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		<title>Thomas Fazi, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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	<title>Thomas Fazi, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Why Europe’s kids are revolting</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-europes-kids-are-revolting/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/11/why-europes-kids-are-revolting/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Analysis</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The young are a minority in every European society.'  (Kenzo Tribouillard/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 00:10:10 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 10:37:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Austerity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Riots]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1080618</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The system won’t save them]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>All over Europe, the young are in revolt. The student protests in France have drawn most of the attention, not least because of the violence into which they descended, with rioting, looting and the torching of public buildings. But in recent weeks young people have also taken to the streets in a string of other countries, in some cases violently — in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Germany, Austria and elsewhere. Meanwhile, in Serbia, a student movement that spent two years in the streets has just won a general election, ending Aleksandar Vučić’s long reign.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The triggers may differ — schools in France and Belgium, housing in Spain and Portugal, the cost of living in Italy, corruption and a mixture of the above in Serbia — but the root is the same. These are the protests of a generation that believes it has been robbed of its future. It’s a conclusion that’s hard to argue with. The social contract its parents knew — work hard and you will, at the very least, secure a home, be able to support a family and be better off than those that came before you — has collapsed. For many young Europeans without inherited wealth, adulthood means drifting from one precarious job to the next, earning barely enough to cover the cost of rent and groceries, let alone start a family. That is, if they find work at all. Meanwhile, they have watched the institutions that were supposed to give them a start in life and cushion its blows — schools, universities, health and youth services — wither under austerity and privatization.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>There is no doubt that young people have overwhelmingly borne the brunt of the neoliberal policies pursued over the past decades. That neoliberalism has driven inequality to new heights is widely acknowledged; what is less often noticed is that this inequality is increasingly drawn along generational lines. The geopolitical analyst Arnaud Bertrand recently <a href="https://x.com/RnaudBertrand/status/2112720707771941013" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shared</a> some pretty extraordinary statistics on X regarding France: the over-60s — roughly a quarter of the population — hold around 60% of the nation’s wealth. They also receive nearly two-thirds of all social spending by the French government, in the form of pensions that, under the current system, are paid for by younger generations. This continuous bottom-up generational transfer of wealth is even more extraordinary when one considers that the average French retiree now has an income <a href="https://fortune.com/2025/09/16/france-retirees-higher-income-workers-american-pensioners-cost-of-living-crisis/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">higher than the average worker</a>.</p>
<p>Yet though the protesters often explicitly frame themselves in generational terms — most obviously Germany’s “<i>Gen Z regelt</i>” (which roughly translates as “Gen Z’s got this”) — their demands aren’t phrased as claims against the old. This is surely the right approach. Blaming the boomers would be a mistake. They simply had the good fortune to grow up in an era of full employment, affordable housing and decent pensions, and there is nothing scandalous about aging societies spending more on the old. Moreover, much of that wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small minority of boomers; not all older people live a luxurious life, of course. Ultimately, the problem is not that pensions are too high; it is that the young are being denied what their parents took for granted. The generational divide is simply how a decades-long class war from above is experienced by those who came of age after workers had already lost it, and who inherited a political-economic regime built to transfer wealth upwards. In Europe, that regime has been written into the institutional architecture itself — the euro, the Maastricht treaty, the fiscal rules — which systematically favors asset holders over wage earners, and established workers over new entrants.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;There is no doubt that young people have overwhelmingly borne the brunt of the neoliberal policies pursued over the past decades.&#8221;</div>
