> for seeking to hand control of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. More generally, conservatives of both small and large C varieties accuse his regime of <a href="https://x.com/NileGardiner/status/1845564113415553480" target="_blank" rel="noopener">harboring deep animus toward Britain</a>, as expressed in Labour policy toward anything even tenuously English-coded, from <a href="https://educationhub.blog.gov.uk/2024/11/vat-private-schools-everything-you-need-to-know/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">independent schools</a> to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/nov/19/farmers-betrayed-by-ministers-says-union-head-before-london-protest" target="_blank" rel="noopener">small farmers</a>, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2025/01/22/labour-worship-tax-funds-repair-churches/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">provincial churches</a>, and <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/32543136/keir-starmer-axe-british-history-national-curriculum/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">even history itself</a>.</p>
<p>How does this add up? The explanation is simple: Starmer is all for Britpopper patriotism, of the Spice Girls Union Jack and globalization variety: the kind where national identity is lightly worn, inclusive, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/feb/27/immigrationpolicy.race" target="_blank" rel="noopener">adequately expressed by “British Values</a>”, like a Three Lions football shirt, for sale to anyone who wants to wear one. By contrast, the older, harder style of patriotism saw nations as having both friends and enemies. But since the war, and especially since the End of History, this version has become indelibly associated with racism, jingoism, and hostile, exclusionary sentiments. Starmer’s not for that.</p>
<p>The gap between this End of History Britpopper patriotism, and the harder-edged one that preceded it, was captured in vivid microcosm in the LBC exchange between Matthew Wright and John the Cockney. John tried to explain to Wright that Britain going to war today would be a non-starter, simply because patriotic solidarity has ebbed along with ethnic homogeneity. He was circumspect in his phrasing, saying only that Britain can’t fight because “we haven’t got the people any more”. He continued with the example of how the East End Cockneys left London and “ran for refuge”. And though he doesn’t say what they were running from, the clear implication is that he’s referring to <a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/how-london-killed-the-cockney/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">that area’s well-documented postwar demographic change</a>. In John’s view, those who replaced the Cockneys are unlikely to be as willing as they were, to fight for Britain: “If you went by these schools in the morning…you know…it’s unbelievable. Them kids wouldn’t be fighting.”</p>
<p>He doesn’t say so explicitly, but the clear implication is that John believes the children of immigrants would be less willing than Cockneys to fight for their adopted country. Wright catches the hint and rejects it forcefully: “How do you know? Have you spoken to any?”. John hasn’t, of course, and is dismissed; another smack-down victory for tolerant Britpopperism. For from the perspective of soft patriotism, there’s no obvious reason why the people who live in London now should experience this sentiment any less than those who lived there a century ago.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-angry-imperialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-angry-imperialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/zelen.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-angry-imperialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-angry-imperialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump&#039;s angry imperialism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-angry-imperialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Who is right? Just last month, a Times report <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14382963/Gen-Z-arent-proud-British-wouldnt-war-country-think-UK-racist.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggested</a> only 11% of Gen Z would be willing to fight for Britain, which they aren’t proud of and think is “racist”. The published report didn’t break these views down by interviewees’ ethnicity, so there’s no way of knowing if there’s anything to the imputation made by John the Cockney. But when Rishi Sunak <a href="https://apnews.com/article/uk-election-national-service-rishi-sunak-fdaf7e38793434e4f060c11735fef71e" target="_blank" rel="noopener">floated mandatory conscription for 18-year-olds</a> just before the last election, vox-pop interviews suggested that many young people rejected the idea of British military service out of hand, and in <a href="https://x.com/dave24144975/status/1881731906045436064" target="_blank" rel="noopener">some cases</a>, <a href="https://x.com/Basil_TGMD/status/1896350809237213466" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cited immigrant heritage</a> as grounds for refusal.</p>
<p>In any case, something has clearly gone very wrong with the sense of solidarity upon which military conscription is founded, within the generation upon whom conscription would fall in extremis. At the risk of stating the obvious, this is at least potentially an existential threat to national security. And if there’s a desperate edge to the Britpoppers’ recent spate of Churchill-posting, it surely lies in their dawning, horrified realization of their generation’s contribution to this predicament.</p>
<p>I’m just about old enough to remember Britpopperism coalescing in the late 1990s. As I exited my teens, all was ironic Union Jack iconography and the reclamation and productization of British culture. It wasn’t just London that was to be re-gentrified; it was everything, just this time a bit more inclusive, tolerant, welcoming and non-jingoistic. It was, on its own terms, a sincere utopian vision. It produced a Britain at once shinier, cooler and more optimistic than the dreary Major-era one, but also a Britain indefinably more twee: a culture playing itself in caricature, for an audience of investors and tourists, paradigmatically in the oeuvre of Richard Curtis but also in any BBC costume drama you care to name, and lately, notably, the <em>Paddington Bear</em> movie franchise.</p>
<p>With this twee-ification, too, came a transformation of history and culture proper to the neutered, pasteurized “British Values”: again, a genuinely utopian effort to preserve the solidaristic effect of national fellow-feeling while discarding its more exclusionary aspects. Concurrently, too, something equivalent was afoot on the Continent, in the European Union project: the dream of a permanent end to European conflict, delivered by ever-closer political and economic union of European peoples.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A culture playing itself in caricature&#8221;</div>
<p>But this continent-wide retreat into soft patriotism always tacitly relied on the stability and enduring existence of the US-led international order: an order that, ultimately, had to be backed up by hard power and paid for by someone. In Europe especially, the identity of this someone remained, for the most part, delicately unstated: after all, how could leadership be safely entrusted to any one European state? That prospect bore too great a risk of reviving unhappy and all too recent intra-European rivalries.</p>
<p>The solution had been, literally, to defang Europe: that is, to subordinate all European defense to hegemonic American power. American foreign policy leaders <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-politique-etrangere-2014-1-page-117?lang=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">were always ambivalent</a> about this arrangement, but seem historically to have accepted it as the price of ensuring a relatively internally unified European ally for American geopolitical priorities. Lately, though, Trumpist foreign policy thinkers have been <a href="https://unherd.com/watch-listen/the-world-after-nato/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">signaling their wish</a> to adjust this arrangement.</p>
<p>So what does this imply for the style of post-national peace and plenty enjoyed by the Britpoppers? We can perhaps understand their dismay: American withdrawal, if it happened, would mean losing the fundamental enabling condition for the entire <em>Britpopperanschauung</em>; perhaps even the return of intra-European conflict. It is a genuinely frightening prospect. So all the current international brouhaha over Ukraine can be understood as a negotiation over whether, or how far, this is actually going to happen. And Starmer’s recent spate of flag-waving, militaristic public pronouncements makes perfect sense, understood as an effort to provide European leaders a face-saving means of acceding to defense spending increases Trump has requested, without looking too slavishly obedient to a POTUS whose style they dislike. Perhaps Starmer hopes that such gestures will forestall an overall American withdrawal, from its longstanding role underwriting European stability.</p>
<p>But assuming this is right, can Britain and Europe follow through on such noises to American satisfaction? The difficulty here is at least twofold. Firstly, as Wolfgang Munchau has <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/europes-reckless-bid-for-victory/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pointed out</a>, after some decades of comfortable post-nationalism European defense capability is woefully etiolated. To this we can also add the question of whether the current British regime commands enough public affection to expect patriotic service when a growing subset of the electorate regards their government as <a href="https://thecritic.co.uk/conservatives-can-no-longer-trust-institutions/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fundamentally illegitimate</a> – not least thanks to a perceived cross-party refusal to respond to popular demand and reduce immigration.</p>
<p>But whether or not Cockney John is right about migrants’ likely attitude to conscription, mass migration is arguably an effect of soft Britpopper patriotism rather than its cause. That is: it was the Britpopper vision of national identity as fuzzy, open, and opt-in that enabled the political consensus in favor of mass migration to form. And if it’s really true that only 11% of British youth would be willing to fight for Britain, that means 89% wouldn’t. Recent figures suggest about 25% of young British people are from minority ethnic backgrounds. This suggests that at least some – maybe a lot – of the young people swearing off patriotism must be white British. Even if Cockney John does have a point, migration is clearly not the only thing killing British patriotism.</p>
<p>And this points to the most profound way that Britpoppers have created our defense predicament: it’s their kids who were raised with the soft-patriotic, End-of-History version of national identity. And as it turns out, an ingroup without an outgroup doesn’t seem potent enough to inspire any kind of warlike spirit. So maybe Britpoppers are frenziedly banging the drums of war now, because they’ve realized it was them.</p>
<p>In their certainty that the American security-blanket would last forever, many raised their own kids to believe in a version of patriotism with only friends, no enemies. Now, belatedly, they’ve realized that actually there are plenty of enemies still out there. But their kids don’t believe them. So the yelling is perhaps an attempt, all too late, to be heard over their offspring’s AirPods. Should it fail, we will need to ask, with some urgency: who will don the “boots” Starmer has promised “on the ground”? I doubt somehow it’ll be the Cool Britannia generation.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">660111</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>America will have to dodge the draft</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/09/america-will-have-to-dodge-the-draft/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/09/america-will-have-to-dodge-the-draft/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/GettyImages-2044291975.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malcom Kyeyune]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Thumbnail-Example-1-1.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[NYPD officers stand guard as they prepare for a vigil at a recruiting office (Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malcom Kyeyune</strong> is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 15 Sep 2024 23:03:57 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 15 Sep 2024 23:03:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=621893</guid>
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								<![CDATA[<p>What do <a href="https://blocksclass.com/libr/Napoleon.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Napoleon</a>, America’s <a href="https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3240&amp;context=parameters" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Army War College</a> and <a href="https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/368528/us-military-army-navy-recruit-numbers" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the liberal media</a> have in common? The centuries-old belief that conscription is the “vitality of the nation”. With the US military hamstrung by a catastrophic personnel problem, the “draft” is being handed a new lease of life. Maybe, murmurs the DC think-tank circuit, conscription could provide America with the proverbial shot in the arm it needs: polarised internally and beset by a multitude of external challenges, the expedient of compelling young Americans to pick up rifles in service to their nation could kill two birds with one stone.</p>
<p>But almost all discussion of conscription today falls into a standard narrative, a just-so story that is both simple to grasp and seductively credible. America <em>could</em> have a draft if it wanted to, the story goes: no doubt it would work and be effective. The problem, however, is that people have grown too self-absorbed for such harsh measures. Previous generations worked hard and sacrificed willingly, while kids these days just want to play videogames.</p>
<p>Such a narrative is increasingly dangerous. The fatal issue with a potential draft is not that people would get very angry about it — though it’s fair to say that they probably would. The entire reason America abandoned the draft in the Seventies was because the Vietnam War was slowly tearing society apart, leading to protests, riots, and an epidemic of <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-forgotten-history-of-fragging-in-vietnam_b_5a1b77b6e4b0cee6c050939d" target="_blank" rel="noopener">enlisted soldiers murdering their own officers</a>. Any attempt to reinstate conscription would likely bring with it a “Vietnam syndrome” far worse than the original one. But in some ways that is beside the point.</p>
<p>Right now, even if America wanted a draft, the entire administrative apparatus required to actually implement it no longer exists. Just as Rome eventually forgot how to muster its legions or maintain its roads and bridges, so too has the US government forgotten how to quickly gather hundreds of thousands of men under arms. The systems necessary to do so have been destroyed through decades of malign neglect, and they probably can&#8217;t be brought back at all, let alone repaired on short notice.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Even if America wanted a draft, the entire administrative apparatus required to actually implement it no longer exists.&#8217;</div>
<p>To understand just how impractical a draft is, it&#8217;s necessary to understand how it might work. Eligible Americans, upon reaching the age of 18, are supposed to be registered in the Selective Service System (SSS) database. Once a draft happens, the draftees chosen by lottery could then be sent notices, ordering them to report for service. When they have been given the chance to appeal or seek deferments, the remainder would report to the US military, which would train them and send them to war.</p>
<p>Today, every piece of this chain is broken beyond repair. The first step — the registration of eligible candidates — seems like it would be the easiest to get a handle on. But nothing could be further from the truth, for the simple reason that no single federal agency even attempts to keep an up-to-date record of every American’s actual place of residence. Take it from the horse’s mouth: according to the <a href="https://hasbrouck.org/draft/HASC-19MAY2021.pdf#page=6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chair of the House Armed Services Committee himself</a>, “absolutely nobody” bothers to notify the SSS when they move.</p>
<p>Moreover, the SSS doesn&#8217;t even know whether the names they have on their lists are eligible Americans in the first place. As a result, it’s forced to rely on borrowing information from other federal and state agencies to figure out where young Americans live. But not only are states <em>not</em> required to keep address information up to date, but people who cannot be drafted, such as those with student visas, get included in these rolls. Moreover, several states, such as California, refuse to be a part of this system. Other states offer Americans the choice to put an “X” in the gender field on their driver’s licence, which excludes them from SSS data collection.</p>
<p>All of this might seem like a minor technical quibble, but it’s really not. The inability to actually keep track of where citizens live doesn’t just mean that people might be slow to show up to basic training — it would completely undermine the government’s ability to actually prosecute anyone for draft-dodging in the first place.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/who-will-win-a-post-heroic-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/who-will-win-a-post-heroic-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-2212371.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/who-will-win-a-post-heroic-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/who-will-win-a-post-heroic-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Who will win a post-heroic war?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/who-will-win-a-post-heroic-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>To pursue these draft-dodgers, the federal government would have to clear a legal bar that is essentially impossible to reach unless the draftee decides to wilfully self-incriminate. To wit, the government has to prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt: that it sent the notice to the correct address, that the draftee actually read the notice and understood its meaning, and finally, that he made a conscious decision to refuse to show up for service after having fully understood his responsibilities. Today, a majority of Americans are essentially immune to being prosecuted without any intention on their part: they’ve simply moved away from their parents without notifying the SSS, and now the government has no idea where they are. But even when the government does, it’s not a crime for parents to rip up induction notices. And if that doesn’t work, they could claim that the mailman hid it, or their dog ate it. The ability for the federal government to prove otherwise is essentially nil.</p>
<p>All of this was already a big enough problem during the Vietnam era, where the government could only manage to convict some 8,000 people for draft offences, out of a total caseload of nearly 600,000. The idea of today’s administration doing any better is laughable. In 2021, the SSS made almost 250,000 referrals to the Department of Justice for failures to comply with registration laws. The response from the DOJ was to announce that it had no intention of actually enforcing these laws, and that the SSS should stop asking them to.</p>
<p>But even putting the issue of sending draft notices aside, does the US military have the institutional capacity to absorb and train hundreds of thousands of recruits on short notice? Can America produce the additional equipment that would be needed to actually give the sons (and perhaps daughters) of America a fighting chance? Does America still have the ships and planes to transport all those draftees to where they would theoretically be fighting in, say, Asia? The answer to all of these questions is no.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/why-the-west-will-refuse-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/why-the-west-will-refuse-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-2149871375-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/why-the-west-will-refuse-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/why-the-west-will-refuse-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why the West will refuse to fight</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/why-the-west-will-refuse-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malcom Kyeyune</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The idea that everything is possible as long as you will it to be so is seductive, but it doesn&#8217;t match up with reality. To organise a draft, or repair a bridge, or build a fighter aircraft, you don&#8217;t just need a can-do attitude: you need institutional knowledge, you need money and resources, and you need people. For smaller countries such as Sweden, which already uses a draft, this is much less of a problem: there, the government hasn’t yet lost the institutional capacity to keep track of its citizens. But in America, that ship sailed years ago.</p>
<p>Indeed, even if the federal government were to try and force a draft into existence, the result would be disheartening. Inevitably, the burden would fall on local sheriffs and police departments, and trying to push through a blatantly illegal and unconstitutional draft would almost certainly guarantee that several states would refuse to comply. From that point, it would only take a handful of them to declare this new “streamlined” draft illegal, and offer up their own territory as safe havens from “federal tyranny”, for the US to descend into a constitutional crisis.</p>
<p>American pundits, think tanks, and government apparatchiks can complain all they like that the young aren&#8217;t conscientious enough to support a draft over Iran or Taiwan. But this is little more than projection. To truly understand why conscription is a non-starter, they need only look upon their own mighty works — and despair.</p>
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					<title>Has Japan given up on pacifism?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/07/has-japan-given-up-on-pacifism/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/07/has-japan-given-up-on-pacifism/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-51750299.jpg?w=526</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Warfare</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Christopher Harding]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Blue-thumbnail-example-1-300x300-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Will Japan need to defend itself? Yasser Al-Zayyat/AFP/ Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div>
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<div><strong>Christopher Harding</strong> is a cultural historian of India and Japan, based at the University of Edinburgh. His latest book is <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/448290/a-short-history-of-japan-by-harding-christopher/9780241563199" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>A Short History of Japan </em></a>(Pelican, 2025). He also has a Substack: <a href="https://www.chrishardingjapan.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Japan and the World.</a></div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>drchrisharding</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a cultural historian of India and Japan, based at the University of Edinburgh. His latest book is <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/448290/a-short-history-of-japan-by-harding-christopher/9780241563199" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>A Short History of Japan </em></a>(Pelican, 2025). He also has a Substack: <a href="https://www.chrishardingjapan.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Japan and the World.</a></div>
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 11 Jul 2024 23:01:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 11 Jul 2024 23:01:16 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japanese Self-Defence Forces]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[row]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=607812</guid>
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								<![CDATA[It can no longer rely on American protection]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“They pay in yen, we pay in blood!” Such was the refrain when, after the Gulf War broke out in 1990, Japan’s leaders decided that under the terms of its American-authored postwar constitution they could not send forces to the Middle East. All they could do was write a very large cheque: some $13 billion. This led to the perception, in some quarters, that the Japanese preferred to throw money at problems rather than take risks. When the Kuwaiti government took out an advert in the <em>New York Times </em>to thank the countries that had helped liberate them from Saddam Hussein, there was no mention of Japan. It was a public relations catastrophe.</p>
<p>Ever since the formation of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) back in July 1954, Japan has argued over its remit and how best to present its role to the public, both at home and abroad. The general approach up until 1990 was neatly expressed by a senior figure in the SDF: “The pheasant would not be shot, but for its cries.” In other words, given worries within Japan and across East Asia that the SDF might somehow be a continuation of the old Imperial Japanese Army, which in the mid-20th century had subverted democracy at home and waged war abroad, the best thing the SDF could do was to keep its head down. That policy, it became clear, would have to change.</p>
<p>The SDF had its roots in a National Police Reserve (NPR), formed in 1950 with the strong encouragement of the American-led Occupation administration. Its official remit was to keep the peace at home while American troops stationed in Japan for that purpose went off to fight in the Korean War. Keen to shore up their Asian ally, the US equipped the NPR and encouraged its enlargement, regarding it not so much as a police force as the nucleus of a future Japanese army. And indeed, it would have been an impressive domestic insurrection whose quelling required the use of the NPR’s bazookas, flame-throwers, tanks and artillery.</p>
<p>The morphing of the National Police Reserve into the Self-Defence Forces — Ground, Maritime and Air — did not alter the official interpretation of the constitution in Japan. While the UN Charter allowed for both individual and collective self-defence, Japan permitted itself only the former. It could not come to the aid of its ally, the United States. Even then, the SDF had to work hard to build up a degree of trust with the Japanese public, taking on roles in civil engineering projects and disaster relief. When, in 1960, Tokyo erupted in violent protest against the renewal of Japan’s unpopular security treaty with the United States, there was a moment when it looked as though the SDF might be called upon to intervene. This would have been disastrous: confirming domestic fears that Japan might be becoming once again the kind of society where the military held the whip-hand.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/in-defence-of-weebs-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/in-defence-of-weebs-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-916546146-1-e1701877617802.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/in-defence-of-weebs-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/in-defence-of-weebs-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>In defence of Weebs</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/in-defence-of-weebs-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher Harding</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Fortunately, the moment passed and the SDF struggled on, using the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 to help bolster its reputation. The SDF helped out with security, contributed athletes to some of the events — including the winner of a gold medal in weightlifting — and even dazzled the crowds with an aerobatics show, courtesy of its display team “Blue Impulse”. Three years later, the SDF enjoyed what seemed at first to be a great propaganda coup, when the celebrated writer Mishima Yukio enlisted in the Ground Self-Defence Forces. The moment soured in November 1970, when Mishima attempted to instigate an <em>actual</em> coup from inside a GSDF barracks in Tokyo and then took his own life in grizzly, samurai fashion when it failed.</p>
<p>In the wake of the Gulf War, and the reputational damage done to Japan, the Japanese Defence Agency (now the Ministry of Defence) began to do what countries like the United States had been doing for a long time: seek to massage public opinion surrounding their own armed forces with the help of top PR experts. The advertising giant Dentsū was enlisted and the SDF gained its very own mascot: the cute and inoffensive Prince Pickles, whose story was told in a dedicated manga series. Pickles is convinced that his peaceful, idyllic Paprika Kingdom has no need of its defence force. His father, the king, sees things differently. The prince cannot succeed him, says the king, unless he first learns at first-hand the value of maintaining such a force. Cue a series of adventures, involving a nearby ally, the Broccoli Kingdom and an Evil Empire just next-door, in the course of which Pickles learns that there can be no peace without a deterrent.</p>
<p>Prince Pickles and his love-interest, Miss Parsley, were eventually retired as SDF mascots, replaced by a boy and girl named Takuma-kun (from the Japanese word for “resolute”) and Yū-chan (from a word meaning “kind”). Meanwhile, the Self-Defence Forces have tried a range of other tactics to win over the public, from Miss Air Force Contests to music festivals. Then there are the live fire exercises held each year at the GSDF’s training area at the base of Mount Fuji, which used to attract tens of thousands of spectators before becoming a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=458125350231317" target="_blank" rel="noopener">live-stream</a> only event in 2023.</p>
<p>Opinion polls suggest that some combination of PR efforts, SDF contributions to disaster relief in Japan — most notably in the aftermath of the triple disasters of 2011 (earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown) — and the tense security situation in East Asia is warming people in Japan to their Self-Defence Forces. The SDF is now trusted more than the police, and about the same as the country’s hospitals. The question is whether and how their remit may change in the future.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/the-case-for-decolonising-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/the-case-for-decolonising-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-534259620-e1718879998830.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/the-case-for-decolonising-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/the-case-for-decolonising-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The case for decolonising philosophy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/the-case-for-decolonising-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher Harding</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The political and diplomatic context for the contemporary SDF was set by Shinzō Abe during his second term as prime minister, from 2012 to 2020. A National Security Council was created in order to centralise security policy and a National Security Strategy was developed, whose core aim was for Japan to make a “proactive contribution to peace”. The ban on Japan engaging in collective self-defence was lifted and multilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific were strengthened, notably via Japan’s membership of the “Quad” alongside the United States, Australia and India. Since 2022, Japan has also been a regular attendee at Nato meetings, where this week the threat from China was once again restated. Meanwhile, efforts have been made both to improve relations with China, with which Japan has very strong economic ties, and to ensure that the US-Japan alliance remained strong enough to withstand the doubts noisily expressed by Donald Trump while on the campaign trail and later as president.</p>
<p>Little has changed under Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, who served for many years as Abe’s foreign minister, except that worries about China, Russia and North Korea have intensified. There have long been debates about whether the Self-Defence Forces ought to develop a means of pre-emptively destroying missile launch facilities abroad rather than relying on ballistic missile defence — giving itself, to use the military lingo, a spear to go alongside the shield. At the same time, heavy investment is being made in space and cyber capabilities, and joint exercises have been carried out in recent years with the British Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Marines. The SDF has even opened its first ever overseas base at Djibouti International Airport — dubbed an “activity hub” in deference to those old, lingering fears about what Japan’s Self-Defence Forces might eventually get up to.</p>
<p>One of the greatest challenges for the SDF is the threat of China attempting to take Taiwan by force. The fear in Japan is not just of being drawn into any resulting conflict, but being drawn in only for the United States to prove unable or unwilling to look after Japan’s security should the fighting spiral out of control. Japan’s south-western islands might then be at risk, since it is from here that elements of any American response to an attack on Taiwan might be launched.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Japan’s south-western islands might then be at risk.&#8221;</div>
<p>Those south-western islands include the tiny sub-tropical paradise of Yonaguni, home to around 1,700 people, and from where it is sometimes possible to get a glimpse of Taiwan’s coastline, just over 100 kilometres away. Residents and visitors already share space with SDF personnel operating radar bases on the island, and there are plans for expansion. Earlier this year the US Ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel, paid the island a visit — the first ever to make the trip.</p>
<p>Residents of Yonaguni are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/17/yonaguni-island-japan-taiwan-china-relations" target="_blank" rel="noopener">divided on</a> what all this might mean for their island. Some fear that the military build-up here and on nearby Japanese islands will only make tensions worse. Others take a view similar to that of Prince Pickles, back in the Nineties: there can be no peace without a strong deterrent. Security analysts including Matsuda Yasuhiro, at Tokyo University, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-boosts-defenses-on-remote-islands-near-Taiwan-amid-China-fears" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argue</a> that a Chinese operation against Taiwan might include the taking of Japanese islands for use as forward operating bases. Matsuda believes that China may wait a few more years yet, for its military capabilities to grow and American interest in Taiwan to decline. At that point, Japanese people’s faith in the Self-Defence Forces may face its toughest test yet.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">607812</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Who will win a post-heroic war?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/06/who-will-win-a-post-heroic-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/06/who-will-win-a-post-heroic-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-2212371.jpg?w=537</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[A US soldier in Mosul in 2003, when America still believed in war (Scott Nelson/Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2024 23:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 20 Jun 2024 18:57:56 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[none]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=606479</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Neither side is prepared to fight]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Neither the West not its enemies are prepared to fight. Some 30 years ago, I <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20047127" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coined the phrase</a> “post-heroic warfare” to acknowledge a new phenomenon: the very sharp reduction in the tolerance of war casualties. My starting point was President Clinton’s 1993 decision to abandon Somalia after 18 American soldiers were killed in a failed raid. But in truth, post-heroic attitudes had already emerged — and not just in affluent democracies. In 1989, the Soviet Union, whose generals could once lose 15,000 men before breakfast without batting an eyelid, abandoned Afghanistan after 14,453 of its soldiers were killed over almost a decade.</p>
<p>Nor was the post-heroic phenomenon strictly related to the merits, or lack thereof, of any particular act of war. Margaret Thatcher stayed up all night writing personal letters to the families of every one of Britain’s 255 dead in the Falklands. But it did not mollify her critics, who argued that Britain should never have used force, even if it meant that Argentina would be allowed to conquer the islands.</p>
<p>Four decades later, it is even more obvious that we are living in a post-heroic age, to the great benefit of the West — at least for now. In 2022, Ukraine found itself fighting an enemy that could have mobilised its regular army formations, each with its quota of 18-year-old conscripts, and also recalled two million reservists. But Putin did neither, fearing the fury of Russia’s mothers, who even under the restrictions of Soviet rule had successfully pressed for the withdrawal from Afghanistan.</p>
<p>But for Kyiv, the new post-heroic rules are only partly advantageous, and might even result in its final defeat: for while they have prevented an all-out Russian invasion, they also severely inhibit Nato’s capacity to help Ukraine.</p>
<p>On paper, Nato has some sizeable armies, but when <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68417223" target="_blank" rel="noopener">French President Emmanuel Macron</a> called for arms and troops to be sent to Ukraine in February, his plea fell on deaf ears. Indeed, the Italian defence and foreign ministers went out of their way <a href="https://decode39.com/9029/italy-response-to-macron-soldiers/#:~:text=On%20Monday%2C%20Defence%20Minister%20Guido,soldiers%20to%20fight%20in%20Ukraine." target="_blank" rel="noopener">to publicly declare</a> that they wouldn’t send even one soldier to Ukraine, under any circumstances. In a similar vein, in spite of the severe economic damage that Houthi pirates in the Red Sea have inflicted upon European economies, only the US Navy and the Royal Navy have responded in earnest — while Italy’s navy was only allowed to send one ship, despite suffering the greatest damage from traffic being diverted from the Mediterranean. The same is true of Nato’s air forces: only the US and UK have bombed Houthi weapon stores in Yemen, while no European air force has taken any action, not even the French with their base in Djibouti next door.</p>
<p>The great question, of course, is why? Why is it that, with larger populations than ever before, our tolerance for casualties is increasingly low?</p>
