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		<title>Beijing - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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					<title>How China’s Zoomers lost hope</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-chinas-zoomers-lost-hope/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/how-chinas-zoomers-lost-hope/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Sinopessimism</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tianle Zhang]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Tianle-Zhang.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[‘Never to find those happy days again’. (bilibili)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div>Tianle Zhang lives in Philadelphia and writes at the Substack <a href="https://tianlezhang.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://tianlezhang.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1789136386515000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2AM_DgTF968HNzX6G_C2QD">Katorga</a></div>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<div>Tianle Zhang lives in Philadelphia and writes at the Substack <a href="https://tianlezhang.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://tianlezhang.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1789136386515000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2AM_DgTF968HNzX6G_C2QD">Katorga</a></div>
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 23:01:15 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 23:01:15 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dreamcore]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gen Z]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mark Fisher]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nostalgia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Olympics]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1074144</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[They yearn for more than economic growth]]>
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																									<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>You were born in China around the 2000s. Night is falling after another endless day at work. The commute home has been a gray, anodyne blur. Some mechanism of involuntary association returns you to simpler times: voices, laughter, the warmth of remembered sunlight. “Something’s off,” you feel more than think. “Life wasn’t supposed to turn out this way.”</p>
<p>Later, in bed, like twentysomethings the world over, you <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/worklife/article/20201123-the-psychology-behind-revenge-bedtime-procrastination" target="_blank" rel="noopener">defer sleep</a> with your phone: scrolling through selfies on WeChat, video essays on bilibili, and microcelebrity meltdowns on Weibo. When you open the photosharing app, RedNote, one post catches your eye.</p>
<p>“You’re awake,” <a href="https://www.rednote.com/discovery/item/698256d2000000000c037cc7?xsec_token=ABR1gF2fN2IdIffFLmTvv0yf2WjRj_msnVHvpyx6sXH1M=&amp;xsec_source=pc_user" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the title reads</a>. “It’s ‘08 in a Beijing alley, and the Olympics are set to begin.”</p>
<p>The images flicker through dimly remembered scenes from childhood: cluttered newspaper stands, roadside skewer vendors, kindergarten kids in bright tank tops. Prominently featured are the <a href="https://www.rednote.com/discovery/item/67f74c0d000000001b03abb8?xsec_token=ABtVQb7QLxqFOg2mZTHZiEsZOE7bPjzWdg44ad7-NqsNc=&amp;xsec_source=pc_search&amp;source=web_search_result_notes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fuwa</a>, the five adorable multicolored mascots of the 2008 Olympics. The posts have gnomic, melancholy titles (“<a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1m6421Z7YB/?spm_id_from=333.1387.favlist.content.click" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Why cry? Wasn’t this the life you always wanted?</a>” or “<a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1Wx421k7sA/?spm_id_from=333.1387.favlist.content.click" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Never to find those happy days again</a>”) that serve as little daggers to the Gen Z heart.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/why-the-british-left-has-fallen-for-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/why-the-british-left-has-fallen-for-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-25-at-17.05.59-e1787674080625.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/why-the-british-left-has-fallen-for-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/why-the-british-left-has-fallen-for-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why the British Left has fallen for China</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/why-the-british-left-has-fallen-for-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonny Ball</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But what really gets you — what really sets off the <em>Sehnsucht</em> in your bosom for the lost dreamworld of childhood — is the music. &#8220;<a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1yf4y1R7mU/?spm_id_from=333.337.search-card.all.click" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Beijing Welcomes You&#8221;</a>, the old Olympic anthem, is a soaring, catchy ballad that can crack the cool facade of even the most stoic of Chinese Zoomers. Its lyrics (&#8220;Open, always, is the gate of my home&#8230;&#8221;) capture a China that was confident, cosmopolitan, and welcoming; a China that now seems as forgotten as the threadbare plushies of our childhood.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1074167" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1074167" style="width: 1045px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1074167 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg" alt="" width="1045" height="492" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg 1045w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg?resize=300,141 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg?resize=768,362 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg?resize=1024,482 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg?resize=267,126 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg?resize=253,119 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg?resize=250,118 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg?resize=660,311 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-75-e1789901067573.jpg?resize=480,226 480w" sizes="(max-width: 1045px) 100vw, 1045px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1074167" class="wp-caption-text">&#8216;This song has such pure intentions: there&#8217;s no political agenda to it at all. Culture above all else.&#8217; (Credit: bilibili)</figcaption></figure>
<p>What gives the song such emotional significance is the sheer breadth of its saturation. In the Summer of 2008, you heard it broadcast on the <a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1SP411d7n7?spm_id_from=333.337.search-card.all.click&amp;vd_source=c33bcfb0ccd09a73ec0fd60245074bcf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bus ride</a> to school; on a walk with your parents in the park; as you snuck into the cornershop to buy <a href="https://www.rednote.com/discovery/item/6a1d2fd1000000000702691a?xsec_token=ABxZBekEPn7eQj-47dASW9Vw3N_zkkrQrTusEC8tdSQB4=&amp;xsec_source=pc_search&amp;source=web_search_result_notes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">red bean popsicles</a>.</p>
<p>It’s clear from all the comments that the rediscovery of &#8220;Beijing Welcomes You&#8221; is, for China’s Gen Z, only part of a wider reckoning with the recent past. “In those days we all believed in progress and world peace…” <a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1sc411c7px/?comment_on=1&amp;comment_root_id=177540518848&amp;share_tag=s_i#reply177540518848" target="_blank" rel="noopener">writes</a> one poster on bilibi (China’s YouTube analog). “This song has such <a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1yf4y1R7mU/?comment_on=1&amp;comment_root_id=3214344853&amp;share_tag=s_i#reply3214344853" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pure intentions</a>; there’s no political agenda to it at all. Culture above all else…” adds another. A reply to this notes that the star-studded cast features A-listers from both shores of the Taiwan Strait, as well as the Chinese diaspora: “Back then, everyone set aside their ideologies and national differences to showcase to the world nothing other than Chinese civilization and the Olympic spirit… Truly, those were the good times.” Without getting lost in the vexed politico-linguistic question of Chinese autonyms, it’s notable here that the commenter uses the term “中华文化” (Zhōnghuá wénhuà) for Chinese civilization, which has the expansive sense of an overarching culture spanning all Chinese-speaking people, as opposed to the more parochial “中国文化” (Zhōngguó wénhuà), which refers to Chinese culture within the People’s Republic. Such are the linguistic pains taken by the user to emphasize the ecumenism of Chinese unity manifested during the 2008 Olympics.</p>
<p>British readers might feel a pang of recognition at the potency of Olympic patriotism; images from the London 2012 opening ceremony are still apt to prompt wistful accounts from progressives about the forward-looking, multicultural, welcoming country they thought they grew up in. But whereas Britain’s Olympic games live on in cultural memory as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2022/jul/16/danny-boyle-2012-london-olympic-opening-ceremony-feelgood-factor" target="_blank" rel="noopener">last gasp</a> of liberal Britain, Beijing 2008 was supposed to be the inauguration of a newer, more open China — a China that never was.</p>
<p>The aesthetic that Chinese Zoomers have fashioned in response to these foreclosed hopes is a variation on “dreamcore&#8221;, a style that first took shape on US-based platforms like Tumblr and DeviantArt in the mid-2010s. American dreamcore is marked by its obsession with eerie <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liminal_space" target="_blank" rel="noopener">liminal spaces</a> like hotel lobbies, parking lots, or the yellow, fluorescent-lit basements of old furniture stores that inspired <em><a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt26657236/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Backrooms</a></em>, this summer’s horror blockbuster. Chinese dreamcore retains some of the formal elements — eerily empty streets, 2000s internet graphics — while sinicizing its content; this is, in other words, nostalgia with Chinese characteristics. It could even be seen as further confirmation of the late Mark Fisher’s pet concept, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fq.2012.66.1.16" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hauntology</a>, the idea that we’re living now in the “slow cancellation of the future”, surrounded by the dreams we once abandoned.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1074169" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1074169" style="width: 1254px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1074169 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg" alt="" width="1254" height="754" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg 1254w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg?resize=300,180 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg?resize=768,462 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg?resize=1024,616 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg?resize=267,161 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg?resize=253,152 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg?resize=250,150 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg?resize=660,397 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-87-e1789901111410.jpg?resize=480,289 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1254px) 100vw, 1254px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1074169" class="wp-caption-text">&#8220;Why cry? Wasn&#8217;t this the life you always wanted?&#8221; (Credit: bilibili)</figcaption></figure>
<p>That the Chinese youth are just as pessimistic, anxious, even fatalistic, about the present state of affairs as young people in the West may come as a surprise. From <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article69a597fd7fd0cd971e10c0fa/wir-sind-einfach-nicht-mehr-leistungsfaehig-genug-merz-video-geht-in-china-viral.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Friedrich Merz</a> to <a href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/carson-jerema-mark-carney-embraces-chinese-evs-and-the-uh-new-world-order" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mark Carney</a>, politicians on both the Left and Right often invoke China as the presumptive winner in our global return to bipolar Great Power geopolitics — the country with the technology, infrastructure, jobs, growth rates, and above all, the sense of collective purpose buoyed by national unity. But behind the phalanxes of dancing robots and ribbons of high-speed rail is the stark economic reality facing the generation now coming of age, who, like their counterparts in the West, are coming to terms with the closure of the guaranteed upward mobility that their parents enjoyed.</p>
<p>In the late Seventies, China’s then-leader Deng Xiaoping implemented a wildly ambitious suite of market reforms. As Deng overhauled the creaky Soviet-style economy that he had inherited from Mao, a corresponding ideological makeover of the Chinese Communist Party was inevitable. Gone was the fiery Marxist-Leninist exporter of international revolution, replaced by the staid, technocratic guardian of state capitalism we’re familiar with today. Jettisoning the Mao-era baggage, however, meant losing the story that gave the Communist government its legitimacy — the grand Us vs Them narrative of the working class as co-authored by Marx and Engels, a story second only to the New Testament in its ability to form social cohesion and inspire mass action.</p>
<p>What narrative could fill the ideological vacuum left by Marxism? Political scientist Feng Chen argues that the CCP’s pivot to “<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.2307/3235314" target="_blank" rel="noopener">eudaemonic legitimacy</a>” accomplished precisely that. Here, <em>eudaimonia</em>, Greek for happiness or flourishing, refers not to any lofty Aristotelian actualizing of human potentialities, but to satisfying people’s demands for iPhones, McDonald’s, electric cars, hotpots, Korean beauty products, and so on. The result was a tacit social contract that “led the masses to link their assessment of the regime to their personal material advancement&#8221;. In the post-Mao period, political legitimacy depends on the uninterrupted economic growth that allows the government to deliver the (literal) goods.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Human beings are more than rational self-maximizers; man does not live by designer bags alone.”</div>
<p>One shortcoming of deploying eudaemonic legitimacy as a long-term political strategy is that it’s crassly reductive. Human beings are more than rational self-maximizers; man does not live by designer handbags alone. We have an exasperating tendency to put forth moral, not just material, demands — and when these moral demands are unmet, political stability falters. For Chen, eudaemonic legitimacy depends not only on delivering economic growth to the people, but also on ensuring that those people adhere to a notion of morality that is itself narrowly economic.</p>
<p>In the Mao era, moral character meant subscribing to a mix of proletarian solidarity, anti-imperialism, and ascetic self-discipline. A capitalist China required, at minimum, an abandonment of these collectivist socialist ideals — and, ideally, something to replace them. From the late Nineties, Chinese media saw a number of happiness campaigns — deliberately engineered self-help movements involving everything from TV talk therapy to positivity gurus to a torrent of translated American self-help paperbacks. The plan, as the anthropologist Jie Yang documents, was to inculcate new values in Chinese society — values such as “self-care, self-realization, and self-enterprise&#8221;, enabling the Chinese people to positively affirm themselves as autonomous agents, happily engaged in private enterprise.</p>
<p>So as the government delivered on economic growth, the governed reconceived of the good life along exactly such lines. What could go wrong?</p>
<p>The more basic problem with the quid pro quo of political acquiescence for material gain is what to do when growth tapers off. In the popular Chinese consciousness, the tapering took place sometime <a href="https://www.rednote.com/discovery/item/6a60c2fd000000000a038221?xsec_token=AB5b4_qnfLcLVdYmdOzjp1JJJ0PZjrb7y8u0_5uUGdG6E=&amp;xsec_source=pc_collect" target="_blank" rel="noopener">between</a> 2018 and the beginning of the pandemic, and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-youth-jobless-rate-hits-11-month-high-july-2026-08-19/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">record-breaking</a> 17.9% youth unemployment rate recorded in July evinces no change to this downward trend. Attitudes, though, can be slower to change than economic realities, and a distinct generational gap has opened between the Deng cohort, who maintain a sunny and increasingly obsolescent optimism that comes only with decades of double-digit GDP growth, and their children, who are now faced with a job market decimated by outsourcing, automation, and cutthroat competition. In response to this future of secular stagnation, Gen Z has rejected en masse the chipper self-help morality of China’s boom years.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/can-you-stomach-creepypasta/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/can-you-stomach-creepypasta/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Untitled-design-51.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/can-you-stomach-creepypasta/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/can-you-stomach-creepypasta/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can you stomach creepypasta?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/can-you-stomach-creepypasta/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Sarah Ditum</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the absence of civil society — and in the face of continued state-sponsored optimism campaigns — China’s youth has vented its dissatisfaction in the only direction available: inwards. The ethnographer Dino Ge Zhang has coined the term “<a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2025/08/05/on-sinopessimism-or-junkies-of-futility/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sinopessimism</a>” to characterize the private world conjured up by the slang of Chinese Zoomers. They describe their time in higher education and <a href="https://astrapublishinghouse.com/product/i-deliver-parcels-in-beijing-9781662603044/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the workforce</a> with the term 内卷 (“<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/chinas-involuted-generation" target="_blank" rel="noopener">involution</a>)”, or “the experience of being locked in competition that one ultimately knows is meaningless&#8221;. The natural reaction to an involuted society is 躺平 (“<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/03/world/asia/china-slackers-tangping.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lying flat</a>”): in other words rejecting expectations of upward mobility and career advancement in favor of alternative lifestyles.</p>
<p>However, Gen Z’s most distinctive neologism must be 历史的垃圾时间, or “garbage time of history&#8221;. The term, coined by Hu Wenhui, a newspaper editor in Guangzhou, borrows its meaning from “garbage time” in sports, referring to the final portion of a match so lopsided that its outcome is already a foregone conclusion. Hu, in a 2023 WeChat post shared millions of times, extends this to cultural critique: those living in the “garbage time of history” are stuck in an agonizing interim period when nothing seems to work, when decaying, outmoded social structures refuse to collapse, and when individuals feel powerless to respond. Though Hu limits his examples to the Brezhnev-era Soviet Union and the fall of the Tang dynasty (while making thinly-veiled allusions to contemporary China throughout), it’s written in the same spirit of global pessimism that moves Western Zoomers to drop the term “late capitalism”, or the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/14/the-time-of-monsters-everyone-is-quoting-gramsci-but-what-did-he-actually-say" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Gramsci quote</a> that diagnoses the present as the “time of monsters&#8221;.</p>
<p>Nothing expresses the ennui of the Sinopessimism generation better than Chinese dreamcore. Time will tell if it remains a trendy hashtag or develops into a full-fledged artistic movement. But for now, if nothing else, Chinese dreamcore stands as a melancholy corrective to the widely-held assumption that the passing of the globalized era (which counts, as one of its fading triumphs, the Beijing Olympics) also heralds a new epoch of winners and losers: namely the oft-repeated narrative of China’s inevitable rise, and the West’s gradual decline. It seems misguided, to say the least, for Western progressives to spread narratives of <a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/why-the-british-left-has-fallen-for-china/?edition=us" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chinamaxxing</a> at a time when the Chinese youth are themselves avoiding their economic present by escaping to the safety of the past. Ultimately, this new epoch of isolationism may consist only of losers and other losers.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1074164" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1074164" style="width: 1127px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1074164 size-full" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg" alt="" width="1127" height="714" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg 1127w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg?resize=300,190 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg?resize=768,487 768w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg?resize=1024,649 1024w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg?resize=267,169 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg?resize=253,160 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg?resize=250,158 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg?resize=660,418 660w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-88-e1789901136520.jpg?resize=480,304 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1127px) 100vw, 1127px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1074164" class="wp-caption-text">“In those days we all believed in progress and world peace”. (Credit: bilibili)</figcaption></figure>
<p>If there’s any doubt about the crisis in China’s youth outlook, take a look at the panicky, hectoring responses it has elicited from the establishment. Discussion of &#8220;lying flat&#8221; is censored online; meanwhile a battalion of mainstream academics have come forth with <a href="https://www.eastisread.com/p/beijing-rebukes-brimming-pessimism" target="_blank" rel="noopener">thinkpieces</a> rebutting the concept, decrying it as a “fraudulent academic concept,” a “logical fallacy,” or, my particular favorite, the “absurd fantasy” of “idiotic literary youths.” And, in direct response to Chinese dreamcore, a recent article <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/rzXdGHPrQtqJXuxbY7GP3g" target="_blank" rel="noopener">published</a> in the Social Sciences Review of Gansu Province warns of the “latent ideological risks stemming from the glorification of ‘negative emotions’”. More than just a case of bad vibes, officials are treating the pervasive pessimism as a serious ideological challenge — the one really obvious lesson from the 20th century being, after all, that keeping around a bunch of nihilistic, directionless, and economically downward young people tends to be really, really bad for political stability.</p>
<p>Still, <a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1q2Puz2ETQ/?comment_on=1&amp;comment_root_id=294712906512&amp;share_tag=s_i#reply294712906512" target="_blank" rel="noopener">one comment</a> under a Chinese dreamcore post stood out to me as a corrective to the idea that China&#8217;s recent past really was so much brighter. It was from a bewildered Gen-Xer. “The 2000s were a time when I was scared to leave the house at night, back when trash piled in the streets, and my hometown didn’t even have streetlights. I don’t know where exactly the romance is.&#8221; So even the golden years of childhood prove no escape. If Western pundits idealize a non-existent future for China, its youth romanticize a non-existent Chinese past. All attempts at escape turn up only dead ends. How, then, can we comfort ourselves amidst this time of monsters? Perhaps there is a slender hope: that one day, with enough distance, our present may also be misremembered as beautiful.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1074144</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Meet China’s postmen poets</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/10/meet-chinas-postmen-poets/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/10/meet-chinas-postmen-poets/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2226152605.jpg?w=506</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Culture</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Megan Walsh]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/woman.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Resist the algorithm! Cheng Xin/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Megan Walsh</strong> is an arts journalist and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Subplot-What-China-Reading-Matters/dp/1735913669" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Subplot: What China Is Reading and Why It Matters</em></a>.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an arts journalist and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Subplot-What-China-Reading-Matters/dp/1735913669" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Subplot: What China Is Reading and Why It Matters</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 23 Oct 2025 23:00:13 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 24 Oct 2025 00:54:48 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gig economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1032272</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Working-class literature is deeply subversive]]>
							</description>
												
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								<![CDATA[<p>“A screw falls to the ground,” wrote Chinese migrant factory worker and poet Xu Lizhi. “In this dark night of overtime / Plunging vertically, lightly clinking / It won’t attract anyone’s attention / Just like last time.”</p>
<p>In 2014, this quiet 24 year old from rural Guangdong jumped from the 17th floor of a mall in Shenzhen, just across the road from his favorite bookshop. His death reverberated across China, drawing attention to his beautiful and disarming poetry, as well as to the despair of millions of factory laborers across the nation. By evoking images of spare parts, discarded screws and lumps of iron, Xu used China’s most revered classical art form to articulate the degrading experience of modernity.</p>
<p>A few years later, an essay by live-in nanny Fan Yusu also became a surprise literary sensation. “My life,” she began, “is a book that is unbearable to read.” While Fan cared for wealthier people’s children in Beijing, she mourned her “left behind” children in “motherless villages”. She worried that they, too, could “become screws in the world factory and terracotta soldiers on the assembly line”.</p>
<p>Neither Xu nor Fan set out to write political tracts. Their verse and prose were coping mechanisms, efforts of profound humility and humanity, and that’s what made them so heartbreaking. These so-called “bottom-rung”, or <em>diceng</em>, writers forced people at every level of Chinese society to confront the fate of those who had been forsaken during the years of economic uplift, which saw millions of people move from the countryside to the cities in search of factory jobs.</p>
<p>At the time, Marxists and those on the New Left saw migrants as poignant symbols of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) discordant messaging: socialist ideology foregrounded ordinary workers, while free-market economics required their cheap labor and exploitation. Living on the outskirts of new towns and cities without official residence permits (<em>hukou</em>) or access to any form of social security, China’s estimated <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0140988317300750#:~:text=Since%2C%20the%20millennium%2C%20the%20number,least%20the%20last%20quarter%20century" target="_blank" rel="noopener">274 million</a> rural-to-urban migrants have lost their ideological status. They have gone from being celebrated by the regime as “worker peasants” to the pejoratively labeled “floating population”, “vagrants” or “I-slaves”. These city workers have effectively become illegal migrants in their own country and, unwittingly, central protagonists in China’s contemporary identity crisis. From such despair, a powerful new literary movement has sprung.</p>
<p>China has long had an established literary genre of “bottom-rung” fiction, rooted in a belief that literature should “flip minds” and awaken people to the suffering of others. But now, the confluence of industrialization with widespread internet access in China has given rise to perhaps the largest working-class literature movement in history. These writers are telling their stories on their phones, in literary forums or in self-published worker magazines — whether or not the Party approves of them as “pure” literature.</p>
<p>The latest of these writers to capture China’s imagination is gig worker Hu Anyan, whose memoir <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/465353/i-deliver-parcels-in-beijing-by-anyan-hu/9780241733820" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>I Deliver Parcels in Beijing</em></a> will be published in English later this month, two years after it went viral in China. At the time of writing, Hu had already worked 19 jobs since leaving school, including as a waiter, bike seller, popsicle wholesaler and delivery driver. As a delivery driver, Hu suffered daily humiliations. He was blamed for failing to keep fresh a notoriously smelly durian fruit, when no one was at home to receive it; penalized for late deliveries even if a customer gave the wrong address; and refused entry to malls because of his garish, low-class uniform.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;This is perhaps the largest working-class literature movement in history.&#8221;</div>
<p>However, his artistic spirit sustained him. A few years before, Hu’s eyes had been opened to the world of literature when he worked as an unpaid drawing apprentice with a comic book publisher. He and a bunch of fellow anime enthusiasts listened to punk, talked up rebellion and individualism, and read Kafka. “From then on,” he writes, “both work and writing became ways for me to build my spirit.” The group committed to writing and reading “wild works&#8221; — edgy underground comics and literature that couldn’t be published anywhere except on subversive online forums — and to rejecting any work that resembled “tamed livestock that had long lost its animal nature”. In an age of intense pragmatism and material ambition, Hu instead devoted himself to the humanities.</p>
<p>In his book, Hu argues that the only way to maintain one’s individuality and sanity in the age of Big Data is to remember what it is that makes us human, and to resist the algorithm at all costs. “What I learned was that so long as I didn’t care about being efficient, if I forgot about my return on investment, then every customer was easy to get along with,” writes Hu, with an almost child-like innocence.</p>
<p>Hu’s memoir has sold more than two million copies in China, and a TV adaptation is already in the works. Its popularity signifies a deep philosophical shift in China, and reflects a widespread feeling that the China Dream is over. Whereas white-collar workers once read factory-worker writers like Xu Lizhi and Fan Yusu with a degree of disconnected sympathy, Hu’s experience of gig work resonated with them. Seeing themselves as products of the “<em>gaokao</em> factory” (China’s incredibly stressful university entrance exams), and competitors in an immensely oversaturated job market, graduates have started to re-brand themselves as “IT peasants”. There’s increasingly a sense of communality with those migrant workers who have felt this despair all along.</p>
<p>For “bottom-rung” workers, the myth of social mobility died long before China’s slowing economy started to worry those higher up the ladder. But in its place, a devotion to the humanities has blossomed. While the majority of lower-rung authors write for no other reason than to process menial work into something meaningful, they have created a growing folk tradition of life outside the system. Migrant dorms and communes are places where artists, vloggers, musicians and writers nurture a freewheeling, troubadour spirit. Picun village on the outskirts of Beijing, which was home to thousands of migrants before it was demolished in 2023, was famous for its New Workers Art Troupe and the Picun Literature Group, in which workers hosted pop-up exhibitions, gigs, plays and poetry readings. More recently, artist Li Liao exhibited his scooter and screenshots from his Meituan “super app” at a gallery in Shenzhen, rural migrant Wang Haijia was dubbed “the courier poet” for his widely shared poem “People in a Hurry”, and 23-year-old Song Yucai become an online sensation for singing on the streets of Chengdu after grueling days out on his bike.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-dismantling-of-the-chinese-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-dismantling-of-the-chinese-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-1157292830-1-e1694013173221.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-dismantling-of-the-chinese-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-dismantling-of-the-chinese-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The dismantling of the Chinese mind</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-dismantling-of-the-chinese-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rana Mitter</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Many white-collar workers are following their lead, turning back to the humanities, and even returning to the countryside to work the land. Having been warned against studying non-vocational subjects by anxious parents and strident educational influencers, the young have decided they no longer want earning potential to shape their decisions. Interest is growing in rural reconstruction movements such as the Bishan project — a rural commune committed to bringing modern ideas and culture back to traditional village life that was shut down by the local government in 2016. And people continue to intentionally set up libraries and artistic communities away from cities. The countryside is once again becoming a place of the imagination.</p>