<p>The mechanisms are well understood. A decade of quantitative easing inflated the property and financial assets held by the old while wages stagnated, locking the young out of home ownership. Labor market reforms — from Italy’s Treu package and Jobs Act to Germany’s Hartz laws and France’s El Khomri law — preserved the security of those already inside while consigning newcomers to a revolving door of temporary and increasingly precarious contracts in the name of “flexibility”. After 2010, austerity fell disproportionately on education, youth services and public investment. Existing pensions were largely shielded, while future ones were quietly cut. As a result, across Europe, government spending on older people has risen, while public investment has been gutted. Then came the pandemic, which cost Gen Z years of schooling, work and social life, followed by a surge in inflation, made worse by an energy shock that Europe’s leaders largely inflicted on themselves.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>As if that weren’t enough, the young are now being told to accept further cuts and deteriorating living conditions to make room for rearmament and an open-ended war — for which, it seems, there is always money. Just a few weeks ago, as French police were firing tear gas at teenagers, EU leaders tasked the Commission with finding another €70 billion for Ukraine in 2027, on top of the €45 billion already earmarked. The fiscal rules that were never relaxed for schools or hospitals are being bent for defense, through national escape clauses and joint borrowing for weapons procurement. And the young have noticed. They are told there is no money for their classrooms, while new billions are found for a war with no end in sight — a war that, as conscription returns to the European agenda, they may even be asked to fight. In many countries, young people are starting to explicitly link the cost-of-living crisis with the rearmament drive.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The real question, then, is not why the young are revolting, but why it took them so long. The economic roots of these protests are undeniable. But are they the whole story? Most conservative commentators have focused instead on the presence of second-generation youths of Arab and African background, and on their leading role in the violence and looting, above all in France but also in Italy. For much of the Right, the riots simply confirm what it has been saying for years: that mass immigration has been an unmitigated disaster, filling European cities with a largely Muslim underclass that has no interest in integrating, and that, in the crudest version of this narrative, is cast as bent on destroying the very fabric of Western civilization, in some cases with the help of the “far-Left”. The demands of the overwhelmingly peaceful protests, meanwhile, go largely unheard.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>There is an irony here. The populist Right never tires of complaining that a “globalist establishment” has impoverished and deindustrialized Europe. Yet when young people take to the streets, sometimes violently, against that very establishment and the consequences of its policies, it cannot bring itself to believe that they might have genuine grievances. Instead, it instinctively assumes that someone must be pulling the strings: Islamists, Antifa, Mélenchon.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/bon-courage-to-the-french-protesters/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/bon-courage-to-the-french-protesters/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-2298307084.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/bon-courage-to-the-french-protesters/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/bon-courage-to-the-french-protesters/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Bon courage to the French protesters</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/bon-courage-to-the-french-protesters/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It is, of course, right to distinguish between the peaceful protests demanding economic reform and the rioting and looting that accompanied them. But are they really two entirely separate stories? There is no question that much of the looting, in France as in Italy, had a strong second-generation component drawn from the banlieues and the marginalized peripheries of Italian cities, with little discernible ideology behind it. Nor is there any point denying the costs of mass immigration, from public safety to the pressure on public services. Many of those involved in the violence were clearly acting out of opportunism. And the growth of separate communities of different social and religious backgrounds, often living in conditions of extreme exclusion, is clearly a social time bomb, one that has already done serious damage to social cohesion — and those on the Left who deny this reality are as blinkered as those on the Right who fixate on it at the exclusion of everything else.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>One might go further and argue that mass immigration has itself been part of the neoliberal social engineering of recent decades, not least by creating a reservoir of cheap labor. One might also argue that rioters running amok at peaceful demonstrations damage the protesters’ own cause, drowning out their demands and handing the security forces a pretext for a crackdown. There have even been claims that the French police deliberately allowed the destruction to happen in order to justify mass repression.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>These are all valid arguments. But they raise an obvious question: why do the protesters raging against the status quo not turn their anger on these immigrants and instead often march alongside them? Are they simply blinded by naïve Left-wing ideology? Or is something deeper at work? It is more likely that they experience their struggle primarily through a generational lens, one that cuts across ethnic, and to a certain degree class, lines. That seems far more convincing than the “islamo-gauchiste” theory, which holds that this cross-ethnic alliance is not spontaneous solidarity at all, but something engineered by Left-wing parties such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise. That may hold to some degree in France, but it doesn’t hold in Italy, where there is no Italian LFI, no comparable alliance between the Left and Muslim voters, and yet the same mixed crowds appeared in the streets, as elsewhere.</p>