<p>Back in 1994, I offered a simple theory: the wars of history were fought by “spare” male children. Even as late as the mid-20th century, the average European family had several children. In agricultural households, one male could inherit the family’s land, another might advantageously marry a land-owning wife, and one more might go into the Church — or off to war. If he failed to return, the survivors might miss him most intensely, but the family would not be extinguished. Today, however, with the average fertility of women across Europe less than two and still falling — the EU average <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was 1.46 in 2022</a> — there are no spare children.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/britain-doesnt-want-to-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/britain-doesnt-want-to-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-2156283916.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/britain-doesnt-want-to-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/britain-doesnt-want-to-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain doesn&#039;t want to go to war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/britain-doesnt-want-to-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Freddie Sayers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The extreme case here is China, with its <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2024/03/21/chinas-low-fertility-trap" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fertility rate</a> of 1.1. President Xi is, by all accounts, a bellicose man who enjoys threatening war against Taiwan. And yet, curiously, in 2020 he took <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-56121781" target="_blank" rel="noopener">eight months to reveal</a> that one PLA officer and three soldiers had died during the fighting on India’s Ladakh frontier. During that period of official silence, the families of the four were re-housed and provided with welfare payments or better jobs; the officer’s wife who taught piano in a village school was elevated to the Xi&#8217;an Conservatory of Music, with a new house to go with it. Each of the four also became the subject of dedicated media campaigns, which portrayed the youngest as cinematically good-looking and the officer as so conscientious that, up in cold Tibet, he would wake up before his soldiers to prepare hot-water bottles for them. Later, the names of the four were added to many highway bridges to remind all of their sacrifice.</p>
<p>Why the grand acts of remembrance? The answer is demographic. Thanks to China’s one-child policy, imposed in 1980 with the abundant use of forced abortions, the four deaths extinguished eight family lines.</p>
<p>The good news, then, is that because of China’s low birth rates, the post-heroic syndrome makes it unlikely that Beijing will act on its pugnacious threats. Given the regime’s most elaborate response to four combat deaths, how could it cope with the 4,000 that might be lost in one day in a war for Taiwan? Incidentally, Iran is also suffering a crisis in fertility; it was only 1.7 when <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=IR" target="_blank" rel="noopener">last measured</a>, way below the replacement rate, with many of the births among restive minority populations rather than Persians. But Tehran has found an effective remedy: it arms, trains and funds expendable Arab militias while being extremely careful with its Persian manpower</p>
<p>As for Israel, it is the only country in the world where even secular, university-educated, professionally employed, married women have two or more children on average, with more than three children on average for the religious. This <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/08/18/in-israel-birth-rates-are-converging-between-jews-and-muslims" target="_blank" rel="noopener">high fertility rate</a> is the fundamental reason why Israel is not post-heroic, and will not be forced to abandon its current military plans because of combat casualties. This is especially important because the war started so badly, and because urban combat becomes so deadly once tunnels are added to the usual perils of high-rise snipers and alley mortar crews.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;This high fertility rate is the fundamental reason why Israel is not post-heroic.&#8221;</div>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of the October 7 atrocities, most Israelis were very eager to fight, including all those reservists with families who flew back from their homes in Silicon Valley or New York to rejoin their old units. Now, however, that initial enthusiasm has waned: only the new recruits who have just finished their combat training are eager for action, while <a href="https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/743646/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">many are fed up</a> with a war that in Gaza now only makes incremental advances. As for the Israelis who face Hezbollah in the north, almost daily attacks seem set to continue without end, leading to calls for more decisive action. But the total number of Israeli war casualties, tragic as each death is for family and friends, does not weigh on the nation as it would if it had fertility rates at Chinese or even Iranian levels.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/israels-war-cabinet-was-set-up-to-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/israels-war-cabinet-was-set-up-to-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-2157140717-e1718647640522.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/israels-war-cabinet-was-set-up-to-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/israels-war-cabinet-was-set-up-to-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel&#039;s war cabinet was set up to fail</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/06/israels-war-cabinet-was-set-up-to-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For the rest of the West, meanwhile, these new post-heroic limits raise a question that nobody is willing to confront in earnest: why keep armies that will never be asked to fight?</p>
<p>The fact that so many European units have served in Afghanistan and Iraq does not prove anything at all, because in most cases their governments ensured that they would not be employed in raids or assaults, limited to cautious patrols close to their heavily fortified bases. (At least one Nato government sent intelligence agents to pay off the local Taliban to allow patrols to proceed unmolested.) As for the European troops serving in the United Nations peace-keeping force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) — established to ensure that Hezbollah stays well away from Israel’s border — they are considered war-experienced veterans when they return to their respective armies. But this overlooks the fact that UNIFIL has not even tried to keep Hezbollah from the border, for the simple reason that no UNIFIL battalion is willing to confront even the smallest Hezbollah infiltration.</p>
<p>The result is that, all across Europe, entire military institutions are colluding from top to bottom to sustain the illusion that they are capable of combat, which is now only true in rare cases, such as with Britain’s shrunken but still combative armed forces. But to some extent, the same can be said of their adversaries in Russia and China. In our current post-heroic age, everyone’s calculations of the true balance of power need to be revised.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">606479</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>America is turning into revolutionary France</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/06/america-is-turning-into-revolutionary-france/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/06/america-is-turning-into-revolutionary-france/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-2155449500.jpg?w=529</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>History</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malcom Kyeyune]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Thumbnail-Example-1-1.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[A pro-Trump protestor following last week's verdict (Joe Raedle/Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malcom Kyeyune</strong> is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 04 Jun 2024 23:01:44 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 05 Jun 2024 11:36:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Revolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=500141</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Politicians are wilfully ignoring the omens]]>
							</description>
												
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								<![CDATA[<p>One of the most dangerous problems in the West today is its vulnerability to normalcy bias: the assumption that nothing will ever happen, things will turn out fine, and there&#8217;s nothing really to worry about. Put plainly, this predisposition is a product of our brains not being able to keep up with events. We only have so much brainpower to spare at any particular moment, so if unexpected things happen too quickly, many humans simply tend to freeze up. Even as the waters were slowly seeping into the Titanic, passengers were still milling about, unsure what it all meant.</p>
<p>Out in the real world, the way to combat the paralysing effects of normalcy bias is through training and preparation. If people do their fire drills before a fire breaks out, they are much more likely to be able to spring into action; the brain can simply act on what it already knows. Similarly, learning from history is a sure-fire way to prevent normalcy bias. The only problem is that few recognise this: most people believe history has nothing to teach us about the modern day.</p>
<p>Still, with America’s great divisions only getting greater, let&#8217;s assume it does for a second. If we tried to compare the position of the United States today with that of France on the eve of the great revolution of 1789, how would the former hold up? Is it in a more stable position than the France that collapsed into revolution, or is it actually worse?</p>
<p>Let&#8217;s start with the domestic and political situation. France in the late-18th century was bitterly inegalitarian. Economic inequality coexisted with social inequality — the old feudal caste system was starting to chafe against the realities of the early modern economy — and the political system itself had basically stopped functioning. Everyone knew reform was badly needed, but passing actual legislation was impossible. Special interests had the ability to veto every change, no matter how necessary, and as 1789 approached, total political gridlock became the order of the day. The French Revolution happened not because it was inevitable, but because the political system proved completely incapable of curing its deficiencies.</p>
<p>Does this seem a bit familiar? It should, because that is precisely the situation in the United States right now. An unequal political system has essentially seized up and stopped functioning, and is now stumbling towards election between the most unpopular president in modern history and the next-most unpopular president in modern history. One of those men is clearly fading rapidly, prone to slurring his speech or forgetting where he is; the other just became the first president to be convicted of a felony. Just as in France in the 1780s, violence, protests and disenchantment seem the likeliest conclusion.</p>
<p>But how is the economy doing? France in 1789 was famously bankrupt; in fact, the bankruptcy of the French Crown was the proximate cause of the entire revolution. It borrowed heavily to fund foreign wars and domestic spending, and before long, it had to keep borrowing even more money to pay off the interest on its old debt, only to borrow even more to pay for those loans, and so on. Finally, France could borrow no more, and the crisis began in earnest.</p>
<p>And yet, when it comes to fiscal impropriety, 18th-century France simply can&#8217;t compete with modern America. The US is by far the most indebted nation in the world today in absolute terms, gorging as it does on some $1 trillion in additional debt every three months. And unlike in revolutionary France, when public pensions and social welfare simply didn’t exist, America has a supplementary “shadow debt” of around $175 trillion, representing its commitments for future welfare.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;When it comes to fiscal impropriety, 18th-century France simply can&#8217;t compete with modern America.&#8221;</div>
<p>On top of this already miserable situation, the US has to contend with another problem not faced by early modern France: deindustrialisation. On the eve of revolution, France was remarkably self-sufficient, which is why it could so easily go from a political and economic basket-case in 1789 to dominating most of Europe in 1812. By contrast, America in 2024 is <em>not</em> self-sufficient; the old industries that allowed it to dominate following the Second World War have now been sold off for scrap, and the US today is dependent on exporting dollars and importing physical goods in return. If demand for dollars drops, those physical goods cannot be quickly replaced. A much more painful period of economic readjustment will have to be undertaken in the US, while France in 1789 essentially only had to rationalise the resources it already possessed to become powerful again.</p>
<p>So, the social and political situation in contemporary America is at least comparable to that in France in 1789, while the economic situation is actually a fair bit worse. What about the military situation?</p>
<p>Well, in 1789, things didn’t look particularly good. France faced at least two big problems: first, its military was suffering from low morale and high levels of dissatisfaction. This partly had to do with the intractable divide between commoners and nobles, and partly with a series of disciplinarian reforms that were very unpopular. The second had to do with foreign policy. In 1787, Prussia invaded the Netherlands, which was supposed to be part of France&#8217;s rightful sphere of influence. Many French people wanted their leaders to defend the country’s honour against the Prussians, but Louis XVI declined — for the simple reason that France was too broke to afford a war. This failure to act like a great power didn’t just have domestic consequences; it convinced other great powers that France was becoming the sick man of Europe.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/trumps-conviction-is-an-assault-on-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/trumps-conviction-is-an-assault-on-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/GettyImages-2154613955.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/trumps-conviction-is-an-assault-on-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/trumps-conviction-is-an-assault-on-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump&#039;s conviction is an assault on democracy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/05/trumps-conviction-is-an-assault-on-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Lind</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>While these weaknesses shouldn’t be underestimated, they are in an order of magnitude less serious than those faced by the current United States. If you wanted to draw a comparison, the French Army’s disciplinarian reforms probably caused about as much discontent as the US military&#8217;s Covid-vaccine policy; not exactly a good spot to be in, but not life-threatening either. The US military, however, has significantly more pressing problems: the recruitment crisis is now so bad that it is undermining the combat readiness of entire formations. &#8220;Ghost units&#8221; — that is, units that should technically exist but practically don’t because they have no men — are now slowly proliferating across the US Army. Meanwhile, the Navy has a massive problem with chronic <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/12/01/short-staffing-sleep-deprivation-navy-gao-report/#:~:text=A%20recent%20federal%20watchdog%20audit,staffing%20is%20a%20major%20culprit." target="_blank" rel="noopener">sleep deprivation</a>, because there simply aren&#8217;t enough sailors to crew the ships to their full compliments. On top of these problems, the US military is increasingly unable to source ammunition for its weapons, and the Navy cannot build enough ships to keep itself from shrinking, nor can it now really perform scheduled repairs on the ships it has.</p>
<p>In other words, the French military had a crisis of internal culture, while the American military has a crisis of internal culture <em>and</em> a massive recruitment crisis <em>and</em> a massive logistics and sustainment crisis. On top of this, the US military is tasked with several orders of magnitude more work than the French: it has almost 1,000 bases across the world. The French failed to show up in the Netherlands in 1787 because they didn&#8217;t have enough money to pay for it; America, by contrast, has tried and failed to wage proxy war against Russia over Ukraine, and tried and failed to stop the Houthis from blockading the Suez Canal. In April, the US Army built an aid pier in Gaza as a sort of show of force, an illustration that the US military — whatever else one might say about the rest of America — was still up to the task. On Tuesday, the pier fell apart and was washed away.</p>
<p>Taken together, then, it seems that the position of the US in 2024 is much worse than that of France in 1789. Does this mean a revolution will happen?</p>
<p>It&#8217;s always easy to come up with a reason for why things will continue like they always have. That is simply how our brains work: if you&#8217;ve done your fire exercises over and over again and you suddenly smell smoke, your brain&#8217;s first reaction is likely to be &#8220;A-ha! Fire! Time to head for the fire exit!&#8221;. If you don&#8217;t know where that exit is, if you&#8217;ve never really thought about the possibility of a fire, your brain is very likely to respond to the sight and smell of smoke with an &#8220;ah, well, it can&#8217;t be that bad, right?&#8221;.</p>
<p>And perhaps, you might say, that is indeed the correct attitude to have today. Perhaps things really aren&#8217;t &#8220;that bad&#8221;. To which I would respond: but things <em>are</em> worse than were in France in 1789. All that remains to be seen is whether that simple, incontrovertible fact about our current moment leads to something or not.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">500141</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Why the West will refuse to fight</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/04/why-the-west-will-refuse-to-fight/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/04/why-the-west-will-refuse-to-fight/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-2149871375-1.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Empire</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malcom Kyeyune]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Thumbnail-Example-1-1.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[(Joe Raedle/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malcom Kyeyune</strong> is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2024 23:03:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 30 Apr 2024 15:07:56 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=496860</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Citizens won't sacrifice themselves]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Western politics is defined by a conflict that is always awkward and sometimes cringe. On the one hand, our leaders are full of loud-mouthed passion, warning that the days of peace are over and that we now need to prepare for total, generational war. On the other, it&#8217;s beyond obvious that nobody cares. Across Europe and America, politicians now openly exhort their populations to feel righteous patriotism and to answer the call of duty, but all seem to accomplish exactly nothing: our militaries are shrinking due to a lack of recruits, <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/24076378.just-17-per-cent-people-willingly-fight-uk-poll-finds/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">polling</a> shows a massive disinterest in fighting for King and Country, the young in particular remain completely unmoved. Even in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/why-ukraine-losing-russia-war/#:~:text=In%20cities%20hundreds%20of%20miles,have%20left%20the%20country%20altogether." target="_blank" rel="noopener">embattled Ukraine</a>, young men are choosing to dodge the draft and go clubbing instead.</p>
<p>How did this state of affairs come to pass? Most &#8220;analysis&#8221; starts and ends with a bit of hand-wringing about the moral decay of the youth. But this doesn&#8217;t explain much. There were countless complaints about the sad state of young people in the late 19th century — but that didn’t translate into a society-wide lack of patriotism and disinterest in defending one&#8217;s country.</p>
<p>More useful, perhaps, is the model supplied by British historian Arnold Toynbee, whose life&#8217;s work mapped the lifecycle of human empires. In particular, one concept is of interest here: the idea of the <em>internal proletariat, </em>a group of people who tend to grow in number as empires begin to stagnate and decline.</p>
<p>The internal proletariat is not a Marxist term (both Marx and Toynbee took the word &#8220;proletariat&#8221; from the Roman <em>proletarii</em>, the name of the poorest class of urban dweller). In Toynbee&#8217;s model, developed in his 12-volume <em>Study of History</em>, it denotes a group of citizens who live inside an empire, but for various structural reasons no longer benefit from it — and so are unlikely to rush to its defence. This is, after all, what happened in Rome: as the empire began to fall on hard times and the decline of the slavery-based economy started to bite, a mix of high taxes and painful labour shortages conspired to make Roman citizenship feel more like a yoke and less like a privilege. Once the barbarians came, many were disinclined to put up much resistance; and why would they?</p>
<p>A more obvious example can be found in the annals of the Aztec empire, which had subjugated a large number of peoples and tribes. When Hernán Cortés overthrew it, he did so by leading a coalition of disgruntled subjects for whom Aztec rule had few upsides. In other words, his army was made up of internal proletarians: people who lost more than they gained from the continuation of empire, even though they were formally part of it in the first place.</p>
<p>Why, more than 500 years later, is any of this relevant? Consider for a moment the recent vote on foreign aid in the US house of representatives. This caused quite a lot of bitterness on the American Right, and for quite good reason: the speaker, Mike Johnson, violated his own party&#8217;s rules in order to pass a foreign aid bill with the help of the Democrats, even though more than half of his own party was opposed to it.</p>
<p>Many, let’s not forget, believe America is heading for bankruptcy. The deficit is massive, the national debt is exploding, and underneath it all lies the underreported but truly eye-watering figure of <a href="https://fiscal.treasury.gov/files/reports-statements/financial-report/2023/02-15-2024-FR-(Final).pdf?ref=tftc.io">$175 billion</a>, which is what the US Treasury projects it will need to actually fund its social safety net. And what is America&#8217;s political class doing in the face of this looming fiscal disaster? They are quite literally borrowing money to send to Ukraine and Israel instead — a move that, in the corporate world, would be considered asset stripping. Ordinary American voters are no doubt starting to feel what the put-upon Romans did: the empire is no longer working for them.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-israel-gaza-war-has-changed-everything/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-israel-gaza-war-has-changed-everything/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-2147824202.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-israel-gaza-war-has-changed-everything/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-israel-gaza-war-has-changed-everything/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Israel-Gaza war has changed everything</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/04/the-israel-gaza-war-has-changed-everything/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Armin Rosen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Previously, such measures would have been justified with bromides about freedom and democracy, but such rhetoric no longer commands the same authority. Americans, just like Westerners in general, are <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-trump-immigration-economy-inflation-abortion-21b95914866c2af3a1e7af8e302dbe27" target="_blank" rel="noopener">checking out</a> and <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/2023/11/10/americans_dont_want_to_fight_for_their_country_anymore_992022.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">refusing</a> to do their &#8220;duty&#8221; towards rulers who have seemingly abandoned any notion of giving them anything in return. The centuries come and go, but these basic social dynamics are as true now as they were in the ancient world: the less valuable citizenship becomes, the less people are willing to stand up and fight for it.</p>
<p>What makes this situation so intractable today is that our political elites have more or less made themselves immune to the negative consequences of their own policies. They neither apologise for mistakes nor accept responsibility for them. To take just one example: the war against Ukraine was supposed to be won quickly, and those who warned about the negative economic consequences of introducing sanctions were ridiculed and marginalised. More than two years later, those measures are <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/24/russia-economy-west-sanctions-00142713" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wreaking havoc</a> on ordinary people, and yet there is seemingly no contrition whatsoever from those who got it wrong — just more calls for the plebians to sacrifice more.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Our political elites have more or less made themselves immune to the negative consequences of their own policies.&#8221;</div>
<p>Of course, to say that this is somehow a unique aspect of the Ukraine war is far from the truth: the war in Iraq, which cost the United States massive amounts of blood, sweat and treasure, is now widely recognised to have been based on lies and misinformation, and yet few were punished. It was the same story after the great financial crisis of 2008. Lack of accountability is at this point endemic.</p>
<p>Thus, we find ourselves in a situation that has much in the way of historical precedent: an insulated, out-of-touch ruling class protected from the ill effects of its own policies, and a general population that is sullenly withdrawing from public service and both mentally and physically &#8220;checking out&#8221;. Because it&#8217;s happened so often before, what happens next is not a great mystery: at some point, yet another crisis will roll along, one that the elites will simply not be able to manage without the active support of the people they rule over, only to find that said support doesn’t arrive. The terrible revolutionary years that Mexico suffered after the botched election of 1910 is one example of where this dynamic can eventually lead.</p>
<p>In another dramatic example of this dynamic playing itself out, Alexis de Toqueville took to the podium in early 1848 to warn his fellow Frenchmen that they were all &#8220;sleeping on a volcano&#8221;. Even as obvious revolutionary activity had ceased, the way in which bitterness, dissatisfaction and loss of faith in king Louis Philippe I had spread all across French society was, in de Toqueville&#8217;s mind, a sign that things could explode at any moment. And half a year later, they did: not just in France but across the majority of Europe.</p>
<p>Of course, trying to predict the specific crisis that will tip things over the edge is always a fool&#8217;s errand — in his case, de Toqueville could hardly know that some fairly insignificant political banquets would be the thing that ended up setting France on fire — but once the tinder is stacked to the ceiling, all it takes is a spark. Today, just as during de Toqueville&#8217;s time, many people still take some comfort in pointing out that people, however dissatisfied they may be, are still &#8220;just&#8221; grumbling about it over the kitchen table. But that sense of safety is illusory at best.</p>
<p>Survivors of tsunamis point out that before the wave actually hits, the water dramatically pulls back and recedes from the shore. And when that happens, one doesn’t have long to run away. For human societies entering periods of chaos, history shows a fairly similar dynamic: an increasing number of citizens choose to retreat. They stop serving and caring; they become sullen, uncooperative and uninterested in coming to society’s aid. This is not a problem of morals, nor a situation that is helped by blaming the young. Instead, the withdrawal of the people, just like the withdrawal of the shoreline, is a sign that a tsunami is approaching.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">496860</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The deception behind America&#8217;s support for Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-deception-behind-americas-support-for-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-deception-behind-americas-support-for-ukraine/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-73002055.jpg?w=519</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malcom Kyeyune]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Thumbnail-Example-1-1.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[(John Moore/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malcom Kyeyune</strong> is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2024 00:02:35 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 18 Mar 2024 00:02:35 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=493339</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Congress is looting from its own army]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Sometimes, a news story seems so ordinary that it barely garners any attention, even as it turns the world upside down. Sometimes, innocent frolicking on the surface distracts from a rot extending below. This is what happened last week, when the Biden administration announced its plans to send an additional $300 million to Ukraine, meant as a stopgap until Congress can finally pass a funding package. According to national security adviser Jake Sullivan, this aid package was made possible by &#8220;unanticipated cost savings&#8221; in various contracts with the defence industry to replace equipment already sent to Ukraine.</p>
<p>At first, it seemed like a benign piece of news. What, after all, is wrong with saving a bit of money? Yet the reality is far more complicated. What Jake Sullivan actually announced wasn&#8217;t merely a case of finding $300 million of change under a Pentagon sofa cushion, but another sordid act in the slow-rolling and underreported drama that is the ongoing collapse of the American military.</p>
<p>To understand why, it&#8217;s useful to begin with some basic facts about America&#8217;s military aid to Ukraine. When the Pentagon decided to send weapons to Kyiv, these were mostly taken from already existing stocks. This was unavoidable, for at least two reasons. First, US munitions production was wildly inadequate to cover wartime demands. Second, the lead time for new production was simply too long: many of the weapons ordered for Ukraine in 2022 would realistically only be ready for use after the war had concluded. And so, the United States stripped its own warehouses of equipment — and it didn&#8217;t stop there. In some cases, it looted ammunition and weapons from its own combat formations. In others, it stripped many of its allies, such as South Korea, of a large amount of their equipment, too.</p>
<p>All of which raises an important question: when one sends an already existing weapon to Ukraine because producing a new one is too impractical and slow, how much does that weapon really cost? Unfortunately, there isn’t a straightforward answer. For instance, some of the weapons sent to Ukraine were no longer in production, and in fact could not be produced anymore. This could be due to their electronic components being obsolete, the factories and tooling having been sold off, the manufacturer being defunct, and so on. So, while the US Army might indeed have paid around $40.000 for <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/business/2023/06/raytheon-calls-retirees-help-restart-stinger-missile-production/388067/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a Stinger missile</a> in the mid-Eighties, extrapolating the cost of one today is at best a matter of guesswork. Even in less dramatic cases, where the munitions are still in production, costs can still be subject to extremely high volatility: the price of acquiring 155mm artillery shells for Nato allies has roughly <em>quadrupled</em> since the start of the Ukraine war.</p>
<p>For America, this made it possible to send huge quantities of Nato weapons to Ukraine, while merely guesstimating the real cost of those weapons. And unsurprisingly, this has massively incentivised making optimistic estimates: the less you say the shells and rockets are worth, the more of them you can send within your allotted replacement budget. Of course, if you lowball your cost estimates, or inflation and labour scarcity mean that it is no longer profitable for the defence industry to produce at that price, the end result is a form of budgetary looting. Something has been taken away, money has in theory been allocated to replace it, but either due to naivete, corruption or malice, that money is not sufficient to actually pay for replacements. Ultimately, you’re left with a big hole in your budget, and a big hole in your military readiness. Whether costs are intentionally lowballed or simply underestimated doesn’t matter; the result is the same. The US political class, having long believed that their country can go anywhere and do anything, are simply not in the mood to take no for an answer.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Ultimately, you’re left with a big hole in your budget, and a big hole in your military readiness.&#8221;</div>
<p>Nor is budgetary raiding confined to the Ukraine war. When, for instance, Congress didn&#8217;t want to allocate funding for the extremely polarising issue of the southern border wall, the Trump administration briefly floated the idea of simply taking that money out of the US military. Elsewhere, the US Navy is currently <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/03/11/navy-postpones-several-modernization-programs-to-pay-for-operations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">planning to pay</a> for its ongoing operations in the Red Sea by taking money out of funds it previously had allocated to badly needed modernisation programmes. In other words, the Navy&#8217;s budget is being cannibalised: critical future investments are being eaten up in order to sustain daily operations.</p>
<p>Why is this happening? In the interest of brevity, it&#8217;s sufficient to point out that the US no longer even has a regular budget process. Sadly, few people grasp just how dysfunctional Congress has become these days, and what consequences this has for many important institutions. More often than not, it fails to adopt a budget at all; and even when it manages to do so, the spending bills are chronically delayed. The most central, practical upshot of this is that most US spending is on a form of autopilot. For various reasons, making changes to spending, or reacting to new events or sudden needs, is becoming near-impossible.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/02/hamburgers-will-decide-americas-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/02/hamburgers-will-decide-americas-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-485070795.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/02/hamburgers-will-decide-americas-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/02/hamburgers-will-decide-americas-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hamburgers will decide America&#039;s future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/02/hamburgers-will-decide-americas-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malcom Kyeyune</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>When people today talk about the massive level of US debt ($34.5 trillion and rising fast) or the ongoing federal budget deficit (upwards of $1.6 trillion for fiscal year 2024), they often assume that these things are problems of the future. All agree that, at some point, these fiscal problems will start to truly harm the nation’s global standing; people simply disagree about when this will start happening. Unfortunately, the reality is that the massive debt load and the federal deficit is already beginning to destroy America from within. This is not a problem of the faraway future; it is a problem in the here and now.</p>
<p>With the fiscal sword of Damocles hanging over Congress, rather than assign additional funding to cover true cost increases, the name of the game is now budget trickery and budget raiding, shuffling money from one &#8220;pool&#8221; to another. But when that money is shuffled, it generally isn&#8217;t getting replaced. The &#8220;pool&#8221; that was drained in order to furnish money for something else remains empty, awaiting a refill that might never come.</p>
<p>It is this fundamental glitch in the US system that is now manifesting in all sorts of places, behind all sorts of headlines. So, when the Pentagon discovers some $300 million in &#8220;savings&#8221;, allowing for more equipment to be sent to Ukraine, this is in fact an accounting trick. But that trick belongs to a whole family of illusions, and their effect on the US military, taken as a whole, is rapidly becoming catastrophic. Thus, we now read stories about the US National guard <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/03/05/want-reenlist-guard-consider-not-doing-it-now-bonuses-are-hold.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">temporarily cutting</a> its retention bonuses in the middle of a massive recruitment crisis, or the Air Force <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/07/11/here-are-air-force-jobs-losing-special-duty-assignment-pay.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">removing special duty pay</a> for many jobs within the service. Structural underfunding within the armed forces appears to be endemic.</p>
<p>Yet what’s particularly worrying is not even the lack of money per se, but the way in which the charade has been maintained. In the German movie <em>Goodbye Lenin</em>, the mother of an East German family falls into a coma right before the collapse of the Berlin wall. When she eventually wakes up, communism has already collapsed, and East Germany no longer exists. Her children, having been told that her mother&#8217;s heart probably can&#8217;t handle the shock of that revelation, then set out to create an illusory world around their mother. They raid pantries for older brands of foodstuffs, they put on fake news broadcasts, and they loot the attics of friends and neighbours for communist memorabilia.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/joe-biden-has-broken-the-union/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/joe-biden-has-broken-the-union/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-1980757170-e1709660407366.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/joe-biden-has-broken-the-union/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/joe-biden-has-broken-the-union/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Joe Biden has broken the Union</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/joe-biden-has-broken-the-union/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malcom Kyeyune</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Today, America increasingly resembles a sort of capitalist funhouse mirror version of this. Its political class is more of a grey-haired gerontocracy than that of the late Soviet Union, and they very much were born in a time when US wealth was limitless and US military power was without equal. Yet in order to protect that belief that nothing has changed, a much more systemic deception is being maintained; rather than pantries and attics, the US is raiding bonus funds for its sailors and soldiers and looting the money meant to maintain its ships and planes. All the while, the debts keep growing and the real budget (adjusted for inflation) keeps shrinking.</p>
