October 6, 2024 - 4:00pm

Whatever the Israeli retaliation for Iran’s ballistic missile barrage might be, attacking Tehran’s oil industry would be a bad idea. More than that, it reveals once again an inability to understand commodity markets among Western leaders.

As we have seen in recent days, the mere rumour that such an attack might be imminent was enough to drive oil prices up. Demand for oil is notoriously inelastic, meaning that “it does not take significant undersupply for prices to skyrocket, nor does it take significant oversupply for prices to crash,” as the energy experts at Doomberg have pointed out. During the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, US crude oil futures plummeted to a negative $37 per barrel, meaning that suppliers were basically paying anyone who was willing to take their oil.

The plan to destroy Iran’s oil industry would certainly do massive economic harm to the country, but the fallout would not be limited to Iran. Any conflagration that drives up international prices for energy will hit the EU hard. The bloc consumes approximately 11% of the world’s oil and 8% of its natural gas while only producing 0.5% of the former and 0.9% of the latter.  The major European economies are already either in a recession (Germany and Austria) or on the brink of a financial crisis (France). If you throw in oil prices of over $100 per barrel, there is no credible scenario for an economic recovery.

And then there’s the US. America is swimming in oil and gas, but it is unlikely that it has the export capacities to compensate for a complete withdrawal of every last Iranian barrel from the market. To make matters worse, China has been one of Iran’s major customers, so any Israeli attack that appears to be backed by Washington would be interpreted as a hostile act by Beijing.

To make matters worse, someone else would actually profit from such a scenario: Vladimir Putin. Surging oil prices would spill additional billions of revenue into Moscow’s war chest, something that no G7 price cap would be able to prevent. What this means is that any attack on Iranian production would have to be immediately compensated by additional supply from somewhere else.

Saudi Arabia could potentially play that role, but the Biden administration has often antagonised Riyadh and it is not clear whether Mohammed bin Salman would be willing to help out, especially since he would profit from higher oil prices. What’s more, despite the pragmatic approach of the Saudi elite to relations with the state of Israel, the Saudi public is less enthusiastic, and appearing to do the “Zionist entity’s” bidding could cause domestic problems for the Kingdom.

At this point, it should be assumed that the Israeli leadership is aware of all these facts and will therefore threaten but not execute a full attack on Iran’s oil industry. While a limited attack could also have significant consequences, these would most likely be short-lived and could also serve as a wake-up call for the Europeans to finally get their energy policy in order. If not, it is just a matter of time until geopolitical instability causes another major oil price shock and, consequently, a European energy crisis.


Ralph Schoellhammer is assistant professor of International Relations at Webster University, Vienna.

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