<p>Rattled by the prospect of graduates turning into a bunch of work-shy hippies, Xi Jinping announced in 2021 that it was necessary to stop what he called this trend of “involution” and “laying down”. One way to do this was to “disrobe”. In a public ticking-off of disillusioned university graduates, state broadcaster CCTV suggested they consider “taking off the long gown”. This is a reference to a story by one of China’s most revered writers, Lu Xun, in which failed scholar Kong Yiji insists on wearing the “long gown”, the sartorial symbol of wealth and education, in contrast to the “short jackets” worn by the poor and uneducated. The moral of the story is that status is a trap and those who cling to it are obtuse and conceited. By continuing to ally itself with Lu Xun, a writer beloved by Mao, the CCP is trying to shift the focus away from its own economic responsibilities towards China’s workforce to the moral responsibilities of the individual.</p>
<p>One proponent of disrobing is Ding Yuanzhao, a graduate of Oxford as well as China’s two most prestigious universities, Tsinghua and Peking, who this year was forced to sign up as a delivery driver when he couldn’t find a suitable job. It offered him a stable income, he told the <em>Oxford Mail</em> cheerfully, and it enabled him to “make a contribution to society”. He will not be the last scholar destined for a wardrobe change.</p>
<p>In her science fiction story <em>Folding Beijing</em>, Chinese novelist Hao Jingfang imagined a future in which the different classes of society were physically separated into three spaces, and that traveling between them was a criminal offense. Now it seems possible that white-collar and blue-collar workers are folding into one. Automation, algorithms and AI pose existential threats to everyone’s role in society; all workers will end up competing for similar jobs. In such a world, literature offers an opportunity to live beyond the rat race.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1032272</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Has pacifism doomed Tibet?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-pacifism-doomed-tibet/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-pacifism-doomed-tibet/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-74529444.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Resistance</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Kapil Komireddi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[What comes after him? Kristian Dowling/Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Kapil Komireddi </strong>is the author of <i></i><a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/malevolent-republic/k-s-komireddi/9781787380059" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i>Malevolent Republic: A Short History of the New India </i></a>(Hurst)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>kapskom</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is the author of <i></i><a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/malevolent-republic/k-s-komireddi/9781787380059" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i>Malevolent Republic: A Short History of the New India </i></a>(Hurst)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 06 Jul 2025 23:02:22 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 06 Jul 2025 23:02:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Buddhism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Colonialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dalai Lama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restofworld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tibet]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=690280</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Dalai Lama has become a curio]]>
							</description>
												
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								<![CDATA[<p>“In war-torn Asia, Tibetans have practiced non-violence for over a thousand years…” So begins Martin Scorsese’s epic 1997 drama <em>Kundun</em>. Denied filming in India, dropped by Universal, disavowed by its eventual distributor Disney as a “stupid mistake” that alienated China, its release was almost miraculous. Yet, for all its merits, its opening claim, far from being a scrupulous summation of Tibetan history, still stands out as one of the more sensational exhibits of the seraphic spell radiated by Tibet’s most illustrious export: Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama.</p>
<p>Tibet was never a particularly peaceable place. Its empire, at its summit in the 8th century, extended to northern India, western China and central Asia. The Arabs, making inroads into the neighborhood, were awestruck. And China, in the words of an inscription memorializing Tibet’s conquest of the Tang Chinese capital of Chang’an in 763, “shivered with fear” at their mention. But, peaking early, Tibet decayed over subsequent centuries into a reclusive hagiarchy. In 1950, when Mao’s Red Army marched in, Tibet possessed neither the vocabulary to parley with the communists, nor the capacity to resist them.</p>
<p>Tenzin Gyatso, identified in 1937 as the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama, was hastily confirmed as Tibet’s supreme ruler at the age of 15. His court, spurned by the outside world, watched helplessly as Mao’s “peaceful liberation” of Tibet unfolded in earnest. Monasteries were razed, monks executed, thousands of peaceful protesters massacred — with many more detained, starved, tortured, and carted away to communes to toil in conditions so brutal that some resorted to cannibalism. In 1959, the Dalai Lama, facing imminent capture, escaped to India with his entourage.</p>
<p>Since then, he has devoted himself to the preservation of Tibetan culture and the emancipation of Tibet from Chinese shackles through exclusively nonviolent means. Last week, in the lead-up to his 90th birthday yesterday, His Holiness resolved the critical question of his succession by stating explicitly that the next Dalai Lama will be identified by a trust founded by him. Exactly three decades ago, Beijing disappeared the Panchen Lama — second only to the Dalai Lama in the Tibetan pantheon — and replaced him with their puppet. China, officially atheist, is determined to appoint its own Dalai Lama once Tenzin Gyatso finally dies. By proclaiming his will to “reincarnate” in a body born in the “free world”, the Dalai Lama has given his institution a shot at survival. Yet as he enters his 90s, it is no insult to ask what his celebrity has done to secure the Tibetan people and their mutilated homeland.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-race-to-choose-the-next-dalai-lama/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-race-to-choose-the-next-dalai-lama/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/GettyImages-481614121.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-race-to-choose-the-next-dalai-lama/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-race-to-choose-the-next-dalai-lama/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The race to choose the next Dalai Lama</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/the-race-to-choose-the-next-dalai-lama/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher Harding</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Tibet today has the distinction of being the world’s largest colony. In official Chinese documents, it is classified as “Water Tower Number One”— a source of prized minerals and hydropower. Since annexing Tibet, Beijing has relentlessly disfigured it. It has mined and carted away its mineral wealth, dammed and diverted waters from its bountiful rivers, herded innumerable Tibetans into communes, stamped out the expression of Tibetan identity, and annihilated whole ways of life.</p>
<p>An exhaustive report published some years ago by Human Rights Watch documented how Beijing has corralled millions of Tibetans into rows of identical-looking apartment blocks <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/27/china-end-involuntary-rehousing-relocation-tibetans" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> “New Socialist Villages”. A more recent study, by the Tibet Action Institute, <a href="https://tibetaction.net/when-they-came-to-take-our-children/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">details</a> the coercion of children as young as four into boarding schools to be intensively Sinicised. When they come home, they lack the language to communicate with their Tibetan-speaking parents. To Tibetans, this is only the newest phase in a long campaign to purge their identity. The sinisterness of Beijing’s conduct is exceeded only by the crassness of its propaganda. A captive Tibet is proclaimed as being free, the suppression of its language is justified as a necessary condition of its integration, and the destruction of its culture is trumpeted as evidence of its progress.</p>
<p>Hundreds of Tibetans — monks and lay people alike — have sought to draw attention to the plight of their land by immolating their own bodies. Consider Tsulrim Gyatso, a highly respected scholar at the Amchok monastery in Gansu, driven to despair by all he saw around him. “Tears drop from my eyes when I dwell on this state of sufferings,” he wrote in the winter of 2013. Later the same day, Gyatso walked to a busy intersection, doused himself with petrol, and lit his body on fire. As the flames consumed his flesh, Gyatso folded his palms in a gesture of respect: the tender final act of a Tibetan Buddhist who believed, like so many before and after him, that his calvary would stir the world beyond into some form of action. I have often wondered how the world may have reacted to Gyatso and his brethren had they chosen to blow themselves up among crowds of civilians in Shanghai. Might they have incited debates on the “root causes” of Tibetan “militancy”, and ignited protests in solidarity with their cause?</p>
<p>Despite preventing his people from adopting violent methods of resistance, the Dalai Lama has been branded a “terrorist” by China. A message from him in 2008, when an uprising against Chinese rule erupted in Tibet, would have paralysed Chinese administration in the region. His choice, instead, to calm the protesters, by invoking Buddhist precepts of nonviolence, resulted in no gratitude or offer of negotiation from his people’s tormentors. As he writes in his most recent book,<em> Voice for the Voiceless</em>, “Chinese Communist leaders have only a mouth to speak but no ear to listen”.</p>
<p>Beijing’s refusal to deal with him has eroded some of his authority within the Tibetan community in exile. Certainly, the Dalai Lama continues to be revered as a spiritual leader by almost all Tibetans, and their veneration only intensifies as age reveals his mortality. But many also see in China’s unyielding push to eradicate their identity a confirmation of the futility of nonviolence — a central pillar of the Dalai Lama’s teachings. As far back as 1988, he downgraded his demand for full independence from China to limited autonomy within its boundaries. Nearly four decades on, his homeland of six million people remains, alongside Xinjiang, the most intensely policed territory under Chinese rule. A young, restless generation of Tibetans is turning inwards, casting doubt on the movement that has so far failed to deliver anything for them.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A young, restless generation of Tibetans is turning inwards, casting doubt on the movement that has so far failed to deliver anything for them.&#8221;</div>
<p>And it is difficult to fault them. Over the decades, the Dalai Lama has travelled from capital to capital, picking up major accolades — including the Nobel Peace Prize — and interacting with well-meaning film stars, activists, and politicians. But what does he have to show for it? He admires Lincoln, but Lincoln was consequential only because his words, as Julia Ward Howe put it, were “writ in burnished rows of steel”. He admires Mahatma Gandhi — but Gandhi, as even Tibet’s most famous dissident writer Shokdun concedes, fought a system that had “some degree of moral conscience”. The CCP is not the British Raj. To say that His Holiness has kept his homeland’s cause alive while not being able to halt the slow erasure of Tibet itself is not to impugn him: it is to recognise that our world, which kowtows to votaries of violence while treating pacifists as comical curios, is what it is.</p>
<p>Even at the height of his fame in America, the Dalai Lama was seldom regarded as anything more than an exotic spectacle, the Oriental Pope expected to dispense morsels of easily digestible Eastern spirituality. He became anything “we would like him to be”, the late British-Indian historian Patrick French once observed. Barring notable exceptions, his supposed champions barely knew him. Larry King once introduced him to his audiences as a Muslim. Sharon Stone opened another event by calling him “Mr Please, Please, Please let me back into China”. Western Publishers minted fortunes selling books with his name on the cover, then sent 1% of the profits to his office.</p>
<p>For its part, the West, rapidly secularising and becoming more and more dependent on China, has grown less and less enamoured of him. The earliest omen of this denouement was Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Desperate to gratify his hosts, the US president abruptly terminated the CIA’s covert assistance to Tibetan resistance. This did not in itself make a great difference: the purpose of the programme, which cost Washington about $2 million, had always been to use Tibetans to gather intelligence on China, not to help them regain their homeland. What did make a ruinous difference to Tibet, however, was the international acceptability Nixon’s summit conferred on Mao.</p>
<p>The Mao who received Nixon, and whom Nixon exalted in self-clowning tones as a visionary statesman, was by then responsible for more bloodshed than any other leader of the 20th century. After all the death and devastation he had supervised in Tibet, Xinjiang, and China proper, Mao entertained himself by being vulgar, vile, and vicious even to the people who served him. When told by his physician that the procession of young women brought to his bed were being hospitalized with infections because of his appalling hygiene — Mao refused to rinse his body or brush his teeth — the Great Helmsman replied: “I wash my prick in their cunts.” The powers that fraternized with Mao were sooner or later going to teach themselves to overlook the victims of the regime he erected. The <em>Financial Times</em> garlanded Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, as its “Person of the Year” two years <em>after</em> he presided over the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-42465516" target="_blank" rel="noopener">massacre</a> of 10,000 pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square.</p>
<p>By then, a self-serving consensus for closer relations with China had crystallized in the West, which, it was claimed, was more likely to influence China by partnering with it — by creating a prominent position for it inside global institutions. Especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US locked itself into a self-destructive trade relationship with the People’s Republic. Advanced economies, underwriting Beijing’s rise by incinerating the jobs that supported their own working classes, scattered the seeds of explosive discontent at home to export material prosperity to a regime that converted it into hard power: to wield against its own benefactors.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GettyImages-1249393342-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Narendra Modi&#039;s useful idiot</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Kapil Komireddi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This rationale has come back to haunt the West. Far from molding the Chinese state’s behavior, it is the West that has incrementally relinquished its own professed values to propitiate Beijing. It is Western authors who self-censor for the tawdry privilege of being published in China. It is Hollywood that modifies its films to placate the Chinese censors. International agencies that performatively hector others lose their voice when dealing with Beijing. And governments that never tire of puffing their chests at the Middle East’s tinpot tyrannies in the name of human rights flee from the Dalai Lama for fear of offending China.</p>
<p>Even India, home to the largest community of exiled Tibetans, is terrified of crossing China by appearing too supportive of their spiritual leader. Narendra Modi’s government, for all its bellicose nationalism, has not endorsed the Dalai Lama’s right to decide his succession. Even before Modi appeared on the scene, it was a tradition in New Delhi to invoke penal codes dating back to the British Raj to lock up anyone of Tibetan appearance during a senior Chinese dignitary’s visit to India. Still, the profoundly worshipful attitude of Indians to the Dalai Lama — the global face of a faith that originated in India — has deterred successive governments from stamping on his acolytes. It is chilling to contemplate their fate when the Dalai Lama is gone.</p>
<p>This is one reason why the Dalai Lama spent the past two decades modernizing the Tibetan resistance movement and equipping the exiled community with the means to continue without him. He has weakened his own office, fostered political institutions distinct from the spiritual branch he oversees, and subordinated himself and devolved his powers to them. Tibet now has a government-in-exile that is democratically elected by a highly organized diaspora. Now, by pronouncing emphatically on his succession, His Holiness has ring-fenced an institution that has sustained Tibetan identity for centuries. Is this sufficient to guarantee its survival, and will the United States and India forever refuse to endorse a successor handpicked by Beijing? Their past behavior does not encourage optimism.</p>
<p>This is a truly grim moment for Tibetans. The figure who has held their nation together is fading away, while the tenets upon which his struggle was premised have so far produced no results. His long-suffering people are now torn between the precepts of their faith and a longing for home, which, 75 years after its seizure by China, looks more unrecognizable, and out of reach, than ever.</p>
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					<title>Trump&#039;s tariffs won&#039;t hurt China</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-tariffs-wont-touch-china/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-tariffs-wont-touch-china/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-871894534-1-1.jpg?w=513</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>DETENTE</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Goldman]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/image_from_ios_720.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[They've divorced. Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>David P. Goldman is deputy editor of <em>Asia Times</em> and a fellow of the Claremont Institute’s Center for the American Way of Life.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>davidpgoldman</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[David P. Goldman is deputy editor of <em>Asia Times</em> and a fellow of the Claremont Institute’s Center for the American Way of Life.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 08 Mar 2025 00:00:44 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 08 Mar 2025 13:41:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tarriffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=661323</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The superpowers divorced years ago]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>While President Trump seesaws between punishing or not punishing Canada and Mexico with tariffs, he has shown no such hesitation when it comes to China. Upon returning to the Oval Office, he doubled the 10% tariff on Chinese exports to the United States. The People’s Republic retaliated with tariffs on a range of US agricultural products, with the latest People’s National Congress in Beijing warning of a “bitter” fight ahead.</p>
<p>That sounds like a script for a trade war, but it may not play out this way.</p>
<p>Chinese tech stocks have rallied sharply in recent days, and Beijing shows little inclination to escalate relentlessly in response. This is because both Washington and Beijing know well that the old bilateral China-US trade relationship is untenable. Under that arrangement, US consumers underwrote China’s industrial might at the expense of America’s domestic manufacturing sector. It was the product of a neoliberal consensus that has proved deeply unpopular with the working-class and lower-middle-class Americans who form the Trumpian GOP’s base.</p>
<p>In short, the old free-trade regime isn’t coming back, and both sides are making plans accordingly. Trump may reduce tariffs on Chinese goods in exchange for stronger action to curb illegal immigration and opioids, or other concessions. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said on 5 March, “I think [Trump&#8217;s] going to figure out, ‘you do more, and I&#8217;ll meet you in the middle some way’. And we’re probably going to be announcing that tomorrow”. Hong Kong’s tech stock index, which traded flat until just before Tuesday’s close, jumped 10% in the three sessions after Lutnick’s remarks came across the wire.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/china-is-back-in-business/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/china-is-back-in-business/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-844660746.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/china-is-back-in-business/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/china-is-back-in-business/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China is back in business</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/china-is-back-in-business/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>“There&#8217;ll be a little disturbance. But we&#8217;re okay with that. It won&#8217;t be much&#8221;, Trump said of the impact of tariffs in his address to a joint session of Congress. Contrary to the remonstrations of Lawrence Summers and other neoliberal economists, he well may be right.</p>
<p>Here’s a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of tariffs: in December 2024, the American economy imported $250 billion worth of goods, while retailers sold $650 billion in goods. Imports are about 40% of retail sales. If the average tariff is 10%, and half of that 10% is absorbed by exporters to the United States, the resulting impact on the price level for imports goods would be 5%. In turn, 5% of the 40% import share in retail sales is 2%. Goods comprise roughly half of the Consumer Price Index, so the impact on overall inflation would be around 1%. (Of course, a great deal of imports are production inputs, rather than finished goods, but let’s assume that the cost is simply passed on to final consumers.)</p>
<p>That would be the “little disturbance” the President has mentioned. An average 10% tariff on $3 trillion a year of imports would yield about $300 billion in revenues, enough to put a meaningful dent into America’s $1.8 trillion budget deficit. This is the benign scenario.</p>
<p>There may be some collateral damage, in particular to business investment. The United States now imports more capital goods than it produces at home, and investment in equipment fell sharply at the end of 2024. Higher prices for capital goods due to tariffs might suppress investment and, perversely, make the US more dependent on imported goods. The administration will do its best to strike a balance between structural change and short-term economic sensitivities.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-661381" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-2.png" alt="" width="1000" height="727" srcset="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-2.png 512w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-2.png?resize=300,218 300w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-2.png?resize=267,194 267w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-2.png?resize=253,184 253w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-2.png?resize=250,182 250w, https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-2.png?resize=480,349 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/why-trumps-tariffs-are-a-masterplan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/why-trumps-tariffs-are-a-masterplan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-2198242985.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/why-trumps-tariffs-are-a-masterplan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/why-trumps-tariffs-are-a-masterplan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Donald Trump&#039;s economic masterplan</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/why-trumps-tariffs-are-a-masterplan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Because so much of US manufacturing depends on foreign inputs, it will be hard for domestic manufacturers to replace imports with local production. If Trump ramps up the tariff to 25%, it would produce more than a little disturbance — perhaps a 5% increase in the average price of goods sold in the US — but a 10% rate is manageable. And there’s another factor working in Trump’s favor: foreign businesses may invest in the United States to avoid tariffs. Trump claimed in his speech to Congress that $1.7 trillion in foreign investment was already in the pipeline. That may be an optimistic estimate, but more foreign investment is a net positive for the US.</p>
<p>Still, there is reason to be anxious, and the White House will watch the impact of tariffs on the economy closely. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, a key member of the President’s inner circle, warned 25 February that the US had entered a “private-sector recession”. He added: &#8220;The previous administration&#8217;s over-reliance on excessive government spending and overbearing regulation left us with an economy that may have exhibited some reasonable metrics but ultimately was brittle underneath”.</p>
<p>Private investment began contracting in the last quarter of 2024. There are warning signs of economic weakness: the highest unemployment claims in two years and low employment growth in a private ADP survey; sagging consumer confidence according to University of Michigan and Conference Board surveys; and a sharp 0.9% fall in January retail sales.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Working in Trump’s favor: foreign businesses may invest in the United States to avoid tariffs.”</div>
<p>Which brings us to China’s perspective. Chinese policy makers were initially hoping for a return to the 2020 “Phase One” deal, in which the Middle Kingdom agreed to buy an additional $200 billion worth of US products (though it fell short of that commitment during the Covid recession). Peking University’s Professor Yao Yang, a prominent Chinese commentator, told the Chinese news outlet <em>Guancha</em>: “We can also consider buying American oil and gas, especially natural gas. Our energy procurement also needs to be diversified, and we can import more agricultural products.”</p>
<p>But turning the clock back to 2020 now seems improbable. Beijing reads the same numbers as Trump and his team, and Chinese officials know that Washington can’t continue to run a $1.2 trillion trade deficit forever. As of 2024, the United States had a net international investment position of negative $24 trillion. That’s the amount of assets the United States had to sell to finance the last 30 years of trade deficits. What can’t go on forever, won’t. Aware of US vulnerability on this count, Chinese officialdom has now set aside its “Phase One” hopes.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-661396" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-3-300x227.png" alt="" width="900" height="680" /></p>
<p>And China is prepared. The first Trump administration was a wake-up call for Beijing, and it spent the past eight years reimagining its place in the global economy. As a result, the world trade landscape has shifted dramatically: it isn’t so much that the United States has decoupled from China, as much as China that has decoupled from the United States. China’s exports to the America have shrunk, while its exports to the Global South have doubled; it now sells more to the Global South than to all developed markets combined. And it sourced 53% of last year’s soybean imports from Brazil, compared to 38% from the United States.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-661393" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-4-300x209.png" alt="" width="900" height="626" /></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-reverse-nixon-manoeuvre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-reverse-nixon-manoeuvre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/putin.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-reverse-nixon-manoeuvre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-reverse-nixon-manoeuvre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump&#039;s reverse-Nixon manoeuvre</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-reverse-nixon-manoeuvre/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>To be sure, China’s economic exposure to the US market — and America’s dependence on China for a wide range of products — is bigger than the bilateral trade data show. It’s true that US imports from China have fallen to less than $40 million a month, down from a 2022 peak of more than $50 million a month. However, US imports from the rest of the Global South have risen sharply. Crucially, much of US imports from Latin America and Asia are assembled in third countries using Chinese components, or come out of Chinese-owned factories.</p>
<p>For example, Vietnam — which is not subject to tariffs under the Trump regime — exports a quarter of its GDP to the United States, and imports the capital goods and production inputs to do this. There has been talk about imposing tariffs on Chinese content in imports from third countries, but that is impractical.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-661390" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-5-300x171.png" alt="" width="900" height="513" /></p>
<p>Bottom line: it simply isn’t in China’s interest to rock the boat. Beijing’s retaliatory tariffs on US agricultural products will shift China’s imports away from the United States and towards Brazil, which already provides China with more than half of its soybean imports. It will continue to shift manufacturing capacity to countries not subject to US tariffs, and its indirect exports to the US will compensate to some extent for the continuing decline of its direct exports.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-661402" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/chart-6-300x189.png" alt="" width="900" height="568" /></p>
<p>While Uncle Sam and the Dragon look poised for a trade fight, their earlier decoupling, combined with the shifts in the global trade landscape, will likely avert the worst.</p>
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					<title>Trump&#039;s reverse-Nixon maneuver</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-reverse-nixon-manoeuvre/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-reverse-nixon-manoeuvre/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/putin.jpg?w=470</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Influence</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[A reverse Nixon. Jorge Silva/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 2025 00:01:33 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 04 Mar 2025 07:46:15 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=660070</guid>
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								<![CDATA[He's prying Putin from Beijing]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As the world reels from the scenes of the televised boxing match between Zelensky and Trump, with Vance egging the fight on, we are in danger of losing sight of what the encounter reveals about Trump&#8217;s priorities. Though it was not explicitly named during the entire undignified episode, it is China and not Russia that is the White House’s main concern these days, and that explains the refusal to subordinate everything to Ukraine’s needs and ambitions.</p>
<p>The first signs emerged back in 2017, during the years of Trump One, when the US for the first time acted very directly against China&#8217;s techno-economic rise. Seeing its increasing threat, the Administration cut off access to some of the advanced technology that China really needs, starting with advanced microprocessors, the &#8220;chips&#8221; of both missiles and smartphones. Tellingly, this was the one Trump policy that Biden did not reverse. Indeed, his Administration tried to strengthen the technology export controls.</p>
<p>Now, as Trump Two kicks off, America is dealing with a distinctly more aggressive China. It has become clear that Xi Jinping&#8217;s &#8220;China Dream&#8221; is not about a richer or a happier nation, but rather a stronger and indeed more warlike one. He has been visiting the different headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army to urge the assembled officers to be ready to fight — to really fight, and win! Further, it seems that defectors have reported that Xi has told members of the Central Military Commission to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-breakdown-of-the-cia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-breakdown-of-the-cia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/CIA.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-breakdown-of-the-cia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-breakdown-of-the-cia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The breakdown of the CIA</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/the-breakdown-of-the-cia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>So while the immediate rationale behind the humiliation of Zelensky in the White House would have been to soften up Russia and obtain a prompt ceasefire, and start negotiations for a territorial compromise, it was all done in the service of Trump’s larger and longer term ambition of neutralizing China. In this, he is pulling off a &#8220;reverse Nixon&#8221;: instead of courting China to oppose the USSR, as Kissinger and Nixon did in 1972, Trump wants to detach Moscow from Beijing.</p>
