February 11, 2025 - 1:45pm
At the Munich Security Conference later this week, US Vice President JD Vance and envoy to Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg will use the stage to present European leaders with part of the Trump administration’s peace plan for the region. Nato membership for Kyiv will be excluded, and Russia will effectively be left with the Ukrainian land it currently holds — with the possible exception of a territorial swap involving Ukrainian withdrawal from Russia’s Kursk province, if its army can hold the territory long enough.
These “concessions” are in fact closer to recognitions of reality. Donald Trump has no intention of taking on additional security commitments in Europe, and it is militarily impossible for Ukraine to reconquer its lost territories unless Washington intervenes directly — which the US President certainly will not do.
Assuming that Trump’s recent conversation with Vladimir Putin was sufficiently frank, certain factors should now be obvious. Of these, the most important is that the idea floated by US officials of a ceasefire before a comprehensive settlement will be dead on arrival. The Russians have made clear they will not agree to this, given that their own military advances and the threat of Ukrainian collapse are Putin’s principal points of leverage in negotiations. If America fails to grasp this, a great deal of time — and many more lives — will be wasted.
The other reason why the Trump administration should give up on the idea of an early ceasefire is that there are many people in Ukraine, Europe and Washington who want the talks to fail in a way that can be blamed on Russia. Consequently, they could suggest that there is implacable opposition in Moscow to a compromise peace. The genuine hardliners in Russia, who are indeed opposed to compromise, would no doubt be glad to have evidence that the West is making impossible demands.
Another idea which is dead on arrival is that of a powerful European “peacekeeping” force for Ukraine. This will be vetoed by Russia; but, equally importantly, as soon as the Europeans say they would only provide such a force if its safety is formally guaranteed by the US, the Trump administration will abandon it. That is, if it has not done so already. A peacekeeping force will be necessary to separate the two sides and enforce a ceasefire, but it will have to come from neutral countries.
The general contours of a viable peace involve the US meeting wider Russian security concerns, and the Kremlin in return giving up its maximalist ambitions in Ukraine. What is less clear is how far, and how quickly, either side will be prepared to go. This will only become apparent during the negotiations themselves. Will the Trump administration be willing to offer significant Nato arms limitations? Will Putin abandon his demand for additional Ukrainian territory, beyond what Russia currently holds?
The extent of Russia’s eventual captured territory will be decided on the battlefield. From all the evidence of the past year, the longer the war goes on the more ground Ukraine will lose. Yet Russian forces are advancing very slowly. The key effect of drones has been to make it extremely difficult to create the local mass necessary for a decisive breakthrough. Tanks cannot be brought up to the front line at all; infantry can only be brought up in tiny packets. On the other hand, drones don’t compensate completely for Ukraine’s critical lack of troops. The danger of Ukrainian collapse is another reason why the Trump administration cannot afford to waste any time in these negotiations.
Anatol Lieven is a former war correspondent and Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington DC.
lieven_anatol
Join the discussion
Join like minded readers that support our journalism by becoming a paid subscriber
To join the discussion in the comments, become a paid subscriber.
Join like minded readers that support our journalism, read unlimited articles and enjoy other subscriber-only benefits.
SubscribeEven if the US doesn’t assist, the European nations need to understand that they will be fighting Russia soon enough anyway, and act accordingly. Any “agreement” that might be reached will be reached by Russia as soon as it suits them. Europe must also leave sanctions in place, and never ever buy Russian hydrocarbons again.
When will European nations fight to defend their borders?
Good question. They are certainly not fighting today. In fact, all Putin would need to do is put on a keffiyeh and walk right on in.
Ha!
Presumably when they see Russian tanks crossing them.
Russia couldn’t even defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, Vladimir Putin is not going to attack NATO.
And why shouldn’t Europe buy Russian hydrocarbons if that helps end the war? Russia can offer them at a cheap price, and if Russia falls through as a supplier, then Europe will be no worse off than they are now.
For the same reason they shouldn’t have bought them last time. Once you are connected to Russia by pipeline, it is too easy to just let the contents of that pipe flow. By stroke of good fortune, that last pipeline exploded, but that may not happen the next time.
Russia has no desire to tangle with the UK or even France. Both nations have viable fighting forces, and would call on NATO.
Russia is also less likely to invade if there’s a market for their energy. Dependence on Russian imports must of course be avoided – the waffling on Nordstream encouraged Putin to invade, as did deadly bungling in Afghanistan – but a country growing wealthy by trade will be a better neighbor than a country impoverished by sanctions or embargos.
The UK has a viable fighting force…against whom?
Nukes….
Good. Russia can grow wealthy selling its hydrocarbons to the Chinese and Indians. Let them sign up to be hostages to Putin.
The eventual settlement depends on how much pressure Trump is willing to apply. If Trump is willing to take serious action against the Russian “shadow fleet” that’s smuggling oil, he can seriously hurt Russia and force a deal.
And watch the oil price rocket…in which case Russia probably won’t lose much at all.
So what? A short term spike will encourage production, and OPEC to supply more. Oil is a far larger percentage of Russia’s economy than oi8l consumption is for the US and Europe. If India and China go into recession, good.
It’s amazing to me that after 3 years of failed sanctions (spectacularly so in Europe’s case) some people still think the Americans can just up the sanctions a little bit more and THEN the Ruskies will give up (as if they wouldn’t have done it if they could).
Such deluded “support” is more detrimental to the Ukrainians than half the maneuvers the Russians have made.
The longer this goes on the more people will die, but then again, who cares about sacrificing another nations youth to the altar of American hegemony for no discernible gain, Ukraine must be “free”.
Not a little bit more. If Somali pirates and Houthi rebels can interdict international shipping lanes, with a little bit of help Ukrainian privateers and drone boats could devastate the “shadow fleet”. We’ve seen what they’ve done in the Black Sea. Move that to the shipping lanes and Russia’s in deep trouble.
Ukraine has every right to destroy Russian shipping wherever it is. We just need to help them a bit.
Ukraine must be free, as must Palestine.
Good point. Donald Trump should be broadening the negotiations to include oil and gas sales, and any other things that might be thrown in as an incentive. The United States has a lot to bargain with, and if we want to find the best deal, we will look at everything to see what to put on the table.
US do not have a lot to bargain with as long as US public opinion continues to be unfavorable towards Ukraine.
Too many people are like this author, trying to map out how negotiations will go and to predict what the principals will agree to and not. That’s not a good way to approach negotiations. It turns them into a zero-sum game, a win-lose situation, or worse, a negative-sum game that is lose-lose.
Much better to practice the art of the deal, where you try to put together a positive-sum game, the proverbial win-win. Donald Trump has long been a master of the art of the deal, looking past what others focus on to broaden the negotiations to find things that can get him his goals while giving up some to let the other side get their goals too.
In dealing with North Korea in his first term, Donald Trump was masterful. It was a delight to see him in action. Donald Trump’s quick trip to North Korea, arranged by tweet no less, was a master’s stroke.
But I’m afraid that Donald Trump the master is fading. He doesn’t seem to have the energy or creativity he had before. He’s relying on others too much, instead of displaying flashes of brilliance himself.
Maybe I’m wrong. Maybe he will talk to Volodymyr Zelensky and to Vladimir Putin and find a way to give both men a deal they will each consider a win. I certainly hope so. We’ll see what happens. In any event, the negotiations need to start now. the best way to reach a deal is to take a cautious first step, let the other side respond, and let the process unroll.
The non-starter seems to have started.