<p>Yet reducing the violence solely to its second-generation component is also misleading, and far too comforting. Young people of European background have taken part in it too. The crowds that recently rioted in Milan included kids with Italian-born parents alongside those from immigrant families. So we have to ask to what extent this violence is also a reaction to a system that offers no avenue for political change. This is not to justify it. Violence, in and of itself, leads nowhere emancipatory. But we cannot escape an uncomfortable fact: an <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-western-democracy-died/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">increasingly authoritarian</a> system that is actively committed to blocking any democratic systemic change, with no social intermediaries between power and the masses, and no forces capable of giving the revolt a direction and a political content, of placing it under the guiding idea of social emancipation, is bound to breed violence. And then there is the merciless generational arithmetic: the young are a minority in every European society. They cannot win elections on a generational platform.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;When individualism, purposelessness, anxiety and despair become the norm, we shouldn’t be surprised if the result is collective depression, or rage.&#8221;</div>
<p>But the violence — and especially the wanton looting — also expresses a deeper malaise, one that goes beyond economics. It reflects the nihilistic void into which Western societies have sunk: when individualism, purposelessness, anxiety and despair become the norm, we shouldn’t be surprised if the result is collective depression, or rage. At a time of moral decay at all levels of Western societies, particularly among its political and corporate elites, who systematically display little respect for either human life or (other people’s) property, is not a little delusional to expect the youngest and most disadvantaged to hold themselves to a higher moral standard than their rulers?</p>
<p>Writing about the riots in England in 2011, the German social psychologist Götz Eisenberg described the young as the “surplus generation” — no longer needed by society, its labor expendable, deprived of the chance to build an independent life through its own efforts, yet constantly dazzled by the promise of self-realization through consumption, a state that is increasingly beyond its reach. Fifteen years on, his diagnosis is more relevant than ever — and indeed Britain remains a social powder keg that could once again explode at any moment. Violence is no solution to social problems, but neither does it arise in a vacuum. Where political and economic power has become anonymous, anger turns on the nearest symbols, such as a Louis Vuitton boutique. A shop window can be smashed; financial markets and austerity can&#8217;t.</p>
<p>That said, we shouldn’t make the mistake of assuming the protestors represent an entire generation. The same generation that fills the streets also votes, in growing numbers, for the anti-immigration Right. In France’s 2024 election, a third of under-25s backed the Rassemblement National; in Germany last year, more than a quarter of young men voted AfD. The anger at the establishment is the same but it is channeled in the opposite political direction. The question is whether European politicians, whether incumbents or its “populist” challengers, have any real answers.</p>
<p>Addressing the protesters’ grievances would require systemic change: greater public investment in education and housing, higher wages, more secure jobs, economic redistribution (focused on the real wealth hoarders, not pensioners in general), and a rational energy policy, which would itself demand a radical shift in geopolitical paradigm. However, it’s hard to see how any of this could be achieved within the current EU-Nato architecture, which no major party seems prepared to challenge. Meanwhile, the idea that the problem of alienated second-generation youth can be solved through even more heavy-handed repression — or perhaps even “remigration” — is little more than a fantasy.</p>
<p>The question, then, is whether the young people of Europe can replicate what happened in Serbia. That is a country that faces much the same demographics — an aging and shrinking population — yet its student movement managed to build a platform that drew support across generations, partly by shunning traditional ideology and unifying under a simple, non-partisan message for change. It’s ironic that today this seems harder to achieve in the “liberal-democratic” West than in a country routinely described as authoritarian.