<p>Of course, today&#8217;s Russia is but a shadow of the still vigorous USSR that Nixon had to contend with. But even in its much-weakened state, Russia still adds a great deal to Chinese power. It provides everything from jet engines for Xi’s fighters (its own remain stubbornly unreliable), to Polar access via Russia&#8217;s arctic ports, railway access to Western Europe via Kazakhstan and Moscow, and overland access to Iran and the Middle East.</p>
<p>More simply, Russia’s immense territory interposed between China and the “West”, both in Europe and North America, would function in war as the Pacific Ocean serves the US, from San Diego and Pearl Harbor to Taiwan and China.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“As Trump Two kicks off, America is dealing with a distinctly more aggressive China.”</div>
<p>Trump is much better placed to bargain with Putin than Biden ever was — for one thing, he never insulted Putin as Biden did. But that is not the main reason why Trump has a decent chance of pulling off this diplomatic maneuver. These days, one of Putin’s growing worries is the territorial integrity of easternmost Siberia, Russia’s Maritime Province.</p>
<p>Local officials and academics in Vladivostok voiced acute concerns about Chinese intrusions even during my last visit in 2019 — before the sharp increase in China&#8217;s relative power caused by the Ukraine war. Since then, things have only grown more concerning.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the problem is demographic. Eastern Siberia — officially the &#8220;Far Eastern Federal District” — is a tad smaller than Australia, much bigger than the European Union and twice the size of India, but only had a population of 8.1 million at the last count. Meanwhile, China&#8217;s northernmost big city Harbin has more than 10 million inhabitants all by itself, while its Heilongjiang province has 30 million, and Inner Mongolia another 24 million.</p>
<p>As the Chinese increasingly outnumber Russians along that immensely long and scarcely patrolled border, there are other shifts there to alarm Moscow. One small example tells a significant tale. In 2023, the Chinese government abruptly issued an ordinance that mandates the use of the pre-Russian name &#8220;Haishenwai&#8221; for Vladivostok, in place of the previous &#8220;Fúládíwòsītuōkè&#8221; — which was clearly a meek attempt at a Chinese pronunciation of the Russian name.</p>
<p>This seemingly innocuous linguistic tweak belies a deep historical resentment. The Chinese still remember with great bitterness the collapse of imperial power in the 19th century, and the ensuing territorial losses under &#8220;unequal treaties&#8221; and forced concessions to the British, French, Japanese, Austro-Hungary, Germany (in Qingdao where good German beer is still made), and even Italy, in Tianjin.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/keir-starmers-foolish-china-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/keir-starmers-foolish-china-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-994373488.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/keir-starmers-foolish-china-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/keir-starmers-foolish-china-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Keir Starmer&#039;s foolish China strategy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/keir-starmers-foolish-china-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Elizabeth Lindley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Over time, most of those territorial losses were revoked, including Hong Kong that reverted to China in 1997, but not the biggest territorial losses by far, which were extorted by Imperial Russia in 1858 and 1860. They now constitute a slice of Siberia and Russia’s Maritime Province in the Far East, including Vladivostok. In spite of the passage of time, many in China still remember the lost territories and the old humiliations only too keenly. Let’s not forget why the Russians invaded Ukraine.</p>
<p>Then, more recently, another warning appeared, with China&#8217;s very quiet but momentous request to build a modern container port in the bay of Slavianska, in Russia&#8217;s Maritime Province south of Vladivostok, where Chinese territory arrives within 11 miles of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese certainly have a very good reason to build the port: the economy of the entire its north-east, the “rust belt” <em>Dongbei</em>, has long suffered from its distance from a seaport. As the economy there is transformed, so the Chinese threat increases.</p>
<p>So, yes, it is certainly a key Western interest that the war in Ukraine ends advantageously, with an agreed territorial settlement not imposed by either side. Equally, it is vitally important that Russia should not be as dependent on China as it now is. Europe may have its head stuck in the sand in this regard, but it seems that Trump has spotted this opportunity, realizing that in Putin’s pursuit of a favorable outcome in Ukraine there is an opportunity to detach him from Beijing. While it might seem far-fetched, even for this most unpredictable of presidents, the televised humiliation of Zelensky did seem to indicate that Nixonian intent.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">660070</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>A trade war could crash China</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/02/a-trade-war-could-crash-china/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/02/a-trade-war-could-crash-china/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/china.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Industry</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[George Magnus]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/1-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[After a series of economic wobbles, China could do without new external shocks. Photo: Wei Dongsheng/VCG/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>George Magnus</strong> is an economist and the author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Red-Flags-Why-China-Jeopardy/dp/0300233191" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy</em></a>. He is an Associate at the China Centre at Oxford University.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>georgemagnus1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an economist and the author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Red-Flags-Why-China-Jeopardy/dp/0300233191" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy</em></a>. He is an Associate at the China Centre at Oxford University.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 05 Feb 2025 00:00:07 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 07 Feb 2025 14:45:47 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Industrial policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=654066</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Trump's timing couldn't be worse for Beijing]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Even though it is Chinese New Year this week, Beijing has wasted no time in hitting back at Trump’s additional 10% tariff on all US imports from China. For now, though, this remains a mere skirmish, yet to escalate into a full-blown trade war — it could yet lead to some sort of negotiation and agreement. We’ve seen this already in Mexico and Canada. The risk, though, is that while these North American countries are neighbors and supposedly America’s allies, China is a strategic adversary. Trade conflict is a symptom of deeper political and economic tensions. The problem for China is that its economy is not well positioned to weather a new major external shock.</p>
<p>For now, a 10% tariff increase would have a minor impact, maybe subtracting about 0.2% from Chinese GDP in 2025 — a fairly trivial amount in an $18 trillion economy. Nonetheless, Beijing can’t be seen to lose face. And so, having previously promised “countermeasures”, and that it would file a complaint with the World Trade Organization, it will also lift tariffs on 10 February by 10% on American coal and LNG, and levy 15% on crude oil, agricultural equipment and large autos. Even so, these products barely account for $14 billion — or less than 10% — of imports from the US; China can get almost as much oil and gas from Russia to compensate. Because China has fewer American imports on which to act, it is notable that it announced investigations into Google, Intel and Nvidia for possible breach of anti-monopoly laws, along with export controls on tungsten and about two dozen other rare earth minerals.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Almost 20 years ago, Premier Wen Jiabao noted that China’s economy was unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated and unsustainable.&#8221;</div>
<p>These initial moves by the US and China are hardly of sufficient gravity to qualify as a trade war. None will have a serious impact on the world’s two largest economies, and any of them could be suspended, or dialed back if there were a sudden willingness to calm down and discuss at least temporary ways of addressing mutual concerns.</p>
<p>If, though, the Trump Administration takes offense and escalates further, China would be bound to respond — by allowing the Renminbi to decline and perhaps with targeted measures on exports of sensitive materials. But any move would be carefully weighed. Beijing would dearly relish it if the President’s attention were to remain focused on his nearer neighbors, along with those who are yet to feel the slap of a tariff, such as Europe and even Britain. One imagines that nothing would please China more than to watch NATO countries in disharmony and distrust over the coercive tariff policies of the US.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/chinas-plan-to-defeat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/chinas-plan-to-defeat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/GettyImages-2062399335-e1722779522607.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/chinas-plan-to-defeat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/chinas-plan-to-defeat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China&#039;s plan to defeat the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/08/chinas-plan-to-defeat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> George Magnus</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Ultimately though, it is the fracturing of Sino-US relations that will be the major axis on which the world will pivot. Everyone would feel the blowback. And even as both tread gingerly for now, it is inevitable that as China and the US both struggle for global dominance, they will throw down the trade and commercial gauntlet from time to time. These tensions are a symptom of their adversarial relationship, and as the world order shifts, it is certain to intensify.</p>
<p>What is more important, though, beyond this spat over tariffs, is a far more consequential trade story which has been playing out over the last few years and which has deep, deleterious roots.</p>
<p>According to the IMF, China’s balance of payments surplus in 2025 is expected to be 1.6% of GDP — or roughly $300 billion. This is most probably a considerable underestimate, since it was in the region of $600-700 billion in 2024, or around 3.5% of GDP. In actual fact, China’s trade surplus probably reached around $1 trillion last year, with Chinese exports growing four times more than the estimated 3% rise in world trade.</p>
<p>This matters because in a properly functioning trade system, countries produce and export what they are good at and import where they have shortcomings. In China’s case, exports are booming, partly because China’s uniquely well-funded industrial policies are the cornerstone of its economic and political strategy, and partly because China produces things the world wants — like EVs, batteries, wind and solar equipment — relatively cheaply. This focus on production and capacity, bolstered by serious industrial policies which stress self-reliance, has contrived to propel exports at breakneck speed, and keep imports subdued. But the consequence of such imbalance is that far from being the main engine of world growth, as is often claimed, China is one of the biggest drags on it. Put another way, countries that sell more to the rest of the world than they buy are forcing other nations to import more which subtracts from growth; while countries that buy more than they sell, like the US or UK, are offering stronger export opportunities for other countries, which adds to growth.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-taiwan-safe-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-taiwan-safe-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/xi-1-e1737133613442.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-taiwan-safe-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-taiwan-safe-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will China go to war with Trump?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-taiwan-safe-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> N.S. Lyons</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The reason imports are so weak is twofold: China owns the entire supply chain in a large number of goods, so it has no need to import intermediate or component products; more important, though, is the fact that household incomes, and therefore consumer demand, are in the doldrums. And the government has no desire, or finds it hard politically, to recalibrate this economic imbalance.</p>
<p>For now, then, China’s modern, vibrant tech sector is concealing other vulnerabilities. It sits alongside leading firms and brands in clean energy, electric vehicles, batteries, industrial machinery, semiconductors, robotics, life sciences and biotechnology. But it only accounts for about 13% of GDP. And much of that remaining 87% is treading water, with the country’s still outsized real estate and infrastructure sectors facing difficult years ahead as they come to terms with excess supply, shrinking demand, and severe financial problems among heavily indebted provincial governments.</p>
<p>A plethora of measures have been undertaken to stabilize the real estate market, encourage the equity market to rise and banks to lend, as well as restructuring local government debt — but the implementation of market reforms and the redistribution of income, wealth and ownership, entailing a redistribution of political power to private households and entrepreneurs, can’t possibly be contemplated by Beijing. So while the glitzy tech sector prospers, the greater part of the economy suffers from slow growth, troubling unemployment, stagnating productivity, and misallocation of capital.</p>
<p>Almost 20 years ago, Premier Wen Jiabao noted that China’s economy was unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated and unsustainable. In some important ways, things are much worse now. But its impressive looking tech scene and surging exports are drawing attention away from systemic weaknesses for which they cannot compensate.</p>
<p>China can probably withstand or deflect a trade spat or disturbance, even as its economy struggles. But if serious trade conflict were to break out, with high tariff rates and other restrictions, things could get painful pretty quickly. And not only would Chinese mercantilism be on the hook — the whole world would feel the chill. Trump may be the proximate cause of protectionist tariffs as we look around the world, but unless China is willing to change its economic and political ways, trade conflict and commercial resistance are inevitable.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">654066</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>How Britain lost British Steel</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2023/04/how-britain-lost-british-steel/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2023/04/how-britain-lost-british-steel/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-611382154-1-e1680526020160-2.jpg?w=631</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Derek Turner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/derek-turner-blue.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[A steelworker watches molten steel in Scunthorpe (LINDSEY PARNABY/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Derek Turner</strong> is a novelist and reviewer. His first non-fiction book, <a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/edge-of-england/derek-turner/9781787386983" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Edge of England: Landfall in Lincolnshire</em></a>, has just been published by Hurst.</div>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>derekturner1964</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a novelist and reviewer. His first non-fiction book, <a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/edge-of-england/derek-turner/9781787386983" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Edge of England: Landfall in Lincolnshire</em></a>, has just been published by Hurst.</div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 03 Apr 2023 23:00:57 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 03 Apr 2023 23:00:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British Steel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Industrial decline]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lincolnshire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Manufacturing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Margaret Thatcher]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Red Wall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Scunthorpe]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=468581</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Scunthorpe can't compete with China]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 1859, a north Lincolnshire landowner named Rowland Winn discovered that under his land lay a valuable commodity. After digging it up, he sold 500 tons of the stuff to a Barnsley ironmaster — and Scunthorpe’s die was cast. This remote rural locality would become one of England’s engine-rooms — and the home of British Steel.</p>
<p>A few years after Winn’s excavations, the first furnaces were built, and the Domesday hamlet of Scunthorpe started producing pig-iron. The borough’s old crest features a blast furnace belching flames, with the redolent motto: “The Heavens Reflect Our Labours.” Soon, the county’s companies started turning the iron into steel. By the end of the First World War, Scunthorpe produced 3% of the UK’s steel, some of it armouring the first military tanks, invented in Lincoln; by the start of the Second, it was producing 10%, some of it used in D-Day landing craft.</p>
<p>Since then, Scunthorpe metal has gone into everything from Sydney Harbour Bridge to the London Eye. But this elemental industry is rusting away. British Steel has recurred in the last decade’s headlines, almost always linked to job losses. Now, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-humber-64487430" target="_blank" rel="noopener">up to 800</a> of its remaining 3,200 steel jobs are at risk — a painful reversal for Lincolnshire.</p>
<p>Scunthorpe’s steel was for many years a magnet, attracting workers from all over Britain, and sometimes overseas — Germans before the Second World War, Eastern Europeans afterwards, Asians in the Seventies. In 1960, almost a third of Scunthonians (around 20,000) were directly employed in steel. A BBC documentary from that year, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p_y6H50-BYc" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Scunthorpe is Booming</em></a>, shows a town of bustling streets, with optimistic interviewees talking about all the things they could buy thanks, directly or indirectly, to steel — cars and foreign holidays and “tellies” — although a few did express reservations about the social effects of all this dynamism. Industries sprang up to cater to steel’s ever-lengthening supply chains, and all these new consumers — including Golden Wonder crisps. (Some locals claim the cheese and onion flavour was invented in the town.)</p>
<p>It was Steve Cook who cast Scunthorpe’s last ingots, in 2000. He started at British Steel in 1968 with just four O-levels, and retired in 2007, having risen to the rank of Quality Manager. Sitting in his immaculate house within earshot of the furnaces, he exudes quiet pride: “Scunthorpe was renowned for making one of the best steels in the world, and the name British Steel was synonymous with quality.” He recalls an avuncular employer, which sponsored his studies in metallurgy, then provided a job for life. The town, he remembers fondly, largely revolved around shift-times, with hooters announcing shift-changes. Streets would fill with men on bicycles and then as suddenly empty again, an almost instinctive mass movement of those who were busily forging the future. Now the town’s commuters, faces fixed to their phones, are living in worlds of their own.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-nuclear-war-for-lincolnshire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-nuclear-war-for-lincolnshire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1127383738-copy-scaled-e1678096986597.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-nuclear-war-for-lincolnshire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-nuclear-war-for-lincolnshire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The nuclear war for Lincolnshire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/03/the-nuclear-war-for-lincolnshire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Derek Turner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Not everyone enjoyed their time working in Scunthorpe steel. Conditions were hazardous in the early days. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, steelworkers would work 12-hour weekday shifts, and 24-hour shifts on alternate Sundays, with no extra pay even on Christmas Day. Veterans of the Twenties recalled their lunches being layered with fine iron grit. There were frequent accidents: on the worst day, in 1975, 11 workers died when one of the town’s iconic “Four Queens” furnaces blew up. As recently as 2021, <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/shocking-moment-huge-explosion-fireball-23408706" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a fireball erupted unexpectedly at the British Steel works,</a> although luckily no-one was hurt. Last year, a 27-year-old worker was <a href="https://www.grimsbytelegraph.co.uk/news/woman-fell-height-scunthorpe-steelworks-7348651" target="_blank" rel="noopener">killed falling from a crane</a>.</p>
<p>And not all the social impacts of the works were positive. Influxes of large numbers of young single men, and the Tartarean thirstiness of their work, resulted in problems with public drunkenness; as early as 1860, extra constables had to be drafted in. Employers took a zero-tolerance approach, with workers liable to be sacked if they had any alcohol on their breath — except for one steelworks, which ran what must have been a highly lucrative “wet canteen” into the Seventies.</p>
<p>A community spirit nevertheless emerged, grounded in shared experience and Methodist morality (nearby Epworth was John Wesley’s birthplace), and reinforced by institutions. Technical colleges and grammar schools, a hospital, a theatre, and an array of social and sporting clubs all began to appear, most famously Scunthorpe United, founded in 1899, and nicknamed “The Iron”. Workers wistfully recall a steely solidarity, with its own vocabulary — casters, feedstocks, gangue, sinter, trunnion — and a confidence borne of mastering dangerous elements for their own and everyone’s benefit. Steelworkers took on an almost mythic quality at times in the popular imagination, brilliantly skilled men silhouetted against incandescent orange, controlling leviathan cranes that swung 130-tonne ladles filled with 280 more tonnes of molten menace. Today’s call-centres, industrial parks, and offices are pallid by comparison.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-britain-sacrificed-its-car-industry/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-britain-sacrificed-its-car-industry/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GettyImages-976102078-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-britain-sacrificed-its-car-industry/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-britain-sacrificed-its-car-industry/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the UK sacrificed its car industry</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2023/02/how-britain-sacrificed-its-car-industry/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>When British Steel was born, in 1967, as the British Steel Corporation (BSC), there was much excitement about “the white heat of technology”. Innovations would, it was argued, remould the tired old post-imperial country. BSC emphasised quality over quantity, investing constantly in technical research. Britain had always been a world-leader in steel — but the pace of change had sped up. Some of the cars snapped up by Scunthorpe’s happy Sixties shoppers would have weighed a ton and a half of mostly British-made steel, but cars were becoming steadily lighter and smaller. There was less and less demand for Scunthorpe’s product, even before the whole motor industry went into the doldrums, along with British shipbuilding.</p>
<p>Then as now, successive governments failed to capitalise on British technical ingenuity. Ted Heath hoped that the new local authority of “Humberside”, into which Scunthorpe was lumped in 1974, might be an English Ruhr. But BSC always found itself fighting, often unavailingly, against cheaper Asian imports and other countries’ tariffs. The would-be Ruhr sometimes seemed at risk of becoming more of an American-style rust belt.</p>
<p>Enter: the Iron Lady. In the first two years of her reign, Margaret Thatcher appointed the uncompromising Ian MacGregor as chairman of BSC. Two of Scunthorpe’s four ironworks were closed. A December 1979 announcement of swingeing cuts at Scunthorpe was dubbed “Mr MacGregor’s sick Christmas card” by the town’s mayor, and led to a 13-week strike. But MacGregor was up for a fight, and ultimately, he won. In 1980, BSC had employed 166,000 nationwide, and lost £1.8 billion every year; by the time MacGregor left in 1983, it employed 71,000, and annual losses had been cut to £256m. In 1985, it recorded its best results since the Sixties. Scunthorpe was a crucible of a new economic order, melted and remade by monetarism — but there was a human cost, as in the mining communities of the North. Unemployment nationwide <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/timeseries/mgsx/lms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was almost three times</a> what it is now.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the nation was losing its grip on the industries that built it. Now a profitable company, BSC was privatised, before being absorbed into the British-Dutch Corus Group — the biggest steelmaker in Europe and the third-largest in the world. Corus was itself taken over, just in time for the financial crash, by the Indian firm Tata, which ended up selling it in 2016 to a venture capital firm for £1. After reintroducing the nostalgic name, the firm sold the plant on in 2019 to China’s Jingye Group, which now operates as British Steel. With every takeover, hundreds of jobs were lost; since 2007, Scunthorpe’s annual steel production has halved from 5m to 2.5m tonnes. This most substantial of great British industries is now forced to trust in overseas investors with no stake in the borough, and its rooted community relies on boardroom decisions in Beijing. Britain’s steel production is, after all, something of an afterthought from a Chinese perspective; in 2019, <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7317/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the UK produced just 7m tonnes of steel, compared with the 996m made in China</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/is-this-british-company-arming-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/is-this-british-company-arming-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/2-4.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/is-this-british-company-arming-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/is-this-british-company-arming-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is this British company arming China?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/08/is-this-british-company-arming-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rose</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The now barely British British Steel, reeling under high energy costs, is a pressure point for the Government. On the one hand, there is the wish to protect jobs in a “Red Wall” seat, won for the Conservatives in 2019 by the granddaughter of a steelworker. On the other, there is a national commitment to Net Zero carbon emissions, and steel accounts for around 14% of UK industrial emissions. Recently, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/feb/22/british-steel-announce-300-job-losses-scunthorpe-works" target="_blank" rel="noopener">British Steel has threatened</a> to shed at least 260 jobs at Scunthorpe, and maybe <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-humber-64487430" target="_blank" rel="noopener">as many as 800</a> — a quarter of all the jobs left — unless the Government gives it money to invest in greener electric furnaces. The Government has offered £300m, but negotiations appear to be foundering, because the money is thought insufficient, and comes with preconditions about guaranteeing employment for a decade. If all these Scunthorpe jobs <em>do</em> go, many Scunthonians fear they would be followed inexorably by others.</p>
<p>The Government claims to be committed to the industry, <a href="https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/markets/article-11847847/Kemi-Badenoch-Steel-vital-industry-making-it.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">although support sometimes seems uncertain</a>, and no new measures were announced <a href="https://bmmagazine.co.uk/news/uk-steel-industry-in-crisis-after-lack-of-support-in-budget-union-warns-pm/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in the latest budget</a>. Steel does not contribute much directly to the UK economy — <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7317/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">just £2 billion in 2020</a>, when it accounted for 1.2% of manufacturing output and 0.1% of UK jobs. Still, there is strong ongoing and projected demand for steel — for projects ranging from HS2 to healthcare, flood defences to the military — and much of it could be produced here. Better to have our needs met in Scunthorpe than Baoshan, surely.</p>
<p>Industry veterans are sceptical about the Government’s Net Zero priorities. David Amoss, who spent 30 years working in Scunthorpe, points out: “The steel’s still got to be made and it may as well be made in Scunthorpe as in the Far East. I find this carbon footprint thing an absolute distraction and a nonsense. Not that I don’t believe we’re destroying our own planet, but if we don’t do it someone else is going to.” Steel that is not made here will just be made in another country, perhaps one with weaker environmental safeguards, and boosting their economy instead of ours. Steve Cook concurs: “From a global point of view, it’s just shifting the problem elsewhere.” Besides, closing down both furnaces could cost <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jan/27/british-steel-tata-jobs-funding-grant-shapps" target="_blank" rel="noopener">more than £1 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Manufacturing has long been a victim of modern Britain’s focus on service industries over making things the world both needs and wants. “If steel does go, as a manufacturing country we’re buggered,” says Amoss. “I fail to understand how any country can really exist with any sort of wealth if it doesn’t make anything and consumes a lot.” To those who built their lives around industries like steel, today’s Britain can seem an unkind as well as unwise country, ungratefully casting off its past and recklessly mortgaging its future in the interests of expedience and profit.</p>
<p>The story of steel in Scunthorpe is unique, but it echoes that of the North’s, or Wales’s, mining communities. Our nation is replete with towns like this: so strongly associated with its industry that it is almost impossible to envisage existence without it. After 150 years of unglamorous and unrelenting endeavour, Scunthorpe’s whole reason-to-be has suddenly become ethically suspect, its Britain-building citizens at risk of being abandoned. Can a forward-looking national realism, drawing on an old sense of obligation, compete with today’s green and globalised agenda? This time-tempered town is not the only one nervously awaiting an answer to that question.</p>
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					<title>The myth of Chinese supremacy</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-myth-of-chinese-supremacy/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
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							<![CDATA[They're really not that good (Naohiko Hatta - Pool/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 21 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 21 Feb 2022 09:47:11 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Strategic incompetence has always plagued Beijing]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p class="p1">When I first arrived in China in 1976, four years had passed since Nixon and Kissinger had gone to Beijing to meet Mao, kicking off what Nixon would label “the week that changed the world”. But that interval was not long enough to dispel the thick fog of misrepresentations and outright lies spun during that visit by both the Americans and Chinese — though none of those tales concerned what really mattered: the geopolitical victory that came from that trip.</p>