<p>In <em>Goodbye Lenin</em>, maintaining the illusion that the DDR still exists becomes impossible in the end, and the ailing mother goes to her grave having realised that the state she lived her life in collapsed years ago. Whether Nancy Pelosi or Joe Biden will share that fate is an open question. For now, the slash-and-burn inside the US Navy, Army and Air Force continues, as people such as Jake Sullivan work tirelessly to make sure their fragile elders don&#8217;t discover the truth.</p>
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					<title>Will Britain lose World War Three?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/02/will-britain-lose-world-war-three/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 02 Feb 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 22 May 2024 14:11:59 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[To defeat Russia, we must pivot to air and sea]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><strong>Will 2024 be the year of a Third World War? As Russia&#8217;s war in Ukraine grinds on, the Middle East threatens to erupt, and China intensifies its military pressure on Taiwan, a global conflict seems all but inevitable.</strong></p>
<p><strong>How strange, then, that Britain’s Armed Forces are unprepared to defend their country. Over the past month, an increasing number of military insiders have been sounding the alarm, warning that, if we are to survive, we may have no choice but to enlist a “citizen army”. </strong></p>
<p><strong>The truth, however, is even more concerning. </strong></p>
<p><strong>As Aris Roussinos reveals in this Special Report, it may be too late to guarantee Britain’s survival. Decades of political indifference and dismal procurement strategies have left our Armed Forces outgunned and obsolescent. And with military insiders increasingly expecting a land conflict with Russia, Britain now faces an uncomfortable question: is the coming war already lost?</strong></p>
<h5><strong style="margin-bottom: 0;">Read on to learn about:</strong></h5>
<ul>
<li><a href="#one"><strong>Russia’s ability to expose Britain’s weakness</strong></a></li>
<li><a href="#two"><strong>The dismal state of Britain’s Armed Forces</strong></a></li>
<li><a href="#three"><strong>A catalogue of procurement fiascos</strong></a></li>
<li><a href="#four"><strong>How we were crippled by support for Ukraine</strong></a></li>
<li><a href="#five"><strong>Can Britain build a new army?</strong></a></li>
<li><a href="#six"><strong>Why we must pivot towards the air and sea</strong></a></li>
</ul>
<div><div style="left: 0; width: 100%; height: 0; position: relative; padding-bottom: 56.25%;"><iframe src="//cdn.iframe.ly/api/iframe?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutu.be%2Fj0ZvGwzo3GQ&amp;key=357d953055da7177194e1a84a2d8a5a3&amp;playerjs=1" style="border: 0; top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%; height: 100%; position: absolute;" allowfullscreen scrolling="no" allow="encrypted-media; accelerometer; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; autoplay"></iframe></div></div>
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<p>How close is Britain to all-out war? It would be comforting to assume that all the recent warnings from defence officials are mere hyperbole. But quite the opposite is true: as it stands, there is a very real risk that the British Army will be politically committed to fighting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/us/politics/europe-nato-russia-trump.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a land war against Russia in eastern Europe</a> within the next five years. Without American support, we are <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/british-army-too-weak-to-fight-in-european-war-mrm2sk839" target="_blank" rel="noopener">on course to lose</a>.<br />
<a name="continuereading"></a><br />
When the Chief of General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, claimed last week that “we need an army designed to… equip the citizen army that must follow”, the debate it produced centred on whether Britain is now too woke <a href="https://thecritic.co.uk/talk-of-conscription-is-pure-fantasy-politics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">or too ethnically diverse</a> to sustain mass conscription, while also considering <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/would-i-die-for-britain-no-thanks/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">whether the Britain of 2024 is even worth fighting for</a>. While these are valid questions, the broader context — the idea of a land war against Russia — was left largely unexamined.</p>
<p>Yet Sanders’s warning was not without precedent. In 2022, he <a href="https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2022/06/rusi-land-warfare-conference-cgs-speech/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> that this is “our 1937 moment”, in which the British state had a few short years to mobilise industry and modernise the Army on a war footing, with the aim to avert a war if possible, or at least not lose if one began. But if 2022 was 1937, by Sanders’s reckoning, 2024 is 1939 — and this work has not been done.<br />
<a name="one"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Russia will expose Britain’s weakness</strong></p>
<p>In 2022, even as Russian troops found themselves bogged down and on the back foot in Ukraine, Sanders presciently cautioned observers that “historically, Russia often starts wars badly”. Thanks to “its depth and resilience”, however, it “can suffer any number of campaigns, battles and engagements lost, regenerate and still ultimately prevail”. While Russia’s slow progress initially birthed <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-underestimated-russia-ability-to-resupply-army-troops-ammo-general-2024-1?r=US&amp;IR=T" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a crowing sense of overconfidence</a> among British commentators and Ukraine’s online cheerleaders, Sanders warned: “Putin’s declared intent recently to restore the lands of ‘historic Russia’ makes any respite temporary and the threat will become even more acute. We don’t yet know how the war in Ukraine will end, but in most scenarios, Russia will be an even greater threat to European security after Ukraine than it was before.”</p>
<figure id="attachment_497813" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-497813" style="width: 1920px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-497813 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Patrick-Sanders_1.jpg" alt="" width="1920" height="1080" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-497813" class="wp-caption-text">General Sir Patrick Sanders, Chief of the General Staff since June 2022.</figcaption></figure>
<p>A year and a half later, Ukraine is <a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/peace-in-ukraine-has-never-seemed-further-away/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">firmly on the back foot</a>, and while Russia’s gains on the ground are slow and costly, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/business/economy/russia-economy-ukraine-war.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Putin’s mobilisation</a> of his vastly larger economy and population towards the war effort mean that, over the course of the next few years, Russia’s prospects of victory will become more likely, while Ukraine’s will dwindle. To defeat Russia, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/27/biden-endgame-ukraine-00133211" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in the current reality</a>, means not recapturing lost territory but blunting the Russian advance at such cost to Putin that negotiations to freeze the conflict become a more attractive prospect than total military victory. In pursuit of this goal, Ukraine has been dependent on a constant flow of war materiel from the United States which has now ceased, and on a rapid scaling up of Europe’s military-industrial capacity that has not manifested. Just to stay in the fight, Ukraine will be forced to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3ce63abc-9a71-427b-8e11-ab5309288845" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conscript half a million men</a> from a civilian population <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-real-reason-thousands-are-fleeing-conscription-in-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">increasingly unwilling</a> to fight in a war that has caused the country, <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13758/pdf/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according to Sanders</a>, “hundreds of thousands” of casualties.</p>
<p>Indeed, the unspoken assumption in military circles is <a href="https://x.com/nicholadrummond/status/1750512367417413741?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a scenario</a> in which Ukraine loses the war against Russia, perhaps next year or the year after. And if this happens, Putin will <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-chief-sees-real-risk-of-putin-attacking-other-countries-after-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">then turn his gaze</a> to eliminating Nato as a threat to Russia by <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/polands-national-security-chief-russia-could-attack-nato-within-3-years/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">launching a war on the alliance’s eastern frontier</a>. The United States will be too preoccupied with <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/06/09/america-weapons-china-00100373" target="_blank" rel="noopener">its confrontation with China</a> to take part, and European armies, including Britain, are too under-equipped to win. As Sanders warned two years ago: “Given the commitments of the US in Asia during the Twenties and Thirties, I believe that the burden for conventional deterrence in Europe will fall increasingly to European members of Nato and the JEF [Joint Expeditionary Force].”</p>
<p>Giving evidence last summer to the Commons Defence Select Committee, the RUSI analyst <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13249/pdf/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Justin Bronk suggested</a> that Britain’s “window of vulnerability is probably late 2026 to about the end of 2028”. That is, he cautioned, “<a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-AMONSON%20&amp;%20EGLI_FEATURE%20IWD.PDF" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the maximum window of vulnerability</a> for a Chinese-American clash in the Pacific”, as, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/02/draft-pentagon-strategy-china-00129764" target="_blank" rel="noopener">due to Pentagon procurement errors</a>, this is the period in which <a href="https://news.usni.org/2022/11/29/pentagon-chinese-navy-to-expand-to-400-ships-by-2025-growth-focused-on-surface-combatants" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chinese naval power in the Pacific</a> will overmatch the American forces they are rapidly preparing to confront.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/europe-must-urgently-prepare-deter-russia-without-large-scale-us-support" target="_blank" rel="noopener">As Bronk has warned</a> elsewhere, “in the event of such a military confrontation with China in the mid-to-late 2020s, Russia will have a strong incentive to take a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to break Nato while the US cannot reinforce Europe effectively. By 2026-2028, Russia’s industry will have been at full-scale military production for years, allowing it to rebuild its increasingly battle-hardened forces.” It is because of <a href="https://nypost.com/2024/01/23/news/norway-military-chief-warns-europe-has-two-maybe-3-years-to-prepare-for-war-with-russia/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">this likely scenario</a> that prominent US strategic thinkers such as Elbridge Colby, who would be expected to play a major role in a future Trump administration, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/02/11/america-wont-defend-europe-britain-has/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have warned</a> that “America must first and foremost ensure that it can defeat China in a conflict, and Washington no longer has a military capable of fighting two concurrent wars”.</p>
<figure id="attachment_497811" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-497811" style="width: 1920px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-497811" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Elbridge-Colby.jpg" alt="" width="1920" height="1080" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-497811" class="wp-caption-text">Elbridge A. Colby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development during the Trump administration.</figcaption></figure>
<p>With a laser focus on America winning a war against China, Colby makes clear that “European Nato needs leadership” — and Britain should fulfil that role. <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13249/pdf/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bronk</a> implicitly acknowledges this, warning that: “We must plan on the danger that, if the Americans are more than occupied, they will not just be unable to reinforce Europe; they will be pulling things out… in all domains, because the threat is really huge in the Indo-Pacific. I would ask people in the country as well: how secure would you feel against Russia in Europe, given it will continue to mobilise long after Ukraine fighting stops, if the United States is not coming to save us?”</p>
<p>The only answer is: <em>Not very.</em> According to one recent study, based on the volume of artillery fire in the Ukraine war, the British Army would run out of munitions <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/british-armys-ammunition-would-last-for-only-a-week-of-war-says-royal-united-services-institute-fd2hm0gh7" target="_blank" rel="noopener">after eight days</a>.<br />
<a name="two"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>The dismal state of Britain’s Armed Forces</strong></p>
<p>If <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/11/30/putin-seems-to-be-winning-the-war-in-ukraine-for-now" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russia defeats Ukraine</a>, and then launches an incursion against Nato in Eastern Europe while the US fights <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/united-states-big-one-krepinevich" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the greatest war in its history</a> in the Pacific, then Britain is committed to fighting Russia on land in Europe without significant American help. This is not a scenario for which British defence planning has geared the Army to undertake, and is not a war the Army is currently capable of fighting.</p>
<p>Everyone is aware that the British Army is too small for its stated task. From 109,600 troops in 2000, the Army <a href="https://x.com/gregbagwell/status/1751200677873787278?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">had shrunk</a> to a mere 80,500 in 2022. As Sanders warned: “If this battle came, we would likely be outnumbered at the point of attack and fighting like hell.” And yet, in the year and a half since, the Army has shrunk to 76,950, and is on course to shrink further to 73,000. <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12248783/Head-British-Army-quits-boss-claimed-naval-officer-job.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sanders has resigned in protest</a>. To put these numbers in context, Russia has currently deployed 40,000 troops in its current operation to seize the small Ukrainian town of Avdiivka, just one front in a series of Russian offensives taking shape over the coming year. Yet it is perhaps under-appreciated that not only is the Army too small for its purpose, it is vastly under-equipped for the coming task.</p>
<p>The most sobering evidence of Britain’s shoddy preparation for our increasingly dangerous strategic environment can be found in the testimony of Armed Forces chiefs and military experts to the <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/24/defence-committee/publications" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Commons Defence Select Committee</a>. Its 2021 report on the state of Britain’s armoured capability put its conclusions in its title: <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmdfence/659/65902.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“Obsolescent and outgunned.”</a></p>
<p>As it warns: “Were the British Army to have to fight a peer adversary — a euphemism for Russia — in Eastern Europe in the next few years, whilst our soldiers would undoubtedly remain amongst the finest in the world, they would, disgracefully, be forced to go into battle in a combination of obsolescent or even obsolete armoured vehicles, most of them at least 30 years old or more, with poor mechanical reliability, very heavily outgunned by more modern missile and artillery systems and chronically lacking in adequate air defence. They would have only a handful of long-delayed, new generation vehicles, gradually trickling into the inventory, to replace them.” Due to “bureaucratic procrastination, military indecision, financial mismanagement and general ineptitude”, for which the Army’s leadership is, if anything, more responsible than the Government, “we are still some four years away from even being able to field a ‘warfighting division’, which, itself, would now be hopelessly under-equipped and denuded of even a third combat brigade”.</p>
<p>As Brigadier (Retd.) Ben Barry, Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, warned the enquiry: “The reduced UK division”, which would be Britain’s initial land contribution to a war against Russia, “has half the anti-armour capability, only 30% of the tanks of a Russian tank division, two-thirds of the armoured infantry fighting vehicles, 20% of the anti-tank guided weapons and 15% of the self-propelled artillery. It would be very difficult for that reduced division to stop a Russian tank division. A Russian tank division would seriously overmatch the reduced Third Division. ‘Overmatched’ is a very polite, clinical way of saying ‘could be defeated’.”</p>
<p>As another expert witness, the <a href="https://uklandpower.com/about/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">defence consultant Nicholas Drummond</a>, observed, Russia outguns the British Army in a number of areas: “The first is artillery. It needs to do a wholesale renewal of its artillery systems.” The second is the British Army’s “ability to fire anti-tank missiles from under armour. It does not have that ability. It urgently needs that. The third missing capability is air defence. We are woefully short, and we would get absolutely spanked if we went to war without investing there.”<br />
<a name="three"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>A catalogue of procurement fiascos</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_497784" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-497784" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-497784" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1238355140.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="715" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-497784" class="wp-caption-text">One fiasco among many (Daniel Leal &#8211; Pool/Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Since 2021, even those timelines have slipped, and capability has worsened since then. Britain’s armoured fleet consists of Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks, CVR(T) reconnaissance vehicles, Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles and FV432 Armoured Personnel Carriers. By the middle of this decade both the FV432 and CVR(T) will be approaching 70 years in service: indeed, CVR(T) was partly designed to fit between the trees in Malayan rubber plantations. Warrior and Challenger 2 entered service in the Eighties and Nineties and are also reaching the end of their working life. Yet the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ddfdfb87-b651-4eb4-92b3-1fa3e88f420d" target="_blank" rel="noopener">joint MoD and Army “fiasco”</a> of procuring their replacements has left the Army waiting for new armour that will not enter service until the end of the decade at the earliest.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-497846" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Aris-graphic-3_top-trumps-5-300x155.jpg" alt="" width="914" height="472" /></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/armys-new-ajax-tanks-make-crew-ill-and-cant-fire-shells-on-the-move-pn3wlh77v" target="_blank" rel="noopener">long-delayed Ajax Armoured Fighting vehicle</a>, whose vibrations <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9990089/Troops-injured-Armys-3-5b-Ajax-tanks-claim-hundreds-thousands-pounds-lawyers-say.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cause the troops inside debilitating injuries,</a> may <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/06/03/sort-ajax-tanks-shambles-scrap-whole-scheme-mod-told/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">enter service in 2030</a>: the Army is “cautiously optimistic” on this point. <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/12532/pdf/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">According to Select Committee evidence</a>, the upgraded Challenger 3 is expected to enter service in tiny numbers — 18 — by November 2027, and its full complement of 148 by December 2030. The wheeled Boxer family of armoured vehicles will see 27 enter service in 2027, not reaching its full complement of 623 units until 2032. As the Committee Chair Tobias Ellwood remarked: “The full complement will not come into service here until the 2030s, when we can start doing our all-arms combat. Until then, we have a mix and match of old and obsolete kit, with the stuff that is coming online.”</p>
<p>If Britain goes to war in the mid-2030s, it will do so with a small but modern armoured force. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the war may already be over by then. As Bronk warned the committee, if the MoD was tasked with providing “a backbone of European deterrence against Russia, with credible warfighting capabilities in Europe in the next three to five years”, and resourced to do so, it will still take “five to 10 years to build that force”.<br />
<a name="four"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Crippled by support for Ukraine</strong></p>
<p>If Britain goes to war with Russia within the timeframe our military leadership fears, it will do so with the Army we have, or can quickly build in the next few years. And as the RUSI analyst Jack Watling <a href="https://static.rusi.org/by_parity_and_presence_final_web_version.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned in 2020</a>, the Army we have is not equipped for the task: “The UK lacks ground-based air defences and deployable long-range precision fires… Its heavy armour is under-gunned, its protected mobility is worn out, its artillery is outranged, its logistics are under-resourced, its deployment is too slow, and its ammunition stockpiles too small to deliver the effect for which it is designed.”</p>
<p>Due to well-meaning political decisions, which have not been matched by a sense of urgency in rebuilding the Army, the situation has deteriorated further. The <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/02/23/uk-ukraine-challenger-tanks/?expand_article=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">donation of 14 Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine</a>, along with <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11703401/British-army-runs-heavy-guns-pledging-30-AS90s-Ukraine-stave-Russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">AS90 self-propelled artillery systems,</a> <a href="https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-military-mastering-m270-mlrs-and-105-mm-l118-howitzers-in-great-britain/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">M270 rocket launchers and L118 Light Guns,</a> <a href="https://mil.in.ua/en/news/fv432-bulldog-apc-heading-to-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">FV432s</a> and significant quantities of anti-armour munitions and artillery shells “will leave us temporarily weaker as an Army, there is no denying it”,<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11642011/Army-chief-writes-letter-warning-helping-Ukraine-make-troops-vulnerable.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Sanders warned a year ago</a>. “There is no doubt our choice will impact on our ability to mobilise the Army against the acute and enduring threat Russia presents and meet our Nato obligations.”</p>
<p>As Watling <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/rearming-british-army" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cautioned in 2022</a>, “UK anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) stockpiles have now been significantly depleted — having been gifted to Ukraine — leaving British units toothless. With the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-61701055" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announcement</a> that the UK’s MLRS are also going to be sent to Ukraine, the punch that was supposed to buy out the UK’s lethality in the close fight is about to be stripped from the order of battle. The already woefully inadequate stockpiles of rockets for these systems are now to be expended.” As one senior defence source <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/10/02/britain-run-out-of-arms-send-to-ukraine-says-military-chief" target="_blank" rel="noopener">told the press</a>: “We’ve given away pretty much everything we can afford to give…” As another<a href="https://news.sky.com/story/us-general-warns-british-army-no-longer-top-level-fighting-force-defence-sources-reveal-12798365" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> warned</a>: &#8220;The PM&#8217;s wartime approach is currently to cut the Army, hollow it out further by gifting [equipment to Ukraine] and with no plans to replace [the weapons] for five to seven years.&#8221;</p>
<p>Britain’s Nato commitment to the ground defence of Eastern Europe is <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2021/01/british-army-heavy-division" target="_blank" rel="noopener">an armoured division by 2025.</a> Unfortunately, this division does not exist. As RUSI observed in 2022, the “current force comprises two armoured regiments of obsolete tanks, while one brigade has been converted to a medium-weight Strike Brigade. This forms the core of the UK’s current land contribution to Nato’s conventional ‘hard power’ in Europe to deter Russia.”</p>
<p>Moreover, as <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13249/pdf/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ellwood notes</a> of those two tank brigades: “We have just one brigade deployed in the Baltic right now and it is going to take days, if not weeks, to bring that up to divisional strength. Bear in mind that if the Russians cross the border into the Baltic, that second brigade is going to be under attack all the way from the UK into the Baltic area. Our lines of communication are certainly going to be hit, and hit very hard.” In fact, it is doubtful that even the single existing brigade is currently fit for its commitment, <a href="https://x.com/FTusa284/status/1747194651335909655?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according to the defence analyst Francis Tusa</a>.</p>
<p>In the air, too, Britain will be heavily outgunned, outranged and outnumbered by its opponent. Because Nato’s SEAD capability — the ability to search and destroy enemy Surface-to-Air Missiles — <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/getting-serious-about-sead-european-air-forces-must-learn-failure-russian-air-force-over-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">is dependent on the US</a>, for the first time since midway through the Second World War, Britain cannot expect air superiority and must work on the assumption that any build-up of forces will be both visible and vulnerable far behind the front line. Under-equipped on almost every front, Britain is heading towards military defeat.<br />
<a name="five"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Can Britain build a new army?</strong></p>
<p>The question is what to do now. As long as Ukraine stays in the fight, Russia will not be able to expand the war, providing Britain and the rest of Europe with breathing space to rebuild military capacity. But enabling Ukraine to do so requires <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/seven-countries-order-ammunition-under-eu-scheme-aid-ukraine-2023-09-29/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a vast, Europe-wide effort</a> to produce munitions in the quantity sufficient for full-scale war. And in the two years since the war began, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/11/14/eu-countries-failing-to-meet-ammunition-production-demands-for-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Europe has not achieved production</a> sufficient for Ukraine’s own needs, let alone rebuilding Nato stockpiles. <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/breton-eu-countries-must-pressure-defence-industry-to-ramp-up-production-for-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Unless this work is done now</a>, the looming war will be lost almost before it has begun.</p>
<p>Even if this level of production is reached, a question mark hangs over Ukraine’s ability to conscript the manpower necessary to survive the coming war: Europe’s year or two of breathing space will be very costly in human lives for Ukraine, without even guaranteeing the country victory at the end of it. In that short space of time, Britain will need to marshal its existing resources — which means shifting its focus to training Ukrainian troops rather than gifting Ukraine our dwindling stockpiles of equipment — while converting what remains of British industry to a war economy.</p>
<p>Yet a country that cannot produce its own steel, and is dependent on nations that will be either open rivals or detached observers for much of its imports of raw materials, is hardly geared towards a wartime-level of production. In the short term, Britain could engage in a frantic spending spree, buying off-the-shelf armour from European allies, <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/british-army-should-seek-retain-armoured-capability" target="_blank" rel="noopener">as it should have done years ago</a>. But even here, whether Britain could outcompete equally panicked European allies for limited production is questionable. The <a href="https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/british-army-to-receive-archer-sphs-as-interim-capability" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent acquisition of 14 ARCHER artillery systems</a> to replace equipment donated to Ukraine shows that, while far short of the investment needed, a rapid procurement programme could swiftly bring results.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Britain needs to rapidly pool resources and production with European allies, based around a standardised, interchangeable suite of capabilities. <a href="https://x.com/nicholadrummond/status/1747227972161937838?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Drummond suggests</a> a five-year spending drive to buy Boxer armoured vehicles, anti-tank munitions, drones and long-range artillery, while increasing the Army to a size of 90,000 formed in eight brigades — all at a cost of an extra £10 billion defence spending a year, solely focused on the Army. This is a useful baseline level of thinking, but whether the political will exists is doubtful: the two controversially expensive aircraft carriers came to around £8 billion in total, while <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/25/the-guardian-view-on-a-uk-citizen-army-unpopular-and-unaffordable" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the <em>Guardian</em>’s lofty declaration</a> that defence spending “should take a place in the queue” behind council funding and fighting climate change suggests that the British political class has no understanding of what the country is very shortly going to be tasked to do, the amount of effort and pain it will take, and the level of spending it will require.<br />
<a name="six"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>A pivot towards the air and sea</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_497790" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-497790" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-497790" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-88184864-1.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="672" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-497790" class="wp-caption-text">An RAF Tornado GR4 fighter bomber (Peter Macdiarmid/Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Any future war would not be easy for Russia: the war in Ukraine has re-emphasised that, in modern warfare, the defending side <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russia-stopped-ukraines-momentum" target="_blank" rel="noopener">holds a strong advantage</a>. Britain would not fight alone: it would fight alongside the small but capable Baltic armies, currently building <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/01/19/baltic-states-to-build-new-defences-to-bolster-natos-eastern-border" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a joint defensive line</a> along the Russian border, the currently more effective French Army, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-nato-leaked-memo-defense-budget-boris-pistorius/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the German Bundeswehr</a> and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/22/poland-us-weapons-ukraine-russia/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rapidly expanding Polish army</a> (whose defence procurement and recruiting effort, at much less cost, should shame Britain), as well as Sweden, Finland and other nations. Britain’s land contribution has been so woefully managed that we should expect to play a supporting role, perhaps under European command.</p>
<p>But perhaps we should rethink the question from first principles: the Army is the weakest link in the Armed Forces, and as it stands threatens to be the weak link in Nato’s ground campaign, which itself means it will be disproportionately targeted by Russian fire. Given how things stand, should Britain be frank with the rest of Nato about the state of our Army, and shift our contribution to our better-resourced Air Force and Navy?</p>
<p>As Watling <a href="https://static.rusi.org/by_parity_and_presence_final_web_version.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned in 2022</a>: “if the UK feels it can no longer resource a war-fighting capability then this must be the starting point from which UK strategy develops, and extensive and difficult conversations with allies must be initiated.” Perhaps the time has come to warn Nato that we’re going to be late handing in our homework.</p>
<div><div style="left: 0; width: 100%; height: 0; position: relative; padding-bottom: 56.25%;"><iframe src="//cdn.iframe.ly/api/iframe?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutu.be%2Fj0ZvGwzo3GQ&amp;key=357d953055da7177194e1a84a2d8a5a3&amp;playerjs=1" style="border: 0; top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%; height: 100%; position: absolute;" allowfullscreen scrolling="no" allow="encrypted-media; accelerometer; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; autoplay"></iframe></div></div>
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<p>At some time in the 2030s — all things being well — Britain will possess a functioning Army, but until then it does not. A weak and underpowered British land commitment in Europe threatens to become a drag on Nato’s capacity, a burden rather than a gift. Should a war break out this decade, Britain has three choices: to go to war with the Army we have, and lose; to spend the next few years rapidly building up the Army, at vast cost; or to admit in good time that the Army will not be functional this decade, and shift Britain’s contribution to a European war to the air and sea. These are fundamentally political decisions, each of which will be controversial, and which require a degree of political leadership and popular legitimacy the current government, in its waning days, does not possess.</p>
<p>As the historian Robert Lyman <a href="https://x.com/robert_lyman/status/1744021201717010522?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">observes</a>: “We have opened ourselves up to a shock of very significant proportions.” This is the insufficiently-understood context in which the current conscription discourse, essentially a debate on how to quickly replace our currently-existing Army, which has been set up for defeat, exists. But unlike 1914 or 1940, there is no strategic hinterland of booming factories and willing volunteers to fall back on. There is no Empire to come to Britain’s aid, Russia’s resources will be pitted against us, and the United States will be hard-pressed with its own war against <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/china-worlds-sole-manufacturing-superpower-line-sketch-rise" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the world’s greatest industrial power.</a></p>
<p>As Watling warned two years ago: “The old British tradition of losing the early battles but winning the war does not work when it takes years to build sophisticated modern military equipment. In short, if deterrence fails, and the Army is not appropriately provisioned, there will be no comeback. There will simply be defeat.&#8221;</p>
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					<title>The curse of warrior women</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/01/the-curse-of-warrior-women/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mary Harrington]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Slay queen. (Uriel Sinai/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mary Harrington</strong> is a contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>moveincircles</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 26 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Violent militarism and sexual desire always overlap]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>If history teaches us anything, it’s that you can’t be a warrior woman without some guy wondering what you’d look like going commando. <a href="https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Herodotus/4E*.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">According</a> to Herodotus, after the Greeks defeated the Amazons, they loaded three ships with captives — only for the Amazon women to kill the ships’ crews and make landfall on coast of Scythia.</p>
<p>There they first fought with local Scythian men, only for those men to set up camp near them, creating an uneasy standoff. Herodotus recounts how the tension broke when a Scythian man met a lone Amazon woman near the camp, and sparks flew. After this, the two groups came together to form couples — though, even then, the Amazons refused to become Scythian village women, insisting their newfound husbands instead adopt their nomadic, pillaging ways.</p>
<p>The combustible cocktail of militarism and female sex appeal causes meltdowns to this day. Recently, news that 22-year-old US Air Force Second Lieutenant <a href="https://www.instagram.com/madiisabellaa/?hl=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Madison Marsh</a> had become the first active-duty soldier to be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/16/miss-america-2024-winner-madison-marsh-us-air-force" target="_blank" rel="noopener">crowned Miss America</a> caused instant media pandemonium: “She’s beauty, she’s grace, she’s bad to the bone,” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4dN1IWoy_iA&amp;ab_channel=NewsNation" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a> NewsNation.</p>
