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November 29, 2024 - 7:45pm
The news this week that Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun is under investigation for corruption served as a clear indication that Xi Jinping is restructuring his military high command. Then, just a day later, came an announcement that Admiral Miao Hua, a fellow member of the Chinese Central Military Commission and head of the political work department in the People’s Liberation Army, had also been accused of “serious violations of discipline”. When one adds these cases to the purge which took place last year of key parts of the country’s army, culminating in Dong’s predecessor Li Shangfu being ousted last October, the process appears ever more cyclical.
Why the need for this constant reshuffling of the upper ranks? The Red Army, since its foundation in 1927, has always been the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party: its loyalty lies there, rather than with the state. Historically, it provided the key power base for both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, a trump card to be produced whenever their power was challenged.
Xi worked in the military at the beginning of his career, before moving on to the civilian arm of government, and so carries direct knowledge of how China’s army works. But a new factor is the significant increase in the country’s military expenditure. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in 2024 China’s overall budget for defence will reach a record $233 billion. While still some way behind the US, in real terms the resources available to Beijing’s soldiers and generals are massive.
The purges in recent years have usually centred on the parts of the military to which much of these resources have been devoted — in particular, a unit called the PLA Rocket Force. This has a broad remit to purchase and maintain both nuclear and conventional weapons, from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to standard bombing and launch equipment. This crucial arm has received the bulk of the state’s defence largesse, as well as being tasked with ensuring that China is ready to engage in regional wars to protect its interests in the coming decades.
Under Xi, the country is undergoing a more nationalistic and populist turn. But it is also highly aware of the volatile international situation. While often neglected by commentators, China’s domestic politics are profoundly influenced by external events, particularly in the US. Rising volatility in the Sino-American relationship since the first Donald Trump administration has made Xi’s leadership recognise the need to be prepared for any eventuality. The very actions the outside world considers signs of the country’s assertiveness are often a direct result of how China sees the pressures and threats arising from the international environment. It’s a vicious circle, and one with steadily rising risks.
The impact of this is both to upgrade China’s offensive capacity and to guarantee absolute loyalty among key military and administrative personnel. The problem in the army remains the same, however, as that which has historically plagued the Beijing government generally: personnel on relatively modest wages who are driven to temptation by the sizeable funds swishing around them.
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SubscribeThe inner power struggles among factions within the Chinese Communist party are a black box. Purges have been ongoing in China since 1949. The only thing I would say for certain is that this has nothing to do with corruption and everything to do with Xi Jinping perceiving a threat to his power. Corruption is a catch all excuse used when the leader wants to get rid of someone. These generals may be more dovish than Xi or more hawkish who knows, but military men usually prefer to avoid costly wars while politicians don’t.
Another thing I would say with certainty is that anyone in the west who says they know what is going on in China, doesn’t. Communists are the best liars.
Is there a touch of Stalinistic paranoia going on?
Interesting essay. Thank you.
It should be added that many of the characters in these actions are descendants of comrades in arms of Mao, particularly on the Party side. There is considerable antipathy between the members of the armed forces and the princelings running China from Beijing. Thus the need for the royal households to reign in the upstarts in the higher echelons of the army and navy.
Maybe Xi is also a believer in Stalin’s policy of never leaving a senior person in power for long.
If only someone had applied that principle to Fauci and Collins twenty years ago.
But then we would have been deprived of the immense schadenfreude of seeing the contemptible Collins replaced by the courageous Jay Battacharia.
That didn’t work out so well for Stalin.
Perhaps Xi is using Stalin’s playbook from the 1930s. He had the party, the police, and the military. Two in succession would purge the third, ultimately putting all into total subordination to his will. Terror works.