<p>At the time, exactly 50 years ago, the US was deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Congress was refusing to fund both that increasingly unpopular war and also the broad build-up needed to match the Soviet Union’s huge military upsurge. It would ruin the Soviet economy a decade later, but in the meantime, the US was being outmatched — until, that is, Nixon went to China and secured a diplomatic revolution that would open up a “second front” for the USSR. Among other diversions of Soviet energies, by 1976 at least 45 Soviet tank and motor rifle divisions were deployed towards Beijing, thousands of miles from Nato&#8217;s front in Germany.</p>
<p>Whatever else may be said against Nixon or Kissinger, their decision to open up to communist China at its worst — in 1972, the murderous cultural revolution was still in full swing — was a clever idea that many might have thought of only to dismiss it out of hand. All President Nixon had to do was embrace the malodorous Mao (his doctor would reveal that he never brushed his teeth, or bathed, unless he was in merry company).</p>
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<p>But for Nixon the politician, the sacrifice was much greater, although he did not know it until the Watergate scandal drove him from office on August 9, 1974, two years after he had triumphantly landed in Beijing. The connection was straightforward: the centre-Right core of the Republic Party coincided with the &#8220;Taiwan Lobby&#8221;, which in turn encompassed the anti-Communist bloc, and which formed the hard core of Nixon&#8217;s supporters from the start of his political career. When Nixon betrayed the cause by embracing the very worst communist on the planet — altogether more extreme than the Soviets when it came to abolishing private property — and when he turned his back on Taiwan, the Republican Right did the same to him as he pleaded for help to fight off the Watergate charges.</p>
<p>A strange man in many ways — who else would think of himself as an absolute underdog while sitting in the White House&#8217;s Oval Office? — Nixon was also a real patriot: in 1942, assigned to the safest of Navy billets in Iowa, he strove very hard to manoeuvre himself into a combat zone. But had he known that his Beijing foray would leave him unprotected before his enemies and cost him the White House, he might have stayed well away from Mao.</p>
<p>Neither the American nor the Chinese media misrepresented that momentous strategic encounter, but they did join hands in utterly concealing the reality of China itself. For example, none of the admiring descriptions of Beijing and its imperial monuments in the <em>New York Times </em>prepared me for the stomach-turning stench that pervaded the city, and reached indoors as one tried to eat in the Beijing Hotel dining room. Throughout the city, human waste was not flushed away but carefully collected as precious “night soil” fertiliser, and then ladled into handcarts that were slowly pulled through the city to the surrounding vegetable fields.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/americas-forgotten-powell-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/americas-forgotten-powell-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2GettyImages-1251381800-scaled-e1634820922156.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/americas-forgotten-powell-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/americas-forgotten-powell-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America&#039;s forgotten Powell Doctrine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/americas-forgotten-powell-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Nor did I read in 1972 about how the crowds in Beijing’s streets trudged from place to place in various states of clinical depression, understandably enough given the deep misery in which they were living — from their one-room-per-family, courtyard houses with no hot water to everyone’s shabby Mao suits and grey faces that evidenced border-line malnutrition. All this stood out even more because of the ubiquitous posters depicting ecstatically happy, rosy-cheeked enthusiasts applauding Mao.</p>
<p>Nor did anyone in 1972 care to mention that the officials they encountered — as I did four years later — were all suffering from intense sleep-deprivation: they had to reach their offices soon after dawn for lengthy pre-work &#8220;struggle sessions&#8221;, with the janitors and junior staff who run their ministry’s Revolutionary Committee playing Red Guards to upbraid them. The topsy-turvy rituals of the Cultural Revolution persisted until Mao died.</p>
<p>Instead of any criticism, the US press praised everything, including the health-giving virtues of riding a bicycle to and from work, even though Beijing&#8217;s summer air was full of faecal dust, with carbon monoxide added in the freezing winters of the coal-heated city.</p>
<p>A journalist of great fame at the time, James Reston, had already recounted his own marvellous experience of Beijing when he suddenly needed emergency surgery there in July 1971. His acute appendicitis could have killed him, but it turned out that the nearest hospital was fully equipped, and the surgery went well. It was only many years later, when Mao’s doctor defected and wrote his memoirs, that it emerged that Reston was taken to the hospital reserved for the top party leaders — the only one in Beijing fully equipped to treat him, or anybody who needed surgery.</p>
<p>The smell went away in later years as chemical fertilisers arrived, but many of the misrepresentations of that 1972 trip linger till this day — of which the most important by far is the legend of China&#8217;s strategic statecraft, superior by virtue of its very long-range perspective, then personified by Zhou Enlai. Because Kissinger negotiated primarily with Zhou, he elevated that servile toady — who never once tried to save life-long colleagues from Mao&#8217;s murderous intrigues — into a statesman of transcendental wisdom, fully endowed in the long-view department.</p>
<p>This was exemplified by Zhou’s answer to Kissinger’s fawning request for his retrospective view of the French Revolution. Indeed, Kissinger never tired of relaying the Great Man’s answer: “Too early to tell”. You see, you see, Kissinger would add, China’s greatest minds look ahead 200 years. Today, authors and publishers still use “playing the long game” in the subtitles of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Long-Game-Long-Term-Thinker-Short-Term/dp/164782057X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">books</a> about China.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/we-dont-need-a-long-telegram-on-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/we-dont-need-a-long-telegram-on-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GettyImages-117831631-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/we-dont-need-a-long-telegram-on-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/we-dont-need-a-long-telegram-on-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How to stop China&#039;s long march</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/we-dont-need-a-long-telegram-on-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>They should not. Chas W. Freeman, the interpreter, immediately told Kissinger that Zhou was referring to the 1968 student uprising that overthrew De Gaulle, whose final outcome was indeed still unclear in 1972. But Kissinger refused to give up his two centuries for a mere four years, and continued to repeat the story when gracing the dinner tables of the extremely rich in subsequent decades. It was one of the simpler Kissinger mystifications: by turning Zhou into a great statesman, he qualified himself as one — unnecessarily, it would later transpire, because he had so little competition until Reagan arrived to deflate the balloon of Soviet power.</p>
<p>Kissinger’s lie about Zhou was only the tail of a much bigger rat: the historical falsification that ignores China&#8217;s stupendous record of strategic incompetence down the ages, in order to attribute profound strategic wisdom to the Han — a wisdom also embodied in China’s classic strategic manuals, with Sun Tzu’s the most famous.</p>
<p>To believe that legend, the most basic fact about Chinese history had to be ignored: again and again, after the downfall of the Tang — conventionally dated 618 to 907 — the Han were defeated, conquered and long-ruled by much less advanced invaders whom they hugely outnumbered. One can visualise how it went: a few steppe warriors in rags and furs would arrive, the Chinese generals in silks and shiny armour facing them would exchange oh-so-clever Sun Tzu citations, their army would be overrun, the country conquered, and then ruled for decades or centuries.</p>
<p>Over the thousand years down to the fall of the Jurchen-speaking Manchus in 1912, it was only during the Ming dynasty 1368–1644 that the Chinese were ruled by Chinese — very likely because the founder Zhu Yuanzhang started off as a monastery servant and could not have read Sun Tzu or any other of the delusional manuals that reduce warfare to clever tricks. Their uselessness was proved right into the 20th century, when the Japanese became the last of the badly outnumbered foreign conquerors to conquer Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Canton and as much of China’s territory as they wanted, with both Communist and Kuomintang forces equally incapable of fighting them successfully.</p>
<p class="p1">At present no steppe warriors threaten Beijing, but the strategic incompetence of its rulers persists. Exactly at a time when the deeply divided United States needs allies to contain China, Beijing’s erratic aggressions since 2009 have overcome the neutralist preference of India (attacked in Ladakh and provoked over Arunachal state), the neutralist temptations of Japan (during the three-year ascendancy <span class="s1">of the Democratic Party of Japan now extinct),</span> the neutralist ambitions of Indonesia, and the pro-China <span class="s1">tendency in the</span> Philippines (<span class="s1">just when many</span> in the Philippines were inclined to slide into Beijing’s sphere, the Chinese responded by stealing islets and shoals).</p>
<p class="p1">Collectively, America’s new allies add enough mass to Vietnam and Australia — the first country to understand the China malady, in 2009 — to outnumber the Chinese, outweigh their economic achievements, and wholly overtake their less-than-stellar technological attainments. (Pentagon hyping of hypersonic FOBS missiles is shameless budget-pumping: they have no discernible purpose in the absence of ballistic-missile defences to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/complex-air-defense-countering-hypersonic-missile-threat-0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">underfly</a>.)</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-curse-of-sliced-bread/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-curse-of-sliced-bread/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/bdff9755612e8bbc27b3912c69245706.jpeg?w=235" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-curse-of-sliced-bread/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-curse-of-sliced-bread/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The curse of sliced bread</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/the-curse-of-sliced-bread/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="p1">As for quantum computing and artificial intelligence, only the severely ill-informed think that the Chinese are ahead. As late as 2020, Huawei’s boasts about its supposedly superior Kirin 980 microprocessors were widely believed; they even deceived poor Xi Jinping. Yes, they were indeed quite good but the technology was not Huawei’s — it belonged to the UK and US, which meant that Trump’s National Security Council could and did shut down Kirin production and much of Huawei’s as a whole with a couple of phone calls.</p>
<p>But Kissinger, who is still going strong, rated Chinese statecraft very highly when he published his China <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/China-Henry-Kissinger/dp/0141049421" target="_blank" rel="noopener">book </a>in 2012. He believed, correctly, that the Chinese would continue to work hard, expand their economy and overtake slow US growth. He also thought, incorrectly, that Chinese leaders would transcend their zero-sum mentality, thereby allowing Washington and Beijing to arrange the affairs of a &#8220;G-2&#8221; world, in which — as he wrote — countries like India and Japan would have to find their places.</p>
<p>Always improbable, G-2 became impossible when Xi Jinping arrived. For him only G-1 is good enough. Not because he is a megalomaniac but the opposite: he thinks, accurately, that unless the Party establishes an unchallenged global hegemony, with its rule is deemed superior to democratic governance, Communist China will collapse just as Soviet rule did. He is right.</p>
<p class="p1">On September 9, 1976, while visiting a military unit near Beijing — I was the number-two in the delegation of J.R. Schlesinger, the just-fired Secretary of Defence — everything suddenly ground to a halt. Mao had just died. What followed was a series of bizarre events that would transform China forever.</p>
<p class="p1">First, there was the lying-in-state, in the shabby immensity of the Great Hall of the People in front of the imperial palace compound. The diplomats already in Beijing formed a long queue going up the steps — not in order of precedence, as is the custom, but in order of preference: Romania was then Number One because the Chinese had quarrelled with Albania while the “revisionist” Soviet Union was way in the back.</p>
<p class="p1">When we entered the hall where a very green Mao was lying dead, we saw that we were alone with China’s absolute rulers, “The Gang of Four”, were standing there: <span class="s1">Jiang Qing </span>Mao’s half-mad, super extremist, last wife; (he had long preferred sex with his very young “nurses”), <span class="s1">Zhang Chunqiao</span> and <span class="s1">Yao Wenyuan (</span>two shabby Party bureaucrats), and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Hongwen%22%20%5Co%20%22Wang%20Hongwen" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">Wang Hongwen</span></a> (Shanghai’s tall, good-looking absolute boss, who had even transferred tanks from the border to strengthen his own huge workers’ militia).</p>
<p class="p1">He was the only one who greeted us with a nod while the others seemed&#8230; terrorised. They knew, as we did not, that they would be locked up very soon. Next, after I had made quite sure that Mao was dead, we were ushered into another room to mourn with the selected “best friends” of China: the North Vietnamese and North Korean ambassadors, with whom we could not speak given the absence of diplomatic relations, two Khmer Rouge envoys who looked like<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>murderous dwarfs, and the Romanian ambassador who walked around saying what a really, really sad day it was, frantically trying to generate a minimum of civility between people determined to ignore each other.</p>
<p class="p1">Nor was I of any help: born in Romania’s Arad, I answered <i>nu sunt sigur </i>(“I am not sure”) to his “sad day” incantation. Utterly startled to hear me speak in his language, and totally embarrassed by my remark, he went to Schlesinger to be reassured that we were not all Romanians sent to catch him out.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/how-china-ghosted-hollywood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/how-china-ghosted-hollywood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/2GettyImages-73274270-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/how-china-ghosted-hollywood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/how-china-ghosted-hollywood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How China ghosted Hollywood</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2022/02/how-china-ghosted-hollywood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christian Toto</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="p1">I had left Beijing when the Gang of Four were arrested, but was back again when Deng Xiaoping announced that it was all over: the Cultural Revolution, the closure of China, Maoism. After that, it all went smoothly until the 2009 financial crisis when the Party bosses thought it was all over for democratic capitalism. Their reaction was <i><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674066427" target="_blank" rel="noopener">perfectly predictable</a>: </i>since 2010, the<span class="s1"> PRC has behaved as if it were a cheap wind-up toy car, </span>rolling straight ahead to collide with its neighbours, provoking increasingly adversarial reactions, and persisting regardless.</p>
<p class="p1">One example is enough for all: just when the Japanese government was sliding into neutralism, the PRC leadership turned a banal, drunken fishing-boat skipper episode just off the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Senkaku_boat_collision_incident" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Senkakus</a> (absurdly claimed by China) into an all-out attack on all things Japanese, from embassies and consulates that were besieged by hostile mobs to attacks against Japanese corporate offices, car dealerships, and even against individual Japanese — all provoked by incessant calls for revenge from hysterical officials. The final outcome was the election of Abe Shinzo&#8217;s LDP, which squarely took on China as an adversary.</p>
<p class="p1">Meanwhile, the US elite, both with Nixon at the start and then after Deng Xiaoping’s opening of China’s economy, was more than content to preside over the de-industrialisation of the United States, uncaring of<a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v16/n07/edward-luttwak/why-fascism-is-the-wave-of-the-future" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> the ultimate political consequences</a> of replacing many millions of $30 per hour factory jobs with $10 an hour “service economy” jobs, with the incoming flood of cheap consumer goods supposedly alleviating the impoverishment.</p>
<p class="p1">Now, of course, China presses against all its neighbours, endowing the United States with new alliances, some overt and official, others overt but without any formal treaty, and others emerging — a process destined to continue until Xi Jinping, who, with his talk of &#8220;war readiness&#8221;, is now in his Mussolini phase, triggers an armed affray serious enough to stop the arrival of tankers and bulk carriers into Chinese ports.</p>
<p class="p1">When that happens, malnutrition will not be far behind, because of China&#8217;s critical dependence on imported animal feed. In 1976, rice, sorghum, cabbage and rare slivers of chicken were enough. Not today. If Xi Jinping falls, pork prices could be the cause.</p>
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					<title>Does the CCP control Extinction Rebellion?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/12/does-the-ccp-control-extinction-rebellion/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[David Rose]]>
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							<![CDATA[Is he just a useful idiot? (NIKLAS HALLE'N/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Rose </strong>is <i>UnHerd</i>&#8216;s Investigations Editor.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DavidRoseUK</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is <i>UnHerd</i>'s Investigations Editor.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 16 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 16 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Western activists are blind to President Xi's ambition]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>A few blocks away from Tiananmen Square, amid the cavernous splendour of the Beijing Hotel Convention Centre, an array of senior Communist Party officials gathered in September to proclaim a clear message: by “focusing on cutting carbon emissions… China will promote green development, and continuously improve its ecology”. The annual general meeting of the China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development (the CCICED) was in full swing.</p>
<p>Rapturous applause filled the room, though that was hardly unexpected. Conferences run by the CCP are not usually marked by dissent, especially when they’re attended by the likes of Xie Zhenhua, who led China’s delegation to Cop26, and vice premier Han Zheng, one of the seven standing committee members of the Politburo, the Party’s supreme elite. Indeed, as the room fizzled with optimistic eco-rhetoric, you could almost forget that China is the world’s biggest source of greenhouse gases — and that the new coal-fired power stations in its construction pipeline alone have a greater capacity than Britain’s entire generation fleet.</p>
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<p>What was remarkable about this meeting, though, was the surprising presence of an external delegation: joining the CCP apparatchiks on a collection of screens dotted around the room were a number of enthusiastic Britons and other Westerners. According to the official conference <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/CCICED/AGM2021/summary" target="_blank" rel="noopener">report</a>, the “foreign committee members and partners lauded China’s ecological civilisation building and its new and greater contributions to promoting the construction of a clean and beautiful world”.</p>
<p>Who were these people? Strange to tell, they consisted of a veritable <em>Who’s Who</em> of British, European and American climate activists.</p>
<p>Here, for example, was Professor Lord Nicholas Stern, Chairman of the Grantham Centre on Climate Change at the London School of Economics, and a longstanding government adviser who wrote a <a href="https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20100407172811/https:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">report</a> for Blair’s Labour government on the need to go green. He told the meeting the world is beginning a “new growth story” that “fits well with China’s vision of an ecological society”.</p>
<p>Here too was Kate Hampton, chief executive of the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), which is mainly bankrolled by the billionaire Sir Christopher Hohn, a key financial backer of Extinction Rebellion and one of the world’s biggest sources of green largesse. During the meeting, Hampton said she “supported Chinese leadership on setting the global path for fulfilling Paris goals” — the attempt to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius — and praised China for “supporting green Covid-19 recovery”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/how-china-could-turn-off-britains-lights/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/how-china-could-turn-off-britains-lights/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GettyImages-493418000.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/how-china-could-turn-off-britains-lights/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/how-china-could-turn-off-britains-lights/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How China could turn off Britain&#039;s lights</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/how-china-could-turn-off-britains-lights/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Clive Hamilton</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Others were equally fulsome, including Laurence Tubiana, France’s former climate ambassador and now chief executive of the European Climate Foundation, which also gives millions to British green campaigns, such as UK100, an alliance of local authorities pledged to turn Net Zero by 2030; and the Conservative Environment Network.</p>
<p>Also present were representatives from ClientEarth, a law firm that tries to block development in Britain and other countries on environmental grounds in the courts; the Worldwide Fund for Nature, whose president is Prince Charles; and representatives from rich and influential organisations based in America including the Natural Resources Defense Council, the World Resources Institute and the Energy Foundation.</p>
<p>And yet in the weeks since the CCICED meeting, Cop26 has come and gone; and largely thanks to China, any hope of a meaningful deal has evaporated. On the last day, British minister Alok Sharma was reduced to tears when India and China refused to promise to phase out coal. Back <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/china-ramps-coal-production-highest-level-this-year-avert-energy-crisis-1640257" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in the real world</a>, President Xi Jinping has said China will increase annual coal production by 220 million tonnes.</p>
<p>Such moves have, unsurprisingly, attracted robust criticism. Professor Jun Arima of Tokyo University, one of Japan’s Cop26 negotiators, told me that allowing China to benefit from cheap, coal-fired energy will only consolidate its industrial domination. Lord Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, pointed out that China’s leaders have repeatedly shown they are not “men of their word”.</p>
<p>Yet those in attendance at the meeting in September have been unified by their reticence. Why?</p>
<p>Last year, in their book <em>Hidden Hand: How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World</em>, <a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/how-china-could-turn-off-britains-lights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Clive Hamilton</a> and Mareike Ohlberg revealed how China influences Britain and other Western democracies by seducing their elites. Its ‘useful idiots’ often believe they are acting for the common good, but become blind to Xi’s avowed ambition: for China to achieve global supremacy by 2049, the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Maoist revolution.</p>
<p>Nowhere is this more effective than in the climate movement. I asked a specialist researcher fluent in Mandarin to examine open-source material from the Chinese web. The results suggest Western greens have become prime targets. Perhaps this isn’t so surprising: before he was a climate negotiator, Xie Zhenhua helped run the Party Discipline Commission, which operates a secret prison network where torture, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/06/special-measures/detention-and-torture-chinese-communist-partys-shuanggui-system" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Human Rights Watch</a>, has long been rife.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2GettyImages-1235247493-e1636469367122.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>President Xi is exploiting #MeToo</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Austin Williams</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>I asked Hamilton if China’s wooing of Western environmentalists explains why the world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide has aroused so little protest? He believes it is likely: “They’ve fallen for what the Party calls ‘discourse control’ — to shape the way the rest of the world thinks and talks about China, presenting the Chinese government in a favourable light. Toadying to the Party leadership is letting them off the hook.”</p>
<p>For Lord Stern, this is nothing new: his environmental record is littered with papers saying CCP leaders are making great progress, and suggesting — prematurely — that their coal use and emissions have already or will soon peak. In 2014, for example, he claimed in a <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/07/china-climate-leader-sustainable-development/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">paper</a> for the World Economic Forum that China was “emerging as a global leader in climate policy”. His co-author was He Jiankun, a ‘counsellor’ to China’s top administrative body, the State Council, and the director of the Energy, Environment and Economy Institute at Beijing’s Tsinghua University. Three years later, following the the annual WEF jamboree at Davos, Stern <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3f1ba5ba-ddac-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>: “The world is looking for a climate champion. In China, it has one.”</p>
<p>Has Stern been naïve and let himself get too close to the CCP? Certainly for the Party, Tsinghua University has a special role: it is Xi Jinping’s alma mater, and home to multiple labs conducting secret research for the People’s Liberation Army. Yet the pair still work together: Stern’s spokesman told me that Tsinghua and the LSE are joint leaders of the Global Alliance of Universities on Climate, which held two international meetings before Cop26 with contributions from Alok Sharma, US climate envoy John Kerry, and — of course — Xie Zhenhua.</p>
<p>This year, for what it’s worth, Stern has <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Towards-carbon-neutrality-and-Chinas-14th-Five-Year-Plan.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> on China to stop building new coal-fired plants. But he still spoke at this year’s CCICED, while his spokesman told me that China remained “keen to learn from the UK’s example of world-leading action on climate change” and said the rate of increase in its emissions had slowed enormously. While this may be true, China’s emissions continued to rise even through the pandemic, and now <a href="https://rhg.com/research/chinas-emissions-surpass-developed-countries/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">exceed</a> the total produced by rest of the developed world.</p>
<p>On paper, at least, you might argue there’s no harm in that. After all, the CCICED’s “mission” is to build “a more beautiful China and a green and bountiful world”. Who could possibly object?</p>
<p>Hardly anyone, I suspect, until they learnt that, the CCICED’s Chinese members include not only top Party bosses but officials who work with China’s United Front Work Department, one of the CCP’s main instruments for exerting influence abroad. Among them is Li Xiaolin, a top party cadre and the daughter of China’s late president Li Xiannan. Until recently, she was the chair of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries — which, as Hamilton and Ohlberg show in their book, is one of China’s most important foreign influence organisations.</p>
<p>What does this mean in practice? According to Patricia Adams, director of the Toronto-based environmental think tank Probe International, in 2017 a new Chinese law forced foreign NGOs there to submit to “close supervision” by the Ministry of Public Security, responsible for crushing dissent and controlling China’s secret police. Any organisation deemed to have “harmed the national interest” risks having its assets seized, its staff jailed, and being permanently banned.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/should-we-force-china-into-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/should-we-force-china-into-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/GettyImages-518133336-scaled-e1636394494631-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/should-we-force-china-into-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/should-we-force-china-into-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Could we win a war in China?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/should-we-force-china-into-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Adams knows this fully well: in 2014, when the new law was being discussed, two Chinese academics she was working with were arrested and later jailed, and Probe International named as co-conspirators. Their crime? “Picking quarrels and provoking troubles” for speaking out on issues such as the rule of law. After that, Adams tells me, “it was no longer safe for us to work in China”. As for the Western environmentalists who still do, she adds: “They hope they can influence China’s leadership. But they are also aware that for them, to publicly criticise China’s policy would be suicide.”</p>
<p>Take, for example, the aforementioned CIFF, whose Chief Executive attended the CCICED gathering in September. Along with the WWF and ClientEarth, it has a branch in China which is subject to CCP control. There, the CIFF employs one Wang Yi as its “independent adviser on climate projects”. As chance would have it, he also happens to be a high-ranking member of China’s puppet parliament, the National People’s Congress.</p>
<p>To what extent that compromises his impartiality is anyone’s guess. But it is striking that the CIFF — a registered UK charity — gives away millions of pounds to projects in China. These include an £18 million grant to “help contribute to peaking China’s emissions”, £14 million to give China “evidence-based recommendations” for renewable energy, and, most <a href="https://ciff.org/grant-portfolio/list/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">astonishingly</a> of all, £8 million to assist China “in global climate governance”.</p>
<p>This might not matter quite so much were Sir Christopher and the CIFF not prominent funders of green causes in Britain and Europe. He has personally given £50,000 to Extinction Rebellion, with a further £150,000 from the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/environment/2019/10/10/extinction-rebellion-funded-charity-set-one-britains-richest/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CIFF</a>. When these payments emerged in 2019, Hohn <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/321f4402-ec31-11e9-85f4-d00e5018f061" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>: “I recently gave them £50,000 because humanity is aggressively destroying the world with climate change and there is an urgent need for us all to wake up to this fact.”</p>
<p>But not, apparently, to China’s role in it. When I asked an Extinction Rebellion spokesperson why they never said anything about China, she told me: “It would be divisive to put pressure on one particular nation. It would be hypocritical.”</p>
<p>Yet the CIFF’s China connection extends well beyond Extinction Rebellion: it is also the biggest funder of the European Climate Foundation, based in Brussels but with an office in London, to which the CIFF donated £29 million last year. Strikingly, the ECF’s deputy chair is a familiar figure: the CIFF’s Kate Hampton.</p>