<p>Marsh is a serving servicewoman, accomplished martial artist, and Harvard graduate student as well as beauty queen: not so much “bad to the bone” as a genuinely impressive avatar of modern American respectability. Even so, does her victory really represent another step in the long march toward women being able to Have It All? In a very limited sense, perhaps. And if <a href="https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/british-public-called-up-fight-uk-war-military-chief-warns/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent mutterings</a> from the MoD about reintroducing conscription come with a side order of liberal feminism, perhaps the young women of Britain will soon be obliged to Have It All too, whether they want to or not.</p>
<p>No doubt, should this happen, some will claim it’s progress. But delving into the long history of women warriors reveals three interconnected truths. First, that female fighters are a long way from being a “stereotype-smashing” recent development. On the contrary, as far back as history reaches, there have been warrior women. And wherever such figures appear, we also find an overlap between violent militarism and sexual desire.</p>
<p>The upshot of this is that the role played in warfare by fighting women is rarely as straightforward as that of their male counterparts. Female soldiers may sometimes be ferocious fighters. But they almost always become propaganda figures as well. And in this dynamic, sex is never far from the surface — sometimes with horrifying consequences.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/virgins-get-more-done/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/virgins-get-more-done/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/4GettyImages-119943339-scaled-e1650473042409.jpeg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/virgins-get-more-done/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/virgins-get-more-done/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Virgins get more done</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/virgins-get-more-done/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In modern military history, Nazi Germany was perhaps the force most committed both to bringing women into the military, and also to keeping their roles distinct from those of men. By the end of the Second World War, the total number of female <em>Wehrmacht</em> auxiliaries had risen to some 500,000, in roles such as signalling, operating Flak guns, or freeing up men for front-line service by performing clerical and back-office work. But <em><a href="https://hist259.web.unc.edu/wehrmachthelferinnen-female-auxiliaries-of-the-german-wehrmacht-1939-1945/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Wehrmachthelferinnen</a> </em>were enjoined to serve without sacrificing their femininity, and never fought at the front.</p>
<p>By contrast, and in keeping with the Communist commitment to radical egalitarianism, the Soviet force that opposed them included many front-line female fighters. Of these, perhaps the most famous is the Ukrainian sniper <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/lady-death-red-army-lyudmila-pavlichenko" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Lyudmila Pavlichenko</a>, also known as “Lady Death”. The most lethal female sniper in history, Pavlichenko notched up 309 confirmed kills, including 36 enemy snipers, before being retired after a shrapnel wound.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.rejectedprincesses.com/princesses/lyudmila-pavlichenko" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Popular profiles of Pavlichenko</a> tend to treat her as a feminist trailblazer, albeit a dark one. <a href="https://elle.ua/ludi/interview/zhinki-na-fronti-10-zapitan-oficerci-zsu-viktorii-kravchenko/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Coverage</a> of more modern Ukrainian female soldiers participating in the country’s defence against Putin has tended to come wreathed in a similar haze of you-go-girl liberal feminism, as have recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/19/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-women-soldiers.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reports</a> from Gaza that female IDF troops will now fight on the front line for the first time. Here, we find approving sentiments about the exigencies of war “upending” sexist “preconceptions about women in combat” and celebrating the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/defense-minister-demands-rabbi-who-disparaged-female-troops-resign/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">denunciation</a> of an “ultraconservative rabbi” who said Israeli female soldiers were “not Jews”.</p>
<p>We can infer that in America-aligned conflicts, winning means defeating not just the enemy, but also sexism everywhere. But a closer look at women in war throughout history complicates this picture, revealing a danger-zone for women warriors between two very different kinds of battle. And in this sense, at least in Herodotus’s account, the Amazons are perhaps the least ambivalent case in point. As he tells it, the Amazon rapprochement with the local Scythian men seems to have been broadly consensual, after the initial outbreak of fighting. Even so, the word Herodotus uses to describe the coming-together of the Amazons and their Scythian suitors —<em> ἐϰτιλώσαντο</em> — raises modern feminist scholarly hackles because some read it as meaning “had sex with” but also “tamed”. There is a connotation not just of sexual intimacy, but also of defeat, and masculine dominance.</p>
<p>This slippage between sexual intimacy and war, between “conquest” and conquest, disturbs modern sensibilities profoundly. But it pervades the literature of love, from Herodotus and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/284173" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ovid</a> through <em>Les Liaisons Dangereuses</em> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0L7FuA8Rry8&amp;ab_channel=TheWhiteStripes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The White Stripes</a>. A woman may be temporarily presented as a military figure — but the moment she is perceived as sexually available, military war is over, and another kind of conquest is sought. And the most famous warrior woman of the Middle Ages, <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/virgins-get-more-done/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Joan of Arc</a> (1412-1431), saw this dynamic as such a grave threat to her effectiveness as a military leader that she fought almost as fiercely to defend herself against accusations of having surrendered sexually, as she did against the risk of surrendering militarily. Even after her capture, she <a href="https://www.firstthings.com/article/2024/02/joan-of-arc-gender-theorist" target="_blank" rel="noopener">enjoined</a> the English to have a woman examine her for proof of virginity. And perhaps no wonder — even more than a century later, Shakespeare’s Henry VI plays set out to smear her posthumously by <a href="https://www.opensourceshakespeare.org/views/plays/play_view.php?WorkID=henry6p1&amp;Act=2&amp;Scene=2&amp;Scope=scene">depicting</a> her as a “trull” (whore) and suggesting she tried to escape death by pretending to be pregnant.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-dark-truth-about-taylor-swift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-dark-truth-about-taylor-swift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1474485141-1-e1703590333374.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-dark-truth-about-taylor-swift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-dark-truth-about-taylor-swift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The dark truth about Taylor Swift</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/12/the-dark-truth-about-taylor-swift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This in turn reveals a second, interconnected role played by women in war: as propaganda figureheads. Though commonly depicted in armour, Joan was <a href="https://www.history.com/news/7-surprising-facts-about-joan-of-arc" target="_blank" rel="noopener">never directly involved in fighting</a>. Rather, she served as strategist and — importantly — as a rallying-point and morale-booster for scattered and battle-worn French forces who had been fighting on and off for decades by the time she appeared. In other words, Joan’s core role was less as a soldier than a symbolic figurehead — and to this end, within the moral framework of her era, the question of whether or not she remained “unconquered” was of immense significance.</p>
<p>Though the modern world is less fixated with virginity than Joan’s, more contemporary front line female soldiers also find themselves routinely confronted with questions about sexiness. On Pavlichenko’s 1942 US tour, despite her evident dedication to combat and lack of interest in being flirty, American journalists often seemed more interested in her femininity than her military achievements. She gave them short shrift, <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/lady-death-red-army-lyudmila-pavlichenko#:~:text=Pavlichenko%20stated%20that%20no%20rules,International%20Youth%20Assembly%20in%201942." target="_blank" rel="noopener">retorting</a> to a question about makeup: “Who had time to think of her shiny nose when there is a battle going on?” And when one said that the cut of her uniform made her look fat, she <a href="https://nypost.com/2018/05/12/soviet-girl-sniper-had-309-kills-and-a-best-friend-in-eleanor-roosevelt/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">replied</a> that she wished he could experience a bombing raid, as “you would immediately forget about the cut of your outfit”.</p>
<p>But, deadly though Pavlichenko was, it appeared — like Joan — that her real power still lay less as a sharp-shooter than as a symbol. Batting away crass remarks about her looks, she addressed vast crowds, had a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IEmOalZOyjU&amp;ab_channel=Davic%C3%ADnN%C3%BA%C3%B1ez" target="_blank" rel="noopener">song</a> written about her by Woody Guthrie, and helped to draw America deeper into the war. And while the modern-day Ukrainian sniper, “Lady Death”, Evgeniya Emerald, didn’t face the same salacious speculations about her sexual availability as either Joan or Pavlichenko, she nonetheless retired from combat after falling in love with a Ukrainian soldier and becoming pregnant in 2022. Even so, she has continued to serve as a propaganda figure: one who commands more than 100,000 followers on Instagram, where her more recent timeline has blended pregnancy and baby shots with <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/C0gQFzDItSk/?hl=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fundraisers</a> for the Ukrainian war effort.</p>
<p>As for the Amazons, for all that they seem to have relented of their own accord, Herodotus’s story suggests that whether men and women clash or cooperate on the literal battlefield, it’s not so easy to uncouple metaphorical conquest from the physical kind. Even Hitler’s <em>Wehrmachthelferinnen</em> were disparagingly <a href="https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/16138925/2013CenturyRphd.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">referred to</a> as “<em>Offiziersmatratzen</em>”, or “officers’ mattresses”, a reference to their supposed sexual availability.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/why-the-fairies-disappeared/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/why-the-fairies-disappeared/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-1430992686-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/why-the-fairies-disappeared/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/why-the-fairies-disappeared/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why the fairies disappeared</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/why-the-fairies-disappeared/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Such encounters gesture in turn at the other, far less consensual aspect of this link between conquest and conquest: sexual violence. However much we fly the flag for gender parity, historically, the role women have played in warfare is not just as warriors, propagandists, or some mix of the two. The other point where sex and war collide is in “conquest” not of the metaphorical, romantic kind but the brutal, violent, and violating sort.</p>
<p>No doubt there were <em>Wehrmachtshelferinnen</em> among those German women who, after the war ended, bore the brunt of the notorious mass rape of German women by Pavlichenko’s one-time fellow soldiers. &#8220;The Russian soldiers were raping every German female from eight to 80,&#8221; <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/may/01/news.features11" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> the Soviet war correspondent Natalya Gesse. &#8220;It was an army of rapists.&#8221; In this, though, the Soviet army was hardly alone. Wherever the most violent and bloodthirsty human instincts are unleashed in war, rape re-emerges as a weapon. Against this, we might wonder what we’re really asking of those women now being lionised as you-go-girl avatars for “gender equality” amid the fog of war.</p>
<p>But perhaps, from the perspective of military propaganda, it doesn’t matter either way. If, for example, the service of Israeli women on the frontlines makes inspiring and sympathetic content for a Western readership, so too does their suffering if events turn against them. When such women are <a href="https://x.com/OliLondonTV/status/1744373823300894824?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">captured</a>, and — inevitably — brutalised, their empty eyes and bloodstained faces also make for powerful propaganda.</p>
<p>Behind the cultural power of sex and war, then, lurk two dark, enduring facts. Firstly, that most men can kill most women with their bare hands, while the reverse is not true; and secondly, that most men prefer — consensually or otherwise — the other kind of conquest. Accordingly, throughout history, warrior women have played an ambivalent role in conflict: sort of fighting, but also sort of sex objects, and — in the confusing but powerful emotions this combination evokes — almost invariably vectors for propaganda.</p>
<p>I doubt there is any changing this. Whatever the blank-slatists may believe, there is likely no curing humankind of intermittent outbreaks of bloodthirstiness. And I doubt there’s much we can do either to eradicate the age-old patterns of human sexuality — even when their persistence obstructs the liberal feminist pursuit of absolute “gender equality” all the way to the battlefield. If this is so, women might ask themselves: is this kind of equality really something to fight for?</p>
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					<title>Should Britain lead the war in Yemen?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1920153598.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tom McTague]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Tom-McTague-Website.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[This is an obvious war. (Photo by Mohammad Huwais/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Tom McTague</strong> is UnHerd&#8217;s <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>TomMcTague</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is UnHerd's <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 13 Jan 2024 00:05:06 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 13 Jan 2024 00:05:06 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America First]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=496229</guid>
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								<![CDATA[We are always at the tip of the American spear]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living,” Karl Marx observed. When it comes to British military adventurism in the Middle East, that certainly rings true.</p>
<p>The recent history of British interventions in the region certainly reads like a nightmarish cycle of folly: in Iraq and Syria and Libya and beyond. And yet the cyclical nature of our national life did not start spinning with Tony Blair. It was 1839 when the East India Company first took Aden in today’s Yemen as a British base to protect shipping from the pirates then operating in the Red Sea, disrupting our trade to India. Sometimes you have to wonder whether anything ever changes.</p>
<p>For almost 130 years, Britain kept this toehold on the Arabian peninsula, before being driven out, shamefacedly, by local guerillas in 1967. Within a few months of the so-called Aden Emergency,  Britain would abandon all of its bases east of Suez, the inevitable result of Harold Wilson’s devaluation of sterling the year before. And so went Britain as a global power, and the start of its journey into Europe and our shiny new future as a normal country. Or that was the plan anyway.</p>
<p>And yet, here we are again, out of Europe and using our military power against the tribes of Yemen to protect our commercial interests and those of the rest of the Western alliance. And not only that, but now with bases once again west of Suez, established in Oman and Bahrain during the reign of David Cameron.</p>
<p>Essentially, though, we never left — Britain is still flying sorties over Syria and Iraq from our sovereign base in Cyprus. And in the case of Yemen, as I reported <a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/yemen-is-a-war-worth-fighting/">yesterday</a>, this is as obvious a war as you can get. If we can’t fight terrorists attacking our ships disrupting our economy, who can we fight? Unlike the first decade of the 2000s, when we were gripped by grand ideas of liberal interventionism, or the second, when we convinced ourselves humanitarian aid was “soft power” that actually worked, here is a straightforward conflict of interest conflict, in which our prosperity is being undermined by a ragtag band of Yemeni rebels using cheap drones to attack international container ships. If this isn’t what militaries are for, then what is?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1826914452-1-e1704978468215.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West can stop the Houthis</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rundell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This sort of intervention is the kind of thing we do. As one senior official told me, “it is in our DNA”; it is the tradition of our dead generations. Unlike most other European countries, Britain still (just about) has a military capable of taking part in such action and because we have it, we use it. We use it to project power and defend interests. We have the motive and the means to act.</p>
<p>And yet, this does not answer the question about why Britain should commit itself to having such a military force in the first place. What tangible benefit do we get from always being at the tip of the American spear in foreign policy? This was our position in Afghanistan and Iraq and it did us little good. It is the position we have taken up in support of Ukraine and it is now where we are in the fight to control the Houthis. But how do we benefit from being America’s most reliable military partner? Washington was little help during Brexit, bullied us into banning Huawei from any involvement in our critical infrastructure, and won’t even negotiate a trade deal. France and Germany, meanwhile, seem to thrive just as well without taking such risks supporting US hegemony. The Netherlands are now so small they barely have a foreign policy and yet they are far richer than us. What’s more, it’s not as if this intervention is without risk. From 2015 until very recently, a coalition of extraordinarily rich Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia spent $6 billion per month trying to defeat the Houthis — and failed. What makes us think we can do any better?</p>
<div><div style="left: 0; width: 100%; height: 0; position: relative; padding-bottom: 56.25%;"><iframe src="//cdn.iframe.ly/api/iframe?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutu.be%2FXJsnKQdodjI&amp;t&amp;key=357d953055da7177194e1a84a2d8a5a3&amp;playerjs=1" style="border: 0; top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%; height: 100%; position: absolute;" allowfullscreen scrolling="no" allow="encrypted-media; accelerometer; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; autoplay"></iframe></div></div>
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<p>The great irony is that when Britain abandoned its military bases east of Suez in 1968, those who had been championing this policy believed it would put an end to the special relationship and usher in a new European era for us. Harold Wilson’s deputy George Brown, for example, had long concluded that Britain needed to devalue the pound and abandon any pretensions to global power if we were to modernise our economy as the Labour Party had promised in its election victories in 1964 and 1966. Talking to that great icon of the Labour Left, Barbara Castle, in 1966, Brown declared that Britain would have to reject any American financial incentives to maintain its global presence, cut the cord and join Europe. “We’ve got to turn down their money,” he declared, according to an account of the conversation in Ben Pimlott’s biography of Wilson. “Pull out the troops, all of them… I want them out east of Suez. This is the decision we have got to make: break the commitment to America.”</p>
<p>At this point, remember, it was the Right, not the Left, leading the charge away from the United States. “Left versus Right had lost its old meaning,” Pimlott writes. “Anti-Americanism was a traditional Left-wing prejudice. Yet the former Leftist Wilson, in his bid to shore up the pound, had become an arch-supporter of the special relationship, against the frequently Right-wing devaluers.” Indeed, it would be Harold Wilson’s replacement as Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who would take this to its logical conclusion, becoming the first — and last — prime minister to conclude that Britain should actively reject the special relationship in order to build a new collective European approach to foreign affairs. At one summit in the US, Heath even declined a privileged briefing from the Americans because he did not want to undermine the collective European front with France and Germany that he was trying to build.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GettyImages-109891750-1-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Anarchy is coming</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And yet, here we are, half a century on, and we’re back where we have always been, fighting alongside the United States, projecting our power, while the rest of Europe watches on, benefiting. You have to wonder whether this is sustainable, particularly as Britain’s economic challenges continue to mount — just like in 1967. In the end, a nation’s commitments cannot be greater than its capabilities for very long before something snaps.</p>
<p>In some senses, then, the fundamental question facing Britain never changes, much as the fundamental nature of our foreign interventions never seem to change. “Why Britain should want to keep a world role was a difficult question,” Pimlott writes of the British government’s challenge during the Sixties. “There was confusion about whether Britain wanted to continue to be some kind of world power for reasons of national prestige; or to provide a post-imperial sense of national purpose… or simply to guarantee American financial support when the British economy got into difficulties.”</p>
<p>Today, unlike the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the question is not why we are bombing Yemen, because the answer is easy: because a militia is attacking our interests. The question this time is why we are playing such a disproportionate role when we are no longer disproportionately rich. Tradition is not a good enough answer.</p>
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					<title>Israel&#8217;s illusion of security</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/10/israels-illusion-of-security/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/10/israels-illusion-of-security/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[N.S. Lyons]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/letters2.gif?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[‘Machines don’t fight wars... Humans fight wars!’ Marcus Yam/Los Angeles Times ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>N.S. Lyons</strong> is the author of </span><a href="https://theupheaval.substack.com/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Upheaval</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on Substack.</span></p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the author of </span><a href="https://theupheaval.substack.com/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Upheaval</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on Substack.</span>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 24 Oct 2023 23:02:24 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 24 Oct 2023 23:11:06 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=489225</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Military technology has become a false idol]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Two weeks on, are we any closer to explaining the catastrophic failure of Israel’s extremely expensive, high-tech Gaza border defences to stop the Hamas attack? I’ve seen a surprising number of people, on both Right and Left, argue or imply that the swift collapse of these supposedly impenetrable defences, along with the very slow response by the Israeli military to the attack, justifies a conspiratorial explanation — e.g. that Netanyahu, or Washington, or whomever on the inside must have wanted the attack to get through, as otherwise Hamas would have had no chance.</p>
<p>I find this idea ridiculous, but also telling. Telling in that many apparently find the notion that Israeli Jews were deliberately betrayed and allowed to be murdered by their own fiercely nationalist government to be a more readily believable theory than that complex technological systems could possibly fail. This fact speaks to something important about how we moderns have come to misperceive how things work, misplace our faith in systems, and often accidentally make ourselves more rather than less vulnerable to chaos.</p>
<p>Over the last few years, Israel spent more than $1.1 billion to construct a sprawling security barrier along the entirety of its nearly 40-mile border with Gaza. This was, allegedly, to be the fence to end all fences. In addition to 20-foot-high multi-layered wire, steel, and concrete barriers, the “smart fence” integrated a vast network of cameras, motion and other sensors, radars, and remote-controlled weapon systems, all monitored by dozens of towers that served as data hubs and high-tech observation and listening-posts. An underground wall and sensor system, designed to stop infiltration by tunnels, was extended far below the earth along the whole border, at great expense. Meanwhile, Israel’s advanced, exceptionally costly “Iron Dome” missile defence system protected the skies. “The barrier is reality-changing. What happened in the past won’t happen again,” the then-IDF chief of staff Aviv Kohavi <a href="https://substack.com/redirect/8ecb6eb7-464f-4639-92c7-b9ff656f80d4?j=eyJ1IjoiMWZoZWluIn0.9I2ShlNWoNt5gEFu08FvnSNdA4t1JLFTRX8yAWdJJ40" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> at a ceremony marking its construction in 2019.</p>
<p>Some former members of the IDF have in recent days testified on social media that the fence really was a technological marvel. Not so much as a stray cat could get anywhere near the border without setting off alarms, they recalled. And the Israeli government and military certainly seem to have believed it was impenetrable, which partly explains why, by the start of this month, they had redeployed most of their regular military forces to guard the West Bank and northern border instead.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-democrats-betrayed-the-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-democrats-betrayed-the-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1423178773-1-e1697802716585.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-democrats-betrayed-the-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-democrats-betrayed-the-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Democrats betrayed the Jews</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-democrats-betrayed-the-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Mamet </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But of course, on 7 October, this great wall of silicon proved almost totally useless, overcome in a matter of minutes by Hamas, which was then left to rampage across southern Israel almost unopposed. At least 1,400 Israelis lost their lives as a result. What happened? Let’s lay aside Israel’s broader strategic intelligence failure — having been falsely convinced that Hamas had been successfully pacified and was no longer interested in attempting attacks — which this certainly was. The border’s defences were expected to detect and repel even an unexpected assault — or at least were billed as such. How and why did they fail?</p>
<p>At the simplest level, we could say the IDF was overconfident in its defences and underestimated its enemy. “The thinning of the forces [stationed near the Gaza border] seemed reasonable because of the construction of the fence and the aura they created around it, as if it were invincible, that nothing would be able to pass it,” <a href="https://substack.com/redirect/eddb5a9c-fda0-47fc-a04e-95b821e01daf?j=eyJ1IjoiMWZoZWluIn0.9I2ShlNWoNt5gEFu08FvnSNdA4t1JLFTRX8yAWdJJ40">recounts</a> Brig. Gen. Israel Ziv, a former head of the IDF’s Operations Division and ground forces commander in the south.</p>
<p>We could also say that the IDF had allowed itself to become strategically rigid and was ill-prepared to adapt flexibly when things went wrong. From the moment the fence was proposed, some military officers warned that pouring resources into it — along with the Iron Dome — was a mistake, because it would ultimately degrade the military’s ability to manoeuvre offensively and pre-emptively neutralise the enemy’s capacity to conduct attacks. Col. Yehuda Vach, commander of the IDF’s Officer Training School, warned in 2019 that “because we don’t cross the fence, the other side has become strategically stronger”, as they’d been handed operational initiative. “The enemy will seek in the next campaign to carry out an operation to kidnap soldiers and harm civilians in the towns near the fence, thus enjoying the first achievement of the campaign,” he ominously <a href="https://substack.com/redirect/ec889dcb-e27e-4985-85ba-94c21ad183da?j=eyJ1IjoiMWZoZWluIn0.9I2ShlNWoNt5gEFu08FvnSNdA4t1JLFTRX8yAWdJJ40" target="_blank" rel="noopener">predicted</a>. “The fence creates an illusion and gives a false sense of security to both the soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces and the residents near the fence,” he said.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1725071312-1-e1697734528786.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel is no longer Britain&#039;s war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>These are both classic military mistakes, warned against repeatedly by strategists from Carl von Clausewitz to Sun Tzu. In this case, however, the even greater mistake may have been that the IDF came to rely far too heavily on technological solutions, methods, and ways of thinking.</p>
<p>One of the most famous sayings of the U.S. Air Force pilot and strategist <a href="https://substack.com/redirect/55aee3eb-d328-457b-8d2a-a9d4a389fe5c?j=eyJ1IjoiMWZoZWluIn0.9I2ShlNWoNt5gEFu08FvnSNdA4t1JLFTRX8yAWdJJ40" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Col. John Boyd</a>, who helped to develop modern manoeuvre warfare, was: “People, ideas, machines — in that order!” While warfighting devices were and are important, as are doctrines, tactics, and stratagems, these are all less important than the people doing the fighting, planning, and organising — as well as being far less adaptable and reliable. As Boyd would often harangue generals in the Pentagon, usually to no avail: “Machines don’t fight wars&#8230; Humans fight wars!”</p>
<p>Boyd had seen for himself the perils of overreliance on Big Brain tech wizardry in Vietnam. The latest generation of US aircraft, designed by geniuses who insisted that the age of aerial gunfights was long over, had been stripped of their guns and manoeuvrability — and built to be flying missile and bomb platforms. But in combat, the missiles proved horrifically unreliable — and the planes were no use at all in a dogfight. When they ran into lightweight North Vietnamese MIGs, they got destroyed: the US air-to-air kill ratio fell from 10:1 in the Korean War to 1:1 in 1967.</p>
<p>While technologies can certainly offer solutions to discrete problems, they are typically not flexible and adaptable enough to function as intended when things go sideways. Moreover, fragile technological solutions can produce entirely new liabilities that did not even exist before. In the current case, the widespread reliance of the IDF’s defences on wireless data transmission became a critical weakness that the enemy was able to exploit to great effect.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/do-israels-critics-understand-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/do-israels-critics-understand-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1232901935-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/do-israels-critics-understand-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/do-israels-critics-understand-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Do Israel&#039;s critics understand Evil?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/do-israels-critics-understand-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jacob Howland</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In fact, it seems likely that Israel was actually <em>worse off</em> with all its high-tech border gadgetry than it would have been without it. These over-engineered solutions to guarding the border were not cost-effective, instead representing an opportunity cost that could have been better spent elsewhere — such as on maintaining a far greater number of disciplined, sharp-eyed soldiers with guns. When the tech failed, it was only such men who were able, eventually, to adapt and respond. By reversing Boyd’s admonition and putting machines first and people last, the IDF actively degraded the capability of those people to respond to disaster when it most mattered.</p>
<p>But even this understates the bigger problem exposed by the folly of the “smart fence”. Israel’s smart border defences should be understood as the adoption of a needlessly <em>complex system</em>. “Complexity” here must not be mistaken to just mean “complicated”. Rather, a complex system is a technical term defining a system composed of such a great quantity of component parts, in such intricate relationships of dependency and interaction with each other, that its composite behaviour in response to entropy cannot be predictively modelled.</p>
<p>When things go wrong in a complex system it can’t be easily solved, because each sub-system relies on many other sub-systems, and pulling any one lever to try to solve one problem will produce entirely unexpected effects. This means complex systems are vulnerable to <em>failure cascades</em>, in which the failure of even a single part can set off an unpredictable domino effect of further failures. Even if the original failure is fixed this cannot reverse the cascade, and the whole system may soon face catastrophic collapse.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/gaza-will-change-the-future-of-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/gaza-will-change-the-future-of-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1722744268-2-e1697558373250.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/gaza-will-change-the-future-of-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/gaza-will-change-the-future-of-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Gaza will change the future of war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/gaza-will-change-the-future-of-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Harald Malmgren and Pippa Malmgren </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is essentially what happened to Israel’s border defence system. The replacement of low-tech solutions with high-tech ones needlessly added additional layers of complexity to the system, making it more, not less, fragile. Under pressure, the system then collapsed more completely and with more devastating consequences than if a simpler, more robust system had been used.</p>
<p>This doesn’t mean, to be clear, that I think technology can never be useful. Obviously, technological change has always played an important role in the realm of war — to my disappointment, no army would be able to win today with the cheerful simplicity of the good ole’ sword and shield. But on close inspection, those technologies that have the most transformative and lasting impact are almost always those that are the most simple, robust, adaptable, and scalable, and which generally work in accord with the human element, rather than attempt to totally replace him with a complex system. The cheap little drones that Hamas used so successfully, and which have already <a href="https://substack.com/redirect/211efe27-7bae-4174-8653-c12151055168?j=eyJ1IjoiMWZoZWluIn0.9I2ShlNWoNt5gEFu08FvnSNdA4t1JLFTRX8yAWdJJ40" target="_blank" rel="noopener">revolutionised warfare</a> in Ukraine and elsewhere, are a perfect example of this.</p>
<p>This is true, too, beyond the world of warfare. In all aspects of life, we have come to worship technology and complexity for its own sake, believing it to be the sorcery that can solve our problems once and for all. Except far too often, it doesn’t — it just creates the illusion of having done so, while our own capacities have diminished and our vulnerabilities to systematic collapse have increased. In this way, technology has become a false idol, squatting in the place of or even preventing genuine human ingenuity, innovation, and adaptability.</p>
<p>Just as complex systems are vulnerable to collapse, so are empires and civilisations. And empires fall the same way most complex systems do: by becoming too complex to bear their own weight. They come to span the globe, and have too many alliances and commitments, too many “vital national interests”, too many IOUs, too many enemies, to ever handle at once. This is what “imperial overstretch” really means: not just that there is too much budgeted for the treasury to pay for, but that overall complexity has reached such a level that the empire has become impossible <a href="https://substack.com/redirect/0c4c58ae-0773-4078-b02e-d5ec2b3a839b?j=eyJ1IjoiMWZoZWluIn0.9I2ShlNWoNt5gEFu08FvnSNdA4t1JLFTRX8yAWdJJ40" target="_blank" rel="noopener">to manage</a>. Trying to solve one problem only creates another. The empire may still appear strong, but it has become fragile. The potential for even a single point of failure to ignite a catastrophic failure cascade grows more and more acute.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/can-the-pro-palestine-left-redeem-itself/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/can-the-pro-palestine-left-redeem-itself/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1715809295-e1697132112352.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/can-the-pro-palestine-left-redeem-itself/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/can-the-pro-palestine-left-redeem-itself/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can the pro-Palestine Left redeem itself?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/10/can-the-pro-palestine-left-redeem-itself/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Kat Rosenfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Today, as the United States and its allies rush with increasingly visible panic to try to put out one fire after another around the world, I’m afraid that a global failure cascade may be exactly what we’re witnessing. The number of lights blinking red is growing faster and faster as more dominos fall. If this is the case, then just solving existing problems will never be enough: every effort to fight one fire may just set off new fires. Might America, by embroiling itself in two regional wars at once, prompt China to invade Taiwan when it otherwise wouldn’t have dared, for example? It seems like a possibility. But then we can’t know for sure: growing unpredictability is now the defining feature of the system.</p>