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1080618</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Why British liberals need the Russian bogeyman</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/10/why-rejoiners-need-the-russian-bogeyman/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/10/why-rejoiners-need-the-russian-bogeyman/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/8097ce0c-ad51-405e-a6fb-e5639d794935.jpeg?w=626</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>EU</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The Prime Minister showed his hand while being interviewed by Alastair Campbell and Rory Stewart. (The Rest is Politics)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 23:03:19 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 23:03:19 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alastair Campbell]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Andy Burnham]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rory Stewart]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Rest is Politics]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1078111</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Burnham is following Europe’s playbook]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“A dereliction of duty.” That’s how Andy Burnham just described turning down a closer relationship with Brussels — and he’s hardly alone. For the past decade, the British establishment, and Labour in particular, have tried to neuter Brexit, or indeed even reverse it. Under Burnham, the project has acquired unprecedented momentum. Just a few weeks ago, in his first conference speech as Labour leader, Burnham became the first prime minister to open the door to rejoining the European Union. Shortly thereafter, he suggested his party’s manifesto at the next election might include a referendum on just that question.</p>
<p>It is in this context that Burnham’s latest Brexit “bombshell” should be read. Speaking to Alastair Campbell and Rory Stewart on <em>The Rest Is Politics</em>, Burnham claimed to have “clear” evidence that Russia interfered in the 2016 referendum — implying that Moscow had successfully tilted the vote towards Leave — while offering no details, let alone evidence. The goal, though, seems clear enough: to delegitimize the referendum result once and for all, and so pave the way for its reversal. And what better pretext than the Russian bogeyman?</p>
<p>This fits a wider pattern. Since the 2016 Russiagate fiasco, it has become standard practice among Western elites, especially in Europe, to blame every unwelcome election result — and above all every “populist” rebuke to their rule — on Russian “disinformation” and “interference”. The campaign has escalated dramatically since 2022. We are told that Russia has for years been running a vast influence operation aimed at manipulating helpless voters. Yet the evidence that this operation has reached, let alone swayed, any meaningful number of them is <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-022-35576-9#MOESM1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">scant</a> to say the least.</p>
<p>The consequences, however, are not. Across Europe, the specter of “Russian disinformation” has been used to push through sweeping censorship regimes — chiefly via the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) — and “election-management” tools like the European Democracy Shield. The most extreme case came in Romania in December 2024, when the Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the presidential election — won by Călin Georgescu, an independent euroskeptic and Nato critic — on the grounds of alleged Russian interference. The court cited a TikTok campaign in Georgescu’s favor, but no proof was ever offered that it was funded by Russia. Indeed, internal documents later obtained by the US House Judiciary Committee <a href="https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2026-02/THE-FOREIGN-CENSORSHIP-THREAT-PART-II-2-3-26.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">showed</a> that TikTok had explicitly informed the Commission that it hadn’t found “any evidence” of a coordinated inauthentic network.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/andy-burnhams-rejoin-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/andy-burnhams-rejoin-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GettyImages-2296060701.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/andy-burnhams-rejoin-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/andy-burnhams-rejoin-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Andy Burnham’s Rejoin fantasy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/10/andy-burnhams-rejoin-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yet EU elites plainly regard the episode as a blueprint. As former commissioner Thierry Breton put it, with disarming candor: “We did it in Romania and we will obviously have to do it in Germany, if necessary.” Right-populist parties, such as the AfD and the National Rally, are routinely branded “Russian stooges”, with the usual experts already warning of Russian interference in forthcoming elections in France and elsewhere — preparing the ground to legitimize heavy-handed interventions in the electoral process. The same script was run during this year’s Hungarian election, with the mainstream media making evidence-free claims of Russian interference on Viktor Orbán’s behalf. Meanwhile, journalists and analysts have been sanctioned by the EU for “spreading Russian propaganda”, which in practice means dissenting from the EU-Nato line on Ukraine, as <a href="https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/2026/05/05/human-rights-experts-extrajudicial-sanctions-against-six-european-citizens-undermine-fundamental-rights/8375302/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">evident</a> in the case of former Swiss army colonel Jacques Baud, among others.</p>