<p>Like the CIFF, the ECF website provides few details of the groups it funds. But its UK ‘grantees’ include ClientEarth and the Conservative Environment Network, an alliance of more than 100 Tory MPs and peers set up by environment minister Zac Goldsmith and his plutocrat brother Ben.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2-GettyImages-1230733619-scaled-e1633442210376.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hong Kong&#039;s Zero Covid deception</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cowley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Its ‘global ambassador’, meanwhile, is the Prime Minister’s father, Stanley Johnson, a self-declared “<a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/meet-chinas-best-british-friends-the-johnson-clan-rhz2rgdm6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sinophile</a>” who said last year that China “will come over to our side”, and it was vital “not to raise the temperature” by criticising them. He added he had recently enjoyed “a wonderful, wonderful meeting with the Chinese ambassador”, at which, after discussing global warming, they had <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/meet-chinas-best-british-friends-the-johnson-clan-rhz2rgdm6">sung</a> the Flanders and Swann song ‘Mud, Glorious Mud’ together, inspired by mud’s supposed ability to absorb carbon dioxide.</p>
<p>And yet for all the pledges made in recent years by China and Western environmentalists, the evidence suggests that any future action will be strictly on China’s terms. For many years, Chinese leaders avoided trying to promote the Communist system in the West, but since Xi took power in 2012, this has changed. China, says Clive Hamilton, now touts the ‘China model’ as superior to the West’s.</p>
<p>Anyone doubting this had only attend yet another Beijing meeting, held in June at a Chinese government office by the Foreign Environmental Cooperation Centre, part of China’s environment ministry. The meeting’s attendees included staff from the CCICED, and discussed “the building of ecological civilisation and the community of common destiny”. One leading participant was Chen Xiangyang, the Director of China’s Total State Security Outlook Research Centre — an arm of the Ministry of State Security, which has helped to direct a regime of surveillance against Chinese citizens.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <em>Qiushi</em>, the CCP’s theoretical journal, published an <a href="https://archive.ph/UcUUT" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> in Chinese this year which explores how foreign environmentalists can be utilised. The idea of ecological civilisation, it says, is “Marxist and scientific by nature”, and will have a big role in spreading the China Model’s appeal.</p>
<p>None of this is hidden. This article uses Chinese documents, but all are available on the Mandarin web. Yet climate change activists continue to blindly give China a free pass on its emissions and continued use of coal.</p>
<p>An ECF spokesperson told me: “Climate change impacts every country and so we work with every country, and of course that includes China.” A CIFF spokesperson added: “China is the world’s largest emitter and its transition to a net zero economy is therefore of utmost importance to the entire world. CIFF’s work in China aims to accelerate this transition.”</p>
<p>ClientEarth said: “As a result of our work delivering legal training, the legal system in China is now used to hold Chinese government bodies to account… We are focused on reducing pollution and bringing down emissions both in China and from its overseas investments.” And a WWF campaigns chief added: “All countries need to contribute towards reducing emissions to net zero by 2050. By promising to stop building coal plants abroad, China had ‘given an important signal’.</p>
<p>Ultimately, however, the meaning of that “signal” remains unclear. Is it a sign that President Xi is seriously committed to saving the planet? Or is it a sign that he understands how to fool an influential group of Western environmentalists, with the intention of making that planet his own?</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">291899</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Britain betrays Hong Kong activists</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/12/how-britain-betrays-hong-kongs-young-activists/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/12/how-britain-betrays-hong-kongs-young-activists/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/GettyImages-1223719853-scaled-e1638555267411-2.jpg?w=623</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Benedict Rogers]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/image.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[He deserves better (DALE DE LA REY/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Benedict Rogers</strong> is a human rights activist and writer. As East Asia Team Leader at Christian Solidarity Worldwide, he specialises in Burma, Indonesia, China and North Korea.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>benedictrogers</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a human rights activist and writer. As East Asia Team Leader at Christian Solidarity Worldwide, he specialises in Burma, Indonesia, China and North Korea.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2021 00:01:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 06 Dec 2021 00:01:12 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asylum seekers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BNO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Damian Green]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drugs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hong Kong]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Liam Fox]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nathan Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poverty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prison]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=284546</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Democracy protestors languish in our asylum system]]>
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<p>When, last July, the Government responded to China’s draconian National Security Law in Hong Kong with a new visa scheme, it was rightly applauded for — eventually — doing the right thing. It offered a lifeline to three million Hong Kongers holding British National Overseas (BNO) status and born before 1997, along with their dependents. So far, 90,000 Hong Kongers have taken up the offer.</p>
<p>There is, however, one group of people who are not helped by the scheme, and yet are among those most vulnerable and in need of sanctuary: those activists born after 1997. Yet these are the people most in need of protection: 93% of those who have been <a href="https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all-posts/2021/11/27/as-parliament-prepares-to-vote-on-amendment-to-allow-young-hong-kongers-to-access-bno-scheme-new-report-shows-young-people-account-for-93-of-those-charged-in-protest-cases" target="_blank" rel="noopener">arrested, charged and tried</a> for involvement in the 2019 pro-democracy protests are under the age of 25.</p>
<p>If they have one parent with BNO status, current rules allow them to come to the UK, but only with their parent. For many, this is not possible. Often the parents don’t want to leave — either because their political views are different from their children’s and they back the pro-Beijing establishment, or simply because they don’t want the upheaval of fleeing their home city. And so for those young people who need to escape Hong Kong to Britain, or face years in jail, their only option is asylum.</p>
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<p>There are currently about 200 young Hong Kongers in this situation in the UK today, many of whom are dealing with the trauma of police brutality in Hong Kong and their new plight here. Separated from their families and often with little adult support or oversight, they have escaped arrest and prison but are yet to find freedom. Some are accommodated in bleak hotels, where meals consist of a daily and unvaried diet of curry, with no thought to their own cultural preferences. Anecdotally, there are concerns that the toll on their mental health, combined with the inevitable financial challenges that await them, may lead some to drugs, suicide or crime.</p>
<p>But it doesn’t have to be this way; there is a solution which is sensible, logical and does not add anything to the numbers. Former Deputy Prime Minister Damian Green, who once served as an immigration minister, has tabled an amendment to the Borders and Nationality Bill which is designed to close a loophole. Simply put, it would allow those between the ages of 18-24 who have at least one parent with BNO status to claim that status in the UK without being accompanied by their parent. This adds no extra burden in terms of immigration numbers, because they are already factored in as dependents. It would also ease the burden on the asylum system. And, more importantly, it would enable a relatively small number of brave young activists to study, work and build a new future for themselves in freedom.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2-GettyImages-1230733619-scaled-e1633442210376.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hong Kong&#039;s Zero Covid deception</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/10/hong-kongs-zero-covid-deception/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cowley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Nathan Law knows this well. He was elected as the youngest legislator in Hong Kong in 2016, disqualified from the legislature by Beijing a year later and sentenced to eight months in jail. Fortunately, he was granted asylum in the UK earlier this year. As he wrote in a recent joint letter sent to the Home Secretary: “The Chinese Government’s actions every day show their contempt for [the Sino-British Joint Declaration] with Britain. One simple, humanitarian response the UK can take is to rationalise the BNO policy and offer a lifeline to the young democrats who need it most.”</p>
<p>The amendment already has the support of some eminent politicians, from the Tories such as Former Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt and former Defence Secretary Liam Fox to Labour MPs Select Committee Chairs Stephen Timms and Sarah Champion. And yet I fear the Government may come up with a variety of arguments to try to quash a growing rebellion on its own benches.</p>
<p>If that does happen, they’ll likely say that the UK is being generous enough already. But that’s simply not true: there is a gaping hole in the BNO visa scheme which hangs those born after 1997 out to dry. Or they might point to other paths open to young people, such as the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-ballot-of-the-2021-youth-mobility-scheme-for-hong-kong-sar-passport-holders" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-ballot-of-the-2021-youth-mobility-scheme-for-hong-kong-sar-passport-holders&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1638640628769000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3MQUMywJOfqQaS45qOHigO">youth mobility scheme</a>, but this only has 1,000 places a year and applications must be made outside the UK, so it is no use to someone who needs to escape Hong Kong urgently or has already left. Or the Government might argue that it would lead to unaccompanied minors moving to the UK. But this is nonsense. The amendment is targeted at those aged 18-24, and safeguards could be put in place regarding age, health and security background checks. Nor would it breach the Sino-British Joint Declaration, because it does not re-open registration, it merely allows young people already eligible to apply independently of their parents.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2GettyImages-1235247493-e1636469367122.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>President Xi is exploiting #MeToo</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/11/how-president-xi-exploits-metoo/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Austin Williams</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Ultimately, though, this amendment can’t be reduced to technical justifications; what it really comes down to is whether or not we’re happy to do nothing while brave young activists are placed in danger. At a university in the north of England last week, I met several Hong Kongers who were fearful of what would happen to them once they graduate, if they are forced to return to Hong Kong. They explained how they are in exactly the situation this amendment is designed to help — they have BNO parents who do not plan to take up the BNO scheme, and so would be forced to choose between returning to a city stripped of all its freedoms or claim asylum. Are those really the options we want to offer bright young Hong Kong graduates with degrees from some of the best universities in the world?</p>
<p>Most of my friends in Hong Kong are now in prison. I don’t want to see any more of them behind bars. But nor do I want to see them languishing in our asylum system.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">284546</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>The West can learn from China</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/08/what-the-west-must-learn-from-china/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/08/what-the-west-must-learn-from-china/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/GettyImages-1233746268-e1628531282898-1024x553-1.jpg?w=648</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Marshall Auerback]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/marshallauerback.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Chinese students, not calling for maths to be decolonised (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Marshall Auerback</strong> is a market commentator and a research associate for the Levy Institute at Bard College.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>Mauerback</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a market commentator and a research associate for the Levy Institute at Bard College.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 09 Aug 2021 23:00:26 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 10 Aug 2021 13:32:55 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Biden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Milton Friedman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stock market]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wall Street]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=185390</guid>
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								<![CDATA[There's a powerful moral force behind Beijing's recent crackdowns]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The Chinese government has made an existential choice: rather than surviving by betting on the financial markets, it is going to produce stuff instead. It wants a nation full of engineers, not financial engineers; computer chips, rather than chocolate chips; innovation over financial experimentation. Beijing also wants an education system that actually educates, rather than creating a cottage industry of “progressive” credentialism that engenders a self-perpetuating upper class, rich both in terms of capital and diplomas but provides little in the way of genuine scholarship.</p>
<p>Needless to say, this is not the conventional reading of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-30/investors-lose-1-trillion-in-china-s-wild-week-of-market-shocks?sref=qD0EKJAt" target="_blank" rel="noopener">China’s recent attacks</a> on fin-tech, internet monopolies and private education companies. Take Stephen Roach, former chief economist at Morgan Stanley, who recently decried Beijing’s <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3142817/chinas-regulation-its-spirited-tech-sector-could-be-tipping-point" target="_blank" rel="noopener">actions</a> “as a tipping point for the economy”. He goes on to lament the heavy-handed use of regulation “to strangle the business models and financing capacity of the economy’s most dynamic sector”.</p>
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<p>As the proverbial expression goes, you can take the boy out of Morgan Stanley, but you can’t take Morgan Stanley out of the boy. Roach still retains a Wall Street-centric bias in a country — the United States — where the stock market remains the ultimate arbiter of the American experience. Indeed, if one were to assess America’s “entrepreneurial spirit” via stock market metrics, then that would suggest that US has been stunningly successful. As economist David Goldman <a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2021/05/chinas-attempt-to-avoid-the-american-tech-monopoly-trap/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has noted</a>, “in 2010, the five biggest tech companies accounted for just 11% of the market capitalisation of the S&amp;P 500”. Today, however, “ten companies in the S&amp;P 500 hold two-fifths of all the cash balances of index members, and all but one is a tech giant… The top three cash holders in the S&amp;P — Microsoft, Apple, and Google — hold a fifth of all the cash held by index companies”.</p>
<p>But as Goldman observes, these companies’ profits have increasingly been the product of oligopolistic rents, rather than product innovation: “Apple is so cash-rich that it has bought back $327 billion of its stock since 2012. That explains why its stock price has risen by 82% in the past six years even though its operating income has barely changed.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/chinese-censorship-comes-to-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/chinese-censorship-comes-to-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/GettyImages-862735380-scaled-e1628265043768-1024x573-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/chinese-censorship-comes-to-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/chinese-censorship-comes-to-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Chinese censorship is coming</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/chinese-censorship-comes-to-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jamie Bartlett</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Far from deploying cash toward productive R&amp;D investment, Apple’s behaviour provides a case study of precisely the kind of situation that Beijing is seeking to avoid: companies deploying cashflow toward stock buybacks, rather than investing in stateside facilities to enhance the nation’s productive investment and employment capabilities.</p>
<p>How many times do we find ourselves in an elevator, in an airplane terminal or at home, looking at a screen with stock numbers whizzing by, and people fretting over whether America is about to disintegrate because of a 5% swing in Apple’s share price? How did we get to point where our national economic conversation is dominated by chatter <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/28/robinhood-interactive-brokers-restrict-trading-in-gamestop-s.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">on the stock gyrations of GameStop</a>, when this just an economic irrelevance for most of the 330 million people who live in America, and are struggling to sustain a modicum of economic security?</p>
<p>We ban the use of Chinese 5G equipment in US networks, but few ponder the question as to why there are no longer any American telecom equipment companies. After all, in the 1970s the two largest telecom equipment manufacturers were US companies: Western Electric and ITT. With this story of increasing manufacturing irrelevance as our backdrop, is it really fair to suggest that China is on the road to economic perdition because its government <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-03/tencent-plummets-as-chinese-crackdown-fears-persist?cmpid=BBD080321_MKT&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=newsletter&amp;utm_term=210803&amp;utm_campaign=markets&amp;sref=qD0EKJAt" target="_blank" rel="noopener">decries the “spiritual opium” of computer games</a>?</p>
<p>A harsh charge, especially when one considers China’s own tragic history pertaining to opium addiction. Yet it seems there is some moral force to the Government’s argument which pressured China&#8217;s largest gaming company, Tencent, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/chinese-tencent-gaming-company-limits-access-for-minors-amid-state-criticism/a-58743541" target="_blank" rel="noopener">to announce new restrictions</a> to limit gaming time for children under 12 to just one hour a day and two hours a day during holidays.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/bankers-are-running-the-country/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/bankers-are-running-the-country/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/GettyImages-83244489-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/bankers-are-running-the-country/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/bankers-are-running-the-country/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Bankers are running the country</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/08/bankers-are-running-the-country/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Here in the United States, we lost our way decades ago, when we decided that the only social responsibility of a corporation was to increase its profits, community considerations and employees be damned. This laid the groundwork for economist Milton Friedman’s “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedman_doctrine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stockholder theory</a>”: the idea that shareholders, being the owners and the main risk-bearing participants, ought therefore to receive the biggest rewards.</p>
<p>But while tying corporate decision-making and stock price to innovation and production may have sounded superficially attractive, the champions of this theory, including Friedman himself, never bothered to show how these outcomes could be achieved in the real world. In fact, the historical experience has been abysmal.</p>
<p>Boeing and GE, to cite two prominent examples, were once poster boys for the success of American capitalism. Today they are but a shell of their former glory. With its Max 8 737 plane, and the 787 Dreamliner, Boeing has become synonymous with airplane crashes and shoddy engineering, whilst GE, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/business/general-electric-history-of-innovation.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">once a byword for thriving manufacturing and innovation</a>, suffered the indignity of being yet another target of Harry Markopolos, the accounting expert who first raised red flags about Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.</p>
<p>Both managements are now focused on financial engineering rather than manufacturing, much of which has been sold off, or outsourced to China. In doing so, they reflect an ethos that prioritises finance above all else in an economy increasingly characterised the layering of debt on top of debt. It means a greater share of GDP going to the financial system, going to interest rather than profit, and away from a goods-producing economy.</p>
<p>Beijing has been paying attention as it increasingly bets on real innovation, and targets various companies as strate­gic components within a broader industrial ecosystem to promote national development. True, the Government has fought to protect and promote its own companies within this sector. But what has been caricatured in the West as governments incompetently picking winners and losers has in fact created world-class companies such as Huawei.</p>
<p>At the same time, American “free market” solutions have resulted in a hollowing out of companies that were once world-class innovators, and a corresponding degradation of economic know-how and social capital as highly skilled jobs have been outsourced.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/will-china-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/will-china-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2GettyImages-1232839453.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/will-china-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/will-china-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will China invade Taiwan?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/will-china-invade-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom Chivers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is the context in which we should understand Beijing’s recent crackdowns. What Stephen Roach and others characterise as Beijing’s politically motivated attacks on big tech behemoths such as Jack Ma’s Alibaba, could more accurately been seen reining in Ma’s attempt to convert his company into bank, all the while seeking to circumvent increased banking regulation. In other words, regulatory arbitrage.</p>
<p>Likewise, China’s State Administration for Market Regulation has been criticised for its fines on Alibaba Group, Tencent, and SF Holdings. But a closer look at the situations shows that these firms were singled out for what China’s chief regulator called “monopolistic corporate behaviour”, and the fines were levied “to protect consumer interests”. That sounds like the sort of thing that we are used to in the US, before our tech behemoths — Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft — gobbled up smaller competitors and began stifling competition and actively suppressing competitive innovation. These days, Beijing appears to believe in market competition more than we do.</p>
<p>Similarly, the crackdown on private education companies should be seen as an attempt to curb a credential arms race as we have in the US. Attacks on cramming factories such as TAL Education Group and Gaotu Group are not an attack on education, but a deterrent to the need to furnish students with worthless diplomas while businesses lament a skills deficit.</p>
<p>It’s not as though Beijing’s authorities are saying mathematics is Western and needs to be replaced with Han math or Confucian physics — which would be the real equivalent of what we are currently doing in many of our universities, where the extremes of progressive ideology mean that medical school professors are forced <a href="https://bariweiss.substack.com/p/med-schools-are-now-denying-biological?r=nldl&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=copy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">apologise for referring to a patient’s biological sex</a> on the grounds that “acknowledging biological sex can be considered transphobic”.</p>
<p>In America, among the biggest beneficiaries of the current economic system are not entrepreneurs or innovators, but <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/panama-papers" target="_blank" rel="noopener">parasites</a> who owe their wealth to rigged markets or government subsidies. But they are merely a symptom of the bigger problem: a newfound scepticism in the ability of American capitalism to deliver on its economic promise of prosperity.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/chinas-communists-owe-it-all-to-colonialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/chinas-communists-owe-it-all-to-colonialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/flag.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/chinas-communists-owe-it-all-to-colonialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/chinas-communists-owe-it-all-to-colonialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China&#039;s Communist Party owes it all to colonialism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/chinas-communists-owe-it-all-to-colonialism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Bill Hayton</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>That is precisely the kind of thing that China is seeking to avoid. Stock market investors may be unhappy, but far from destroying consumer confidence, the measures now being undertaken by Beijing might have precisely the opposite effect.</p>
<p>As Chinese fund manager Yuan Yuwei has <a href="https://www.moonofalabama.org/2021/07/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argued</a>, “housing, medical and education costs were the ‘three big mountains’ suffocating Chinese families and crowding out their consumption”. Yuan went on to describe these measures as “the most forceful reform I’ve seen over many years, and the most populist one. It benefits the masses at the cost of the richest and the elite groups.”</p>
<p>Unlike America’s Federal Reserve, whose increasing tolerance and support of financial bubbles continues to engender profound systemic fragility in the American economy, Beijing is prioritising social cohesion above the narrow interests of financial rentiers. If only American policymakers had demonstrated such foresight in decades past.</p>
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					<title>Chinese censorship is coming</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/08/chinese-censorship-comes-to-the-west/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/08/chinese-censorship-comes-to-the-west/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Jamie Bartlett]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Jamie-Bartlett-Profile.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Why are we copying Beijing? (ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>is the author of<em> The People Vs Tech (2018) </em>&amp;<em> The Dark Net (2015)&#8217;. </em></p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>JamieJBartlett</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is the author of<em> The People Vs Tech (2018) </em>&amp;<em> The Dark Net (2015)'. </em>]]>
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										<pubDate>Sat, 14 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 14 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[The internet has never been so authoritarian]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Be honest — did you read <em>UnHerd</em>’s “cookie policy” just now, before you clicked “accept and close”? Have you <em>ever</em> read one of those notices? Or do you, like me, agree to anything and everything so long as you can get to the good stuff more quickly?</p>
<p>The reason these annoying little pop-ups exist at all is thanks to <a href="https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/#:~:text=The%20General%20Data%20Protection%20Regulation,to%20people%20in%20the%20EU." target="_blank" rel="noopener">a recent-ish law</a> which helps you understand what’s being collected about you online. It’s something that probably deserves a moment of your attention. But we’re spending <a href="https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/media-releases/2020/uk-internet-use-surges" target="_blank" rel="noopener">more and more</a> time online; who wants to waste it checking 20 tedious Ts&amp;Cs a day?</p>
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<p>The future of the internet will come down to tiny things like this: subtle decisions made at the engineering or regulatory level — stuff which most of us ignore because we can’t be bothered to find out what it’s all about. Are you curious about “digital object architecture”? Do you want to know who’s behind the “Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers”? A colleague of mine once spent weeks tracking this stuff — only to <a href="https://unherd.com/2018/12/the-greatest-threat-to-your-online-freedom/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conclude</a> that internet protocols are “simply too impenetrable and boring to feel angry about”. Nobody cares. Nobody, except the autocrats of the world, who are quietly trying to wrestle control over various working groups and technical decisions — to make sure they can tame the digital beast.</p>
<p>Given our abject dependency on it, it’s scary to think of the internet as a flimsy experiment. But it’s already changed shape several times over its short life: from a government-funded research project for military scientists, to an academic network, to a vehicle for e-commerce and now a platform for social content. Through it all one thing remained constant, in theory if not always in practice: the idea that the internet was a single open network which anyone could join, and where everything was connected via a standard set of protocols and rules.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/12/the-greatest-threat-to-your-online-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/12/the-greatest-threat-to-your-online-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/GettyImages-155575013.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/12/the-greatest-threat-to-your-online-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/12/the-greatest-threat-to-your-online-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The biggest threat to your online freedom</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/12/the-greatest-threat-to-your-online-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Carl Miller</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>According to a new book, that’s about to change.<em> <a href="https://www.southampton.ac.uk/wsi/research/four-internets.page" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Four Internets</a> </em>argues that<em> </em>the era of a single internet might be drawing to a close, replaced by a balkanised network of different versions living alongside each other. Scholars Wendy Hall and Kieron O&#8217;Hara reckon four internets in particular are already taking shape.</p>
<p>The “Silicon Valley” model is open and libertarian — anyone can join the network, no single authority is in charge and there are few rules about what sort of information can be transported across the network. Its <em>modus operandi</em> is to ask for forgiveness rather than permission. This is the original vision and remains just about still on top.</p>
<p>The “Washington DC” version, by contrast, prioritises data collection and corporate interests. It doesn’t mind big tech firms collecting massive amounts of information on citizens, providing it generates profits and excellent products for consumers to enjoy.</p>
<p>Then there&#8217;s the “Brussels bourgeois” model which is “ordered, respectful, polite, decent, well-behaved, well- mannered, and considerate” (and also a little dull). Preferred by most EU countries, it is quick to launch anti-trust cases and punish companies that “move quickly and break things”. It is the Brussels vision that created <a href="https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/#:~:text=The%20General%20Data%20Protection%20Regulation,to%20people%20in%20the%20EU." target="_blank" rel="noopener">“GDPR”</a> privacy rules, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_be_forgotten" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the “right to be forgotten”</a> and those damn cookie laws.</p>
