November 18, 2024 - 12:00pm

Donald Trump is reportedly the latest leader considering the Tories’ ill-fated Rwanda plan. Among the most controversial policies from the party’s last few years in power, this proposed to house would-be asylum seekers arriving in the UK in Rwanda while their claims were processed, with access only granted if the claim was approved.

Preparations for executing this plan saw Britain agree to pay £370m to Kigali, with part of the money used to fund construction of housing in Rwanda for the anticipated influx of asylum applicants. But the scheme caused considerable public debate and numerous legal challenges, and one of Keir Starmer’s first acts on taking office was to scrap it in favour of Labour’s preferred strategy of “smashing the gangs” — which is to say addressing the upstream people-smuggling infrastructure bringing people to the Channel. Those detained ahead of deportation were released back into the UK.

So far at least, Starmer’s change in approach seems to be having a noticeable effect on migrant arrival numbers, just not in the officially desired direction. This year has brought about a sharp rise in small boat arrivals to the UK relative to 2023, while the total number of arrests announced to date, in relation to this gang-smashing, is one. Meanwhile, the asylum seeker housing whose construction Britain funded in Kigali has remained empty.

Trump’s incoming administration is reportedly not the only one eyeing the facilities, and the associated “third-country” migrant processing proposal. In July Alexander Throm, a centre-right German parliamentarian, responded to news of Starmer’s abandonment of the scheme by calling for his own country to make use of the now-abandoned “capacity”. Speaking to a local paper at the time, Throm said: “We should stick to the plan and make use of the preparations our British partners made for it.” Similarly, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni issued a decree in October formalising a third-country migrant processing agreement with Albania, though this policy also found itself the immediate subject of legal objections.

Meanwhile, the larger issue of rising migration is likely to grow further in salience. Considerable institutional resources are already dedicated to enabling the international flow of people, while it is widely predicted that migrant numbers will rise further in the light of climate change. Just a few weeks ago, for example, at the COP 29 climate conference, the UN Refugee Agency launched a new “Refugees for Climate Action” network. It highlighted the issue of populations leaving their homes for more habitable areas in the wake of drought, flood, rising temperature and other climate-related difficulties.

It is reasonable to assume many such individuals would seek entry to the relatively temperate and wealthy polities in Europe and the Americas. It is also already manifestly clear that many existing citizens of these polities view this prospect with considerable alarm. But this overall trend, and the tensions it causes, remains under-discussed among mainstream politicians: former Tory home secretary Suella Braverman was widely criticised for her choice of language, for instance, when she broke the silence on this topic last year.

Now, it appears a slow public policy pivot may be gradually under way. In May this year, 15 EU states demanded their own Rwanda-style plan. But wherever such plans are proposed, even in response to overwhelming citizen demand, it is those “rule of law” agreements, courts, and institutions assembled since the middle of the 20th century under the America-led international order which pose the principal obstacle. So all eyes in the West will now be on what Trump manages to do, rather than just claim, as regards international migration.

For America leads this international order, while her hard power implicitly underwrites its “rule of law”. She is thus arguably unique in her ability to bring about far-reaching structural changes to that order. Should Trump succeed in modernising the architecture of institutional and legislative impediments to democratic states’ efforts at migration management, the global institutional picture into the 2030s could look very different. Attempts to do so would likely meet fierce resistance from many within those institutions; despite this — or perhaps because of it — we can assume those 15 EU states will be watching closely. Irrespective of Starmer’s inclinations, many in the UK will be watching, too.


Mary Harrington is a contributing editor at UnHerd.

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