<p>The EU, in other words, is at the forefront of an authoritarian trend: invoking a permanent Russian threat to justify a rolling assault on democratic norms, from online censorship to the repression of dissent. It is hardly surprising, then, that Burnham, the Europhile that he is, should borrow a page — or rather a chapter — from the Brussels playbook. As is customary with sweeping claims against Russia, he offered no evidence for his Brexit claims. His statement was nonetheless amplified across the mainstream media. Indeed, pro-EU groups have duly called for Britain to rejoin in light of the Prime Minister’s “revelation”. “We have suspected for years that the 2016 referendum could have been subjected to interference because of how its result helped destabilize a united Europe,” said Richard Kilpatrick of European Movement UK. “Disinformation played a role at the time and it is important to have this public confirmation of those suspicions.”</p>
<p>Public confirmation, or rather evidence, would indeed be welcome — especially since the question has been investigated several times, and nothing has turned up. In 2020, Parliament’s intelligence and security committee published its Russia <a href="https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CCS207_CCS0221966010-001_Russia-Report-v02-Web_Accessible.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">report</a>. It reached no finding of interference in the referendum, though it blamed the Government for never commissioning an intelligence assessment of the question. Whitehall’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/world/uk-government-says-no-evidence-of-successful-russian-meddling-in-brexit-vote-idUSKCN24M1E3/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">response</a> was that it had seen no evidence of successful interference and therefore saw no need for one.</p>
<p>That same year, Elizabeth Denham, then information commissioner, <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/2847/documents/27859/default/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">concluded</a> a three-year investigation into the use of personal data in political campaigning, including during the Brexit referendum, centered on Cambridge Analytica and its parent, SCL Group. Having examined more than 300,000 documents and some 700 terabytes of seized material, she <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/the-brexit-data-chancers-fooled-left-and-right-alike-lfn60l23h" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that she had “found no further evidence to change [her] earlier view that SCL/CA were not involved in the EU referendum campaign in the UK”, and that her office had <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/43962679-b1f9-4818-b569-b028a58c8cd2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">found</a> “no additional evidence of Russian involvement” in the material recovered from the companies’ servers.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2254358804.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Europe ever wake up?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Another study by the Oxford Internet Institute examined thousands of tweets before the Brexit referendum and also found <a href="https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/little-evidence-russia-influenced-brexit-vote-through-social-media-study-finds/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“little evidence”</a> of Russian interference — though, to be fair, Twitter later <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/12/14/kremlin-backed-broadcaster-russia-today-spent-767-twitter-adverts/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">revealed</a> that the Russian broadcast RT had spent a total of £767 on adverts during the referendum. Facebook further <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/world/europe/facebook-russia-brexit-referendum.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that it had found no evidence of significant Russian advertising on its platform around Brexit, though accounts linked to the Internet Research Agency, a Russian “troll farm”, had spent 97 cents on three adverts shown to UK users (about immigration, not Brexit as such) and together generating around 200 impressions.</p>
<p>Funnily enough, this careful approach was backed by none other than Burnham’s own Foreign Office minister, Stephen Doughty, who, asked by Sky News about Burnham’s claims, <a href="https://x.com/SophyRidgeSky/status/2109536602644988168" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>: “Well, the security minister has spoken about this before, and he’s been very clear that they’ve attempted to [but] they haven’t succeeded.” That is a very different statement from Burnham’s; the Prime Minister&#8217;s words were carefully chosen to imply, without quite saying it, that Russia had indeed swung the vote. If not, why raise it in a conversation about rejoining the EU?</p>
<p>Compare all this with the establishment-led Remain campaign, which enlisted most of the mainstream media and the Government itself — which <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35980571" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spent</a> more than £9 million of public money on a Remain leaflet delivered to every household. Add to that the EU, which funds many of the universities, research bodies and NGOs that lined up behind Remain, and private actors such as George Soros, who later <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-42984594" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bankrolled</a> the anti-Brexit campaign to the tune of at least £400,000. In short, the Remainers campaigned openly, lavishly and with the full weight of the state behind them. Which is probably why they have never gotten over the fact that they lost.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Prime Minister&#8217;s words were carefully chosen to imply, without quite saying it, that Russia had indeed swung the vote.&#8221;</div>