<p>Finally, there is the fast-developing “Beijing” internet, which is paternalistic and tightly controlled by the government. Back in 2000, Bill Clinton told a Chinese trade delegation that cracking down on the internet would be like “trying to nail jello to the wall … good luck”. But over the last 20 years the Chinese government has gradually brought the internet to heel through its doctrine of “cyber-sovereignty”. They’ve done it slowly and cleverly: China&#8217;s &#8220;<a href="https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/security-essentials/what-is-deep-packet-inspection#:~:text=Deep%20packet%20inspection%20(DPI)%20refers,traverse%20a%20monitored%20network%20checkpoint.&amp;text=Deep%20packet%20inspection%20will%20not,the%20payload%20of%20the%20packet." target="_blank" rel="noopener">deep packet inspection</a>&#8221; technology checks what’s coming in from the rest of the world; IP addresses they don’t approve of are turned away. All internet content providers are held liable for what appears on their websites, under an insidious “you yourself decide” code, which encourages everyone to turn into draconian self-censors to avoid trouble.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/this-is-how-democracy-dies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/this-is-how-democracy-dies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GettyImages-1233021913-1-e1626260149423.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/this-is-how-democracy-dies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/this-is-how-democracy-dies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>This is how democracy dies</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/this-is-how-democracy-dies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jamie Bartlett</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Where does the UK stand in all of this? It’s hard to imagine our government would have either the competence or the inclination to go as far as China’s, but what if the Beijing model is the future? In his recent book <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Great-Firewall-China-Alternative-Internet/dp/1786995352" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Great Firewall of China</a></em>, James Griffiths argues the Chinese model is starting to spread. Most visibly in Africa, where various governments are <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/05/20/chinese-digital-tech-in-africa-moral-panics-and-the-messy-reality-of-surveillance/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">happy to buy up</a> cheap, decent Chinese technology — and in some cases the surveillance or AI technology that can help them stay in charge. Although as some analysts have argued, it’s not always Beijing pushing the Beijing model — Western companies are also happy to assist snooping autocrats with cheque books. At home, Westminster is liable to fall for the allure of control. While we might not import Chinese technology itself — especially after the furore with Huawei and the 5G network — the promise of being in charge of the internet is irresistible.</p>
<p>And so, our internet is getting increasingly authoritarian. You may recall the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (aka the “Snoopers Charter”), which, among other things, required internet companies to keep a record of the websites you visit for a year. Earlier this year it was revealed that the government was testing <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/internet-connection-records-ip-act" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a creepy new tool</a> as part of the Act — surveillance technology that could track and record everything that every single person in the country does on the internet. Funnily enough, the Chinese government <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-11/-snooper-s-charter-would-make-brits-most-spied-upon-people" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cited</a> the Snoopers Charters when defending their own draconian surveillance techniques.</p>
<p>There also seems to be a running game of cat and mouse between the police and campaign groups over the use of facial recognition technology. Last year the Court of Appeals <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-53734716" target="_blank" rel="noopener">deemed</a> that South Wales Police’s use of live facial recognition technology was unlawful — a win for campaigners. But this year some forces started <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202108/uk-police-forces-trialing-retrospective-facial-recognition-from-bodycam-maker" target="_blank" rel="noopener">trialling</a> retrospective facial recognition technology instead.</p>
<p>Then there’s the proposed <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/online-harms-white-paper" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Online Harm Bill</a>, currently inching through Parliament, which aims to make companies more responsible for user safety on their platforms. It will force tech firms to take on a “duty of care” and remove “harmful content” while keeping up “democratically important” stuff. There’s certainly plenty of bad stuff online, but phrases like “duty of care” and “harmful content” are terrifyingly broad — and reminiscent of China’s “you yourself decide” code. If the British bill passes, it will invariably mean proactive and excessive censorship — with government setting the tone.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-chinese-future-isnt-bright/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-chinese-future-isnt-bright/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GettyImages-1326720488-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-chinese-future-isnt-bright/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-chinese-future-isnt-bright/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Chinese future isn&#039;t bright</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/07/the-chinese-future-isnt-bright/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Pomerantsev</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And it probably will pass, because the truth is the public seem to quite like the Beijing model, even if they wouldn’t call it that. According to a recent <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/technology/survey-results/daily/2021/07/13/66e91/3?utm_source=twitter&amp;utm_medium=daily_questions&amp;utm_campaign=question_3" target="_blank" rel="noopener">YouGov survey</a>, 78% of us want users to disclose their real identity when signing up on social media — <a href="https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/575833" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a petition</a> about this hit almost 700,000 signatures recently. It’s easy to understand the instinct — this followed the controversy over racist attacks on England footballers after the team lost the European Championship final, much of which came from anonymous social media accounts. Labour MPs Margaret Hodge, Angela Rayner and Jess Philips have all argued that de-anonymising users will force them to be accountable for their actions.</p>
<p>If the goal is noble, the method is not. For one thing, it’s not clear that such a move would deal with the problem, given a decent chunk of online abuse <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/social-media/2021/07/who-behind-online-abuse-black-england-players-and-how-can-we-stop" target="_blank" rel="noopener">comes from</a> anonymous users overseas (should we ban them too? How?) Besides, cyber-disinhibition is also caused by the lack of face-to-face, immediate contact, which wouldn’t change — unless of course the government forced us to hand-deliver our tweets and posts in person to the recipient. And besides, after everything we know about Facebook, are we sure we really want to hand our passports or driving licenses over to Zuck? What of those who have good reason to stay anonymous online — the whistleblower, the undercover journalist, the teen in a self-help group?</p>
<p>Anonymity used to be seen as a benefit of online life: a chance to say what you really think, to safely explore new ideas and new identities. “On the Internet nobody knows you’re a dog,” went <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Internet,_nobody_knows_you%27re_a_dog" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the famous <em>New Yorker</em> cartoon</a>, and it wasn’t meant as an insult. Now Fido and Patch are a menace to society.</p>
<p>When you add this all up, it’s possible to see the UK drifting accidentally into its very own authoritarian internet. Not up to Beijing’s Olympian standards, perhaps, but where censorship in the name of harmony trumps all and where surveillance is built in to the rules and the tech.</p>
<p>As the internet becomes more embedded in our everyday life, that will take on an even more sinister meaning. Any minor infraction in our self-driving cars will result in a system override and an automatic locked-door ride to the nearest police station (“in the interests of pedestrian safety!”). Smart fridges will hector you about meat consumption levels and simply refuse to open if you’ve been recorded saying anything rude or offensive (“in the interests of the nation’s health!”). The internet will become a far more sanitised, controlled and monitored place than it already is — and by extension so will all of us.</p>
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					<title>Why China is terrified of Christianity</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/02/why-china-is-terrified-of-christianity/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/02/why-china-is-terrified-of-christianity/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Benedict Rogers]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/image.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[A procession of Chinese Catholics. (Photo by China Photos/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Benedict Rogers</strong> is a human rights activist and writer. As East Asia Team Leader at Christian Solidarity Worldwide, he specialises in Burma, Indonesia, China and North Korea.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>benedictrogers</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a human rights activist and writer. As East Asia Team Leader at Christian Solidarity Worldwide, he specialises in Burma, Indonesia, China and North Korea.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 17 Feb 2021 00:01:26 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 18 Feb 2021 19:26:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Catholic Church]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christianity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cultural revolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hong Kong]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[religious freedom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=57257</guid>
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								<![CDATA[From destroying churches to jailing priests, the Communist Party is bent on eliminating religion]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Religious freedom in China is facing the most severe crackdown since the Cultural Revolution — and most people don’t even realise. Yes, in the past year, the plight of the predominantly Muslim Uighurs has drawn increasing attention. At least a million, perhaps as many as three million, have been incarcerated in prison camps, where they face systematic torture, rape, slave labour and forced sterilisation. Likewise, the continued persecution of Falun Gong, a Chinese spiritual discipline in the Buddhist tradition, has inspired worldwide condemnation.</p>
<p>But far less known is the brutal, and intensifying, repression of China’s Christians. For while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime has always repressed religion in general, Christianity has always been its biggest target. This is partly a result of the Party’s promotion of atheism, as well its nervousness towards any gathering of people that it does not control. But it is also rooted in its fear that Christianity represents a “foreign” threat to its way of life, albeit one that the CCP hasn’t quite worked out how to deal with.</p>
<p>Under Mao Zedong, the Party attempted to eliminate Christianity altogether, though it succeeded only in driving the church underground. Indeed, as Deng Xiaoping started to open up the economy in the 1980s, the regime realised that the Church could not be eradicated so sought to control it instead; re-establishing state-approved church institutions for Catholics and Protestants that had been shut during the Cultural Revolution, while continuing to persecute underground congregations.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/china-will-never-stop-rewriting-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/china-will-never-stop-rewriting-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-566455249.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/china-will-never-stop-rewriting-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/china-will-never-stop-rewriting-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China will never stop rewriting history</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/china-will-never-stop-rewriting-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Isabel Hilton</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There then followed a period of varied relaxation in which, while there was never religious freedom, the situation for some Christians did improve, depending on the attitudes of provincial authorities. Some local leaders turned a blind-eye to gatherings of unregistered churches, as long as they did not directly challenge the CCP. In other places, even large unregistered “mega churches” were permitted; Beijing’s Zion Church operated for years with hundreds of worshippers, while the Golden Lampstand Church in Shanxi province attracted a staggering 50,000 members.</p>
<p>But now China is in a fourth era — one of severe repression, propaganda and central control. Since he became President in 2013, Xi Jinping has taken an active interest in policy on religion, and initiated several national-level conferences dedicated to its “Sinicisation”. They culminated in the introduction of new regulations in 2018; today, even churches within the state-controlled institutions face new restrictions. Officially, the regime estimates that there are 50 million Christians in China today, though the real figure is believed to be at least double that number.</p>
<p>Every church is now forced to demonstrate its loyalty to the CCP by displaying portraits of Xi Jinping and party propaganda banners alongside, or even instead of, religious images. Surveillance cameras are installed at the altar, recording all who attend, while under-18s are prohibited from going into places of worship at all. Meanwhile, Christians on low incomes have been pressured by officials to give up their faith, with threats that their state support could be withheld.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-1211365730-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China&#039;s plan for medical domination</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Steve Boggan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Most dramatically, thousands of crosses have been torn down and some churches have not only been closed, but demolished. In 2018 alone, the Golden Lampstand Church was dynamited, Zion Church was forced to close and the Home of Christ Church in Shantou, Guangdong province, was shut after the authorities called it an “illegal religious organisation”.</p>
<p>Christmas and the Bible are now in the regime’s sights, too. In 2019, the CCP announced its intention to produce a new translation of the Bible, which would bring it into line with the party’s “thought” by reinterpreting key passages. Last Christmas, they banned all festive activities, with the exception of attending government-sanctioned churches and family gatherings at home. Even so, groups of so-called “Pro-Mao” citizens reportedly marched through the streets in subsequent days, proclaiming anti-Christian messages. Some universities prohibited students from celebrating the holiday and banned them from attending off-campus events.</p>
<p>But in many ways, the CCP regards Christianity as an <i>external</i> threat — as a “foreign” force intent on undermining the country’s way of life. We can see this in the publication last November of a new draft document on regulations for foreigners’ involvement in religious activities. In effect, the new measures prohibit Chinese religious adherents from participating in activities organised by foreigners in China, and criminalise proselytisation — or even religious education and training — completely.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-75883527-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Don&#039;t mess with China&#039;s feminists</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Qi Chen </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This wariness towards Christianity’s “foreign” elements partly explains why in Hong Kong, where the rule of law is being dismantled by the CCP, religious freedom is particularly under pressure. Consider the case of pastor Roy Chan, whose Good Neighbour North District Church was raided by police last year, an act of retaliation for Chan&#8217;s decision to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-asia-china-50000995" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">support</a> young pro-democracy protestors. &#8220;Beat me, not the kids,&#8221; Chan said at the time. And he was beaten — not just by the police but by HSBC which, under pressure from the authorities, have frozen the assets of the church, pastor Chan, and his family.</p>
<p>But while some religious leaders in in the city continue to speak out against this crackdown, others, including Hong Kong’s current Apostolic Administrator, Cardinal John Tong, are not showing similar courage. When the President of the Federation of Asian Bishops Conferences <a href="https://www.ucanews.com/news/cardinal-bo-let-us-pray-for-hong-kong/88640" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Cardinal Charles Bo</a> tried to mobilise a prayer campaign for Hong Kong last year, the diocese actively discouraged it. A few weeks later, Cardinal Tong issued an instruction to clergy to <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/hong-kong-cardinal-warns-priests-to-watch-your-language-24915" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">“watch your language”</a> in homilies, and the diocese has since published religious textbooks with guidance on how Hong Kong students can <a href="https://hk.appledaily.com/news/20200914/S5IFFMP5XZAPFMNIMOD4C7UECE/?utm_campaign=hkad_social_AppleDailyENG&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">“contribute to their nation</a>” — a clear pro-Beijing slant. Whether it wants to or not, the diocese is undoubtedly feeling — or at least anticipating — the CCP’s pressure.</p>
<p>Yet none of this dissuaded the Vatican from renewing its two-year-old agreement with the regime in China over the appointment of bishops in September 2020. First negotiated in 2018, the text of the agreement remains secret but it essentially allows the Chinese Communist Party to nominate bishops, for final approval by the Pope. In the Vatican’s mind, the aim was to better protect Catholics in China and bring the state-approved and underground churches together, but it has had the opposite effect.</p>
<p>Even when it was first mooted, a precondition for the deal should have been the release of all imprisoned Catholic clergy, at a minimum. Instead, not only was that not secured, but several brave underground Catholic bishops who had stayed loyal to Rome for decades, who had been in and out of prison or risked arrest many times, were forced by Rome to stand aside in favour of Beijing’s preferred bishops.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-1278945992.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will China&#039;s millennials ever rebel?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Only two months after the deal was announced, bishop Peter Shao Zhumin of Wenzhou, was arrested for the fifth time in two years. He was released, but continues to face harassment. Meanwhile, in January last year, Bishop Vincent Guo Xijin of Mindong, Fujian Province, who had already been demoted to the position of auxiliary bishop to make way for a Beijing-appointed prelate, was forced by the authorities to leave his residence, which was then shut down. The 61-year-old cleric ended up sleeping in the doorway of his church office and only after an international outcry was he permitted to return to his apartment, albeit with the utilities cut off. Then in June 2020, 70-year-old Augustine Cui Tai, coadjutor bishop of the underground church in Xuanhua, was arrested again — having already endured 13 years in detention. Since then, there have been countless <a href="https://www.csw.org.uk/2020-china-report" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">others</a> like him.</p>
<p>And so as the world rightly focuses more on China, on accusations of genocide against the Uighurs and breaches of an international treaty in Hong Kong, we must not forget the images of dynamited churches, destroyed crosses, Communist propaganda in holy sanctuaries and jailed priests.</p>
<p>Wang Yi, the pastor of Early Rain Church in Chengdu, warned over two years ago that the regime had launched “a war against the soul”. A year later he was sentenced to nine years in prison for “inciting to subvert state power”. But as Pastor Wang made clear in his one of his offending sermons: the CCP has “established for themselves an enemy that can never be detained, can never be destroyed, will never capitulate nor be conquered: the soul of man.”</p>
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					<title>How China could turn off Britain&#8217;s lights</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/01/how-china-could-turn-off-britains-lights/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/01/how-china-could-turn-off-britains-lights/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GettyImages-493418000.jpg?w=517</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Clive Hamilton]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Clive-Hamilton.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[China in Britain: Xi Jinping in London, 2015. Credit: Carl Court/Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b data-stringify-type="bold">Clive Hamilton</b> is professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University in Canberra and the co-author of <i data-stringify-type="italic">Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World</i>.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>CliveCHamilton</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b data-stringify-type="bold">Clive Hamilton</b> is professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University in Canberra and the co-author of <i data-stringify-type="italic">Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World</i>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 25 Jan 2021 00:13:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:44:42 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Britain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CGN]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electricity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=55069</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Businesses loyal to Beijing are taking over our nuclear power and electricity systems]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In any future war between Britain and China, the winner could be decided in a matter of hours — and Britain is unlikely to be the victor. For years now, Chinese businesses have been quietly positioned at the heart of British infrastructure. Were a conflict to erupt, their employees could, willingly or otherwise, be mobilised by Beijing. In fact, they would be legally compelled to.</p>
<p>What could this mean in practice? To put it simply, if he were so inclined, President Xi Jinping could, at the flick of a button, turn off the lights at 10 Downing Street — not to mention freeze Britain’s financial system and paralyse its hospitals.</p>
<p>Perhaps that’s why there has been such a concerted <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/boris-johnson-narrowly-wins-bid-to-scrap-anti-genocide-measure-from-trade-bill-despite-tory-rebellion-12192800" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">effort</a> by British politicians in recent weeks  to address their country’s dependence on trade with Beijing. These efforts are certainly well-intentioned, but as someone who has spent years charting China’s silent campaign of global interference and subversion, I fear they could be too late. In my recent book, <em>Hidden Hand</em>, my co-author Mareike Ohlberg and I detailed the threat the Chinese Communist Party poses to Western democracy. Here, for the first time, a small but disproportionately concerning new aspect of that can be revealed: how China is slowly taking over Britain’s nuclear power and electricity systems.</p>
<p>On the face of it, you could be forgiven for wondering why Chinese investment is so troubling. Why should we care that its businesses are investing in Britain, when those from other countries — including a number of unpleasant ones — do the same? The answer is straightforward. China is different because its businesses can be, and are, used as an extension of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Referred to as a “party-corporate conglomerate”, there is a deep intermingling of China’s business elite with the “red aristocracy” — that is, the Communist Party families that rule the nation. Even President Xi, who pledged to crack down on corruption following the CCP’s 18<sup>th</sup> National Congress in 2012, has family members with secret offshore <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/06/panama-papers-reveal-offshore-secrets-china-red-nobility-big-business" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">bank</a> accounts and hundreds of <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/panama-papers-family-of-chinas-president-xi-implicated" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">millions</a> in assets squirrelled away.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GettyImages-871894532.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West&#039;s utter failure to see China&#039;s end game</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mike Martin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At its heart, however, the party-corporate conglomerate is built on the strength of China’s powerful state-owned enterprises. While we in the West once believed that, under the auspices of “globalisation”, drawing China into the global economy would see independent private enterprise prevail, under Xi the opposite has occurred. In 2016, for example, President Xi <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-10/12/content_27035822.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">declared</a> that the party’s leadership is the “root and soul” of state-owned companies and they should “become important forces to implement” the decisions of the party.</p>
<p>More worryingly, the following year China’s parliament passed a law that <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/the-real-danger-of-chinas-national-intelligence-law/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">obliges</a> all Chinese citizens overseas to provide assistance to the country&#8217;s intelligence services if requested: Article Seven stipulates that “any organisation or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according to law.” And that applies to heads of Chinese corporations as much as to any other citizen. If China’s shadowy Ministry of State Security tells the boss of Huawei in Britain to do some spying, then he is obliged to obey. Anyone who dared to refuse could be escorted back to China quick-smart — <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8233203/Chinas-disappeared-happened-dared-speak-coronavirus.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">never</a> to be seen again.</p>
<p>Such occurrences are, however, rare. Chinese companies have Communist Party cells active inside them — the secretary of the cell is the most powerful person in the company. After all, he (and it normally is a <em>he)</em> represents the masters in Beijing and can over-rule the company’s board. However, conflict between a company board and party cell is hardly common. In 2016, President Xi decreed that the positions of party secretary and chairman of a Chinese company’s board should be <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1024360.shtml" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">occupied</a> by the same person.</p>
<p>All of this applies to the state-owned China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), which owns a third of the nuclear power station being built at Hinkley Point and hopes to be involved in the construction of two more nuclear plants, at Sizewell in Suffolk and Bradwell in Essex. The personnel of CGN is typical of any CCP-sponsored company. Until a few months ago, its chairman in Shenzhen was a man called He Yu, who <a href="https://archive.today/2021.01.21-120150/http:/www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2020-07-23/1466456.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">doubled</a> as the secretary of the company’s Communist Party cell. He was <a href="https://archive.today/2021.01.21-113432/http:/m.caijing.com.cn/article/184601" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">instrumental</a> in securing CGN’s investment in the Hinkley power plant.</p>
<p>His replacement, Yang Changli, was <a href="https://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2020-07-23/1466456.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">appointed</a> secretary of the party committee and chairman of the CGN’s board in July 2020. As business executives, their aim is to advance CGN’s commercial interests, but as senior cadres of the CCP their first loyalty must be to the party.</p>
<p>Nor are He and Yang the only ones at CGN with disturbing ties to the CCP. Outside of China, Zheng Dongshan, the man who runs its UK subsidiary, has also been a <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170902205403/http:/news.bjx.com.cn/html/20170707/835622.shtml" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">member</a> of the parent company’s “CCP Leadership Group”. However, before he arrived in Britain in 2017, “Comrade Zheng” took the precaution of <a href="https://finance.sina.cn/chanjing/gsxw/2017-07-07/detail-ifyhwefp0214309.d.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">resigning</a> from his party positions. Even so, it’s safe to say that he still toes the party line. If Beijing asks CGN UK to do something, then it must — even if it could spell disaster for the UK.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/01/china-buying-western-minds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/01/china-buying-western-minds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/confucius-1124611_1920.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/01/china-buying-western-minds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/01/china-buying-western-minds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China isn&#039;t just buying Western businesses. Is it also trying to buy Western minds?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/01/china-buying-western-minds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Chris Deerin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Allegations of its connections to the CCP probably explain CGN UK’s recent attempt to create an acceptable face for the company to the British public. In 2019, it <a href="https://en.cgnpc.com.cn/encgn/c100035/2019-03/11/content_f918bb9a7023400ca6ac9830ff3e0054.shtml" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">set up</a> a UK advisory board featuring knights of the realm, including former Chairman of Crossrail Sir Terry Morgan and once top civil servant Sir Brian Bender. Like Huawei’s local <a href="https://www.theofficialboard.com/org-chart/huawei-uk" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">board</a>, which bristles with titles (Lord Brown, Dame Helen Alexander, Sir Andrew Cahn, Sir Michael Rake), they are, in effect, there to help the company’s public relations.</p>
<p>And CGN needs all the good PR it can get. In 2017 a CGN engineer was <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-nuclear-engineer-sentenced-24-months-prison-violating-atomic-energy-act" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">jailed</a> in Tennessee after he was convicted of enlisting US experts to transfer to CGN sensitive American nuclear technology with military uses. It clearly rattled the White House, which <a href="https://www.energylivenews.com/2019/08/16/us-blacklists-chinese-nuclear-firm-involved-in-hinkley-point-c-project/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">blacklisted</a> the company two years ago, accusing it of stealing American nuclear technology. Only recently, FBI director Christopher Wray <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/06/china-technology-theft-fbi-biggest-threat" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">said</a> that the bureau has around 1,000 active investigations into technology theft carried out for the benefit of China.</p>
<p>Of course, there is nothing to suggest that CGN has any plans to steal commercial secrets relating to Britain’s nuclear energy system. But it is still worth noting the recent <a href="https://www.realclearenergy.org/2018/10/29/us_warns_britain_against_chinese_alliances_on_nuclear_287134.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">warning</a> by a senior US official to the UK government not to engage with CGN because the company is part of Beijing’s efforts to use civilian nuclear technology for military purposes. It is part, he explained, of Xi Jinping’s program of “civil-military fusion” ­— that is, to break down barriers between civil and military institutions to allow personnel and technology to be shared.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the role of Chinese companies in keeping Britain’s lights on goes well beyond CGN’s role in nuclear energy. In recent years, they have also invested heavily in solar and wind power, the future of Britain’s energy supply. CGN itself owns <a href="https://en.cgnpc.com.cn/encgn/c100058/list_newenergy.shtml">two</a> wind farms in Britain.</p>
<p>Perhaps more importantly, Chinese state-owned company China Huaneng Group is currently building Europe’s largest battery storage facility in Wiltshire. As Britain shifts to renewable energy, battery storage will be essential to the stability of the whole system. So <em>who</em> constructs it is a question that should concern us all.</p>
