The coverage of the recent events in Lebanon and northern Israel has warned of the vanishing chances that an “all-out war” can be avoided.

In reality, it is likely that the war has already commenced. After months of build-up, many are waiting for a decisive moment — such as an Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon or a mass barrage of rockets from Hezbollah — to declare that the war has truly begun.

As far as the Israeli military is concerned, however, the pager attack was effectively the opening salvo. Israel’s forces have committed themselves to stop the rocket attacks north of the country and allow the displaced residents to return, and now they are attempting to fulfil that goal. This weekend, Hezbollah responded with more rocket attacks on the Israeli port city Haifa, illustrating that a conflict is already well underway.

The political imperatives for this war are obvious: unlike the increasingly divisive conflict in Gaza, a war with Hezbollah to end the shelling of northern Israel and allow the displaced to return has support from different parties and different sections of society. The electoral base of Netanyahu’s Likud party may have washed their hands of the hostages, but they are not willing to accept the humiliation of Hezbollah rendering a large swathe of the country uninhabitable.

A war in the north also provides a distraction — for both the domestic audience and international opinion — from the operation in Gaza, which has notably failed to either return the hostages or destroy Hamas. (Israeli news yesterday reported a rumour that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has been killed, and the IDF is trying to seek confirmation, which would change this picture.) Indeed, since the pager attacks, the world’s media has shifted its focus from the tens of thousands of dead civilians in Gaza to arcane points about acceptable levels of collateral damage and the potentials of electronic warfare.

This new war obviously comes with huge new risks, most seriously an all-out bombardment of Israel by the full range of Hezbollah missiles, which, if it ever happened, would overwhelm the Iron Dome and inflict death and damage to property unprecedented in Israeli history. Any ground invasion of Lebanon would also surely inflict a higher casualty rate on Israeli troops than has been seen in Gaza.

But given the cross-party consensus that the status quo in the north can no longer be maintained, the Israeli war cabinet has decided to embrace these risks. And we should not expect the war to proceed in a straightforward manner: it would be surprising if the Israelis repeated the actions of 2006 or 1982. Whatever one thinks of the morality or ethics of the pager and walkie-talkie bombs, they were certainly innovative, and we should expect more of the same. There is even talk of an ambitious amphibious and airborne assault that would land behind Hezbollah lines, and drive south towards the border.

On Sunday evening, local politicians from the northern towns and cities deserted by the Hezbollah attacks since 7 October, and which would suffer the heaviest damage in any escalation, spoke to Israeli news. They told Channel 12 news that though they demand “more significant action”, there is “no sight of a strategy”, and they remain unconvinced that the government and military will be able to secure the safe return of their residents.

Whatever the strategy, it is hard to see how the government and military commanders can now de-escalate. There is no political or military incentive for Israel to go back to the status quo of a few weeks ago. The Israeli military has promised that it will allow the residents of the north to return. Unlike the hostage rescue or the destruction of Hamas, this is something which can be achieved by military means — however bloody.

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