<p>There are many people who, witnessing this chaos play out, will predictably argue that the empire needs to redouble its efforts, to yield no ground anywhere, and to show everyone the power of its “global leadership”. The encroaching jungle must be forced back everywhere because to retreat would be to demonstrate weakness and invite calamity. Needless to say, <em>doing more</em> will only add more complexity to the system, and thus more vulnerabilities. It won’t do anything to prevent or stop a failure cascade — only increase its ultimate scope, momentum, and unpredictability.</p>
<p>Naturally, a wiser method would be to simplify: to deliberately pare back commitments and overextended positions, concentrating on conserving strength and defending only the most critical nodes of the system, until the balance of capabilities and commitments can reach a stable new equilibrium. But reform of this kind is extremely difficult, as untangling the imperial Gordian Knot one thread at a time often proves to be impossible. Historically, this type of impasse is typically only ever resolved, and simplicity restored, with one decisive stroke: by systemic collapse.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p>This essay is an extract from a longer piece on <a href="https://theupheaval.substack.com/p/hard-lessons-from-israels-high-tech" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Upheaval</em></a>.</p>
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					<title>Poland&#8217;s leaders have endangered Nato</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/05/why-nato-cant-trust-poland/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/05/why-nato-cant-trust-poland/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Michal Kranz]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/author30aug.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Poland has little room for error. Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Michal Kranz</strong> is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>Michal_Kranz</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2023 23:00:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 19 May 2023 10:51:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=473875</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Politicians are putting self-interest over security]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>On 16 December 2022, the most significant territorial breach in Nato’s history took place, but the chances are you didn’t hear about it. That day — almost a month after a presumed-to-be errant Ukrainian air defence rocket made international headlines when it <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/17/europe/poland-missile-restraint-reaction-intl-hnk/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">killed two civilians</a> in southeastern Poland — another object crossed Poland’s eastern border and travelled for hundreds of kilometres before landing just west of Bydgoszcz, a mid-sized city in the North. This time, however, the incident was kept secret from the public. It wasn’t until April this year that the object was discovered, by a random passerby walking in a forest, and it wasn&#8217;t until last week that <a href="https://www.rmf24.pl/raporty/raport-wojna-z-rosja/news-news-rmf-fm-biegli-wstepnie-potwierdzili-ze-pod-bydgoszcza-s,nId,6767139#crp_state=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">military analysts determined</a> it to be a Russian Kh-55 cruise missile, capable of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/military-object-found-polish-forest-was-russian-missile-media-2023-05-10/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">carrying a nuclear warhead</a>.</p>
<p>A political blame game has since erupted in Poland. Both Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Defence Minister Mariusz Błaszczak have denied being aware of the incident when it took place, with the latter implying that members of the Polish armed forces had obfuscated it in official reports at the time — a claim which <a href="https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2023-05-12/rakieta-pod-bydgoszcza-ekspert-o-bardzo-powaznym-problemie-nasze-panstwo-zostalo-zaatakowane/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">seems unlikely</a>.</p>
<p>However, regardless of who is to blame, the episode reveals a state hierarchy vastly underprepared to protect Poland, and by extension the rest of Nato, from Russian threats. Not only did a missile manage to fly over more than half the country, including potentially over its capital Warsaw, without being shot down, but the Polish government chose to keep emergency services in the dark rather than risking attracting media attention, despite the threat to civilian lives. After it landed, authorities allegedly called off the search without locating the missile, <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/05/12/questions-after-missile-landed-in-poland-in-december-but-was-not-found-until-april/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reportedly</a> refusing to widen it for similar reasons — even though no one at that time knew what sort of payload the Kh-55 had been carrying. It’s a wonder no one was hurt.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1248090167-scaled-e1678805769122-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Moldova&#039;s war on Russian saboteurs</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The fact that the missile didn’t hit any civilian infrastructure appears to have been a stroke of luck. Some commentators in the Polish media have <a href="https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2023-05-12/rakieta-pod-bydgoszcza-ekspert-o-bardzo-powaznym-problemie-nasze-panstwo-zostalo-zaatakowane/">noted</a> that, had it continued on its course, the missile could have hit a key LNG terminal near Poland’s border with Germany, which would have endangered the region’s energy security. And if the missile’s angle of flight had been just slightly different, we may instead have witnessed an assault on Poland’s eighth-largest city, which would have seen civilian casualties and potentially the invocation of Nato’s Article 5 against Russia.</p>
<p>“This was a significantly more serious incident than anything that had happened previously,” Marek Świerczyński, the head of the security desk at the Polish research institution Polityka Insight, told me. “I imagine that all the decision-makers and military leaders who knew about this were sweating from head to toe, and were praying to all the gods they knew that this wasn’t an attack, that this wasn’t war.”</p>
<p>The Polish government has never revealed whether contact with the Russian side ever took place, and although it’s clear in hindsight that the strike was likely a mistake, there’s no knowing if Poland’s leaders were aware of this on 16 December. With this in mind, the Polish government’s lack of communication and apparent predisposition to hiding facts to save face presents a grave risk not only for Poland’s security, but for Nato’s as well. Although we do not know the full facts of the case, and possibly never will, the strike appears to have exposed vital gaps in the bloc’s security and Poland’s crisis management readiness — gaps that could be exploited by Russia.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/GettyImages-1485059981.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Ukraine war became a spectator sport</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What we do know is this: on 16 December, during a Russian missile barrage on targets across Ukraine, the Ukrainians alerted the Polish military to a potential rocket moving towards the Polish border, <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/russian-missile-wreckage-found-near-143800708.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">likely originating over Belarus</a>. The Poles scrambled fighter jets to track the missile. Soon enough, they lost it from their radar systems, as the missile was apparently only in the air over Poland for about half an hour. A <a href="https://tvn24.pl/polska/rakieta-pod-bydgoszcza-incydent-lotniczy-policja-dostala-telefon-z-wojska-wyslala-patrol-ustalenia-tvn24pl-7122044" target="_blank" rel="noopener">single local police patrol</a> was dispatched to search for the missile on the ground, and helicopters also reportedly searched from the air. Both gave up after failing to locate anything out of the ordinary, even though it remained possible that an unexploded ordinance, potentially of a nuclear variety, remained somewhere in the area.</p>
<p>Speculation has swirled about why a missile was able to fly for such a long distance over Nato territory without being neutralised. According to <a href="https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/czy-mozna-bylo-zestrzelic-rosyjska-rakieta-na-polska" target="_blank" rel="noopener">some analysts</a>, Poland’s armed forces are not equipped for continuous tracking of low-flying airborne objects when in a peacetime posture, and it would have been nearly impossible for the jets to catch up with the missile given its head start. But Poland’s missile systems, deployed along the border and around Warsaw, were not activated to meet the threat either. Poland has purchased billions of dollars’ worth of air defence systems in the past year, and already has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-technology-poland-government-united-states-4647a1c524c57db26d9aa58b7d1b53a1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">several US-made Patriot batteries</a> at its disposal. According to Świerczyński, ground-based air defence systems are historically quite poor at engaging targets like this one without a dense array of radar systems at their disposal. But while Poland is still in the process of dramatically upgrading its armed forces, the impression that the nation is unable to secure its airspace with its current capabilities, outside of wartime, is deeply concerning.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/ukraines-path-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/ukraines-path-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/GettyImages-1251938325.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/ukraines-path-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/ukraines-path-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ukraine&#039;s path to victory</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/05/ukraines-path-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There is an even more pressing problem: that political concerns were prioritised over the security of Polish citizens. According to Błaszczak, American fighter jets were dispatched along with Polish ones on 16 December. This would have necessitated communication with US allies, making it highly improbable that the defence minister wouldn’t have been made aware of the incident at the time. Nato’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg <a href="https://www.rmf24.pl/raporty/raport-rosyjska-rakieta/news-rosyjska-rakieta-w-lesie-pod-bydgoszcza-beda-zmiany-w-proced,nId,6779524#crp_state=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">appeared to confirm</a> that such communication took place this week, making it all the more perplexing that neither Polish nor Nato authorities seemed particularly interested in locating the potentially lethal rocket.</p>
<p>In conversations with Stoltenberg on Monday, Polish President Andrzej Duda implicitly admitted that the system had failed, <a href="https://www.rmf24.pl/raporty/raport-rosyjska-rakieta/news-rosyjska-rakieta-w-lesie-pod-bydgoszcza-beda-zmiany-w-proced,nId,6779524#crp_state=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">calling</a> in particular for revised Nato search procedures in such situations. It remains to be seen whether these revisions would extend to the vital procedures that should have taken place in the minutes after the missile was first detected and before it landed.</p>
<p>“The most difficult and important issue is not whether some radar detected something, or if some ground-based air defence system was ready to shoot it down,” Świerczyński said, “but if on the side of Nato and Poland there was clarity on whether this was a mistake or whether this was an attack.” According to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/13/document-leaks-discord-biggest-findings/">the recent Discord leaks about the war in Ukraine</a>, the US has considerable intelligence about Moscow’s moves in the theatre of war. But even so, it would be difficult to imagine that the Americans had advance knowledge about whether this missile had been dispatched toward Poland intentionally — let alone about its payload. Therefore, it was likely that there was no such clarity about the nature of the Kh-55, making the Polish government’s lacklustre response seem all the more irresponsible.</p>
<p>That Poland’s government has learned so few lessons from November&#8217;s rocket incident is something that bodes ill not just for Poland, but for many Nato states that have tacitly started to rely on it as a “<a href="https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2023-04-06/army-poland-nato-powidz-9719318.html">linchpin of regional security</a>”. Poland has become particularly crucial to guaranteeing the security of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-boost-military-protection-baltic-energy-infrastructure-2023-05-04/">natural gas</a> flowing from Norway through pipelines in the Baltic Sea, and to the security of the <a href="https://tvpworld.com/65965270/poland-baltic-states-declare-tightening-cooperation-on-security-ukraine">neighbouring Baltic states</a>. With such growing regional responsibilities, Poland increasingly has little room for error in the security sphere.</p>
<p>We can only hope that this incident serves as a wake-up call for Polish and Nato leaders and paves the way for greater transparency. Poland’s politicians must realise they cannot afford to sacrifice national security for the sake of their political careers. After all, it was a fortunate accident that this Kh-55 failed to cause any real damage or endanger any lives — but next time, we may not be so lucky.</p>
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					<title>Private armies are making a killing</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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							<![CDATA[A private security contractor in Afghanistan (Matt Moyer/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 12 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 14 Apr 2023 10:24:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Army]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[The Wagner Group]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=469681</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Mercenaries thrive while democracy dies]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Last week, Russia <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/03/world/europe/bakhmut-ukraine-wagner-russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> to have seized control of the city of Bakhmut after an eight-month battle with Ukrainian forces — the longest and bloodiest fight of the war so far. The assault, however, wasn’t led by the Russian Armed Forces, but by a private army that has been fighting alongside regular Russian troops since the invasion: the infamous Wagner Group.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group has always been cloaked in mystery. In the first days of the war, reports emphasised the secretive nature of its military operations, including a plot to assassinate Zelenskyy and his cabinet. Until recently, it was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/06/what-is-wagner-group-russia-mercenaries-military-contractor/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unclear</a> whether a company registered under the name “Wagner” even existed.</p>
<p>That all changed in September 2022, when Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Putin, published a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/yevgeny-prigozhin-admits-that-he-created-the-wagner-group/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">statement</a> claiming that he founded the group in 2014 to “protect the Russians” when “the genocide of the Russian population of Donbas began”. Then, in January this year, he decided to make it official, registering Wagner as a business and opening its “PMC Wagner Center” <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/17/wagner-group-becomes-legal-entity-in-russia-bbc-a79967">headquarters</a> in St Petersburg. He didn’t make any secret of its activities: as the company’s name, which also appears on the group’s logo, makes clear, the Wagner Group is a PMC: a private military company, also known as a mercenary group. The Russian government was forced to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-denies-conflict-between-wagner-defence-ministry-2023-01-16/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">acknowledge</a> its existence. The Wagner Group’s clandestine status was officially discarded.</p>
<p>In many ways, Wagner’s emergence from the shadows symbolises the changing nature of modern warfare, in which the traditional Clausewitzian paradigm — based on a <a href="https://users.sussex.ac.uk/~hafa3/kaldor.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">clear distinction</a> between public and private, friend and enemy, civil and military, combatant and non-combatant — has given way to a much messier reality, in which state armies now regularly fight alongside private and/or corporate paramilitary and mercenary groups. Today’s conflicts, even when violent in nature, often occur in a “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/todays-wars-are-fought-in-the-gray-zone-heres-everything-you-need-to-know-about-it/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">grey zone</a>” below the threshold of conventional military action; adversarial states increasingly confront each other through proxies or surrogates — including private armies — rather than through their own armed forces. And this is not just a Russian issue: the increasingly central role of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in modern warfare is a global phenomenon.</p>
<p>Private armies have existed for centuries. In recent decades, the use of mercenaries was particularly widespread during the Cold War, especially in Africa, in the context of decolonisation and the ensuing civil wars. In particular, they were widely used between the Sixties and early Eighties by the West to prevent colonies attaining independence or to destabilise or overthrow newly independent governments, such as in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44147734" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, the <a href="https://warisboring.com/in-1977-80-mercenaries-nearly-took-over-benin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Republic of Benin</a> and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Seychelles_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt#:~:text=The%201981%20Seychelles%20coup%20d,%2C%20James%20Mancham%2C%20to%20power." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Republic of Seychelles</a>.</p>
<p>At the time, there was virtually no international legal framework regarding mercenarism. It was only in 1977 that the Geneva Conventions incorporated an <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47?activeTab=undefined">international legal definition</a> of it. A mercenary, it held, is any person who is recruited to fight in an armed conflict, who actively takes a direct part in the hostilities, and who is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by one. It was a very narrow definition — but one which, at the behest of the newly independent nations, was <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA440071.pdf">specifically tailored</a> to address the use of mercenaries by the West against the post-colonial governments.</p>
<p>This led to the appointment, in 1987, of a Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries; and then, in 1989, to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, which entered into force in 2001 and added language specifying that mercenaries were people undermining legitimate governments — another clause that implicitly reflected the concerns of post-colonial countries. To this day, the Convention — which essentially copies the wording of the 1977 definition — represents the international legal definition of mercenarism.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1229447690-1-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The battle to control America&#039;s mind</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Samuels</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As a result, during the Nineties, there was a significant rise in the number of private military and security companies, who sought to distance their activities from the legal definition of mercenarism by presenting themselves as official business entities offering “legitimate” security and defence services allegedly distinguished from that of rogue mercenary groups. And, by and large, they did so successfully. In that decade alone, PMSCs <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/18294" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reportedly</a> trained the militaries of 42 nations and took part in more than 700 conflicts.</p>
<p>There was a broader backdrop to this growth, too. The growing influence of the neoliberal logic of economic rationalisation and deregulation during the Nineties also pushed states to privatise and outsource many government functions and services — including warfare. Security came to be perceived as a commodity, a service like any other that could be sold and bought in the marketplace. This was also part of a broader push towards the transfer of national prerogatives to suprastate or, as in this case, non-state actors as a way to shift the decision-making process away from democratic institutions. This trend was compounded by the global <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2325&amp;context=nwc-review" target="_blank" rel="noopener">downsizing</a> of national military forces, which also expanded the recruiting pool for PMSCs.</p>
<p>Even though PMSCs started out by mainly selling their services to developing countries and so-called failed states facing political crises, by the mid-Nineties Western governments, particularly the US, started to use them as well. By contracting them to support, train and equip the military and security forces of friendly governments — most notably in former Yugoslavia — Western powers were able to promote their interests and <a href="https://www.chaire-eppp.org/files_chaire/10_14_2009_TCE_paper.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">foreign policy agendas</a>, while avoiding becoming embroiled in unpopular conflicts, and even circumventing national or international constraints on troop deployment. By the end of the decade, NGOs (such as Oxfam) and even the United Nations had also come to rely heavily on PMSCs for their own security and even for <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248954186_Private_military_companies_A_second_best_peacekeeping_option#pf4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">peacekeeping missions</a>.</p>
<p>In this sense, PMSCs did not replace the role of states as much as integrate into them. In some cases, they even bolstered state military power, by allowing governments to engage in forms of warfare that they might otherwise have been prevented from undertaking for fear of provoking a conventional military response by more powerful states, while also escaping public scrutiny. The Wagner Group’s activities in several African and the Middle Eastern countries — such as Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic and Mali — are a good illustration, insofar as they granted Moscow a degree of plausible deniability concerning its foreign interventions and the alleged <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/01/mali-un-experts-call-independent-investigation-possible-international-crimes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">human rights abuses</a> committed by Wagner.</p>
<p>Over the years, various efforts have been made to regulate this new phenomenon at the international level, eventually leading to the establishment of a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/wg-mercenaries" target="_blank" rel="noopener">UN Working Group</a> on the use of mercenaries in 2005. But these bodies have, by and large, failed. Today, the sector remains largely unregulated and operates in a <em>de facto</em> legal vacuum. PMSCs can’t be considered soldiers or supporting militias under international humanitarian law, since they are not part of the army or in the chain of command — but nor can they usually be considered to be mercenaries under the narrow legal definition adopted by the UN. In the current conflict in Ukraine, for instance, the Wagner Group can’t be considered a mercenary group by legal standards for the simple fact that its members are nationals of one of the parties to the conflict.</p>
<p>These private military companies remain largely unaccountable, characterised by a “fundamental lack of transparency around, and oversight over [their operations]”, as the UN Working Group <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3883092?ln=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">noted</a> in 2021. Indeed, it suggested that this is sometimes “done precisely with the ominous objective of providing ‘plausible deniability’ of direct involvement in a conflict”. Greater regulation would be welcome, of course, but it wouldn’t change the fact that corporate armies intrinsically <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429296161-3/unaccountable-current-state-private-military-security-companies-marcus-hedahl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">undermine democratic accountability</a> — arguably one of the reasons that makes them attractive to states in the first place.</p>
<p>More fundamentally, what we are dealing with here is the legalisation and normalisation of mercenarism. The only real difference between traditional guns-for-hire and PMSCs is that the latter are often legally constituted businesses with corporate organisational structures. This lends them legitimacy and, theoretically, makes the monitoring of their actions and prosecution easier. But ultimately they remain, to all intents and purposes, “new modalities of mercenaries”, as even the UN General Assembly <a href="https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2022-02/PB_08-22_Mquirmi.pdf">argued</a> some years back.</p>
<p>Crucially, the UN report acknowledges that the private security and military industry is a global and growing phenomenon. While today’s focus is on Wagner, the real mercenary boom occurred during the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, the US relied heavily on PMSCs such as DynCorp and Blackwater (now known as Constellis). Indeed, at points, the number of contractors on the ground actually <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&amp;did=825564" target="_blank" rel="noopener">outnumbered</a> American troops. By 2006, there were estimated to be at least 100,000 PMSC employees in Iraq working directly for the US Department of Defense.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-492383529-1-e1679081068457-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Russia and China overtook the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And like Wagner today, these were involved in several human rights abuses in the country. <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Blackwater-Powerful-Mercenary-Revised-Updated/dp/156858394X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Blackwater</a>, for example, the most high-profile PMSC in Iraq, was involved in the massacre of 17 Iraqi civilians in 2007 (which led to the conviction of four Blackwater employees), while other PMSCs <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20034280" target="_blank" rel="noopener">were involved</a> in the Iraq Abu Ghraib prison scandal (though none faced prosecution) and <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/international-accountability-cias-torture-flights" target="_blank" rel="noopener">were alleged</a> to have participated in the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” programme — the kidnapping and forced removal of individuals to places known to torture. Despite these obvious failures, by the summer of 2020, the US had more than 20,000 contractor personnel in Afghanistan — roughly twice the number of American troops. Before that, in 2017, Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, had proposed to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/officials-worry-trump-may-back-erik-prince-plan-privatize-war-n901401">fully privatise</a> the war effort there.</p>
<p>What could possibly inspire such chutzpah? Well, although the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts are generally considered to have been a strategic blunder for the US, not to mention a humanitarian tragedy, they were a boon for the PMSC sector: up until 2016, the US State Department <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44116/11" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spent</a> $196 billion on PMSC contracts for the Iraq war, and $108 billion for the Afghan war. And business hasn’t slowed: in 2022, the PMSC sector — whose <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Mapping-the-ten-largest-known-PMSCs-by-services-offered_tbl2_297918918" target="_blank" rel="noopener">largest businesses</a> are now American or British — <a href="https://www.vantagemarketresearch.com/industry-report/private-military-security-services-market-1578" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was valued</a> at $260 billion and is projected to reach a value of around $450 billion by 2030. The largest PMSC in the world, UK-based G4S, alone employs more than 500,000 people and <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/private-military-and-security-companies-views-uk-and-russia-regulation-and-accountability" target="_blank" rel="noopener">is present</a> in more than 90 countries.</p>
<p>Should we be surprised? Ultimately, the growth of the PMSC sector is just another example of how economic transformations in recent decades have blurred the boundary between the public and private-corporate sphere to the point of making it indistinguishable. The result has been the rise of a state-corporate Leviathan which has gobbled up every sector of the economy — healthcare, banks, energy, tech — and has now taken over the field of warfare as well, at the expense of democratic control and oversight. This applies to Russia just as much as it applies to Western countries. If the conflict in Ukraine has taught us anything, it’s that war today is a bigger business than it’s ever been. No wonder peace — in Ukraine or elsewhere — seems constantly out of reach.</p>
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					<title>Elbridge Colby: China is more dangerous than Russia</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/04/elbridge-colby-china-is-more-dangerous-than-russia/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/04/elbridge-colby-china-is-more-dangerous-than-russia/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Freddie Sayers]]>
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							<![CDATA["Don't screw around"(CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Freddie Sayers</strong> is the <strong>Editor-in-Chief </strong>of UnHerd and CEO of OQS Media. He was previously Editor-in-Chief of YouGov, and founder of PoliticsHome.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>freddiesayers</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the <strong>Editor-in-Chief </strong>of UnHerd and CEO of OQS Media. He was previously Editor-in-Chief of YouGov, and founder of PoliticsHome.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 31 Mar 2023 23:10:50 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 31 Mar 2023 23:10:50 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Donald Trump's foreign policy advisor warns of a new Cold War]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Since writing Donald Trump’s National Defense Strategy in 2018, Elbridge Colby has become one of the most influential conservative defence thinkers in America. If a Republican wins the presidency in 2024 — whether Trump or DeSantis — he is likely to be at the centre of power once again. His perspective thus gives a glimpse of possible American foreign policy in the very near future.</p>
<p>When we spoke earlier this week, he set out a radically different focus for the American military — away from Ukraine, and towards a conflict with China that he believes could come as soon as 2027. Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.</p>
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<p><strong>FS: You&#8217;re neither a full isolationist, nor a full maximalist — what&#8217;s your vision for American strategy?</strong></p>
<p>EC: My perspective is that the right equilibrium for America, but certainly for a Right-of-centre political movement, is to ask what is in the American people&#8217;s concrete interest.</p>
<p>If you look at the voting bloc of the Republican Party — not to say that foreign policy should only serve them — but it’s made up of working- and middle-class Americans. I don&#8217;t think our foreign policy has served them. We&#8217;ve had this maximalist foreign policy that has proved disastrous. Americans are really tired of the “forever wars”. If you watch Fox News over the course of the day, the ad that leaves the most impressions, though maybe not the most common, is the one that&#8217;s for wounded warriors, people who were horribly wounded during Iraq or Afghanistan, or were killed in 9/11, or their widows. That is the mindset of a lot of Republican voters. I think there&#8217;s a real distrust and discontent about that foreign policy establishment, which is often the same people making the same arguments that got us into Iraq and the long war in Afghanistan. So what I&#8217;m saying is: let’s be unashamed in asking, “What&#8217;s in Americans’ interests?”</p>
<p><strong>FS: And what <em>is</em> in their interests — let’s start by asking if America is too committed to the defence of Ukraine.</strong></p>
<p>EC: The way you frame it is exactly the problem — we should be starting with China. It’s very revealing because a lot of not only the Biden administration but many Republicans of that above-the-waterline iceberg agree with you. I think <em>that</em> is the problem, because China is clearly by far the most significant challenge to the concrete, regular American interest. It&#8217;s far more formidable economically, but now also militarily.</p>
<p>The way I look at Ukraine is not in a vacuum or separate from China, but precisely through the lens of China, and through the lens of the recognition that we are neglecting the scale of the challenge posed by China. Through the defence strategy that I worked on, and other efforts, we have become more attuned to China, but it&#8217;s not a self-referential exercise. It&#8217;s more like a business. If you&#8217;re GM in the Seventies and you&#8217;re changing to adapt to Toyota, but you don&#8217;t do enough, you&#8217;re going to go out of business — or IBM <em>vis-à-vis</em> Microsoft.</p>
<p>In that context, I would say, yes, we are focusing way too much on Ukraine. I&#8217;m not in favour of just simply cutting the Ukrainians off. I think what Russia did and is doing is evil. That&#8217;s not the issue. But if our foreign policy is about Americans’ concrete interests, then we&#8217;re doing too much. We&#8217;ve already spent over $100 billion. We&#8217;ve sent equipment, which is not easily replaceable, which is relevant to the potential fight over Taiwan, and certainly the implications as it reverberates through our defence industrial base is very relevant. This stuff sounds arcane, but it&#8217;s not. For want of a shoe, the kingdom can be lost. Why are we taking risks on the most significant challenge to the US position in the world and our interest in the world in 150 years? We were a much larger economy than the Soviet Union. We alone were larger than the three Axis Powers, let alone with the British Empire and the Soviet Union. That’s the right way to look at this.</p>
<p><strong>FS: But what does that mean, practically? If you were Senior Advisor to the President right now, what would you tell him to do?</strong></p>
<p>EC: I would say, “I don&#8217;t want to talk about Ukraine right now. We&#8217;re going to talk about Taiwan and China and Asia first, and once we fix that problem to a satisfactory degree, we&#8217;ll spend time and political capital and resources on Ukraine.” I think we should put a lot more pressure and encouragement on Europe to step up and take the primary role. Why is the United States providing the vast majority of military and financial support to Ukraine — certainly in the military context, but also in the civilian area? That makes no sense. Europe is a vastly larger economic area than Russia. It has enormous latent military advantages <em>vis-à-vis</em> Russia. A lot of people have been celebrating US policy saying “American leadership is back” — I actually think this is bad. This is a failure, because if anything, it&#8217;s suffocated any effort by Europeans to stand up and say, “We&#8217;re going to take leading responsibility.” My basic attitude would be that Americans need to focus on China. We&#8217;re not just going to cut the Ukrainians off, but we are going to get the Europeans to do what we&#8217;ve been trying to get the Europeans to do since Dwight Eisenhower.</p>
<p><strong>FS: But European countries have stepped up — Germany famously has torn up its postwar neutral position.</strong></p>
<p>EC: No, the Germans haven&#8217;t, sorry.</p>
<p><strong>FS: They are committing to vast amounts of increased expenditure on arms. Even if they were committing as much as you want, it&#8217;s going to take years or even decades for them to get the kind of military that you would need. You need American power there anyway, don&#8217;t you?</strong></p>
<p>EC: Let&#8217;s get to the nub of the matter, which is: we don&#8217;t have time. It&#8217;s the assessment of the US intelligence community that Xi Jinping has ordered the Chinese military to be ready for a successful attack on Taiwan by 2027. It&#8217;s not a prediction, but that&#8217;s about as much warning as you can expect in the tough world of international politics. So we don&#8217;t have time. That&#8217;s four years away — in defence planning terms, that&#8217;s yesterday. We actually have very limited things that we can do.</p>
<p>The Germans deconstructed their military, not as a result of World War Two, but as a result of the end of history and the peace dividend. They had a very large and impressive military when the Federal Republic was seeking to defend itself against the Soviets and the Eastern Bloc. This has been a matter of policy, particularly under former chancellor Merkel — whose legacy will be ashes in her mouth. But the question is: can Germany do it? They&#8217;re not stepping up. Their military budget is going to be way below 2% of GDP again this year. The country that deserves applause, in this respect, is Poland, which is committed to almost 5%, and is actually putting its money where its mouth is.</p>
<p><strong>FS: What about the UK?</strong></p>
<p>EC: I give it a lot of credit for its ambition. Under Boris Johnson, it almost committed to 3% but I think that figure has been knocked down over time. My view is it&#8217;s great that Britain is more engaged on the continent, precisely because we are going to have to shift to Asia and the UK has very limited ability to project serious military power. if we&#8217;re looking at it from the enlightened, self-interested point of view invented in the United Kingdom, then we can&#8217;t get China and Asia wrong.</p>