<p>And yet, true to form, the chairman of China Huaneng Group, Shu Yinbiao, is <a href="https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/china-appoints-new-chairman-at-power-producer-huaneng-group/66633593" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">also</a> the company’s Communist Party secretary. To be fair to Shu, he certainly isn’t as involved as the company’s former boss Li Xiaopeng, the “princeling” son of the former prime minister Li Peng, known as the Butcher of Beijing after he sent in the tanks to crush students protesting in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Li Xiaopeng, who <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/HNGZ:CH" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">remains</a> on the board of China Huaneng, is now a top Communist Party official in Beijing, a <a href="https://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Xiaopeng/full" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">member</a> of the Central Committee of the CCP and Xi Jinping’s Minister of Transport.</p>
<p>However, the security risk of China’s investment in the <em>generation</em> of Britain’s electricity pales in comparison to the threat it poses to Britain’s electricity <em>distribution</em> system, the transmission networks that get the electrons from the power plants to the power points in your home.</p>
<p>Here, Britain already had a serious problem. When the London Electricity Board was privatised in 1990, it was bought by an American company, which was later sold to EDF, the French company, which in 2010 <a href="https://www.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/internet/en/about-us/our-history/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">was</a> bought by Cheung Kong Group. This Hong Kong conglomerate is owned by the legendary billionaire Li Ka-shing.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/05/china-playing-west-fools/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/05/china-playing-west-fools/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/PA-31983758-2-e1586868570109.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/05/china-playing-west-fools/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/05/china-playing-west-fools/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China is playing the West for fools</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/05/china-playing-west-fools/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Isabel Hilton</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The shrewd tycoon has kept Beijing at arm’s length. But he has also been <a href="https://www.weekinchina.com/2015/01/change-of-guard/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">willing</a> to get into bed with the China International Trust Investment Corporation (CITIC), the huge state-owned conglomerate known for its links with China’s military and intelligence services. One Western intelligence expert wrote that CITIC was “swarming with secret agents”. True or not, by operating as CITIC’s “<a href="https://www.weekinchina.com/2015/01/change-of-guard/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">long-term ally</a>” and sponsor, Li Ka-shing facilitated the CCP’s venture into global capitalism: CITIC now owns a vast property portfolio across Western capitals, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/article/2053959/citic-capital-accelerate-uk-us-and-japan-property-investment-despite" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">including</a> a high-end residential development in Mayfair.</p>
<p>Since then, Li Ka-shing has passed control of the CK Group to his son Victor Li, who has further embedded the CCP within the company. In 2018 he was appointed an executive member of the the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, sometimes referred to as China’s upper house. A vital element of the CCP’s overseas influence operations, the Conference <a href="https://archive.today/bjY8" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">describes</a> itself as “an organisation of the patriotic United Front of the Chinese people”.</p>
<p>But it is in Britain where Victor has reaped the most success. In addition to its <a href="https://www.northerngasnetworks.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/private-march-2010-investor-presentation.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">monopoly</a> on the supply of gas to the <a href="https://www.cki.com.hk/english/about_CKI/cki_at_a_glance/index.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">north</a> of England and <a href="https://www.wwutilities.co.uk/about-us/our-responsibilities/customer-services/customer-satisfaction-survey/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">across</a> Wales and southwest England, his CK Group also enjoys a monopoly on the supply of electricity to London through a <a href="https://www.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/internet/en/about-us/our-ownership/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">company</a> called UK Power Networks, the old London Electricity Board. It also controls electricity distribution in the south and south-east England.</p>
<p>Such a startling fact bears repeating: CK Group, with its close ties to the Chinese Communist Party, is responsible for supplying electricity to everything that makes London function — its road transport system, its rail network, its office buildings, ATMs and even the Bank of England. Imagine if CK Group were to be weaponised: all of these and more could suddenly grind to a halt. It’s a terrifying prospect, one that could have been plucked straight from a Hollywood playbook. All it would take is a phone call from Beijing, a flick of a button and much of Britain could descend into darkness.</p>
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					<title>What Dominic Cummings got right</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2021/01/cummings-was-right-about-our-governments-failings/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2021/01/cummings-was-right-about-our-governments-failings/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Maybe we should've listened to Dom. Credit: Leon Neal/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 14 Jan 2021 00:06:38 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 29 May 2021 09:39:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bureaucracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Coronavirus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COVID-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dominic Cummings]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[He warned that when crisis hit our sclerotic system, it wouldn't cope]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><em><span style="font-weight: 400;">This piece was first published on January 14, 2021</span></em></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is painful to remember, one year after the beginning of the Covid pandemic, the early claims that the virus would prove to be China’s Chernobyl moment. One year on, while the virus runs rampant across Western societies, sending deaths climbing and economies plummeting, China’s brutally efficient state bureaucracy has more or less eradicated Covid from the Middle Kingdom. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nearly all liberal democracies have performed poorly, Britain’s rather more poorly than most. Perhaps the West’s model has been superior at developing vaccines; yet the Chinese model is clearly better at utilising the resources of the state to enable a swifter return to ordinary life. Is there a lesson in this dispiriting state of affairs about state capacity in liberal democracies, and if there is, how should our systems be reformed?</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In any analysis of Western dysfunction, the political thought of Dominic Cummings deserves renewed attention, not least because he represents a fascinating, and unique figure. He was, essentially, a dissident, technofuturist, accelerationist blogger at the heart of British governance, as if </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Land" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nick Land</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> or </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtis_Yarvin" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mencius Moldbug</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> had somehow scored a seat at the cabinet table. His eventual, lobby-led defenestration removed from the heart of government surely the most acerbic critic of British state dysfunction to have reached No 10 in decades. Notwithstanding what he failed to get done while in government, his analysis of it should be taken seriously. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Over the course of two Conservative governments, Cummings savaged in his </span><a href="https://dominiccummings.com/an-index-of-blogs-articles-papers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">blogposts</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the “broken system” of “Whitehall’s profound dysfunction”. We place “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">too much trust in people and institutions that are not fit to control so much</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">,&#8221; he warned; “politicians thrash around with no priorities and fundamentally little idea about what to do other than try to stay a step ahead of the media with badly implemented gimmicks and avoid blame for our institutionalised dysfunction”.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/who-are-covids-guilty-men/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/who-are-covids-guilty-men/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GettyImages-1205431160.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/who-are-covids-guilty-men/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/who-are-covids-guilty-men/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Who are Covid&#039;s guilty men?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2021/01/who-are-covids-guilty-men/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the event of a national crisis — Cummings explicitly cited a pandemic as an example of looming threat — “the current system is absolutely bound to respond with sloth/panic, chaos, and blunders”. This is the direct consequence of “our inability to develop political institutions able to think wisely about the biggest problems in order to pre-empt some crises”. Our system of governance is as dysfunctional in addressing and defusing urgent threats as it was in 1914 or 1939: when crisis hits, he warned, the disaster will be as total. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The distilled insight of his writing is that bureaucracies stifle creativity and freedom of action, enervating governance; talented outsiders, left to their own devices, will inevitably produce better results than sclerotic state administrators.  </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">There are, by his reckoning, two models of functioning systems superior to state bureaucracies: the hands-off, scientist-led innovation of the Apollo space program and of </span><a href="https://theconversation.com/arpa-what-is-it-and-why-does-dominic-cummings-want-one-in-the-uk-130975" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">ARPA</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and that of the free market, the Darwinian competition of which, he believes, outcompetes centralised state planning in a manner analogous to an organic system.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And yet, there is a certain ambivalence to his understanding of the bureaucratic state that is worth teasing out. He notes, correctly, that both the Apollo program and ARPA depended on the vast defence budgets of the American state, locked in competition with a statist rival, to function; behind the glamorous innovation of the scientists lay the unglamorous pen-pushing and paper-shuffling of countless tax-raising, policy-devising bureaucrats who made their work possible. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">He observes also that, at least in the field of mathematics, the Soviet Union produced higher quality theoretical work than the United States, as “the actual system in the US really discourages people who are truly original thinkers.” There is, perhaps, an unconscious extrapolation of the failures of Anglo-American bureaucracies or the British Civil Service to a general, dismissive theory of bureaucrats and centralised states in general: yet, sadly, Britain’s problems in this area may be uniquely our own. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After all, technological innovation and competition only get you so far. The governance of Nazi Germany was typified by extreme, Darwinian competition in Hitler’s inner circle, and its record of scientific advance over the course of the war — the invention of the rocket, of advanced jet fighters and of the modern assault rifle — laid the groundwork for the postwar military and scientific innovation of the war’s victors. Yet Nazi Germany was crushed by the Soviet Union, which chose good, basic designs of tanks, artillery, aircraft and guns and devoted the full resources of the state towards producing them in vast numbers. The USSR was a system so bureaucratic it embedded ideological commissars in even the smallest fighting unit: and it won. There is a strong counter-argument to be made for the state, and even for bureaucracy, that Cummings does not squarely address.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is with China that this tension becomes most clearly apparent. In </span><a href="https://dominiccummings.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/20130825-some-thoughts-on-education-and-political-priorities-version-2-final.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">early blogposts</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Cummings made the dramatic claim that the West’s rise in the Early Modern period was a result of free markets, and China’s decline the result of “the strong central control of the Chinese imperial bureaucracy”, which “imposed a rigid and static intellectual outlook” and strong system of state monopolies. Yet </span><a href="https://dominiccummings.com/2017/09/29/review-of-allisons-book-on-uschina-nuclear-destruction-and-some-connected-thoughts-on-technology-the-eu-and-space/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">later posts</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> showed a greater appreciation of the Chinese model, observing that “China erects skyscrapers in weeks while Parliament delays Heathrow expansion for over a decade. The EU discusses dumb rules made 60 years ago while China produces a Greece-sized economy every 16 weeks.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Moreover, “China already has an aggressive space program. It has demonstrated edge-of-the-art capabilities in developing a satellite-based quantum communication network, a revolutionary goal with even deeper effects than GPS. It will go to the moon.” Cummings’ admiration for China’s state capacity is as clearly apparent as his displeasure with our own system of governance: it is difficult to imagine that the events of the past year will have changed his mind.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Surely, then, this is a dramatic argument in favour of strong, state-directed planning? How does Cummings’ analysis account for this seeming discrepancy? After all, it is difficult to imagine that the Chinese Communist Party is a less bureaucratic organisation than the Department for Education. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Citing Fukuyama’s </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The End of History</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Cummings argues that China’s rise is a product of economic liberalisation, and that its relative decline, or a crisis of political legitimacy is fated — he predicts this with 80% probability within 20 years — due to the Chinese regime’s lack of “openness” to the rest of the world: “developing hi-tech businesses cannot be done without a degree of openness to the rest of the world that is politically risky for China.” China, he argues, will be forced to move closer to a Western political and economic model to continue to survive and thrive. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-westminster/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-westminster/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GettyImages-1156575726aris.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-westminster/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-westminster/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The rot at the heart of Westminster</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-westminster/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><a href="https://www.the-american-interest.com/2020/05/18/what-kind-of-regime-does-china-have/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet Fukuyama himself now takes a different tack</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">: he cautions against emulating China due to its totalitarian nature, without suggesting that the arc of history will force its political system to liberalise. He notes that throughout  history, “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Chinese regimes have been centralized, bureaucratic, and merit-based,” and observes that “there is no true private sector in China” and that “the state can reach into and control any one of its supposedly “private sector” firms like Tencent or Alibaba at any point” (</span><a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2020/china-201225-rfa02.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">as rumours of Alibaba’s imminent nationalisation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> indicate), clearly a powerful and surely now dominant countervailing tendency to any emulation of ARPA or the Apollo programme. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The subordination of Western corporations and governments to the diktats of the Chinese government also highlight another powerful trend, under-analysed by Cummings: when forced to, the market kneels at the feet of the state; all the innovation of the Western world ends up in the armoury of the Chinese state through either purchase or subterfuge: in the grand battle between decentralised innovation and bureaucratic statism, it is far from clear that statism is losing. Perhaps the Western model may be superior, taking the long view: yet China looks on course to win this contest in the meantime.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For Fukuyama, the cautionary lesson from China is that &#8220;the world looks to Xi’s totalitarian model, rather than a broader East Asian model that combines strong state capacity with technocratic competence, as the winning formula”. Fukuyama does not, then, see a powerful state bureaucracy as an inherent weakness, but rather as a model worthy of emulation, if stripped of China’s uniquely authoritarian tendencies, which seems to contradict Cummings’ central assertion that state bureaucracies are inherently sclerotic and dysfunctional. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The free market states of the West are clearly being outcompeted by China, </span><a href="https://palladiummag.com/2020/10/19/the-centralized-internet-is-inevitable/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">yet as the analyst Samo Burja notes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, China’s growth is  “powered primarily not by advanced technology, but by party discipline and organization — paper-pushing not too dissimilar to that of the U.S. federal government of the 1940s.”</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/01/could-the-cummings-nerd-army-fix-broken-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/01/could-the-cummings-nerd-army-fix-broken-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/GettyImages-168600966.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/01/could-the-cummings-nerd-army-fix-broken-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/01/could-the-cummings-nerd-army-fix-broken-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Could the Cummings nerd army fix broken Britain?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/01/could-the-cummings-nerd-army-fix-broken-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom Chivers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Is there a synthesis to be found between </span><a href="https://dominiccummings.com/2017/06/12/the-unrecognised-simplicities-of-effective-action-2b-the-apollo-programme-the-tory-train-wreck-and-advice-to-spads-starting-work-today/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Cummings’s argument</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“a complex mix of centralisation and decentralisation,” where “we replace many traditional centralised bureaucracies with institutions that mimic successful biological systems such as the immune system” and the Chinese model? Cummings argues that “while overall vision, goals, and strategy usually comes from the top, it is vital that extreme decentralisation dominates operationally so that decisions are fast and unbureaucratic” — so the essential question becomes, is this actually achievable within a state bureaucracy?</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The China analyst </span><a href="https://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2020/06/on-cultures-that-build.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Tanner Greer observes</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">that </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“even now both the Party and the state bureaucracies that canvas the Chinese hinterland are highly decentralized; these government and Party units are given a great deal of room for experimentation and in many realms are practically independent from outside control. This causes endless frustration to centralizers in Beijing, but the benefits are clear: it is not wrong to think of these units as ‘labs of communism.’” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This seems to hint at a solution: yet Cummings has insisted that the British Civil Service is essentially unreformable, leaving the free market and decentralised scientific innovation as the preferred alternative models. Perhaps, within the framework of liberal democracy and the inherited structures of the British state, he is right. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Cummings.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The 10 brains behind Dominic Cummings</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Beyond technological innovation, the great tension within Cummings’s wrestling with the essential nature of state bureaucracy is that between a Hayekian faith in the wisdom of the free market, and a scepticism of “‘Conservatives’’ and “‘The Right’” (the quotation marks are his) who ignore the vital role of state planning and resources in enabling scientific advance. Free market conservatives tend “to ignore that the high tech market ecosystem depends on government funded basic science. Politicians, think-tankers, pundits etc on ‘the Right’ tend to be ignorant of the contribution of government funding to the development of technologies that appear in markets years later.” He also notes, accurately, that the incentives of the market are structured to provide investors what they </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">want</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and not what they don’t yet realise they </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">need.</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Behind everything, then, looms that wasteful, frustrating yet irreplaceable entity: the state, composed, </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leviathan_(Hobbes_book)" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">like Hobbes’ Leviathan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, of its indistinguishable multitude of functionaries.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The scale of Cummings’ ambition, the high modernist vitality and his penetrating critique, from an insider’s perspective, of Whitehall’s deathly torpor is both admirable and necessary. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Brexit provided the opportunity for a “<a href="https://dominiccummings.files.wordpress.com/2018/09/20180904-arpa-parc-paper1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">hard reboot</a>” of the British state, an opportunity “to change the basic orientation of the country and to improve normal government bureaucracies and policies more radically than has happened since World War II”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet perhaps he has over-engineered the solutions; perhaps the answers lie not with the tiny cognitive elite of scientists spurring technological advance, but with the unglamorous thousands of pen-pushers and administrators enabling their work.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There is, in the end, no way out but drastic reform of the state bureaucracy, perhaps on a decentralised model that severs the dead hand of Whitehall while simultaneously preserving the wealth, power and majesty of that awful and irreplaceable entity, Leviathan. Can we weaken Whitehall’s grip while simultaneously boosting the state’s capacity at the local level, constantly refreshing the state with new blood and new ideas, and allowing administrators far greater autonomy from central government? </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Imagine local government with far greater powers and responsibilities than currently allowed by our simultaneously over-centralised and incapable state: where each local authority functions as both an experiment in governance and a school for administration, selecting and training a class of competent administrators to replace the Whitehall mandarins. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It surely cannot be the case that it is easier to build a base on the moon than reform the British civil service. Whatever the resistance from Whitehall, if we are to survive the coming decades as a nation, we have no option but to try, as urgently as possible.</span></p>
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					<title>Is China preparing for war?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2020/04/china-is-preparing-for-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2020/04/china-is-preparing-for-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Maajid Nawaz]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[Chinese police officers in front of the Tiananmen Gate. Credit: Betsy Joles/Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Maajid Nawaz</strong> is a columnist, LBC presenter and Founding Chairman of Quilliam.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MaajidNawaz</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a columnist, LBC presenter and Founding Chairman of Quilliam.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2020 12:30:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 20 Apr 2020 16:23:53 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British Steel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Coronavirus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Covid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supply chains]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wuhan]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=34789</guid>
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								<![CDATA[There's a reason Beijing is aggressively pursuing a policy of total national self-sufficiency]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>China is on a war footing. While the Covid-19 outbreak has exposed some grave political miscalculations behind decades of international strategic relations with Beijing, the depths of our problem are only just beginning to dawn on us.</p>
<p>Fuelled by our desire for ever cheaper goods, the world has collectively sleepwalked into a supply-side dependency on the People’s Republic.</p>
<p>The gamble had been pitched as a trade-off. China was expected to evolve democratic norms and embrace relations with the international community, while we got richer from globalisation. But we have been played.</p>
<p>Whether it’s clothing and factory-fashion, personal protective equipment or hardware parts, too many of our manufactured goods today rely on a ‘Made in China’ supply-chain. At the same time as it was busy taking control over our manufacturing, China was busy cloning western software, via her lackadaisical respect for international copyright rules.</p>
<p>And while the world relies on China for hardware, China avoids software dependency on outsiders by creating substitutes: TikTok to replace snapchat, Weibo instead of Twitter, WeChat &amp; RenRen for Facebook. Indeed, there is an alternative Chinese version for almost any platform.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/04/weve-cosied-up-to-china-for-too-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/04/weve-cosied-up-to-china-for-too-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/GettyImages-493776266.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/04/weve-cosied-up-to-china-for-too-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Further reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/04/weve-cosied-up-to-china-for-too-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>We&#039;ve cosied up to China for too long</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/04/weve-cosied-up-to-china-for-too-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nick Timothy</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>With manufactured goods and hardware ‘Made in China’, and software increasingly ‘Cloned in China’, what of natural resources? Through the ‘Belt &amp; Road’ initiative — a ‘21st century Silk Road’ connecting China to Europe over a network of land and sea trade routes, the People’s Republic has embarked on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">huge infrastructure projects</a> in 60 countries, including loans and construction projects that secure key ports and mines as collateral to China for payment.</p>
<p>Look to Pakistan, African or southeast Asian nations to see China’s rapid expansion in ownership of mines and ports. Look to the UK and China’s attempts to secure our telecoms industry via the Huawei deal, her recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/mar/09/british-steel-bought-by-china-jingye-saving-more-than-3000-jobs" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">purchase of British Steel</a>, and her quest to secure the nuclear power industry. Beijing even secured a deal to develop British nuclear station Hinckley point C in Somerset, thus paving the way globally for China to enter the global market to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jul/26/chinas-long-game-to-dominate-nuclear-power-relies-on-the-uk" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">dominate nuclear power</a>.</p>
<p>Over decades, we have naively outsourced or lost manufacturing, software, natural resources and critical infrastructure to China. The economic benefits of globalisation are well trodden, yet as Covid-19 has shown, it has left our society vulnerable during a major crisis, unable to manufacture the most basic of necessities such as PPE. Meanwhile, China has achieved self-sufficiency.</p>
<p>While pursuing economic dominance abroad, China’s communist one-party state has centralised political power at home, gained unprecedented command over her own population via wide ranging and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/china-surveillance/552203/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">well-documented spy-tech</a>, and placed anything between 1 to 2 million <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-rights-un/u-n-says-it-has-credible-reports-that-china-holds-million-uighurs-in-secret-camps-idUKKBN1KV23P" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Uigur Muslims in gulags</a>.</p>
<p>Considering what we know of colonial history, there is little room for doubt that China is at a pre-colonial stage. States at this stage attempt to centralise domestic power under a strong leader, dominate global supply chains and monopolise industry, all the while expanding abroad to secure natural resources. China is aggressively pursuing total national self-sufficiency, and the question arises as to why.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/china-is-not-the-hero-in-this-darkest-hour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/china-is-not-the-hero-in-this-darkest-hour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/GettyImages-1207963492-e1584967344307.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/china-is-not-the-hero-in-this-darkest-hour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Further reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/china-is-not-the-hero-in-this-darkest-hour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China is not the hero in this darkest hour</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/china-is-not-the-hero-in-this-darkest-hour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>My conclusion is that China is preparing for war: total, not limited war. The kind that seeks to rebalance the world order, tipping it in her favour by replacing the US as the dominant global power. Historically, major conflicts have arisen when the leading global power is challenged by a rival, a problem known as the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Thucydides</a> trap — and China is expected (by some metrics) to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy this decade.</p>
<p>Also, and crucially unlike us, China is preparing for the next type of war. The People’s Republic knows that she cannot beat the US militarily — and she knows that type of ground war is almost over.</p>
<p>Instead, by securing global supply chains, maintaining IT independence, and having a cast-iron grip over her own population, China can focus on building her cyber and biological war capabilities while remaining relatively safeguarded against the same herself. Considering all of this, from steel to nuclear to telecoms, our policy towards China until 2020 can best be described as one of miserably failed economic appeasement. From China’s perspective, she has successfully gifted us a Trojan Horse.</p>
<p>So what is the solution? Do we take that bait and prepare for war too? No. We must first understand what happened, and grasp how it came that we so willingly handed China the very tools by which to defeat us.</p>