<p>It is, of course, possible that Burnham has been shown damning evidence buried for a decade. But how likely is that? The fact that he chose to make his claim to Alastair Campbell, of all people, is ironic indeed, given the latter&#8217;s role in the Iraq war debacle. Burnham, it is worth recalling, voted for the war — a war built on claims that could easily have been disproved at the time, and indeed were by many — yet defended his vote for years afterward. Given his record, some skepticism is in order, especially since his latest suggestion is, so far, equally unsupported. And the stakes may be as high as they were a quarter of a century ago — perhaps higher. Then, it was about justifying an invasion to bolster a US-led unipolar order at the height of its power. Now, it is about propping up a liberal establishment facing its deepest crisis since the Second World War.</p>
<p>Little wonder Burnham is so adamant about rejoining: Brussels is the most powerful tool available to discredited national establishments, providing supranational instruments that can be deployed against democratic upheavals, and buttressing transnational financial interests, above all in the City of London, which fought Brexit a decade ago. It is also no coincidence that, on the podcast, Burnham singled out France and Germany as fellow victims of “Russian propaganda” — two countries whose leaders are at historic lows in the polls and who are likewise invoking the Russian threat to shore up their position against populist challengers.</p>
<p>Russia-blaming pays a further dividend too: it cements the rearmament drive. A Russia capable of swinging a British referendum is a Russia against which no expenditure is too great and no sacrifice too onerous. This narrative recasts any critic of Europe’s own choices — the “coalition of the willing”, the pledge to spend 5% of GDP on defense, the ReArm Europe borrowing schemes — as a Kremlin asset.</p>
<p>Indeed, one might argue that this is the real threat to democracy — not a few hundred dollars of Russian adverts, but a political class that would rather write off millions of voters as dupes of foreign propaganda. The 17.4 million who voted Leave in 2016 had profound and legitimate frustrations with the economy, with immigration and with the EU itself, and had voiced them for years without being heard. To recast them, a decade on, as the unwitting instruments of a Kremlin operation for which there is next to no evidence is not a defense of democracy but its negation. It also tells us something about Burnham himself. A prime minister who inherited a country in deep economic and social crisis might have been expected to confront its causes. Instead, his first instinct has been to relitigate 2016 and double down on the path — ever closer alignment with a sclerotic and increasingly authoritarian Brussels — that helped produce the crisis in the first place. That does not augur well for Burnham’s ability, or his willingness, to provide the answers Britain needs.</p>
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					<title>The plot to stop the AfD</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-plot-to-stop-the-afd/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/09/the-plot-to-stop-the-afd/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2292035279.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Saxony-Anhalt</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Ulrich Siegmund, the AfD's candidate in the Saxony-Anhalt state election. (Jens Schluter/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 23:02:11 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 23:02:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AfD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[firewall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saxony-Anhalt]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1073368</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Germany’s firewall is crumbling in Saxony-Anhalt]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Saxony-Anhalt, in the western part of eastern Germany, is hardly the country’s most important state: it accounts for only a fraction of Germany’s GDP and is home to just two million people, half the population of Berlin. It is often described as a no-man’s-land between east and west — the flat, monotonous backdrop to the final hour-long approach to Berlin. Yet Saxony-Anhalt is poised to become the stage for one of the biggest political showdowns in recent German history.</p>
<p dir="ltr">State elections will be held there on 6 September, and the AfD is set for a sweeping victory. The party is currently polling at 43%, on track to secure an absolute majority of seats — though that outcome largely hinges on whether the parties currently polling close to the 5% threshold, primarily the Greens, make it in or not. A handful of votes could tip the outcome in the opposite direction, allowing the establishment parties to keep the AfD out of power once again, as they did in Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg after 2024 — if not through a full everyone-minus-the-AfD coalition, which might prove arithmetically difficult, then through a minority government.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In short, the result sits on a knife edge; little wonder that the German political establishment is in a state of panic. For the AfD to win an absolute majority would be a historic triumph and mark the definitive collapse of the “firewall” erected around the party in recent years. Not only would it be the first time the party takes power in a state, but it wouldn’t have to share that power with anyone else — a feat hitherto achieved only by the two main establishment parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Meanwhile, the AfD continues to rise practically everywhere — including in Berlin, where it has doubled its support (in the polls) since 2023 and now runs level with the CDU, behind the frontrunner, the Left-progressive Linke. Berlin votes a fortnight later, as does the eastern state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where the AfD leads the polling. This makes Saxony-Anhalt all the more important, since a victory there could propel the party forward in the other two contests as well.