<p>If China takes over Asia, in a hegemonic situation, which I think is its goal, our interests are going to suffer far more than they would suffer because Asia is a much, much larger economic area than Europe. China is a much larger and more formidable power than Russia is. So the question is, who&#8217;s going to bear the cost?</p>
<p>If Europe presents a future administration with “we just can&#8217;t do it, it&#8217;s going to take us too much time”, then, I’m sorry, you have to bear the consequence of that decision and inability. If you want to change that, we will help you, but we, the American people, are not going to allow China to take over Asia because you won&#8217;t take the steps needed to be able to defend yourselves. I think this administration is — and this is the point I made<a href="https://unherd.com/2022/11/how-america-can-save-taiwan/"> in <em>UnHerd</em> last year</a> — actually <em>not</em> helping Europeans by providing a false sense of assurance about what the United States can and will offer in the future.</p>
<p><strong>FS: Does that mean that attempting to keep back the Russian line in Ukraine or even push it further east is a dead project?</strong></p>
<p>EC: I don&#8217;t think that&#8217;s true. Obviously, you can do things at the same time. The point is that at the political level, we need to make sure that everything that is even remotely needed for a Taiwan fight is allocated — that the resources go there. We gave a bunch of Abrams tanks to Ukraine — it is pretty hard to imagine Abrams tanks being useful in a fight with China. F16s and F35s are going to have trouble against the Chinese. So I don&#8217;t see why we couldn&#8217;t give F16s potentially to the Ukrainians. But also the Russians are having real trouble. They’re not ten-feet tall; this is not the Red Army of 1945. The notion that they&#8217;re just going to roll over the Ukrainians — you don&#8217;t have to accept that, Europe. You&#8217;re a huge economic area. The problem is that Europe is not stepping up.</p>
<p><strong>FS: Where does Nato stand in this new world?</strong></p>
<p>EC: During the Cold War, the relative balance of expenditures on defence between America and Europe was closer to 50%. I think we should go back to basics, which is: it&#8217;s not about the United States. And this is where that establishment and Europe&#8217;s interests do align, because the establishment in Washington loves to be the global leader — the Madeleine Albrights, George W. Bushes. “We stand taller; we&#8217;re the indispensable nation.” That&#8217;s great for that Washington establishment, but that is not what serves the people who are watching the wounded warriors. Why are the American people spending 3.5% of their GDP? It&#8217;s really insane when you think about it, that the Americans in Duluth, or Dubuque, or Denver are spending 3.5% while the Germans — who have more responsibility to provide for collective defence than anybody by orders of magnitude — spend 1.5%. And people say: “Germans don&#8217;t feel threatened.” Do you think Americans do? The only way to make this sustainable is to have a more balanced approach. I&#8217;m not advocating that the United States get out of Nato — to the contrary. I think the treaty is great. But if you go back and look at the ratification in 1949, this was not supposed to be the outcome — in fact, this was the concern.</p>
<p><strong>FS: The treaty holds that “an attack on one is an attack on all”. That, if Russia invades Poland or Lithuania, it should be treated by America as an attack on America, and therefore would call on all of its defence capabilities.</strong></p>
<p>EC: That’s not actually what the treaty says. And, of course, we would not treat an attack on a European ally the same way as an attack on the United States itself. The whole Nato strategy during the Cold War was explicitly about <em>not</em> doing that. That was why we developed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_response">flexible response</a>, because there was a difference between an attack on Western Europe and an attack on the American homeland. Obviously there&#8217;s a <em>rhetorical</em> level at which that happens. The good thing is the Russians are not sufficiently threatening to make that a problem, because they can&#8217;t threaten European Nato, given the attrition that they&#8217;ve had in Ukraine, at least for some time.</p>
<p>That <em>is</em> a problem, much more of a problem, with China, which is, in a sense, the new Soviet Union. The point about Nato is that it&#8217;s got this post-Cold War model. We need to go back to something closer to the Cold War model, not the post-Cold War model, which is, basically, America takes care of everything. That benefited the Washington old guard, and benefited a lot of Europeans who could disarm. That doesn&#8217;t benefit the regular American people. If Nato continues in this direction, it risks breaking. My approach is designed to sustain Nato over the long term.</p>
<p><strong>FS: What makes you so sure that China is actually planning some kind of attack on Taiwan?</strong></p>
<p>EC: I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s much of a debate anymore. The leader of the most unified Chinese government since Mao Zedong has explicitly given instructions to the party-army to be ready to attack Taiwan by 2027. And the Chinese pretty much assume that the Americans would come to Taiwan&#8217;s defence. That would mean war. That&#8217;s not a prediction, but if you go back to some old British wisdom represented in the Crowe Memorandum before World War One, usually aggressive powers won&#8217;t give you a precise date and time on which they&#8217;re going to move. And Xi Jinping has actually given us that. So we can never say we haven&#8217;t been warned.</p>
<p>The other thing is: it ain’t just rhetoric. Look at the military they&#8217;re building: it is obviously designed to take on, not just Taiwan, but the United States, Japan. They’re clearly developing a global military that looks like the American military: aircraft carriers, space satellites, nuclear powered submarines. Their basing architecture: Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, Pakistan, Equatorial Guinea, which is on the Atlantic coast of Africa. This is the future. I don&#8217;t make any predictions; I have no idea what Xi Jinping is going to decide to do. But if it looks like a duck, and walks like a duck, and swims like a duck, maybe it&#8217;s a duck.</p>
<p><strong>FS: Do you think it would actually be an attack rather than just a blockade?</strong></p>
<p>EC: One of the lessons of Ukraine is: don&#8217;t screw around; don&#8217;t pussyfoot around. If you&#8217;re going to do something, do it right. If you&#8217;re going to send two missiles, send six. I think the Chinese are clearly developing the capability to do just that. Yes — it’s difficult to mount and sustain an amphibious and air invasion across the strait, 100 miles. It&#8217;s not impossible. We&#8217;ve been able to do it over the last 75 years. With the exception of the Persian Gulf War, we haven&#8217;t, but everybody knew that we could drop marines pretty much where we wanted in large parts of the world, and that nobody could do anything about it. That’s one thing we have in our favour, the difficulties of such an operation.</p>
<p>To go back historically: the Wehrmacht was much more powerful than the remaining British Army after Dunkirk, but the Germans couldn&#8217;t find a way to get across the Channel and sustain it. That’s the model to think about. But the reason I think they&#8217;re not going to do a blockade — which I think they could, it&#8217;s not impossible, and that could succeed — is that it would leave a lot to chance. It leaves a lot in the hands of the Taiwanese; it leaves a lot in the hands of the Americans. It cedes the initiative, it cedes the element of surprise, and I just don&#8217;t think the Chinese are likely to do that. I think they&#8217;re at least as smart as we are — probably smarter given our foreign policy over the last 25 years — and so I would expect them to take the most advantageous approach: something that would move below the threshold of our response.</p>
<p><strong>FS: But China is actually quite a cautious state. Why risk plunging the whole world into war?</strong></p>
<p>EC: I don&#8217;t know how the Chinese have gotten this reputation. They won the Civil War through the most brutal means possible. Then they seized Tibet through invasion. They invaded Hainan Island as part of the conclusion of the Civil War, and they were planning on invading Formosa before they directly intervened in the Korean War with huge amounts of troops and fought the Americans and the British to a standstill. They also directly attacked Vietnam in 1979 — their ambitions were to go a lot further.</p>
<p>Why would they do it now? I think they actually feel that they need to. Xi Jinping is saying that the United States is trying to strangle China. You see what he&#8217;s doing with Vladimir Putin and Russia — they regard us as being in an almost existential struggle, which is very dangerous. The reason they would use military force is to secure their place as the world&#8217;s top economy, and a large guaranteed geo-economic sphere, because they can see what&#8217;s happening with things like Aukus and so forth. There’s a lot of balancing behaviour to check China&#8217;s overweening ambitions, and if they want to get out from under that, they have a strong incentive to use military force, and they&#8217;re preparing to do so.</p>
<p><strong>FS: Let’s say that attack does happen. What do you want the American response to be?</strong></p>
<p>EC: This is a situation where being “half-pregnant” is almost the worst approach. My preferred policy — which is, of course, designed to deter and avoid a war, rather than get into it — is for the United States to act decisively and expeditiously to defeat a Chinese invasion, which would involve anti-ship, anti-air, attacking Chinese ground forces that land on the islands. It almost certainly would involve selective attacks on the Chinese mainland that would be constrained to try to help manage escalation, which would be an uncertain endeavour. The best thing in this situation is to be as prepared as humanly possible, and not to get close to the marginal edge of a conventional fight — and that&#8217;s what we&#8217;re not doing right now. I think the problem is that if we half-bake it, we could get a situation in which the Chinese do it, and we offer an unsatisfactory or unavailing response, which means we&#8217;re at war with China, but we&#8217;ve lost. That’s the worst outcome, and that’s actually going to be worse for Europe, because in that situation, there&#8217;s going to be a giant sucking sound of every US resource going to the primary theatre.</p>
<p><strong>FS: And that means greater investment in military hardware and deterrence around the South China Sea?</strong></p>
<p>EC: No, actually the reverse. I&#8217;m in the “speak softly and carry a big stick” department. I think we are peacocking right now, and probably with the strength of a peacock. It&#8217;s mostly for show. Forgive the analogy: if you remember the movie <em>Rocky 4</em>, but Dolph Lundgren is the Soviet boxing star who was all business and quiet, and then you have Apollo Creed in the American flag dancing around, then Dolph Lundgren kills him in the ring. That&#8217;s my fear of the situation that we&#8217;re heading into.</p>
<p>I actually want us to really focus on sharpening that stick, making it a bigger stick, if you will, and doing less in the way of publicity. All these people are on the island and making all these statements about Taiwan — “the CCP is evil” and all this stuff. Sure, the CCP is evil. I sympathise with Taiwan&#8217;s freedom. But we are in a super dangerous situation and should focus on hitting the gym. In Europe — I&#8217;m not picking on Ukraine — we&#8217;re not anywhere near as disciplined as we want. There’s waste in the defence budget. There are difficulties in resuscitating the defence-industrial base. But that&#8217;s the world we have to live in. We have to live in the world of now. By the way, the American people are not showing a lot of interest in dramatic increases in defence spending. This is not 1980.</p>
<p><strong>FS: Isn’t that a problem? If the American people aren’t interested and regard this as another “forever war”, they may not be with you on Taiwan.</strong></p>
<p>EC: That’s exactly the problem and that&#8217;s one of the reasons I&#8217;m so worried about Ukraine. People say we can walk and chew gum — no, we should be husbanding the voters’ resolve. We should be very careful with their money. I think we can do it. We&#8217;re already spending almost a trillion dollars on the defence budget. But then, if we&#8217;re going to do that, we can’t think we can fight a proxy war with Russia indefinitely. I&#8217;m acutely conscious of whether the American people will support a defensive Taiwan. And the Taiwanese are not helping the cause by spending less per capita on defence than the American people do, which is insane. We are really on a knife edge.</p>
<p><strong>FS: And you don&#8217;t buy the reverse argument that weakness on Ukraine would signal weakness on Taiwan?</strong></p>
<p>EC: It’s such a tendentious argument. There’s a group now, particularly more on the Left, of people who are Ukraine hawks, who are starting to call for <em>détente</em> with China. I actually appreciate that, because at least we&#8217;re seeing a choice. You find this particularly among hawks, who say, “We&#8217;re going to do Ukraine, and it&#8217;s going to show China and then we&#8217;re going to pivot.” It’s a “we&#8217;re going to win the lottery” sort of strategy.</p>
<p>Obviously China is looking to some extent, but China&#8217;s main calculation is going to be the balance of military forces <em>vis-à-vis</em> Taiwan, and how resolute the American government and the American people are <em>vis-à-vis</em> this specific conflict. It’s the same argument that defenders of the Vietnam War used: that, if we don&#8217;t win in the rice paddies of Vietnam, we&#8217;re not going to win in Europe. Europeans at the time were saying: “We actually think this is a waste; we think you&#8217;re eroding American people&#8217;s support.” And in the wake of Vietnam, initiatives like the Mansfield Amendment tried to pull US forces back from Europe. You have the Robert Kagans of the world, who just constantly harangue the American people to “fight the jungle”, and about “global liberal hegemony”. And they’re tuned out. Of course they&#8217;re not going to do that kind of thing. So what we really need to do is be much more careful and respectful and husbanding of the American people&#8217;s resolve.</p>
<p><strong>FS: Is there a chance you could make conflict more likely by anticipating it?</strong></p>
<p>EC: It’s a very serious worry. We are now in a situation, because of our neglect of Taiwan, where the Chinese clearly want to subordinate Taiwan. That is not the issue — we are not going to catalyse something that they did not already want. They’ve been working, since the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis, assiduously and carefully and ruthlessly to develop a military to do this. By neglecting our defences there, we&#8217;ve now brought it into the realm of the possible. So now we&#8217;re in the situation, frankly, that Britain faced in the late Thirties, where you&#8217;re understrength in the primary theatre. Your choices are: to be weak and essentially ensure failure — you might avoid the war, but at the cost of all your important interests. Or you can arm — but then you might precipitate, at more of an operational and tactical level, a Chinese response to get out from under this. This is a problem I take very seriously.</p>
<p><strong>FS: The alternative historical analogy is the First World War, which some historians would say that we would have been better off not having and was the worst case for everybody.</strong></p>
<p>EC: The worst case was what happened. The second-worst case would have been German dominance of Europe, which would clearly have turned against British interests very quickly. The best case, and it is directly analogous, is that Britain — and I think Britain actually behaved really admirably from a strategic perspective — reoriented its whole military and strategic policy. The historic enmity with France — it settled that issue. It settled the enmity with Russia; it cut deals with the Japanese. It cut deals with the Americans, who — for all this Special Relationship stuff — saw Great Britain as our primary opponent in the 19th century. Britain settled that as well and focused on Germany.</p>
<p>The problem is it didn&#8217;t go far enough. In the decisive moment in the July Crisis, instead of Britain saying clearly it was committed to the alliance with France, it equivocated and hedged. And, more than that, if the British had the military forces already generated and ideally deployed on the continent — that’s the lesson Nato learned in the Cold War — I think the Germans could have been dissuaded. The lesson here is that getting 90% of the way there, or 85% of the way there, is not the same as getting 100% of the way there. You have to get 100% of the way there.</p>
<p><strong>FS: How would you position the two leading Republican candidates — Trump and DeSantis — on these foreign policy questions?</strong></p>
<p>EC: Both Governor DeSantis and Trump are with strategic reality, and where the voters are, far away from that traditional blob, that traditional foreign policy establishment. You have other candidates, like former ambassador and governor Nikki Haley, who are clearly running in that lane. Of course, President Trump was the first not to just talk about China, but really do something about it. Governor DeSantis has been very clear on the primacy of the China threat. I think that that&#8217;s very telling.</p>
<p><strong>FS: Is there a difference between them?</strong></p>
<p>EC: I&#8217;m not going to characterise their positions. You can go ask them. What I will say is, if you look at what they&#8217;ve said, for instance in response to the<a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/republican-2024-hopefuls-respond-tucker-carlsons-questions-about-stance-russia-ukraine-war"> Tucker Carlson questionnaire</a>, I think they&#8217;re both focused on China and they&#8217;re both concerned about overexposure in the Ukraine context.</p>
<p>I think that the strategy that I&#8217;m advocating for is the natural one for a future Republican administration, hopefully one that would win in 2024. Bear this in mind: the next presidential term is going to include the year 2027. So if you are the president, then you are going to really face the issue: am I going to be the first president to lose a major-power war? The United States withdrew from Vietnam or withdrew from Afghanistan, but we have never lost a major-power war. That is going to be a very sobering bucket of cold water to pour on the presidential administration as they transition, or if it&#8217;s a continuation of this administration or another Democrat.</p>
<p>In that context, you need to be super-real, super-practical, because you can&#8217;t do the walk and chew gum. But you also can&#8217;t take the Rand Paul approach, because then China&#8217;s going to take over Asia. That&#8217;s clearly going to be bad. So my argument is not going to catch fire in the US Senate necessarily. But what you are going to see is, I think, a future administration saying:  “We&#8217;re living in a really tough world and we can&#8217;t afford the old shibboleths, the old religion.”</p>
<p><strong>FS: Would you work for either Trump or DeSantis?</strong></p>
<p>EC: At the end of the day, anybody who&#8217;s working in a presidential administration is a servant of the people, but, of course, is working as staff to the person who has been elected. But if somebody wanted to put something like the approach that I&#8217;m advocating for, I would be honoured to work for them. If they&#8217;re not, then I think it&#8217;s pretty clear, I&#8217;m probably not the right guy.</p>
<p>John McCain used to say that we were living in the most dangerous time, and that was in 2006. And I used to think to myself, actually, that&#8217;s probably about the safest time we&#8217;ve had since before World War One. I think today is genuinely a really, really dangerous time. Look at what Xi Jinping was caught saying to Vladimir Putin on video: that changes are coming which have not been seen in 100 years. I don&#8217;t question this man&#8217;s resolve, his seriousness, his ruthless brutality. And I think that&#8217;s the kind of attitude that we need to take — obviously not the same attitude or same approach — but that level of sobriety and seriousness is what we need as we move further into this century.</p>
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					<title>The myth of China&#8217;s military might</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-myth-of-chinas-military-might/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-myth-of-chinas-military-might/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
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							<![CDATA[Do the maths (CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 07 Mar 2023 00:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 07 Mar 2023 10:38:08 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=464698</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Beijing's defence budget doesn't tell the whole story]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The day after Li Keqiang, China&#8217;s departing Prime Minister and the last of Beijing’s moderates, called for more market liberalisation to reach this year&#8217;s 5% growth target, Xi Jinping responded by announcing a muscle-flexing 7.2% increase in China&#8217;s defence spending. That is certainly consistent with Xi&#8217;s truculent stance (he replied to Nancy Pelosi’s recent Taiwan visit with a series of ballistic missile launches), and with his official promise to the Communist Party that China will become the world&#8217;s dominant power by 2049. But what do those percentages actually mean?</p>
<p>The declared total of China&#8217;s newly increased defence budget at 1.56 trillion yuan amounts to $230 billion, according to the current exchange rate. If that were the case, it would mean that China is falling further behind the United States, whose own fiscal 2023 defence spending is increasing to $797 billion (and actually more, since that figure does not include its funding for military construction or the added help to Ukraine).</p>
<p>China&#8217;s own figure is also generally assumed by experts to be greatly understated — not by fiddling the numbers one by one, but rather by wholesale exclusions, such as the attribution of research-and-development spending to civilian budgets. Even if a commando team of elite forensic accountants were sent into action to uncover China&#8217;s actual defence spending, with another team dispatched to determine what’s missing from the US budget, we would still only have a very loose indication of how much actual military strength China and the United States hope to add.</p>
<p>But one thing can be said with absolute certainty: each side is adding less than the rising numbers imply.</p>
<p>In China&#8217;s case, a manpower shortage undercuts military spending in the PLA’s ground forces and naval forces, and soon it will affect manned air units as well. The PLA ground forces now stand at some 975,000, a very small number for a country that has 13,743 miles of borders with 14 countries — including extreme high-mountain borders where internal combustion engines lose power, jungle-covered borders where remote observation is spoiled by foliage, Russian-river borders with endemic smuggling, and the border with India&#8217;s Ladakh where an accumulation of unresolved Chinese intrusions have forced each side to deploy substantial ground forces, with at least 80,000 on the Chinese side.</p>
<p>Except for Ladakh, which now resembles a war-front, borders are not supposed to be guarded by army troops but by border police. And China did in fact have a substantial dedicated border force, but it was abolished for the same reason that the PLA ground army is so small: a crippling shortage of physically fit Chinese men willing to serve in these regions. Cities and towns, by contrast, do not seem afflicted by such severe manpower shortages, leading to the weird phenomenon on Nepal&#8217;s main border crossing to Tibet where, according to an acquaintance, a group of freezing Cantonese city policemen were checking travellers and &#8220;guarding the border&#8221;. (They said they had been &#8220;volunteered&#8221; for two months.)</p>
<p>Even the Party&#8217;s strong-arm &#8220;People&#8217;s Armed Police&#8221; — China’s equivalent of the uniformed and combat-armed French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza, and Spain&#8217;s Guardia Civil — is affected by the refusal of young Chinese men to serve. Its 1.5 million total may sound like a lot, but Italy has 150,000 Carabinieri and Finanzieri for a 60-million population — 10% of the numbers for 5% of the population. And Italy does not have to allocate vast numbers of armed men to corral and control Uyghurs and Kazakhs in Xinjiang, Tibetan herdsmen or severely disaffected Mongols.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-america-can-stop-chinas-spy-balloons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-america-can-stop-chinas-spy-balloons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GettyImages-1246870327-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-america-can-stop-chinas-spy-balloons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-america-can-stop-chinas-spy-balloons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How to stop China&#039;s spy balloons</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-america-can-stop-chinas-spy-balloons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There are no such conclusive comparisons to determine the impact of manpower shortages on the air and naval forces, but here there is another consideration: much more than the ground army, which continues to accept some recruits of low intelligence, the naval and air forces really do need recruits who can absorb technical skills quickly enough to maintain competence as their personnel turns over. High-glamour roles such as pilots will always attract enough bright people, but these days air and naval forces need high skill levels across the board, and that is the PLA&#8217;s Achilles’ heel: bright young Chinese are possibly the planet&#8217;s most civilian-minded population, least inclined to serve under the command of a military hierarchy. More money would only help to induce them to volunteer if there were a concurrent economic downturn. There is one right now, as it happens, with very high youth unemployment numbers declared to be around 20%. But that is hardly a stable remedy for a demographic and cultural reality with deep roots in Chinese history; it&#8217;s a key reason for the long sequence of foreign conquest dynasties that ruled China until 1912. They could do so because their Turkic, Manchurian and Mongol populations preferred to serve as soldiers rather than farmers, while with the Han Chinese it was the other way round.</p>
<p>As for the United States, what diminishes the value of $797 billion is much more obvious: decades of &#8220;research and development&#8221; without war against peer antagonists has generated a culture of baroque, even rococo, weapon designs, offering wonderful capability enhancements in exchange for costs only sustainable if there is no war. For example, an F-35 fighter is so extraordinarily and unrealistically complex that, since production started in 2006, a measly 890 have been delivered (as of February this year) for the US Air Force, US Navy, US Marine Corps and all foreign allies. This year, a grand total of 156 F-35s are to be produced in all versions for all countries. In other words, the F-35 is not actually a practical weapon of war because, stealth or no stealth, 100 aircraft could be lost in a single day of combat. Much the same is true of tanks, as was revealed when Canada was bountifully praised for finding <em>four</em> Leopards to donate to Ukraine — even though an army can lose 40 tanks before breakfast on a bad day.</p>
<p>In other words, because of the accumulated drift from reality, caused by decades without large wars with peer antagonists (already in 1914 it was discovered that colonial wars taught nothing of value when it came to fighting Germans), military equipment and military organisations cannot benefit proportionally from budget increases. What would really increase China’s military power is radical military reform — not increased spending on PLA forces that keep trying to imitate American forces, technologies and strategies designed long ago.</p>
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					<title>Japanese pacifism is dead</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/02/japanese-pacifism-is-dead/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/02/japanese-pacifism-is-dead/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Philip Patrick]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[Unambiguous intention. Credit: Tomohiro Ohsumi/Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Philip Patrick</strong> is a lecturer at a Tokyo university and a freelance journalist.</div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>@Pbp19Philip</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a lecturer at a Tokyo university and a freelance journalist.</div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 03 Feb 2023 00:01:48 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 03 Feb 2023 11:05:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Olaf Scholz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pacifist]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Second World War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taiwan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=459423</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Ukraine war has been a powerful catalyst]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Japan is on manoeuvres. The country for so long tethered — or protected, according to your point of view — by the “pacifist” constitution imposed upon it by the occupying Americans after the Second World War may be about to break free of its bonds. Last December, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced a doubling of the defence budget over the next five years and the acquisition of counter-strike capability to deal with the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pacifist-japan-unveils-unprecedented-320-bln-military-build-up-2022-12-16/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">perceived threat</a> from China, principally, and North Korea to a lesser extent. It is a policy shift which can only be described as seismic.</p>
<p>The plan will involve not only the upgrade of Japanese weapons but the procurement of at least 400 US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. It is a decision some have interpreted as effectively superseding the pacifist constitution and putting Japan on the road to becoming a military superpower.</p>
<p>The initiative shows how seriously Japan’s government takes the threat of an invasion of Taiwan. A Chinese takeover would be calamitous, as it would endanger the shipping lines that supply much of the country’s manufacturing materials and nearly all of its oil. With an American response far from guaranteed, the Japanese clearly feel they need to take their own precautions and signal their intentions unambiguously.</p>
<p>At present, Japan has a unified military structure, the Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF), founded in 1954. With nearly a quarter of a million personnel, its original purpose was domestic security, logistical (non-combat) support for international peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the UN, and reassuring the population that Japan wasn’t completely defenceless.</p>
<p>Japan was obliged, under Article 9 of the 1947 constitution, to renounce war as a “sovereign right of the nation” — the only country ever to do so. The exact wording stated that Japan would never again maintain “land sea or air forces”, but over time the JDSF has developed from its initial Dad’s Army-style and scale into a significant military force, with license to operate overseas, albeit in limited circumstances. The rearmament plan marks a significant step towards Article 9’s further reinterpretation, this time into virtual meaninglessness.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GettyImages-1242704016-e1674143628438-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Germany is in denial about Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Maurice Frank</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Japan’s defence from external threat has long been the preserve of US forces stationed in the country, sanctioned under the Security Treaty signed in 1951 and renewed periodically thereafter. A reorientation of this arrangement would liberate the US from much of its responsibility in the region and a good deal of the cost. The UK is also set to gain, as witnessed by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/dec/09/uk-to-develop-next-generation-fighter-jets-with-italy-and-japan" target="_blank" rel="noopener">trinational fighter jet deal</a> with Italy and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/britain-japan-sign-defence-pact-during-pm-kishida-visit-london-2023-01-11/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">new defence agreement</a> signed in January.</p>
<p>How do ordinary Japanese people feel about it? The majority, it seems, are pleased. In an opinion poll published by public broadcaster <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/12/15/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-defense-budget/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NHK last month</a>, 51% supported increased spending on the military, with 36% opposed. Where once any move to increase the radius of Japan’s military aegis would have seen thousands marching through the streets; now, there are only a few forlorn-looking protesters in Shinjuku station. The press is onside too, with even the Left-wing <em>Tokyo Shimbun</em> newspaper seemingly reconciled to the new direction.</p>
<p>The war in Ukraine has been a powerful catalyst in this change of mood. Nightly coverage of devastated Ukrainian cityscapes has reminded the Japanese that they have had their own quarrels with Russia in the past (over the Kuril Islands), and the threat of a nuclear option sends a chill down the spines of citizens of the only country to have suffered atomic destruction. Kishida himself is from Hiroshima and several members of his extended family were killed in the atomic bombing.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/07/how-the-moonies-took-over-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/07/how-the-moonies-took-over-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/GettyImages-698933-scaled-e1658246992399.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/07/how-the-moonies-took-over-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/07/how-the-moonies-took-over-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Moonies took over Japan</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/07/how-the-moonies-took-over-japan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Patrick</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As for energy, Japan imports 90% of its supply — with 9% coming from Russia — and so is especially vulnerable to disruptions to supply chains. Last May, Kishida announced the restart of the country’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/japan-hopes-restart-4-more-nuclear-reactors-by-winter-2022-07-15/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">nuclear energy programme</a>, partly suspended as a result of the Fukushima disaster. This, too, was met with little opposition. The anti-nuclear energy movement, once formidable, has weakened considerably in recent years in parallel with the anti-Article 9 revisionists. It was reported in August that <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/17/japan-support-for-nuclear-restart-is-highest-since-fukushima-disaster.html#:~:text=In%20a%20first%20for%20Japan,of%20the%20International%20Energy%20Agency." target="_blank" rel="noopener">60% of Japanese</a> supported the restart, fuelled by concerns of a winter energy crunch if the Russians were to cut off supply.</p>
<p>The personality of Kishida may be a significant factor too. It is ironic that the current Prime Minister, seen as a milder, more Left-leaning figure than his predecessor Shinzo Abe, should be the one to reposition Japan as a significant military power, realising his forebear’s lifetime goal. But Abe, whose father had volunteered to be a kamikaze pilot and whose grandfather was a Class-A war criminal, was too closely associated with the war, and with the far-Right, for his arguments for reforming Article 9 to be accepted without suspicion. He was seen by many, fairly or unfairly, as an ultra-nationalist who sought to restore Japan to its pre-war glory and military dominance.</p>
<p>Kishida, by contrast, isn’t viewed with such animosity. The mild-mannered former banker is part of the moderate Kōchikai faction within the ruling party, which has generally supported a dovish foreign policy. He has acquired a reputation as being broadly supportive of the pacifist constitution, or at least lukewarm about revising it. For this reason, the Japanese seem more willing to believe his argument — that, in an increasingly dangerous world, the rearmament is necessary and defensive in nature, and not part of a secret plan to return to the dark imperial past.</p>
<p>But can he pull it off? This is the big question. Germany has made similar promises about bolstering its lacklustre armed forces in recent months and so far, they have yielded few concrete results. Chancellor Olaf Scholz <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/germany-hike-defense-spending-scholz-says-further-policy-shift-2022-02-27/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced a €100 billion</a> increase to its defence budget nearly a year ago, with promises to make a significant contribution to Ukraine. But apart from a few military vehicles, little has been forthcoming from the Federal Republic. There have even been hints that Germany <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-backtracks-on-defense-spending-promise-warns-about-delays-ukraine-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">may resile</a> from its spending pledge altogether.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/the-cost-of-chinas-zero-child-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/the-cost-of-chinas-zero-child-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GettyImages-82190052-e1673979843608-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/the-cost-of-chinas-zero-child-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/the-cost-of-chinas-zero-child-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The cost of China&#039;s zero-child policy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/01/the-cost-of-chinas-zero-child-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Paul Morland</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The rearmament plan could unfold in a similarly nebulous fashion in Japan. Announcing a major new policy direction is one thing, turning it into a reality quite another. Kishida’s once impressive approval ratings have plunged since his controversial decision to award Shinzo Abe a state funeral. Beset by scandals that have seen four cabinet ministers resign in the last year, and with the fallout from revelations of his party’s close relationship with the cultish Unification Church ongoing, his political capital is low.</p>
<p>As for actual capital, it is unclear how the rearmament will be funded. Koichi Nakano, Professor of Comparative Politics at Tokyo’s Sophia University, says it is “most likely unaffordable”, without adding to Japan’s already-colossal public debt. The Japanese economy is in terrible shape; 2022 saw a <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/12/08/business/economy-business/japan-account-deficit-october/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disastrous current account deficit</a>, the Yen has tumbled, and that once-peculiar foreign phenomenon inflation has begun to manifest itself. Signs have gone up in shop windows apologising, in exquisitely formal language, for even modest price increases. Tax rises are the obvious answer, but polling suggests <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/majority-japanese-oppose-raising-taxes-fund-military-expansion-kyodo-2022-12-18/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Japanese are resolutely against higher taxes</a> to pay for an increased military in times like these.</p>
