On 11 April, US foreign envoy Steve Witkoff held what he called a “compelling” third meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Just two days later, on Palm Sunday, Russia launched a major missile attack on the Ukrainian city of Sumy, killing dozens and wounding over 100 others. Then yesterday, President Donald Trump blamed Zelensky again for starting the war.

The sharp juxtaposition of the two events reveals much about Putin’s attitude toward the slow-moving peace negotiations between the United States and Russia to end the war in Ukraine. Accurately assessing that he has the upper hand over President Trump at the bargaining table and Ukraine on the battlefield, Putin sees continued military pressure as his best strategy. Either his military recalcitrance earns him bigger concessions from Kyiv and Washington as part of a settlement, or it frustrates Trump into walking away entirely, giving Russia a free hand in Ukraine. For Putin, it’s a win-win.

In the weeks since Russia agreed in principle to a partial ceasefire in the Black Sea and on energy and infrastructure targets, Moscow has kept up and even accelerated its campaign of aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities. Despite civilian deaths and significant destruction, the Trump administration has been largely unmoved. Though Trump expressed impatience — telling Russia to “get moving” — and threatened to impose additional sanctions, he has, for the most part, avoided directly criticising his Russian counterpart. “I was told they made a mistake,” he said when asked about the Sumy bombing.

Some observers point to Trump’s affinity for Putin to explain his general reluctance to use sharper sticks to coerce Russia into accepting a ceasefire, much as Washington was able to do with Kyiv. It’s certainly possible that Trump’s personal feelings have played a role, but the reality is that the US President has very limited leverage over Putin and few tools at his disposal that might influence Moscow’s decision-making, even if he wanted to use them.

For example, though often suggested by European allies and US Russia hawks, neither new sanctions nor more American military aid to Ukraine is likely to change Putin’s calculus. Over the past three years, Russia’s economy has proven its resilience to repeated rounds of economic restrictions, and Putin himself seems largely unresponsive to additional economic punishments. The threat of more US military aid to Ukraine will be even less persuasive, not least because the United States has already admitted that its depleted stockpiles leave it little capacity to surge military assistance.

With the belief that US pushback is unlikely, and that Russia is immune to any consequence that might arise, Putin has every incentive to press his military advantage as far as possible, even while remaining rhetorically committed to peace. In addition to winning small additional territorial gains, continuing his military campaign weakens Ukraine and wears down its morale while demonstrating to the United States Russia’s military staying power. Putin likely hopes he can translate these outcomes into a better final deal from a more desperate Kyiv and a more impatient Washington.

It is possible that instead of being daunted by Russia’s continued military action, Trump will grow angry. Putin seems sanguine and unconcerned about this possibility, however — and rightly so. Trump may very well become annoyed by Putin’s foot-dragging, but with his limited leverage and general disinterest in and dislike of Ukraine, Trump’s frustration is much more likely to drive him away from peace talks entirely than to bring painful retaliation on Russia. As happened with North Korea during his first term, if Trump begins to perceive significant obstacles on the path to a peace deal, he might choose disengagement over the risk of an embarrassing failure.

For Putin, Trump’s disengagement would be an acceptable and even welcome outcome. Russia would be free to press Ukraine until it agreed to surrender, giving Putin the power to dictate terms. And even if Trump gave up on negotiations over Ukraine, he might still be willing to pursue bilateral talks aimed at stabilising the US-Russia political and economic relationship.

For Putin, “fighting while talking” is a guaranteed win, and he’s unlikely to change course anytime soon.

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Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.

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