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July 28, 2024 - 6:00pm
Since the attacks on 7 October, war between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah has constantly appeared at once imminent and at least a few weeks away. Despite various flare-ups and escalations, both sides appeared unwilling to begin a full-blown conflict, and a consensus had been emerging that an all-out war would not happen until autumn at the earliest — and not before Israel had wound down its campaign in Gaza.
Events this weekend have disrupted that consensus. The strike on the Druze village of Majdal Shams which killed 12 people, 11 of them children, has notably altered public opinion inside Israel.
Previously, different sections of Israeli society had dampened talk of war with Hezbollah, for various reasons: members of the military, because they do not see it as feasible while they are still deployed in Gaza; Left-wingers, because they wish to avoid the war at all costs; and many on the Likudnik Right, who see calls for a war in the north as implicitly critical of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu due to his inability to protect that part of the country.
The recent attack has shifted the discourse. There was a special edition of the main Israeli news show dedicated to the event, which has happened only rarely since 7 October. What’s more, it is seen as a departure from the usual round of tit-for-tat strikes in the north, which were seen as tolerable — despite them resulting in 45 deaths, leaving a large swathe of Israeli territory uninhabitable, and displacing tens of thousands of people for almost 10 months.
It is also significant that it was Druze who were killed, and in an occupied territory rather than Israel proper. Despite being Arabs, the Druze within the 1948 borders of Israel are patriotic and fight in the Israeli military. This is different for the Druze in the Golan Heights, most of whom do not accept the occupation of the area that has been in place since 1967 and still consider themselves to be Syrian.
But that doesn’t mean they support Hezbollah, and the incident has created a desire for revenge among the Druze. In response to the deaths, local community leader Sheikh Muafak Tarif stated that “a proper country cannot allow the continued harming of its citizens and residents. This [has been] the ongoing reality for nine months in northern communities. This evening crossed all possible lines.”
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SubscribeIt sounds like after 10 months of Hezbollah taking responsibility for firing thousands of rockets and explosives into northern Israel, after killing 12 children they did not mean to kill, suddenly it was somebody else, I guess. They’re just little boys playing with their toys that go “Bang!” Time to grow up, kids.
Those were Druze kids, so give me a break… Zionism tolerates Druze community at best because they serve in the military and as a minority are acutely aware that in the mess of the Middle East it’s better to stick to the power ( and relative prosperity) of Israel. But Israel wouldn’t move a finger if the lives of the Arab Israelis were in danger. It’s not even a moral judgement , it’s just the entire rationale of Zionism.
That’s simply untrue. One fifth of all Israelis are Muslim. There are more Muslim Israelis, percentage wise, than there are African Americans.
The Druze are loyal because the Israelis treat them as equals.
I have followed pro-Hezbollah and pro-Israel commentators since October 7th and would agree that elements on both sides greatly fear a war on Israel’s northern border. The former appear to fear this more than the latter although much commentary seems to give Hezbollah the advantage. To my mind if Israel were in a losing position the Arabs and Iranians would have begun a war much earlier than now. It does appear that as with many conflicts an “accidental unforeseen event” will begin hostilities. My money is on a win for the Israelis.
And for the Druze, who are a Shiite minority.
The Druze tribes (outside of Golan) tend to be loyal Israelis, often serving as senior officers in the IDF.
That Hezbollah – a mostly Sunni group, supported by Shiite Iran – launched these attacks hasn’t gone unnoticed.
If I were Iran or Hezbollah I would defer an escalation against Israel until after November, when they will know who will sit in the Oval Office and what message is enunciated regarding Israel. Also, Iran, as a member of BRICS, might be waiting to observe how a new American administration postures toward Russia and China. Interuptions of the status quo in either Ukraine or the Taiwan Strait would have potential significant influence on decisions made by Iran regarding Israel. The more the U.S. is distracted by its other commitments the less of its finite resources are available to support an Israel that no longer enjoys the unquestioned allegiance of the West.
“Hezbollah didn’t intend to cause civilian casualties, and certainly doesn’t want a full-blown conflict with Israel. Since Saturday, the group has been trying to de-escalate: as soon as it was reported that children had died, Hezbollah has alternated between denying responsibility and insisting that it was aiming for a military installation on nearby Mount Hermon. Its leaders would like to back down, but if Israel’s reaction goes beyond the retaliatory strikes launched so far, they might not be able to.” If this is not a biased article, I don’t know what is. And Golan Heights are not “occupied” by Israel. WTF??
I guess your comment is perfectly objective?
The Golan Heights are needed to protect Israel’s south eastern border. Handing them back to Egypt would be very unwise.
At any rate, the Sinai peninsula was returned as part of a peace deal. Oddly, Egypt did not want Gaza returned.
MSM has been so obsessed with the plight of Gaza’s “civilians” that the extent of Israel’s existential threat has been under-reported. Israel is physically surrounded entirely by enemies: on its borders are Hezbollah to the north, Palestine to the east, and Syria to the northeast. Also on its borders are Jordan and Egypt, nominally not enemies but certainly not allies who would aid its defense. Not far to the east is Iran, its arch enemy who is close enough to easily support proxies or conduct direct aggression with minimal logistical challenge. Add to those Yemen’s Houtis who have already succeeded in missile strikes against Israel as well as disruptions to Red Sea commerce. The economic base of Israel’s enemies is further augmented by the flow of money from the wider Moslem world of a billion adherents into the coffers of the terrorist groups. In terms of population Israel is vastly outnumbered by its enemies.
Over the last 75 years Israel has a well-deserved reputation for military prowess based upon an industrial and intellectual base out of proportion to its size, the unusually high motivation of its citizen-soldiers, a vibrant economy, and access to quality western arms. The Iron Dome has been so ingenious and so successful at defending against aerial assault that many have forgotten it is limited by its cost and production constraints. Hezbollah alone possesses over 100,000 missiles, which, if deployed in rapid enough sequence could exhaust the ability of the Iron Dome to respond.
Also, Israel now contends with ambivalent Western allies. If full out war starts with Hezbollah in the north while Gaza is also dealing with Hamas in the south it would be easy to imagine Israel also needing to commit troops to its border with Palestine, even if the later remained quiescent. In effect a war on three fronts. Any success by its enemies, especially if the border is physically breached, would increase the odds of Syria piling on, Yemen increasing drone/missile assaults and Iran dialing up support. At that point the U.S. would have a huge decision as to the size and nature of its involvement. Given recent events who could imagine American soldiers deployed to Israel? And, given hardware commitments to Ukraine, Taiwan, Japan, NATO allies, South Korea, et al, how robust could armament support from the U.S. be?
Two scenarios should be included in considering events concerning Israel. If Israel is sufficiently back-footed and its existence truly at risk, the question is begged of what line must be crossed before it uses its nuclear weapons? The other is that if Israel becomes for the U.S. another Afghanistan with images of evacuating its defeated population, the outcome for the U.S. would be the equivalent to the U.K. losing the Suez Canal: a symbol of the end of empire more significant than the debacles of Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. None of those were ever near-peer allies of the U.S. in the way that Israel has been.
Hopefully, none of these will occur; however, if the ambivalence of Western leaders persists vis a vis Israel and pro-Palestinian protest allowed to continue escalating, the enemies of Israel cannot help but interpret it as an opportunity that has never before presented itself.