<p>This leaves Kishida in danger of overpromising. For along with the military buildup, he has committed himself to dealing with Japan’s demographic crisis by huge increases in welfare spending. The world’s oldest country is losing hundreds of thousands of citizens every year as the old die off and the young stubbornly refuse to procreate. By some estimates, on this trajectory, the Japanese will cease to exist in a couple of hundred years. The obvious quick fix is a massive increase in immigration, but that is still anathema to most Japanese who view their culture as a unique and delicate artefact that wouldn’t survive the rough touch of legions of imported citizens. Many Japanese are asking themselves: will it be babies, or bombs?</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">459423</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The British Army has a class problem</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2022/10/the-british-army-has-a-class-problem/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2022/10/the-british-army-has-a-class-problem/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Simon Akam]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/blue-guy.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Rah. (Kate Green/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Simon Akam </strong>is a British journalist and author of <a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/the-changing-of-the-guard/simon-akam/9781914484124" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Changing of the Guard: The British Army Since 9/11</em></a>. His coverage of the coronavirus pandemic was shortlisted for the Orwell Prize.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>simonakam</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a British journalist and author of <a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/the-changing-of-the-guard/simon-akam/9781914484124" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Changing of the Guard: The British Army Since 9/11</em></a>. His coverage of the coronavirus pandemic was shortlisted for the Orwell Prize.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 09 Oct 2022 23:00:43 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 12 Oct 2022 09:20:02 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Class]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Discrimination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diversity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=446776</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Why does it care more about race and gender?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 2008, at a birthday party in Fulham, a 26-year-old aspiring portrait painter met the adjutant of the Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment. As the section of the British Army that performs ceremonial duties with horses, the regiment is often judged on appearances. Ed Olver, a captain, explained that he was looking for an artist to update a nineteenth-century canvas.</p>
<p>In the officers’ mess at Hyde Park Barracks, there hung a depiction of the regiment’s officers from 1857. It showed an all-male, blue-blooded ensemble, in elaborate dress. The new painting was to take the same format, but was meant to showcase how the Household Cavalry — traditionally the socially “smartest” section of the British Army — had changed. The unit now had black and Sikh officers. In common with other infantry and armoured units at the time, there were still no women formally within the regiment, but there were some working with it, including a vet.</p>
<p>The young painter, Louise Pragnell, agreed to take on the project. In time, the huge 3m-by-1m painting almost drove her insane. The resulting image also embodied the British Army’s confused attitude to diversity in the 21st century.</p>
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<p>Olver explained the concept: “We’ve got these two women here, and we’ve got a Sikh and we’ve got two black guys.” The sitting took place in May 2008 at the barracks south of the Serpentine. The 25 subjects wore a variety of dress, from ceremonial “state kit” with its gleaming breastplate to the scarlet bum-freezer jacket of mess kit, service dress, or combats. Some eschewed uniform altogether, coming in polo kit, hunting gear and Ascot tails. There was a strong equine theme.</p>
<p>As a message, the scene was a mixed one: we have black people, it said. We have women. But we’re all still really posh. Notably, both the black officers — one Ghanaian, the other Zimbabwean — spoke with received pronunciation. Meanwhile, one sitter liked the idea of a soldier servant pouring him a glass of champagne while he stared imperiously in the other direction. That hardly seemed to concur with the diversity message, but Pragnell included it.</p>
<p>I’m always reminded of these mixed messages, whenever a row erupts about diversity in the British military. In August, the head of Royal Air Force recruitment resigned, reportedly due to a focus on hitting “impossible” diversity targets. (In response James Heappey, the armed forces minister, denied claims that job offers for white men had been put on “pause” to achieve such targets, clarifying that air force leadership had paused offering training slots to <em>all </em>candidates while they examined how they might take legal steps — so-called positive action — to assist improving diversity levels on courses.)</p>
<p>Earlier in the year, shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the British Army put all non-essential work on hold for a “diversity training day”, to address concerns including drug and alcohol abuse, bullying and racism. In his first speech in post last December, Admiral Tony Radakin, professional head of the armed forces, said that diversity is “not about wokefulness”. “It is about woefulness,” he added. “The woefulness of too few women. The woefulness of not reflecting the ethnic, religious and cognitive diversity of our nation.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/the-humiliation-of-the-british-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/the-humiliation-of-the-british-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/GettyImages-1649639-scaled-e1635792656920.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/the-humiliation-of-the-british-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/the-humiliation-of-the-british-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The humiliation of the British Army</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/the-humiliation-of-the-british-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Indeed, the British Armed Forces have long failed to reflect the society they are tasked to defend. The full-time military is still 90.4% white and 88.7% male. Female representation is roughly equal between the services, but ethnic minorities make up 14% of the army (in which 40% of ethnic minority personnel originate from abroad), compared to 4.9% of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, and only 3.5% of the air force.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, there is an elephant in the room when it comes to military diversity: social class. Just as Louise Pragnell’s painting displayed ethnic diversity but class homogeneity, all three services are still split into distinct commissioned and non-commissioned universes — between officers and soldiers, in army language. Each track features its own entry requirements and career trajectories. And this split is traditionally based on class: historically, officers were posh; the soldiers were not.</p>
<p>There is some movement between these worlds. For instance, the army sends some promising young soldiers to train at the officer academy at Sandhurst, alongside direct-entry, predominantly graduate cadets. At the other end of the spectrum, there is also now no section of the army where it is impossible to live on your pay as an officer — in the past high mess bills and the prohibitive costs of tailored uniforms could mean a private income was required. Nonetheless, the officer-soldier divide is still the defining fault line in the military’s organisation, and it is most acute in the army. In 2019, 49% of Sandhurst direct-entrant cadets had attended fee-paying schools — whereas the equivalent figure for the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth was 36%. (The RAF does not gather information on educational background.)</p>
<p>Britain’s military institutions are pushing a race and gender diversity agenda, while largely failing to acknowledge that their basic shape is still profoundly non-egalitarian. British Army recruiting adverts released in 2018 included short, animated advertisements with titles like “Can I be gay in the Army?” and “Can I practise my faith in the army?” They did not ask “Will I have to call someone younger and less experienced than me ‘sir’?” or “Can I get into a smart regiment if I don’t know that shirts with single cuffs are taboo?”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/will-putins-gamble-pay-off/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/will-putins-gamble-pay-off/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GettyImages-1423591439-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/will-putins-gamble-pay-off/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/will-putins-gamble-pay-off/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Putin&#039;s gamble pay off?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/will-putins-gamble-pay-off/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>An official Ministry of Defence action plan, leaked in August, aimed to “build defence into an institutionally inclusive organisation” and “to drive significant change by ensuring that race equality is a driving principle in defence”. Every time something like this happens, anonymous Whitehall sources brief “dereliction of duty” and Tory MPs spit fire about quotas, but no one tends to remark that the diversity initiatives speak less loudly about class than race and gender. People simply accuse the military of putting diversity ahead of defence.</p>
<p>It is worth considering, then, whether diversity initiatives actually make the military a more effective fighting organisation. On class and race, I would suggest the arguments are clear-cut. If the army, in particular, can break away from its traditional upper-middle class leadership cadre by recruiting more working-class and non-white officers, it is likely to be less hidebound by tradition. That is important. For all the pomp of the queen’s funeral, wars are not won by polishing things.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Changing-Guard-British-army-since/dp/1913348482" target="_blank" rel="noopener">my book</a>, I focus on a cavalry regiment in the run-up to and during the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. This organisation — pickled in alcohol, obsessed with standards of tailoring and mess etiquette (junior officers weren’t allowed to go to bed until everyone senior to them had departed), even as the drums of war began to beat, now seems picaresque and bizarre. But that ossification came in part from decades of recruiting the same kind of people, putting them through a brutal process of hazing, and then ensuring they replicated that treatment on those that succeeded them. Recruitment across wider social background shakes up things like that.</p>
<p>The full integration of women is more complex. The ban on women in combat roles — infantry or armoured units — was not lifted until 2016, two years after Britain withdrew from Helmand. But the reality of the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, in which there were no front lines, meant that female soldiers, for instance medics attached to infantry patrols, took the same risks as men. “Some of the best soldiers and most promising officers I know are women,” said General Patrick Sanders, at a ceremony in 2018 to mark all roles in the army becoming open to women. “Simply put the infantry will be more effective in war if we include the best talent our country can breed — male and female.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/b.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Ukraine&#039;s counter-offensive is working</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But whether opening armoured and infantry roles to women has improved the army is a complicated question. During the several hundred interviews I conducted for my book, I found that opinion is split. There was clear respect, even from relatively old-fashioned men, for the achievements of women. Many I spoke to suggested that naysayers had been proved wrong. Yet at the same time most men from the combat arms, soldiers and officers alike, remained — in private at least — opposed to the formal integration of women into their units. My sense is that the 2016-18 reform reflected the army leadership’s feeling that keeping some units male-only was now politically impossible, rather than a belief that it would create the most militarily effective army. (“This decision wasn’t forced upon us,” Sanders insisted).</p>
<p>Whenever the subject of women in “ground combat’ is raised there tends to be a lot of sexist and poorly-informed chatter about supposedly innate personality differences or the impact on male behaviour of having women nearby. Much of that is bunkum, as the bravery and effectiveness of female soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan attests. But there does remain an unassailable difficulty: physical requirements.</p>
<p>Many crucial jobs in the contemporary military do not require physical strength. But some do, and within infantry soldiering the ability to move long distances on foot carrying weight remains essential. Some exceptional women can meet and beat fitness requirements designed for men, but they are a minority. The US Army envisioned a gender-neutral new fitness test in 2017, but trials found that only 41-52% of enlisted women were passing, compared to 83-92% of men, depending on the component of the test. Among officers the pass rates were higher, but there was still a significant difference. When the test was actually implemented this year, gender neutral scoring had to be abolished. For example, in the deadlift component, women between the ages 17-21 have to lift 54kg to pass. Men in the same age group have to lift 64kg.</p>
<p>In general, integrating women into ground combat units requires one of two approaches. Either the existing fitness standards are maintained, which effectively means only small numbers of women will qualify. That dooms those exceptional female performers to a kind of tokenistic existence — and isolated women, in units where the hierarchy remains male-dominated, can face the worst of military sexism and harassment.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2GettyImages-1230428940-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is China about to turn on Russia?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nathan Levine</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The British Army moved to a gender-neutral fitness tests in 2018, with then-field army sergeant major Gavin Paton remarking: “I don’t care if you are a man or a woman, I don’t care what you do, and the enemy doesn’t either.” Notably though, while the test is formally gender-neutral, there are various distinctions depending on one’s role. For instance, Infantry and Royal Armoured Corps troops are expected to complete a 2km run within 9 minutes and 45 seconds, with paratroopers expected to achieve that in 8:15. This means that women in elite units will be few, which can create hazards. Imagine being one of a handful of newly-arrived women in a Parachute battalion when a video emerges, as it did in June, of your colleagues engaged in an orgy (albeit consensual) with a civilian woman.</p>
<p>The alternative is to alter physical standards so that women will pass in greater numbers. That expands female presence beyond the tokenistic, and creates a pipeline for female leadership. But lowering fitness bars also alters the fundamental nature of a unit, and, to an extent, its capabilities.</p>
<p>For eight years after the Afghan withdrawal in 2014, the British Army suffered an identity crisis — it could make no cogent case for what it was <em>for</em> as an institution. The Russian invasion of Ukraine changed that. “This is our 1937 moment,” Patrick Sanders remarked in June. But if the British military’s purpose is now to deter Russian aggression, then fighting efficiently should be the key metric for policy. On those terms, the actual size of the army matters. But so does determining which diversity initiatives help, what gets hidden, and what is worthwhile but fundamentally complex.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GettyImages-1328372-scaled-e1663159102917.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Who will stop Putin from going nuclear?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cunliffe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It’s also worth recognising that surface-level reform can hide lingering prejudice, as the conclusion of Louise Pragnell’s project to paint the Household Cavalry showed. The huge image was finally unveiled over lunch in 2010, at the mess at Knightsbridge. The regiment invited Lucian Freud, who had painted a former Household Cavalry officer, Andrew Parker-Bowles, in 2003. In <em>The Brigadier</em>, the ex-husband of our new Queen is decked out in swanky garb, with scarlet stripes down his trousers, but his pose is aloof: he is thrown back in an armchair, jacket unbuttoned and belly spilling out.</p>
<p>At the unveiling, Freud, an octogenarian by this point, with advancing Alzheimer’s, kept forgetting what was going on.</p>
<p>“Who are these people?” he asked Pragnell. Around the table, everyone was pretending to talk while in fact listening to what he was saying.</p>
<p>“They’re officers of the household cavalry,” Pragnell replied.</p>
<p>“So why is there a negro here?” Freud asked.</p>
<p>You could hear a pin drop. All at once, the whole awkwardness of the regiment’s diversity experiment was dragged into the open; the fundamental weirdness of “we’ve got two women and two black guys but we’re still posh” was exposed.</p>
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					<title>Is this British company arming China?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2022/08/is-this-british-company-arming-china/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2022/08/is-this-british-company-arming-china/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/2-4.jpg?w=680</unherd:featured_image>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Rose]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/David-Rose-817-2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA["Dual use", apparently (Naohiko Hatta - Pool/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Rose </strong>is <i>UnHerd</i>&#8216;s Investigations Editor.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DavidRoseUK</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is <i>UnHerd</i>'s Investigations Editor.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 25 Aug 2022 23:01:24 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 26 Aug 2022 08:12:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Charlie Parton]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Grainger and Worrall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intellectual property]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=442395</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Western technology is being unwittingly weaponised]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>By all accounts, the visit by the delegation of leading Chinese businessmen was a resounding success. Hidden away in sleepy Shropshire, Grainger and Worrall is a world-leader in the precision casting business. It prides itself on turning molten metal into complex components used in wind turbines, racing car engines, and speedboats.</p>
<p>But not all its products are so benign. The firm also makes key parts for military drones, vehicles, and artillery; <a href="https://www.gwcast.com/defence-castings" target="_blank" rel="noopener">its website</a> is illustrated with photos of RAF helicopters, Royal Navy destroyers and Army tanks. And it’s with these products in mind that the team from the China North Industries Corporation, a Chinese manufacturing giant usually known as Norinco, paid a visit in 2015.</p>
<p>The Norinco team, led by Wang Yulin, president of its Development Academy of Machinery and Equipment, and Xiaoqing Cheng, the general legal adviser to its Vehicle Research Unit, were evidently impressed. “They are a large industrial company with 300,000 employees that covers planes, trains and automobiles,” Charlie Bamber, G&amp;W’s business development manager for Asia, later told the <a href="https://www.shropshirestar.com/business/shropshire-business/2015/11/17/chinese-trade-mission-heads-into-shropshire/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Shropshire Star</em></a>. “There&#8217;s no limit to the opportunity.”</p>
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<p>Among the possibilities was a “joint venture” — the building of a “mass production entity” that would use G&amp;W’s technology in China. Such a factory, Bamber continued, “can&#8217;t be in Shropshire, but parts leading up to it can. It&#8217;s clearly an opportunity for the county&#8221;.</p>
<p>Yet a crucial detail was left out from his statement. Namely, that the Chinese characters that make up Norinco’s name in Mandarin — 中国兵器工业集团公司 — do not mean “China North Industries Corporation” in English, as the firm implies. What they really stand for is: &#8220;China Arms Industry Group Co. Ltd&#8221;.</p>
<p>Even so, G&amp;W could not plead ignorance. It is <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3158678/chinese-weapon-makers-take-second-biggest-share-global-sales" target="_blank" rel="noopener">well-reported</a> that Norinco, owned by the Chinese state, is the biggest weapons manufacturer in China, producing tanks, grenade launchers, shells, rotary cannons, drones, missiles and strike aircraft. In 2003, George W. Bush sanctioned the company for selling ballistic missile technology to Iran. It has since been blacklisted in America because of its close relationship with the People’s Liberation Army, following executive orders issued by Donald Trump and Joe Biden.</p>
<p>One might think, then, that G&amp;W would have something to say about its partner’s dubious reputation. Yet when I enquired about its Chinese business, which has grown significantly since 2015, it refused to answer any of my questions, beyond issuing a blanket statement insisting that it had done nothing wrong and always obtained UK government approval. On a brief phone call, Bamber suggested I was xenophobic for even questioning its relationship with Norinco. “I think you’re probably aligning yourself with many people who are extremely racist,” he said. “You’re fabricating a scenario which doesn’t actually exist.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/the-british-weapons-expert-cosying-up-to-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/the-british-weapons-expert-cosying-up-to-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/GettyImages-93387528-scaled-e1653402951753.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/the-british-weapons-expert-cosying-up-to-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/the-british-weapons-expert-cosying-up-to-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The British weapons expert cosying up to China</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/the-british-weapons-expert-cosying-up-to-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rose</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In all fairness, G&amp;W’s dealings with Norinco began in the so-called “Golden Age” of Anglo-Chinese relations under David Cameron and George Osborne, when far from being seen as a possible threat, China was promoted by the British government as a rich and generous benefactor.</p>
<p>Since then, however, the political atmosphere has soured dramatically. Hong Kong’s freedoms have been crushed, the Uyghurs have been subject to genocide and China has threatened to invade Taiwan. Fears over China’s acquisition of advanced Western technology have reached an all-time high, as MI5’s Director General Ken McCallum and FBI Director Chris Wray <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/speech-by-mi5-and-fbi" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned in their joint address</a> in London last month. During their press conference, McCullum pointed out that China doesn’t even need to resort to “clandestine espionage methodology” to get its hands on the West’s technological secrets. British businesses and academic institutions are giving IP away in plain sight, under the guise of seemingly innocent commercial deals or academic partnerships.</p>
<p>In recent months, Britain’s politicians have also woken up to such dangers. The National Security Bill — currently going through parliament — would grant further powers to the British government to “combat state threats not just to national secrets but to your intellectual property, your commercial edge, your unique research”. Yet the proposed new law will not be retrospective: intellectual property that has already been shared cannot be taken back. This means the near-decade that G&amp;W has spent working with Norinco is unlikely to come under scrutiny.</p>
<p>It is hard to say precisely when G&amp;W first became involved with China, given its reluctance to talk about it. But it appears to have taken place in 2013, when a company called FLUID Transmission Technology became G&amp;W’s Chinese agent, tasked with looking for business that might benefit from its intellectual property. FLUID doesn’t even try to hide its connection with the Chinese military. Its <a href="https://archive.ph/7dlXL" target="_blank" rel="noopener">goal is to promote</a> “military-civil fusion” (MCF), which the US State Department <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">describes</a> as an “aggressive, national strategy of the CCP” to help China develop “the most technologically advanced military in the world”, partly by “acquiring and diverting” cutting-edge technology from around the globe.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/12/does-the-ccp-control-extinction-rebellion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/12/does-the-ccp-control-extinction-rebellion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/GettyImages-1138283343-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/12/does-the-ccp-control-extinction-rebellion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/12/does-the-ccp-control-extinction-rebellion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Does the CCP control Extinction Rebellion?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/12/does-the-ccp-control-extinction-rebellion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rose</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The most sinister aspect of this MCF strategy is that China is seeking to “exploit the inherent ‘dual-use’ nature” of many civilian technologies that can also be used for defence purposes. In other words, it aims to use seemingly harmless Western technology to strengthen China’s military.</p>
<p>In 2018, FLUID met with the Communist Party leadership of the heavily industrial <a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/commercialized-militarization-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Minhang district of Shanghai</a>, known to be dedicated to MCF. It was the start of a blossoming relationship. Later that year, Matthew and Edward Grainger, the brothers who run G&amp;W, visited Norinco’s Beijing headquarters along with FLUID’s chief executive, Liu Guosheng.</p>
<p>The visit was a triumph for everyone involved. It paved the way for Factory 616 — a casting plant in the city of Datong — built using G&amp;W’s technology by a firm called Shanxi Diesel, a subsidiary of Norinco. The plant is making parts for high-speed water-cooled diesel engines, which could be used in civilian or military vehicles. As G&amp;W <a href="https://blog.gwcast.com/gw-showcases-next-generation-of-motorsport-to-defence-capabilities%20http:/shanxi.chinadaily.com.cn/2021-01/07/c_580576.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has itself pointed out</a>, such technology is a perfect example of dual use.</p>
<p>G&amp;W seemed determined to conquer the Chinese market. It went on to set up a version of its website in Mandarin. In 2020, however, the site abruptly disappeared — when the Huawei scandal hit Britain. It advertised one of G&amp;W’s most innovative and desirable products: a cast made of Compact Graphite Iron, which set “new standards in terms of weight, size, reliability and most importantly, fuel consumption”. This too could have military applications for vehicles and aviation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/china-cant-afford-to-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/china-cant-afford-to-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/2GettyImages-78594846-scaled-e1659981257932.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/china-cant-afford-to-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/china-cant-afford-to-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China can&#039;t afford to invade Taiwan</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/china-cant-afford-to-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> George Magnus </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Then, in November 2019, G&amp;W’s top leadership visited Minghzi Technology, a casting manufacturer in Suzhou. There they signed an agreement, which Minghzi said was “the start of a comprehensive collaboration” — <a href="https://www.mingzhi-tech.eu/collaboration-with-grainger-worrall" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the goal being</a> “to expand business in China and Europe… by tapping the unique strengths of each company”.</p>
<p>When I approached the firm, all it would do was issue a statement insisting everything was above-board: “Each G&amp;W customer opportunity is reviewed for business and commercial fit, moral and ethical soundness, and against UK Government controls. All recommendations and decisions made by the ECJU and DIT are strictly complied with by G&amp;W. In no circumstance is business undertaken in controlled geographic regions or market sectors without the full knowledge and approvals of UK Government. G&amp;W regularly undertake strategic reviews of international operations, taking into account legal, moral, ethical, and geo-political situations.”</p>
<p>Despite their apparent confidence in the deal’s propriety, Matthew and Edward Grainger have refused to be interviewed. Bamber, too, avoided me after our first phone call. After accusing me of racism on the phone, he promised to answer my further questions via email, but never replied.</p>
<p>At some point, though, G&amp;W may have to explain itself. Charlie Parton, a former Foreign Office China veteran and now a Royal United Services Institute fellow, said: “There needs to be a full investigation into what this firm is actually doing… It’s basic: you don’t help a political enemy acquire technology that might be used against you. If that’s what G&amp;W has done, we need to know.”</p>
<p>And we need to know sooner rather than later. As its recent exercises just off the coast of Taiwan demonstrated, Beijing has no qualms with showing off its new weapons. For now, it is preoccupied with its battles in the East. Should its focus shift Westwards, Grainger and Worrall — not to say the UK government — may just find they’ve shot themselves in the foot.</p>
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					<title>Who is Germany preparing to fight?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2022/07/who-is-germany-preparing-to-fight/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2022/07/who-is-germany-preparing-to-fight/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Matthew Olex-Szczytowski]]>
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							<![CDATA[Soldiers of the Bundeswehr honour veterans of its mission in Afghanistan (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matthew Olex-Szczytowski</strong> is a banker and historian who has advised several Polish premiers and ministers.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a banker and historian who has advised several Polish premiers and ministers.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 05 Jul 2022 23:01:07 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 01 Aug 2022 16:22:55 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Olaf Scholz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=436461</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Russia isn't the only enemy in its sights]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The Berlin elite is quick to lambast other countries for any perceived lack of predictability. Being <em>berechenbar</em> or &#8220;reckonable&#8221; ranks high among the Teutonic virtues. So Germany&#8217;s own recent policy gyrations have been wondrous to behold.</p>
<p>The attack on Ukraine has rendered it desirable to condemn Putin, to call for an end to energy dependence on Russia, and urge shipments of arms to Kyiv. Nato has replaced the phantasms of EU-based defence. Ukraine is given a path, albeit lengthy, into the Union. Our bemusement rises as we recall how ragingly this departs from the iron-clad, cross-party consensus under Angela Merkel and her predecessors.</p>
<p>No U-turn has been more radical than the pledge to end decades of de facto pacifism, and to spend seriously on the armed forces<em>. </em>Self-congratulations reverberated in early June when Germany&#8217;s parliament agreed a one-off fund of €100 billion, ostensibly to bring the painfully under-resourced <em>Bundeswehr</em> up to scratch. Virtual unanimity ruled. Olaf Scholz’s governing coalition was joined by the opposition CDU-CSU. At home and abroad, the vote was hailed as evidence of new geopolitical maturity.</p>
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<p>But that for now is nonsense. There&#8217;s been no time for the Berlin state machine to develop a new security doctrine and to sell this to the population. In an echo of other unGerman instant shifts — remember Merkel&#8217;s departure from nuclear power, and her opening of the borders? — the decision has preceded the thinking.</p>
<p>What Germany does with its military is clearly crucial: for allies, neighbours, Putin, and the world. So as we monitor the evolving policies, we&#8217;d do well to remember how brittle the overnight epiphany might be. The war itself is hardly <em>berechenbar</em>, the impact of Putin’s squeeze on gas isn’t predictable, and the German body politic is deeply split on matters of defence.</p>
<p>Symptomatic of the divisions is the <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/ukraine-deutschlands-luecke-bei-den-waffenlieferungen-18117775.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coalition‘s internecine war</a> over weapons for Ukraine. The Foreign (run by the Greens) and Finance (the FDP) Ministries have fought against Defence (run by the SLD). At the core of the chaos has been the Chancellor himself, <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/olaf-scholz-and-ukraine-why-has-germany-been-so-slow-to-deliver-weapons-a-7cc8397b-2448-49e6-afa5-00311c8fedce" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pathologically opposed</a> to sending vital panzers and other serious kit.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/germanys-pacifist-arrogance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/germanys-pacifist-arrogance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/gettyimages-1238807811-594x594-1-e1652351452708.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/germanys-pacifist-arrogance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/germanys-pacifist-arrogance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Germany&#039;s arrogant pacifism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/05/germanys-pacifist-arrogance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Maurice Frank</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At the EU, G7, and Nato summits Scholz has again sworn to support Ukraine. His veracity has been undermined, however, by his chief foreign policy adviser, who blurted out that Germany&#8217;s main aim is to secure its future links with Russia. No surprise here, perhaps: the atavistic SLD <em>apparat </em>has long had a sadomasochistic fixation on Moscow.<em> </em>Scholz himself felt puppy love for Russia when senior in the SLD&#8217;s youth wing in the Eighties. He was a fanatical Marxist, rabidly pro-Soviet, and dead against democracy for Central Europe. He rose under chancellor Schröder, latterly legendary as a paid lobbyist for Putin. In this context <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/lars-klingbeil-deutschland-muss-fuehrungsmacht-sein-18117118.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a sally by Lars Klingbeil</a>, head of the SLD, has raised eyebrows around the world. Germany must be a leading power, a <em>Führungsmacht</em>. The military implications were there but weren’t explained.</p>
<p>Which brings us to the <em>Bundeswehr</em>. The new fund is less than a third of the measly total spent by Germany on its military in the past six years. In 2014 all of Nato agreed a target of 2% of GDP on defence, but Germany brazenly refused to keep its word. It&#8217;s been spending around 1.3%. The target of 2% would have meant a total of around €520 billion; 3% would have equated to €780 billion. The <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US percentage</a> has been around 3.5%. Sir Richard Shirreff, Deputy Supreme Commander of Nato in Europe in the mid-Merkel years, isn&#8217;t impressed<strong>. </strong>He tells me: “It’s likely that Putin would’ve been put off his adventures if the largest economies in Europe, Britain, France, but especially Germany, hadn’t freeloaded, and had invested properly in defence.&#8221;</p>
<p>In any case, we can&#8217;t be sure that the €100 billion will be spent sensibly. The numbers throw up <a href="https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/ministerin-wir-sorgen-fuer-voll-einsatzbereite-bundeswehr-5438596" target="_blank" rel="noopener">many questions</a>. €33 billion is to go on air systems such as 35 American F-35s, €21 billion on digital command and control, €17 billion on land capabilities, and €8 billion on vessels. But what about “sustainment” costs? In the US, initial outlays for F-35s are less than a quarter of forecast “through-life” costs, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2021/07/31/f-35a-jet-price-to-rise-but-its-sustainment-costs-that-could-bleed-air-force-budget-dry/?sh=58ada40632df" target="_blank" rel="noopener">and similar arithmetic will apply</a> to Germany’s other purchases. Modern military kit costs many times what you pay up front when operations and maintenance are factored in. So even if the shopping list makes sense in light of Ukraine, it&#8217;s pretty clear that in future Germany will have to spend close to 3% of GDP. But there&#8217;s no sign of support even for 2%, not from the Finance Ministry under the fiscally frigid FDP, nor from the pacifists in the SLD, or in the population at large.</p>
