February 16, 2025 - 3:30pm

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference yesterday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for the creation of an “army of Europe” to challenge Vladimir Putin. Presumably, this would resemble a Europeanised Nato, to which Zelensky would expect an invitation. Later in the day, Poland’s Foreign Minister swatted away the idea.

Zelensky obviously feels slighted by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remark earlier this week that “the United States does not believe that Nato membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement.” Yet Hegseth was being honest in recommending that Ukraine — after decades of Western toying with Kyiv’s Nato hopes — spend its negotiating time on other goals, rather than accession to the alliance.

The concept of an “armed forces of Europe”, Zelensky’s imagined consolation prize for not being welcomed into Nato by its most powerful member, is an equally unhelpful point of focus for Ukraine. Such a project is improbable for the same reasons that Nato in its modern form is inherently unstable.

The original aim of the alliance, to be a bulwark against the expansion of world communism from the Soviet Union, might have created a sense of unity and solidarity among its members, injecting credibility into Nato’s Article 5 of collective defence. However, as that particular threat has receded, most states have slipped back into the old nationalist paradigm — whether openly or merely tacitly.

Indeed, if today’s Russia — itself animated by national interest rather than any political conviction — were to attack a Nato member, that state would have to rely primarily on cultural affinity and historical bonds to receive military aid from other countries. Ukraine therefore cannot expect to automatically be defended within a wholly European military structure – even in the unlikely event that countries, as Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte urged yesterday, massively boost defence spending to correct a 40-year-old trend of disarmament.

Given the disintegration of shared interests within Nato, its members also interpret international events differently. The increasingly politicised function of the position of secretary-general attempts to maintain (Atlanticist) ideological uniformity, but there is obviously no consensus on, for example, the need to arm Ukraine against Russia or how to respond to recent European election trends. It is worth asking, then, how this would be any different in an “army of Europe”, whose very creation would be contested by countries such as post-Brexit Britain and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary.

Zelensky, in launching his proposal, invoked Friday’s conference speech by JD Vance, in which the US Vice President said that the countries of Europe need to “step up in a big way” on continental security and deterrence after decades of American leadership. Yet the heart of Vance’s speech offered a rebuke against the Ukrainian President’s vision.

Vance scolded the victorious European powers of the Cold War for behaving like “the side in that conflict that censored dissidents, that closed churches, that cancelled elections” in continuing their unpopular policy of mass migration. He also observed that it “is the business of democracy to adjudicate these big questions at the ballot box”. While his warning against elitist technocracy was far from warmly received in Munich, Vance was entirely correct, and his critique may even be extended to security policy.

For the first time since Russia’s 2022 invasion, arms support for Ukraine will be a major issue in a European national election when Germans go to the polls a week from now. Across the Left and the Right, voters are increasingly flocking to growing antiwar political parties, suggesting that the general population is not aligned with the establishment position on Ukraine. An “army of Europe” would therefore be another step down the road towards a governance of thin mandates.


Johan Wennström is a Research Fellow at the Swedish Defence University, currently writing a book about Sweden’s stay-behind network during the Cold War.

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