The Iranian regime is under intense strain. The collapse of its proxy network in Syria, Israel’s evisceration of Hezbollah and Hamas, and US President Donald Trump’s maximum pressure campaign have all greatly weakened Iran’s extended deterrent matrix. Added to this has been the ongoing aerial bombardment of the Houthis in Yemen.

With the Houthis under fire, a recent report in the Telegraph, citing an unnamed “senior Iranian official”, claimed the Islamic Republic was withdrawing its forces from the Arabian peninsula. Iranian officials have good reason to signal an abandonment of their Yemeni proxy, but such claims are unlikely to reflect the regime’s actual strategic thinking. Rather, far from quitting the Houthis, Iran is likely to become more reliant on them in the future.

Since intervening in the Gaza conflict in October 2023, the Houthis have proven to be Iran’s most effective proxy. Boldly employing Iranian-supplied advanced weaponry, they launched a campaign against civilian shipping in the Red Sea, and have regularly targeted both Israeli and American naval vessels with missile and drone attacks. Not only have the Houthis managed to severely constrict global shipping through the Suez Canal, they have also imposed stiff costs on the United States and Israeli forces, who have had to counter the Islamists’ relatively inexpensive weapons with far more expensive ordinance and platforms. Unlike Iran’s proxies in Iraq, who have had little ability to seriously disrupt American or partner operations in the region, the Houthis pose an intractable problem with no easy solution.

The Shia militia’s value to Iran far surpasses the millions Ayatollah Khamenei spends arming the group. And with the collapse of Iran’s Levantine proxy network, the Houthis are not simply Iran’s most able partner: they are also the only proxy militia left that controls a strategically important part of the world. For Iran to persist as a regional power, and continue to challenge Israel and American power, it needs to keep a foothold in Yemen.

Yet, even if the Houthis remain vital to Iran’s strategic ambitions, being associated with them has put the regime at risk. President Trump has already threatened that Tehran would be held accountable for Houthi aggression, and that the United States could strike Iran if the regime does not agree to a deal that would end its nuclear programme.

That blanket of pressure has already compelled Iran to seek ways to mollify Washington. Although the supreme leader has maintained adamant opposition to direct talks under the current climate, he has greenlit indirect negotiations. The reported withdrawal of Iranian military advisors from Yemen should be seen as another step toward appeasement. By reducing its support for its Islamist proxies, Iran is also taking IRGC operatives out of the crosshairs, thereby reducing the likelihood of unintended escalation.

Iran’s Houthi policy should be seen as a pragmatic action of a regime under severe strain, not a meaningful retreat. It’s an indication of how seriously Tehran is taking the Trump administration. With Israel looking to strike a blow against Iran, the regime needs to ensure that the US does not get involved. Doing so while not abandoning the activities and programmes that fuelled Iran’s rise as a regional power will be difficult, and require some outward compromise.

---

Afshon Ostovar is the author of Wars of Ambition: The United States, Iran, and the Struggle for the Middle East, which was published in August 2024.

AOstovar

---