<p>Then take motivation and morale. The <em>Bundeswehr</em> has a mere 100,000 personnel or so in combat roles (total headcount is 183,000). Expansion will rely disproportionately on the eastern <em>Länder</em>, where unemployment is relatively high, but support for the extreme-right <em>Alternative für Deutschland</em> (AfD) is strong. This cannot be ignored: the military have been wracked by Right-wing penetration.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/german-pacifism-is-dead/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/german-pacifism-is-dead/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/gettyimages-548845893-594x594-1-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/german-pacifism-is-dead/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/german-pacifism-is-dead/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>German pacifism is dead</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/german-pacifism-is-dead/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Giles Fraser</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Worryingly, the <em>Bundeswehr </em>has itself been fostering <a href="https://www.rp.pl/opinie-polityczno-spoleczne/art539071-zbiorowa-niewinnosc" target="_blank" rel="noopener">distortions of the Nazi past</a>. The extent of the disease was shown in a survey for the elite newspaper <a href="https://www.zeit.de/2020/19/zeit-umfrage-erinnerungskultur.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Die Zeit</em></a>: half the population is convinced that the Nazis were a small group who captured their country, so most Germans were innocent of war and Holocaust (among supporters of the AfD, 84% think so). Meanwhile, 30% believe, insanely, that their relatives resisted. Around two-thirds believe the country was not defeated but liberated in 1945. Almost 60%, and over four-fifths of AfD supporters, hold that other countries are <em>just as guilty as Germany</em> <em>for Nazi wars and crimes. </em>As the <em>Bundeswehr</em> expands, this kind of thinking may be more rife than ever in its ranks.</p>
<p>So as we watch how Berlin rearms, we’d do well to monitor the narratives and doctrines it develops as closely as the technology it deploys. Nowhere will scepticism be greater than on the Nato and EU front line in Central Europe. There’s consternation there over Germany’s recasting of its history. There is existential worry, too, about <em>Bundeswehr</em> fulfilment of Article Five of the Nato treaty, under which each member is to fight if any is attacked. Before the Ukrainian war <a href="//www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/03/09/americans-and-germans-differ-in-their-views-of-each-other-and-the-world/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">only 34% of Germans</a> would have helped if Russia invaded the front-line states.</p>
<p>We don’t know if more (or fewer) would today. Whatever the number, what would it mean for the nascent <em>Führungsmacht</em>? In places like Warsaw and Prague many are already convinced that the whole German deep state, not just the SLD, is with Russia in wanting Ukraine to fail. This is because a successful Ukraine (plus Moldova and Georgia) would soon be in the EU. With Poland and others, they could form a pro-Atlantic block with one-third of the Union’s population, and so scupper Germany’s hegemonic plans. When Jarosław Kaczyński, head of the ruling party in Warsaw, wondered publicly the other day whether Germany is arming against Putin or Poland, he was making a joke. Not a very good one, perhaps, but one whose bitter core is clear.</p>
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					<title>Why Putin&#8217;s invasion failed</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2022/04/why-putins-invasion-failed/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
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							<![CDATA[Blokes with guns (MARCUS YAM / LOS ANGELES TIMES)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 10 Apr 2022 23:03:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 11 Apr 2022 09:09:04 +0000</updated>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=413327</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Tactical incompetence doomed it from the start]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><a href="https://twitter.com/ELuttwak/status/1497340385378643974" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nothing was more predictable about this most predictable of wars</a> than the certain failure of Putin&#8217;s <em>Coup de Main</em> invasion to seize Kyiv and conquer Ukraine in one fell swoop. And yet its success was confidently predicted by Russia&#8217;s FSB domestic security service, which, instead of the SVR foreign intelligence, was given the task of sustaining the fiction that Ukraine is Russian.</p>
<p>Perhaps it is not strange that Putin, himself a former FSB officer, did not question this reckless optimism. He knew that the CIA fully agreed with the FSB estimate, as did the German <em>Bundesnachrichtendienst</em> (BDN) and the French <em>Direction du Renseignement Militaire</em> (DRM).</p>
<p>The latter induced President Emmanuel Macron to rush to Moscow and Kyiv to avert Ukraine’s imminent downfall by offering last-minute concessions to Putin. But the BND’s error had far graver consequences: told that it was impossible to stop Russia’s swift conquest, German chancellor Olaf Scholz refused to send weapons to Ukraine, refused to allow Estonia to send 122mm howitzers originally received from Germany, refused to rule out restricting its use of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, and refused to allocate funds to rehabilitate Germany’s sadly diminished armed forces. Since Putin is especially attentive to German politics, this served as a strong green light for his war.</p>
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<p>As for the CIA’s totally wrong assessment, it had still more serious consequences. Acting under the impression that the Russians would swiftly conquer Ukraine, the White House chose to evacuate the US Embassy in Kyiv instead of rushing in weapons that would only become Russia’s booty. The demoralising effect was amplified as other Western diplomats followed suit and fled.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/01/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-putin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">failure to dissuade Putin</a>, then, was an intelligence failure — but this is something that only requires the resolve of 51 Senators and one President to fix. By contrast, Russia’s war-making capacity has failed at every level: in the quality of individual and unit tactical combat, in operational capacity, and, most egregiously, at the level of theatre strategy (the deployment of forces over the territory). The attempt to conquer Kyiv with an endless double column of armoured vehicles advancing on a single vector meant that every act of Ukrainian resistance generated cascading stop-and-go delays that emptied out fuel tanks.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GettyImages-1231851318.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has Putin overplayed his hand?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The most important tactical failure came right at the start. In the pre-dawn hours of the war on February 24, elite “air assault” <em>infantry </em>proved incapable of executing the key mission of the entire invasion. This was the <em>Coup de Main</em> that was to secure the Antonov airfield in Kyiv’s Hostomel exurb and open the way to the heart of the city, from where Zelenskyy was expected to flee in panic, leaving Ukraine’s forces leaderless and exposed. Arriving in a fleet of helicopters, the Russians duly seized the little-used airfield. Ilyushin Il-76 heavy transports were then expected to bring in many more troops to secure it, pending the arrival of mechanised units from nearby Belarus. But Zelenskyy and his ministers, who had gathered for war instead of fleeing, immediately ordered an all-out effort to counterattack the Russians with any and all forces that could reach the scene quickly.</p>
<p>In any normal scenario, to send odd lots of soldiers against cohesive elite units would be a sure recipe for disaster — but the ferociously determined Ukrainians overcame the Russians, who were disconcerted by having to fight hard just to survive, instead of advancing triumphantly to Kyiv’s central square, the Maidan. The IL-76 transports could not land amid the fighting, so the surviving airborne troopers had to be relieved by troops from Belarus. By that point, Ukraine’s forces were mobilised nationwide and the rapid capture of central Kyiv was out of the question.</p>
<p>Having blocked the Russians in Hostomel, the Ukrainians were unable to gather larger forces to crush them rapidly because they needed to send units across the country — from Kyiv and Kharkiv all the way round to Mikolaiv and Odessa. But by then the crucial fact had been established: the Russian airborne troopers in Hostomel were not tactically superior as professional elite troops should have been. The subsequent weeks of war have shown that the same was true of Russia’s tank crews, mechanised infantry and the artillery units that pounded towns and cities. Whether it was down to inattentive officers, perhaps distracted by business opportunities on the side, or because of inadequate supplies of fuel and ammunition, almost all Russia’s troops were badly undertrained, and therefore tactically inept.</p>
<p>Russian tactical incapacity also magnified the consequences of another surprise of this war: the emergence of super-empowered infantry that can destroy main battle tanks and knock helicopters out of the sky with shoulder-launched missiles, thereby regaining its long-lost role as the Queen of the battlefield. By 1943, the rocket-launcher M1A1 — nicknamed the “bazooka” — allowed heroic and very lucky infantrymen to occasionally destroy tanks; by 1955, the French produced wire-guided missiles that could destroy tanks if shielded from artillery, smokescreens or gunners on the hunt for them. But neither weapon could seriously impede armoured operations given normal artillery covering fires.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/this-isnt-a-war-between-good-and-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/this-isnt-a-war-between-good-and-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2GettyImages-1239648700-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/this-isnt-a-war-between-good-and-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/this-isnt-a-war-between-good-and-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>This isn&#039;t a war between good and evil</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/this-isnt-a-war-between-good-and-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Now it is different. With today’s missiles, soldiers can reliably destroy tanks and low-flying helicopters with shoulder-launched missiles that need only be pointed at the target once — while still retaining the infantry’s ancient advantages of economy, of abundance, and its ability to find cover far more easily than mechanised forces.</p>
<p>Russian army chiefs must have missed this tactical shift — not because they are still focused on re-fighting the last war, but because, just like their American counterparts, they were hypnotised by the trendy next war. This was meant to be fought with “post-modern information warfare”, or hybrid warfare, or “4<sup>th</sup> Generation warfare ”— all so much more sophisticated, more advanced, and more high-tech than the old-fashioned “kinetic” warfare fought by blokes shooting at each other. It must have come as a big shock to Russia’s generals when Ukrainian soldiers could not be persuaded to surrender by sending menacing messages to their smartphones.</p>
<p>But now that the Ukrainians have gone on the offensive, they have lost their key advantage of remaining under cover while firing at exposed advancing enemies. They need armoured vehicles to avoid being held up by Russian fire, but so far they have received only a handful from the Czechs and Germans. What happens next in this war will very largely depend on the quantity and quality of the armoured vehicles friendly countries are willing to hand over to the Ukrainians. There is certainly no shortage of them in Europe, where shrunken armies have placed thousands of armoured vehicles in storage, ranging from thinly protected ten-ton M.113 troops carriers that are still better than nothing, to full-weight battle tanks with guns that can still be formidable if supplied with up-to-date rounds.</p>
<p>And this is just one more challenge in a war that will continue until Putin is willing to cut his losses and accept the one thing that Zelenskyy can give him: a promise that he will not apply for Nato membership. As to why the stalwart Zelenskyy has indicated he will do this, declaring that Ukraine’s model will instead <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/zelenskyy-wants-ukraine-to-be-a-big-israel-heres-a-road-map/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">be self-sufficient Israel</a>, the answer is obvious: instead of strengthening its members, in recent times Nato has provided an alibi for their unilateral disarmament, which persisted even after Russia’s annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea. Not only have armies shrunk, but their training is more ceremonial than functional, as became painfully evident when supposedly well-trained units were sent to Iraq and Afghanistan.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/putin-is-following-the-bosnia-playbook/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/putin-is-following-the-bosnia-playbook/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/GettyImages-543895000-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/putin-is-following-the-bosnia-playbook/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/putin-is-following-the-bosnia-playbook/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin is following the Bosnia playbook</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/04/putin-is-following-the-bosnia-playbook/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cunliffe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the years since Putin ended the post-1945 peace by seizing Crimea, only two European countries have acted to strengthen their armed forces: Finland in diverse ways, and Sweden whose government promptly reintroduced conscription to rebuild a strong army — neither of which are Nato members. Poland, which is a Nato member, contrives to have an army of 60,000 with its 37 million inhabitants, as opposed to Finland’s 280,000 on mobilisation with one sixth of the population.</p>
<p>As it happens, I was in Warsaw in November 2021, admittedly long ago, before the war. Upon asking the Presidential adviser whom I met for dinner why it was that Poland did not have a remotely commensurate army to defend itself given that it was next to Russia, he cited Nato’s security guarantee, which allowed Poland to spend its defence funds on what really mattered: a frigate in the Baltic (admittedly an excellent target for torpedoes or missiles), fancy helicopters for Polish units sent on peace-keeping missions, and the elaborate peaked hats of Polish officers. No wonder Zelenskyy gave up on Nato membership so easily.</p>
<p>The very great problem we all face — Americans, Europeans, Ukrainians and even Russians — is <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">how to end this new European civil war</a>. Now we are all stuck: Putin cannot leave the roulette table without the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as his prize, but Zelenskyy does not have the authority to give away Ukrainian territory even if he wanted to.</p>
<p>So here is my modest proposal: a referendum in each of the regions that requires a total ceasefire and which itself implies the renunciation of any further claims on Ukraine. Putin’s invasion failed within hours of being launched. Almost 50 days later, it is time for it to end.</p>
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					<title>Putin has made Nato stronger</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2022/03/how-the-cia-failed-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2022/03/how-the-cia-failed-ukraine/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
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							<![CDATA[US generals got it wrong from the start (ALLISON JOYCE/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 31 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 01 Apr 2022 16:17:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[America's leadership is now uncontested]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>War is the domain of paradox, contradiction, and boundless surprise. It is not merely because of ignorance or stupidity that military history is a record of crimes, follies, defeats, and very few victories worth their cost. Even so, the Ukraine war is exceptional in the amplitude of its paradoxes, the extremity of its contradictions, and the magnitude of its surprises.</p>
<p>For the &#8220;<a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/german-pacifism-is-dead/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">post-Pacifist</a>&#8221; German mainstream, the most bitter paradox of all is that the Russians might not have attacked Ukraine had they foreseen Germany’s response: that the Bundestag would cancel the new Russian gas pipeline, invest in <a href="https://www.econnectenergy.com/articles/how-does-regasification-of-lng-work#:~:text=Onshore%20regasification%20terminals%20are%20sometimes,to%20increase%20the%20total%20efficiency." target="_blank" rel="noopener">regasification terminals</a>, send weapons to Ukraine, reaffirm its fealty to Nato, and move to drastically upgrade its armed forces with a €100 billion injection.</p>
<p>The Russians could not possibly have known these things. The day before Putin launched his invasion, the German government declared that the new Russian gas pipeline would be inaugurated no matter what, and that they would send no weapons to Ukraine; it even affirmed it would prevent Estonia&#8217;s delivery of 122mm howitzers to Kyiv because those guns had briefly belonged to Germany when the West German army absorbed East Germany&#8217;s. Yet more egregiously, Germany also denied overflight permission for British transports delivering weapons to Ukraine. As for Nato, Germany reiterated its refusal to spend 2% or even 1% of its GDP for defence. If there were to be collective defence at all, let it be European, and directed by the decidedly civilian European Commission.</p>
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<p>In that remote past of a month ago, those were all decidedly mainstream preferences throughout Europe, albeit with a north-south divide. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden had all resurrected their ancient Baltic connections and therefore viewed Russia as a live threat. But in Italy and Spain such attitudes were rare, and declared Putin admirers could become ministers in coalition governments. As for France, Macron did not oppose the effectively pro-Russian stance of the German government because he also wanted a European defence, led by France, of course, as the only European nuclear power.</p>
<p>All this has now slipped into oblivion in today&#8217;s Europe, where Nato’s centrality and its US leadership are largely uncontested. The Russians assessed Nato as weak because it <em>was </em>weak, and therefore attacked Ukraine. Yet because they attacked, Nato is stronger than it has been for decades.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GettyImages-1231851318.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has Putin overplayed his hand?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In every country&#8217;s military, the equally abrupt reversals are causing no end of trouble for the staff officers and civil servants working on next year&#8217;s budgets. The infantry is once again the queen of the battlefield, empowered as it is by anti-tank missiles that pursue armoured vehicles until they destroy them, and by portable anti-aircraft missiles that are the doom of helicopters, even if they cannot intercept much faster jets. This means that current combat helicopter and armoured vehicle purchases should be cancelled until they can be redesigned with much better protection; that is active defences that detect and intercept the incoming missiles — a process that might take years. (So far only Israel has active defence systems for its armoured vehicles )</p>
<p>By contrast, killer drones that can reliably destroy armoured vehicles and anything else beyond the horizon are grotesquely underfunded given their demonstrated combat value, largely because they are captive to air force priorities, set by pilots and ex-pilot senior officers. Only with political intervention can the stranglehold of the flying fraternity be overcome — they are today&#8217;s reactionary horse cavalry that resisted tanks in the Twenties. But the main thing, of course, is to have more infantry and to train it very well, and that raises the need for compulsory military service which only Sweden has confronted so far — by re-instituting it.</p>
<p>Because Nato has not instituted a no-flight zone, for the excellent reason that it would lead to air combat that the loser might try to nullify by escalation, and with everything happening much too fast for adult supervision, no new air combat lessons have been learned. While the heroism of Ukrainian pilots flying older models of Russian aircraft against newer models is highly admirable, it adds nothing that is not already written in <em>The Iliad</em>.</p>
<p>At the level of grand strategy, the largest and by far most consequential discovery is that in spite of decades of talk about the &#8220;diffusion of power&#8221;, particularly with the rise of China but also of Turkey, Iran, Brazil and South Africa, it is still the same old G7 countries that hold the keys of the world. Once the US, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Union make a decision, any country can be cut off from world finance and most of world commerce. Russia&#8217;s Aeroflot, for instance, had to stop flying abroad because its aircraft are leased from Western companies, and the money-transfer sanctions blocked its payments to them, leading to the confiscation of its aircraft if they land outside Russia.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-myth-of-chinese-supremacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-myth-of-chinese-supremacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/2GettyImages-1170968038-scaled-e1645185908131.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-myth-of-chinese-supremacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-myth-of-chinese-supremacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The myth of Chinese supremacy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-myth-of-chinese-supremacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>That would not bother the Chinese, whose airlines do not depend on foreign lessors. But by the second day of the Ukraine war, Beijing realised that China also lives in a G7 world, with its economy utterly dependent on the daily arrival of bulk carriers loaded with animal and human food from the US, Canada, Australia, Brazil and a slew of other countries. China&#8217;s economy was self-sufficient if miserably poor in 1976 when I first visited, with a population on the edge of malnutrition. But today&#8217;s citizens will not grin and bear it without their meat, eggs, or milk. Last year, Xi Jinping&#8217;s naval groupies, including the jovial retired Admiral Luo Yuan, suggested that the US could be scared off from defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion by sinking a US warship or two, perhaps even an aircraft carrier. Now Xi must realise that if a US warship is sunk, the supply of animal feed would end.</p>
<p>Finally for the United States, the greatest lesson of immediate importance is that its foreign and defence policies are drastically degraded by the lack of basic intelligence about foreign countries — not because the CIA fails to steal their war plans, but because it cannot acquire elementary situational awareness. This is an inevitable consequence of a cultural collapse: in the old days, a CIA officer appointed to serve in a foreign country whose language he did not know would apply himself furiously to learn as much of it as possible. But now, very few CIA officers speak any foreign language. Their superiors do not demand that they learn them, and they themselves are too busy chatting with each other to talk with the locals — other than with English-speaking local counterparts who mostly tell them what they want to hear.</p>
<p>This is why Biden paid a high political price for the effortless Taliban conquest of Afghanistan and the rapid fall of Kabul: the CIA told the White House that the Afghan army would hold out on its own for much more than a decent interval, for years perhaps, and said nothing at all to suggest that it might crumble without a fight. Not knowing Tajik, Uzbek, or any Pathan dialect, the CIA officers who uselessly served in Kabul from their offices did not overhear the jokes on the street about the Afghan army, or hilarious accounts of how incompetent fools could become instant officers by paying a modest bribe.</p>
<p>Because American generals, including media-star David Petraeus, flatly refused to call upon the regiments of Pathans, Tadjiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras who might fight out of ethnic solidarity, instead creating a mythical national “Afghan” army, the result was a fraud from day one. When the time came, they did not fight or even flee: they handed over their US-supplied weapons to the Taliban.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2GettyImages-1238924342-scaled-e1647966212670.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia will never want peace</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In Kyiv, exactly the same thing happened, but in reverse. Just as in Kabul, we had CIA officers with no situational awareness. They did not listen, or understand, or even speak Ukrainian — they proclaimed it unnecessary &#8220;because everyone speaks Russian&#8221;, before sheepishly admitting that they themselves did not. Hence the CIA told the White House that Zelenskyy would flee, that the government would dissolve, that the Ukrainian army would not fight, and that the Russians would control Kyiv in 24 hours.</p>
<p>Since the White House still gave credence to the CIA in spite of its long history of incompetence, it ordered the urgent, even panicked evacuation of the US diplomatic mission to Lviv. Had they had any idea at all, they might have noticed that the Russians proposed to invade Europe&#8217;s largest country with very few troops — 150,000 compared to the 800,000 sent into far smaller Czechoslovakia in 1968 — and told the White House that with a bit of help the Ukrainians would contain the invasion.</p>
<p>But the CIA is highly professional in its press relations, and sure enough the <em>New York Times</em> promptly published an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/us/politics/intelligence-agencies-ukraine-afghanistan.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> that featured “former intelligence officers” highlighting the impossibility of ascertaining &#8220;fighting spirit&#8221;. It was as neat an illustration as any of why Kabul fell, and why Kyiv could too. Unless the US remedies its CIA problem by emptying out and fumigating the place, before restaffing it with people who care enough about the world to learn its languages, the US will continue to fly blind — and crash into the next Ukraine.</p>
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					<title>Russia is dying out</title>
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						<![CDATA[Paul Morland]]>
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							<![CDATA[Putin's demographic time bomb. Credit: Alexey Druzhinin/AFP/Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Paul Morland</strong> is a business consultant and senior member at St Antony&#8217;s College, Oxford. His latest book is <span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Tomorrows-People-by-Paul-Morland/9781529046007" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Tomorrow&#8217;s People: The Future of Humanity in Ten Numbers</em></a>.</span></p>
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						<![CDATA[ is a business consultant and senior member at St Antony's College, Oxford. His latest book is <span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Tomorrows-People-by-Paul-Morland/9781529046007" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Tomorrow's People: The Future of Humanity in Ten Numbers</em></a>.</span>]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 29 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 01 Apr 2022 16:18:28 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Putin is terrified by his nation's demographic crisis]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“One hundred and forty-six million [people] for such a vast territory is insufficient,” said Vladimir Putin at the end of last year. Russians haven’t been having enough children to replace themselves since the early Sixties. Birth rates are also stagnant in the West, but in Russia the problem is compounded by excess deaths: Russians die almost a decade earlier than Brits. Their President is clearly worried that he’s running out of subjects.</p>
<p>It’s a humiliating state of affairs because Russian power has always been built on the foundation of demography. Back in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville foresaw that Russia would become a world power, because “Russia is of all the nations of the Old World the one whose population is increasing most rapidly”. The only other country with its population potential was the United States. De Tocqueville prophesised that, “Each one of them seems called by a secret design of Providence to hold in its hands one day the destinies of half the world.” A century later, they were the world’s two uncontested superpowers.</p>
<p>At the beginning of the 20th century, Russia’s population was 136 million, and was still booming, just as those of other European powers started to slow. Germany’s population was 56 million, excluding its colonies, and the threat of ever-larger cohorts of Russian recruits into the Tsar’s ranks haunted Germany’s leadership; historian and public intellectual Friedrich Meinecke fretted over the “almost inexhaustible fertility” of the Slavs while Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg complained that “Russia grows and grows and lies on us like an ever-heavier nightmare”. This pressure was probably the decisive factor in Germany’s 1914 leap in the dark. German Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow wrote to the German ambassador in London as the storm was gathering that “in a few years, Russia will be ready … Then she will crush us on land by weight of numbers.”</p>
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<p>In the First World War, it turned out, numbers were not enough to compensate for Russian industrial and organisational inferiority. But by the Second World War, Russia’s numeric superiority had exploded. Despite the horrors of Civil War and Bolshevism, the nation’s population grew at about three times the speed of Germany’s in the opening decades of the century. The army had an endless supply of soldiers, the military infrastructure an endless supply of workers, giving the country a decisive edge in the Forties. Vast spaces and appalling weather helped, but ultimately it was the endlessness of Russian manpower which ground down the Wehrmacht in what was perhaps the most epic military struggle of all time. Field Marshall Erich von Manstein complained as he faced Russia’s armies: “We confronted a hydra: for every head cut off, two new ones appeared to grow.”</p>
<p>But if demographic prowess buttressed Russian power then, population decline has undermined it in the years since. Most nations have developed out of the high birth and death rates seen throughout most of human history: as mortality and then fertility falls, first the population expands, then it flattens; eventually, it may contract. But in Russia this process has taken place with a vengeance.</p>
<p>At the time of its dissolution, the Soviet Union was the home of 290 million people, 50 million more than the USA. Today, the Russian Federation has less than half that number — and less than half of the USA’s current total. In large part, this is the result of the loss of non-Russian republics, including Ukraine (which at the outbreak of the current conflict had a population of 43 million). But in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period, the country also collapsed into an orgy of suicide and alcoholism, particularly affecting the country’s men.</p>
<p>One journalist in Russia at the time wrote about how “the deaths kept piling up. People … were falling or perhaps jumping, off trains and out of windows; asphyxiating in country houses with faulty wood stoves or in apartment with jammed front door locks … drowning as a result of driving drunk into a lake … poisoning themselves with too much alcohol … dropping dead at absurdly early ages from heart attacks and strokes”. By the early years of this century, life expectancy for Russian men was on par with countries such as Madagascar and Sudan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russian women were having fewer and fewer children. In the later decades of the Soviet Union, the average woman in the Slavic heartland had an estimated six or seven abortions in the course of her life. The populations in the Caucasus and Central Asia were booming, though, undermining Russians as the USSR’s majority ethnicity.</p>
<p>This proved especially corrosive in the military. Year after year, the share of recruits from the peripheral republics went up, while the share from Russia went down; in the late Eighties, three-quarters of recruits from Central Asia could not speak Russian. (The problems of having a polyglot military had been rehearsed earlier in the century by the Austro-Hungarian Empire — which had, of course, fallen apart.)</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/11/for-germans-and-jews-the-past-is-never-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/11/for-germans-and-jews-the-past-is-never-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/GettyImages-1175345327.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/11/for-germans-and-jews-the-past-is-never-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/11/for-germans-and-jews-the-past-is-never-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>For Germans and Jews, the past is never over</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/11/for-germans-and-jews-the-past-is-never-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Paul Morland</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It’s also worth recognising that the Russian men who fell fighting the Germans in the Forties were from families of six or seven siblings; those who fell fighting the Afghans in the Eighties were from families of two or three. Those falling now, fighting in Ukraine, are likely to be only-children or one of two siblings. The preparedness of a society to sustain military losses falls as family size falls; the only conflicts in today’s world that go on and on for years — from Libya to Syria to Yemen to Congo — are in places where the men who die have many brothers.</p>
<p>Once the Soviet Union was abolished, Russia maintained its population size only by inward migration. Ethnic Russians returned from the now-independent periphery to the Soviet heartland. Increasingly, people of other ethnicities followed them to the North-West, where prospects were better. At least a million and a half Muscovites are ethnically non-Russian, some from places such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, others from Muslim regions of Russia like Tatarstan. In 2013, the mayor of Moscow swore that there would be no more mosques built in the city, hoping to discourage more Islamic migration.</p>
<p>Putin has never publicly expressed concern about the ethnic mix of contemporary Russia, but this demographic nightmare haunts him, and informs his worldview. In 2006, he launched policies to encourage larger families. And last year he lamented: “We have a little more than 81 million people of able-bodied age. We are obliged to increase the number by 2024 and 2030. This is one of the factors for economic growth. Not to mention the geopolitical component of this major issue.” At around 1.5 children per woman, Russia is still dwindling. In the next decade, Russia’s population is forecast to decline by around 300,000 a year, though some suggest the decline will be much faster — perhaps 12 million in the next 15 years.</p>
<p>This steady depopulation is more than a nuisance; it is a strategic headache. Russia’s immense size was supported by the preparedness of its people to settle in some of the most inhospitable habitats in the world. As it reduces, it retreats back towards the big cities of the west and centre, and will leave vast regions uninhabited. “In Siberia it becomes harder and harder to find people to maintain big infrastructure. Things are starting to collapse. And that is making the place less and less liveable which reinforces the problem,” one expert told me. Thousands of villages have been abandoned, particularly in remote areas.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/GettyImages-2149949898.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The sorry decline of Central Park</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/11/the-sorry-decline-of-central-park/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Lewis-Stempel</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What is Putin to do? “Ensuring sustainable natural population growth” was at the top of the executive order of National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Russian Federation signed by the President in 2018. Payments were given to those with two or more children, who are eligible for increasingly generous welfare benefits. Now, payments are given to those with <em>one</em> child. But the best evidence so far suggests that, after a modest bounce-back, fertility is in decline again. At this stage it is not clear that these policies have had any material impact at all.</p>
<p>Of course, one way of growing the population is to annex neighbouring countries and try to persuade its people and the world that they are really Russians. After all, definitions of ethnicity and national identity can be easily manipulated. Turkey, for instance, has tried to redefine Kurds as “mountain Turks”. There were even suggestions in the 18th century that Scots be considered “North Britons”.</p>
<p>But if an incorporation of Ukrainian identity into a wider Russian one was Putin’s plan, it has backfired. The invasion has undoubtedly solidified a sense among Ukrainians that their identity is distinct and that they are in no way Russian. Vitaly Chernetsky, an expert in Slavic languages, commented that, “this crisis galvanized, consolidated, accelerated the development of this new civic identity, where folks who never in their lives spoke Ukrainian all of a sudden made a conscious choice to make an effort to start speaking Ukrainian in public”.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the war could undermine Putin’s plans to boost the birth rate in Russia’s heartlands. With sanctions starting to bite, the funds for generous payments to parents will simply not be available. On the contrary, the economic hardship which the Russian population must now endure is likely to further depress childbearing.</p>
<p>And to compound the problem, many Russians will look to emigrate. It was said in Soviet days that dissidents were trying to change the unleavable, refuseniks to leave the unchangeable. Putin’s Russia seems unchangeable but, for now, it remains leavable. It is estimated that 200,000 people left the country in the first ten days of the conflict alone; millions more are likely to follow, whatever the outcome — partly to reject the regime, partly to escape the impending, sanctions-driven economic crisis which the country faces.</p>
<p>Meanwhile Russia is losing thousands of young men in the war in Ukraine. Many in their early twenties, they are unlikely to have had any children, which doesn’t bode well for Russia. Already ageing and shrinking, the nation simply cannot sustain the kind of campaign it has fought in the past. Its days of vastly superior manpower are over. A long, grinding war followed by a bloody occupation would cripple it.</p>
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