<p>For too long, China has had a strategy for dealing with us, while we have had no strategy for dealing with China. We must urgently <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2019/05/25/the-costly-lack-of-a-coherent-china-strategy/#b063f4948078" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">pivot our strategic relationship</a>, one that entails assuming that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">China is in a Cold War with us</a> already, and ends our current naivety.</p>
<p>We must minimise our total global supply-chain dependency on China, or any one nation for that matter. Trade with China, yes, but we must ringfence critical infrastructure: nuclear, telecoms and natural resources such as steel.</p>
<p>As recent politicisation of the <a href="https://unherd.com/2020/04/how-the-who-has-failed-us-again/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">WHO highlights</a>, the post-war international community — supposedly governed by the UN — is no longer serving its purpose, and perhaps more than ever the UN faces a crisis in moral authority. Instead, NATO-style, we must reorder our strategic and military alliances around the Pacific and build an international consensus against the broader expansionist desire of the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/covid-19-has-exposed-our-financial-fragility/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/covid-19-has-exposed-our-financial-fragility/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/GettyImages-1207637252.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/covid-19-has-exposed-our-financial-fragility/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Further reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/covid-19-has-exposed-our-financial-fragility/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Covid-19 has exposed our financial fragility</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2020/03/covid-19-has-exposed-our-financial-fragility/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonathan Tepper</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Just like with nuclear non-proliferation, there must be newly-developed global consequences for negligence in cyber and bio hazard safety. Post-Covid, we would be wise to build a new global consensus on which punitive measures are suited to states that violate our cyber or biological safety.</p>
<p>Whatever happens in China does not stay in China. Whereas our Orientalist based ‘othering’ of China created this blind spot, only our hubris and naivety would allow for us to continue thus blind. We have been outmaneuvered, but this pandemic has magnified our failures and brought them to the fore. We would only be deserving of loss if we did not learn the lessons now.</p>
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					<title>Will China get stuck in the Afghan quagmire?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2020/01/will-china-follow-america-into-the-afghan-quagmire/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2020/01/will-china-follow-america-into-the-afghan-quagmire/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/GettyImages-1169018971-e1629192356987.jpg?w=680</unherd:featured_image>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mike Martin]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/mike-martin.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[The lads (Photo by Mohammad Sharif Shayeq/NurPhoto via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mike Martin</strong> is a former British army officer and War Studies Visiting Fellow at King’s College London. His latest book is <em><a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/why-we-fight/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Why We Fight</a>.</em></p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>ThreshedThought</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a former British army officer and War Studies Visiting Fellow at King’s College London. His latest book is <em><a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/why-we-fight/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Why We Fight</a>.</em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jan 2020 00:05:46 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 03 Jan 2020 00:05:46 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[9/11]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taliban]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=27239</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[As the US withdraws after two decades of war, how will Beijing protect its interests?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The end of 2019 brings some good news to the long-running saga that is the Afghan conflict, with the US and Taliban leadership announcing a temporary ceasefire. This is a prelude to the signing of a peace agreement between the two parties that would bring the 18-year war to a close.</p>
<p>The as-yet-unsigned peace agreement stipulates that America will rapidly reduce its troops in Afghanistan (currently around 14,000) in return for Taliban guarantees that they will not host international terrorist groups that threaten the US or its allies. Additionally, the Americans would release 13,000 — yes, 13,000! — Taliban prisoners over the coming months. Once the US has withdrawn, the Taliban would then hold talks with the Afghan government.</p>
<p>This sounds like fantastic news, and it would be, were it the whole story. The truth, however, as so often in Afghanistan, is much more complex.</p>
<p>Afghanistan is in a parlous state with a worse and deteriorating security situation, over 2.7 million refugees and a recent heavily-marred presidential election, which saw a narrow win for the incumbent, Ashraf Ghani, on a turnout of just 28%.</p>
<p>It is against this backdrop — little changed for the past five years — that President Trump has announced his desire to withdraw American forces from overseas conflicts and commitments. Afghanistan was a prime candidate: the US could see that they had failed to achieve barely any of their objectives (as has been made very clear in the recent Afghan papers published by the <em>Washington Post</em>). The US duly dropped its previous red line that the Afghan government was included in the talks — for the last decade the Taliban had refused to speak to what they call a “US puppet” —  and the talks began in Qatar.</p>
<p>However, it is not clear that the senior US leadership understands <em>why</em> they lost the war in Afghanistan. Quite simply: this is because the US and its allies characterized the Afghan war as one of supporting an Afghan government against Taliban insurgents; whereas in reality it is a 40-year multi-focal civil war with local tribal, narco, and other criminal interests fighting over hyper-local issues, and sucking in outside sponsors. Violence is driven much more by local disputes over land and water than over ideologies like democracy and Islamism. Fighters and commanders change sides all the time, and survival is paramount in decision making.</p>
<p>The difference is important. Political insurgencies, like the US imagines it is facing in Afghanistan, can be solved with a combination of military pressure and negotiations where concessions are made. Multi-focal civil wars only fizzle out when outsiders stop supplying money and weapons to on-the-ground actors, and these same locals engage in local reconciliation efforts. The US has effectively been fighting the wrong type of war in Afghanistan.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/oh-what-a-lovely-asymmetrical-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/oh-what-a-lovely-asymmetrical-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/GettyImages-1167923975.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/oh-what-a-lovely-asymmetrical-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/oh-what-a-lovely-asymmetrical-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Oh! What a lovely asymmetrical war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/oh-what-a-lovely-asymmetrical-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mike Martin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And it seems that this misunderstanding is going to be repeated in the peace deal. If it is signed as currently described, the Taliban leadership guarantee that they will not host transnational terrorists on Afghan soil. But the Taliban leadership is not in control of most of the violence in Afghanistan — that is in the hands of local warlords and drug militias — so they will not be able to enforce their side of the bargain, even if they wanted to.</p>
<p>So what is likely to happen if, as looks highly likely, the peace deal gets signed?</p>
<p>In a crude analysis, western military support has enabled the Afghan government to keep control of the country’s main ring road and its provincial centres. Most, or much of, the rural areas are in the hands of local actors with various temporary allegiances. The absence of this military support will likely cause even more of the country to slip into local hands, disintegrating even further. Levels of violence and numbers of refugees will increase. There is a real possibility of government collapse.</p>
<p>Uneasily watching this is China, with whom Afghanistan shares a border. Arguably, China has greater interests in Afghanistan than the US has had, once it had completed the initial post-9/11 routing of the Taliban government. Broadly, these interest break down into three baskets: economic, counterterrorism and geopolitical.</p>
<p>On the economic side, China has invested in multiple large-scale projects in Afghanistan since 2001, not least a $4.5bn copper mine near Kabul and a $300m petroleum project in the north of the country. These effectively freeload off security that has been underwritten by the US and its allies. Secondly, counterterrorism: from the Chinese perspective the Afghan-bordering Xingjian province is a hotbed of terrorist activity, with links to networks in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Lastly, and probably most importantly, China views Afghanistan as a key location in its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI). Not only does the country border the northern route (from China, through the ‘Stans, to Europe), but Beijing is actively considering a so-called &#8220;Five Nations Railway&#8221; from China, <em>through</em> Afghanistan and Iran, to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean.</p>
<p>China also announced last year that Afghanistan is going to be linked up to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a $62 billion series of infrastructure projects originally designed to link China to Pakistani seaports, but with eventual plans to join Pakistan to central Asian energy markets.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GettyImages-871894532.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West&#039;s utter failure to see China&#039;s end game</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2018/09/wests-utter-failure-see-chinas-end-game/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mike Martin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The strategic question for China is whether to continue pursuing these interests in Afghanistan: all of these avenues require a level of stability and security in the region <em>above</em> the current levels, let alone if the country disintegrates after the US withdrawal. And if China does decide to continue on its current path, the even more difficult question is how it should set about securing these interests in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Does it, at one extreme, go down the route taken by the West, and before it Russia, deploying soldiers around the country? After all, it currently has small missions training Afghan troops in Badakhshan province, in areas that border China, so could we see something like this expanding across key places in the country?</p>
<p>Presumably this would involve partnering with the Afghan government and mentoring and training its forces. But would China’s authoritarian, statist, centralising approach work in a land that, as my 93-year-old grandmother observed to me before I first went there, is so full of unrepentant individualists?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/GettyImages-1179278286.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>2019: the year the West wised up to China</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Gray</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Perhaps China merely funds and arms a faction in Kabul (a government?) in order to keep secure the areas of the country important to it? But would this work, or would the money end up building villas in Dubai for the Afghan warlords most able to take advantage of their largess? Are there other options, involving proxies or other nations? Pakistan, for instance, has previously worked closely with China on Afghanistan.</p>
<p>How does China achieve its aims without getting their hands stuck in the Afghan mangle, like so many have before?</p>
<p>This will be the year of the US withdrawal. It will also be the year that Beijing has to make up is mind on Afghanistan. To those of us in the West who think that China is an unstoppable behemoth, this dilemma is a useful reminder that the world&#8217;s soon-to-be largest economy also faces real-world, least-worst, strategic choices — just like the rest of us.</p>
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					<title>China&#8217;s war with Christianity</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2019/07/chinas-war-with-christianity/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2019/07/chinas-war-with-christianity/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Christopher Rhodes]]>
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							<![CDATA[A participant at the vigil service in Hong Kong for those who lost their lives during the 1989 Tiananmen square massacre (Photo by Miguel Candela/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Dr Christopher Rhodes</strong> is a Lecturer at Boston University&#8217;s College of General Studies.</div>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>PReligions</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a Lecturer at Boston University's College of General Studies.</div>]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jul 2019 11:23:02 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 08 Jul 2019 12:12:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Catholic Church]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese communist party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christianity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hong Kong]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Religion]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>There has been a curious development amid the anti-China protests in Hong Kong: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1JsJeuUWJI4" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">many of those on the street have taken up an obscure American Christian hymn, “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord”</a>, as one of their signature protest songs.</p>
<p>As far as political protests go, that’s not necessarily so unusual.</p>
<p>Christian organisations have often been at the centre of protests and demands for citizens’ rights. From the Black Church’s central role in the Civil Rights Movement to Catholic backing of Solidarity against Communist rule in Poland, as well as various Church-led pro-democracy campaigns throughout Latin America and Africa, hymns and prayers are often deployed in political confrontations.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/how-long-can-hong-kong-hold-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/how-long-can-hong-kong-hold-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/HK-protest-.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/how-long-can-hong-kong-hold-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/how-long-can-hong-kong-hold-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How long can Hong Kong hold out?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/how-long-can-hong-kong-hold-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Fred Attewill</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>These examples are all taken from areas where the populations are predominantly Christian. Whereas, even though Christianity has been present there since the 1840s, few citizens in Hong Kong claim it as their religion – about 10-12%. And the make-up of the protesters is no different: most of them have likely never stepped foot in a church.</p>
<p>So why the hymns, then?</p>
<p>Some have suggested they are simply easy-to-sing-in-unison songs. Others argue that it is strategic, since <a href="https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap245?xpid=ID_1438402885529_002&amp;SEARCH_WITHIN_CAP_TXT=religious" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the law police use to regulate or disperse public gatherings does not cover religious events</a>.</p>
<p>But beyond these convenient reasons, the song is just one particularly noticeable sign of a much larger reality in the territory: the Church in Hong Kong wields power beyond its numbers, and its power has brought it into conflict with Beijing.</p>
<p>Even though most protesters have probably never gone to a church service, most of them have been pupils in church-founded schools. As was usually the case for many former British colonies, much of the education system in Hong Kong was established by churches during the UK’s long rule, such that today church-founded schools educate over half of all primary and secondary students in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>Many of these schools incorporate religion into their curriculum as a subject of study. With such dominance over education, and other social services as well, the Christian churches of Hong Kong have established their influence among the population, shaping the culture and people. Many Hong Kong residents are therefore familiar with church songs and with weightier aspects of Christianity as well, such as the churches’ outlook on social justice and rights.</p>
<p>And while the protesters, past and present, have not generally been Christians, their leaders have been. Two of the three founders of Occupy Central, one of the main groups leading the 2014 Umbrella Movement protests, are Protestant Christians (one of them is a Reverend). Leading student activist Joshua Wong, who cofounded Scholarism – the predominant student group of the 2014 protests – is a fervent Evangelical whose father heads one of the leading Christian anti-LGBT groups in Hong Kong (the younger Wong has publicly split with his dad’s stance on gay rights but obviously inherited the knack for political activism).</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/is-xi-losing-his-grip-on-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/is-xi-losing-his-grip-on-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/GettyImages-1139413658-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/is-xi-losing-his-grip-on-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/is-xi-losing-his-grip-on-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is Xi losing his grip on Taiwan?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/is-xi-losing-his-grip-on-taiwan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Bill Hayton</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Church’s influence extends to the government. Two of the four individuals to occupy the role of Chief Executive of Hong Kong, the highest political office in the territory since the handover to China, have been devout Catholics. This includes the current Executive, Carrie Lam – a Beijing approved politician who has become a target of the protests after she tried to push through the extradition law.</p>
<p>Despite generally being seen as carrying Beijing’s water, Lam has refused to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), essentially placing a ceiling on her own career within the Chinese government, because she would be required to renounce her faith in order to do so.</p>
<p>Lam’s story of competing loyalties embodies the conflict between the Church and the CCP that is being played out across China, and now in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>The CCP has the opportunity to extend its reach into Hong Kong through officials like Lam and policies like the extradition law. But the freedoms of speech, religion and travel afforded to the churches of Hong Kong during the time of British rule – and maintained under the current “one country, two systems” policy – have long allowed the Hong Kong churches to extend <em>their </em>influence into China by both criticising the CCP and supporting illegal underground churches in mainland China. Such actions represent a threat to the Chinese government.</p>
<p>Catholics in mainland China can legally practice their faith only through the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, a government body that regulates them into a tightly managed and Communist-friendly version of Catholicism. But in Hong Kong, the Catholics are free to practise as they wish – as well as having the freedom to freely criticise the Chinese government.</p>
<p>Much criticism has come from the outspoken Cardinal Joseph Zen (now retired). He rose up the ranks to eventually lead the Church in Hong Kong and spent decades as a human rights advocate, speaking out against the Chinese government’s repressions of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the Falun Gong religious movement of the 1990s, and more.</p>
<p>For years, Cardinal Zen and the Hong Kong Catholic hierarchy, backed by the Vatican, also helped support the massive underground Catholic network in China.</p>
<p>Similarly, tens of millions of Chinese Protestants worship in illegal underground “house” churches. This is especially common in the southeast. The illegal congregations in these provinces have been supported by nearby Hong Kong, <a href="https://time.com/5166220/china-christianity-hong-kong-churches/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">which supplied these illegal mainland</a> churches with everything from moral and spiritual support to theological training and Bibles.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/02/how-africa-is-converting-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/02/how-africa-is-converting-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/GettyImages-669033608.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/02/how-africa-is-converting-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/02/how-africa-is-converting-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Africa is converting China</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/02/how-africa-is-converting-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher Rhodes</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>These Christians are intentionally flouting China’s hardline regulations against religion and consciously challenging the Communist Party’s grip on power with their defiance. No wonder Beijing is irked.</p>
<p>As a result, under Xi, authorities have cracked down on these ‘foreign religions’: they’ve demolished unregistered houses of worship, jailed religious leaders, and even detained entire congregations and communities of religious believers who worship outside of officially-recognised religious organisations.</p>
<p>In a more disturbing move, last year, the Vatican and the CCP concluded years of negotiations with a deal to merge the government-controlled Catholic organization and the underground Catholic Church in China, while allowing Beijing to maintain a substantial role in approving the appointment of new bishops. Many have viewed this deal as a win for the Chinese government, extending its oversight over all Catholics in the country.</p>
<p>Lately, the CCP’s campaign against Christianity – a combination of repression and co-opting – has reached Hong Kong, coinciding with its more general attempts to chip away at democracy and freedom in the territory.</p>
<p>Beijing has tightened restrictions for mainland Christians travelling to Hong Kong, as many have done in the past years to attend Christian conferences and gatherings. And upon returning, those visitors have been subject to intimidation and detention.</p>
<p>More recently, Christian leaders in Hong Kong have become direct targets of Chinese bullying, with several pastors being questioned, and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/1933891/hong-kong-minister-allegedly-arrested-and-tried-mainland" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">at least one prosecuted</a>, for work done on the mainland. Several Protestant Christian leaders of the 2014 protests were also among those <a href="https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2019/april/hong-kong-pastor-occupy-umbrella-movement-chu-yiu-ming.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">jailed in Hong Kong for their activism</a> against Chinese repression.</p>
<p>While Catholic leaders in Hong Kong have not been harassed so directly, many worshippers there see the deal between the Vatican and Beijing as a disaster; Cardinal Zen personally confronted Pope Francis in an attempt to scuttle it before it was finalised.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/what-i-learned-about-freedom-in-xinjiang/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/what-i-learned-about-freedom-in-xinjiang/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/GettyImages-88876973.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/what-i-learned-about-freedom-in-xinjiang/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/what-i-learned-about-freedom-in-xinjiang/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What I learned about freedom in Xinjiang</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/06/what-i-learned-about-freedom-in-xinjiang/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Geordie Stewart</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Pope’s agreement with the CCP is seen a betrayal of their brothers and sisters in the mainland, an erosion of the leverage that the Holy See held against the Chinese state, and a signal that the Vatican is willing to sacrifice its loyal followers  (perhaps even those in Hong Kong) in order to establish better relations with the Chinese government.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the CCP had also found support within the Hong Kong Christian elite from Paul Kwong, Archbishop of Hong Kong’s Anglican Church. He was appointed, in 2016, to <a href="https://www.ucanews.com/news/hong-kong-anglican-archbishop-defends-ties-with-beijing/76643" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">an official advisory position within the Chinese government</a> and subsequently became known for his CCP-friendly stances. He and the Anglican church approached the 2014 and 2019 protests with a combination of pro-Beijing statements and silence concerning police crackdowns on demonstrators.</p>
<p>Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Hong Kong’s Christian minority has been especially outspoken in its attempts to protect the territory’s democracy, and a major part of the resistance movement – the imposition of authoritarian rule in Hong Kong – is at least in part a measure by the CCP to target and control the Church.</p>
<p>Though eclipsed by the 2014 and 2019 protests, there have been two previous instances of significant protest in Hong Kong against Chinese heavy-handedness. The first major demonstration against Chinese rule came in 2003, when hundreds of thousands took to the streets on July 1, the anniversary of the handover to China (the same date as this year’s storming of parliament). Their purpose was to reject a “National Security Bill” that would have given the government added powers to battle “sedition” and “subversion” including restricting links between Hong Kong citizens and “foreign political organisations.”</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s Christians were among the most vocal opponents of this bill; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080430051424/http:/www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=&amp;art_id=23368&amp;sid=&amp;con_type=1&amp;d_str=20030707&amp;sear_year=2003" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">90% of the territory’s Catholics saw it as designed to limit freedoms in Hong Kong</a> (the Vatican could certainly be considered a “foreign political organisation”, no?) and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/02/world/security-laws-target-of-huge-hong-kong-protest.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">both Catholic and Protestant congregations mobilised many of their members to march against the proposed law</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, when the government in 2012 tried to require schools to teach nationalism and pro-Chinese propaganda, churches rejected the proposed curriculum for their schools and helped organise tens of thousands of student protesters (including a young Joshua Wong) to march against the proposed regulation.</p>
<p>Many Christians now fear that this new extradition bill could be used as justification for arresting religious dissidents in Hong Kong and placing them in Chinese cells next to their mainland counterparts. But just as Christianity in mainland China has continued to grow in resistance to government efforts to suppress and control it (a common saying is that there may now be more Christians in China than Communists), the Hong Kong Church has remained defiant of Beijing in the face of new threats.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/can-you-be-trans-and-christian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/can-you-be-trans-and-christian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GettyImages-1052957456.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/can-you-be-trans-and-christian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/can-you-be-trans-and-christian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can you be trans and Christian?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2019/07/can-you-be-trans-and-christian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher Rhodes</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Leaders such as Joshua Wong and Cardinal Zen are as vocal as ever. Wong was recently released from prison for his leadership in the 2014 protests and immediately took up a major role in the new demonstrations.  Meanwhile, the 87-year-old retired Cardinal Zen has taken to social media platforms like <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/christian-leaders-call-for-dialogue-end-to-violence-in-hong-kong-35801" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Facebook</a>, <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/christian-leaders-call-for-dialogue-end-to-violence-in-hong-kong-35801" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Twitter</a> and <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/christian-leaders-call-for-dialogue-end-to-violence-in-hong-kong-35801" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">YouTube</a> to support the current protests.</p>
<p>Even Archbishop Kwong and the usually pro-Beijing Anglican hierarchy have <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/christian-leaders-call-for-dialogue-end-to-violence-in-hong-kong-35801" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">acknowledged the necessity of the latest protests</a> and urged the government to back down.</p>
<p>Even though Beijing has been careful to present its new policies, such as the extradition bill, as responses to secular concerns like maintaining law and order, there is a clear sense that the authorities are becoming more overtly anti-religious.  The first legal complaint over police handling of the protests to reach Hong Kong’s High Court concerned perceived anti-religious bias. During a particularly violent crackdown by police against protesters on June 12 – which saw many demonstrators taken in by local churches as they fled police batons and tear gas – one police officer allegedly demanded that a clergy member marching alongside the protestors “<a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3015184/hong-kong-police-facing-high-court-challenge-over" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">ask your Jesus to come down and see us</a>”. The High Court <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/christian-leaders-call-for-dialogue-end-to-violence-in-hong-kong-35801" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">dismissed the blasphemy complaint</a> against the police as outside of the Court’s purview.</p>
<p>The churches are not in charge of the protests in Hong Kong, which have endured for weeks without central leadership. But the Church’s influence over the current protests goes far beyond a single Christian hymn. From criticising the Chinese Communist Party and supporting underground churches both before and after the handover, to calling upon the population to defy repressive Chinese-proposed laws in the early years of the “one country, two systems” era, the churches of Hong Kong have actively mobilized opposition to Beijing and created an atmosphere of defiance against the CCP.</p>
<p>And so the current round of protests in Hong Kong reflect the larger ongoing battle between the CCP and the Church.  So far, the protesters have stuck to singing the eponymous chorus of “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord.” The full version of the song, however, <a href="https://www.higherpraise.com/lyrics/love/love853403.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">goes on to make several declarations and a promise</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>Jesus is risen from the dead<br />
Jesus is Lord of heaven and earth<br />
Jesus is living in His church<br />
Jesus is coming for His own</p></blockquote>
<p>Was the police officer who challenged protesters to call Jesus down familiar with this latter verse, I wonder?</p>
<p>Regardless, his comment reflects not just the derision that Beijing has towards Christianity and other religions, but also fear: not that Jesus himself is on his way, but that his followers are coming to challenge the Party, unless the Party comes for them first.</p>
<p>In the end, as Christians in both mainland China and Hong Kong have responded to repression with solidified resolve and greater levels of defiance, the Communist Party’s fears may become a self-fulfilling prophecy in Hong Kong and throughout the country.</p>
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