August 10 2026 - 4:00pm
The British Navy has been congratulating itself: operations to monitor Russian vessels in UK waters and the North Atlantic were up 25% across the first seven months of this year compared with 2025. In the year to March, the Royal Navy shadowed 61 Russian warships and 28 merchant vessels around the British coastline.
That Moscow is increasing its activity in British waters is, first and foremost, a practical matter. After the UK boarded a Russian shadow fleet tanker in June, the Kremlin has devoted more naval assets to protecting these ships. On one level this is a positive, as Russian resources are being tied up around Britain and kept far from the Ukraine war.
But it is simultaneously stretching the UK’s perilously underfunded naval capacity. Offshore patrol vessels, submarine-hunting aircraft and helicopters were all deployed last month to monitor Russian vessels. Nor is Moscow treating this simply as a necessity to guard oil shipments. Rather, the Kremlin has spied an opportunity to provoke Britain.
It was hardly coincidental that Russia conducted a rare live fire exercise when Andy Burnham became Prime Minister and declared his support for Ukraine. A retired commander indicated that it was “very unusual” to conduct an exercise so near the south coast, while the Russian vessel did not adopt any safety measures before firing, thereby raising the risk of a ricochet in a busy shipping lane.
Then there is the danger to civilians. In June, a Russian frigate fired warning shots at a British yacht, an incident that then-Prime Minister Keir Starmer said was unlikely to be “sinister”. Yet it illustrates how a growing Russian naval presence around Britain inevitably increases the chances of collisions and other incidents involving untrained civilians, whether deliberate or accidental. That threat is compounded by the poor seamanship and situational awareness that Russian sailors have demonstrated.
The Kremlin and the couple aboard the yacht conducted their own mini information war afterwards, offering conflicting accounts as to what had occurred. Moscow has orchestrated a campaign of sabotage on British streets, with scant regard for the potential loss of life. Should Vladimir Putin wish to take this to another arena and feast on a diplomatic incident, the Russian President could always choose to spark a maritime provocation involving civilians.
Britain will now be forced to maintain this higher tempo of defensive activity with a navy smaller than at any time since the English Civil War. Overall recruitment numbers are beginning to rise, but the quantity of trained personnel ready for deployment is still falling. In March, Britain was forced to borrow a German warship to fulfill Nato commitments, and First Sea Lord General Gwyn Jenkins acknowledges that the naval service may not be ready for war until the next decade. All of this is an invitation for Putin to probe Britain’s weaknesses.
The future is not much brighter. Plans to replace aging destroyers have shifted towards hybrid “Common Combat Vessels” designed to act as a control hub for uncrewed systems, with deliveries not expected until the early 2030s. That may sound attractive in principle, but it means placing faith in developing technology rather than investing in conventional naval assets.
Jenkins has highlighted how Russia, in sharp contrast to the UK, continues to “invest billions in their maritime capabilities”. Hanging on for dear life in the face of sustained Russian pressure hardly constitutes success. The Royal Navy may be trying to spin its defense against Moscow’s increased activity as a victory, but it is better understood as Putin ratcheting up the pressure even while tied down in Ukraine. Britain should be wary of congratulating itself just yet.