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/how-europe-conquered-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/how-europe-conquered-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2242849590.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/how-europe-conquered-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/how-europe-conquered-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Europe conquered Hungary</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/08/how-europe-conquered-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Crucially, because of the way Germany’s federal structure is set up, if the AfD were to take control of a state it would inevitably have to be reckoned with at the national level too — precisely what the anti-AfD firewall was designed to prevent at all costs. As state premier, one of the first responsibilities of the AfD’s candidate, Ulrich Siegmund, would be to assume the annually rotating chairmanship of the regular meetings of Germany’s 16 state premiers. The position typically entails a visit to Berlin and a joint press appearance with the chancellor.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To get an idea of the panic gripping the German political establishment, and especially its metropolitan, social-liberal wing, one need look no further than its house journal, the magazine <em>Der Spiegel</em>, which recently <a href="https://x.com/derspiegel/status/2087860828661797235" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://x.com/derspiegel/status/2087860828661797235&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1788546253032000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0r3DpEXi75DAOJmFBRjgt5">featured</a> on its cover a mugshot-like photograph of Siegmund — a former perfume trader — with the caption “Germany’s most dangerous man”. It’s such an outlandishly exaggerated claim that the cover drew criticism even from mainstream corners. Ulf Poschardt, the former editor-in-chief of <em>Die Welt</em>, pointed out that such brazen and caricatural ad hominem attacks simply play into the AfD’s narrative: that they are fighting an out-of-touch political-media elite that views everyone outside their narrow political-ideological spectrum as a “threat to democracy” — including the party that is polling first across the country, well ahead of Chancellor Merz’s CDU/CSU.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Indeed, it is precisely because the establishment has lost control of the narrative — and Germany is hardly an exception in this regard — that, as <em>Politico</em> recently <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-afd-saxony-anhalt-ulrich-siegmund-government/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-afd-saxony-anhalt-ulrich-siegmund-government/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1788546253032000&amp;usg=AOvVaw29VWqng0I_bLrbUQrIp7zF">reported</a>, it is now studying an arsenal of extraordinary measures designed, in effect, to prevent a possible AfD state government from exercising its mandate. The first scenario involves excluding Saxony-Anhalt’s representatives from meetings on sensitive matters. In addition to the gathering of state premiers that Siegmund would be expected to chair for a year, Germany’s states regularly coordinate through a network of ministerial “conferences”. Among the most important is the conference of interior ministers, where some of the country’s most pressing security and intelligence matters are discussed. Thus, as several ministers confirmed to <em>Politico</em>, one possibility would be to keep holding the regular meetings of the interior ministers, but also organize separate gatherings for particularly sensitive issues from which the representative from Saxony-Anhalt would be excluded. According to an emeritus professor of constitutional law, the idea is “perfectly conceivable”, though he conceded that it might be challenged by the federal courts.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A second scenario would involve raising a “wall” within shared information systems. The argument is that the AfD, given its alleged “closeness” to Russia, cannot be trusted with sensitive dossiers. The notion that the AfD would act as a pipeline of classified information to Moscow is rather ludicrous — if only because that would amount to political suicide. “We talk to everyone, whether West or East,” said a spokesperson for the AfD’s Saxony-Anhalt branch. “That doesn’t mean we’re going to hand over files. Anyone who claims otherwise is talking nonsense. If and when we get access to such information, we understand our responsibility as a party of government.” Nonetheless, a Social Democrat politician told the magazine that the AfD should be kept away from all intelligence on Right-wing extremism and espionage. In other words, an elected government would be deliberately kept in the dark about dossiers crucial to national security, rendering it effectively incapable of governing. Once again, it is claimed that this would be “legally possible”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A third scenario, the most striking so far, would involve financially starving the AfD-led state. Saxony-Anhalt receives almost €3 billion a year from federal fiscal equalization, equal to a fifth of its budget. The threat is to reduce or suspend those funds in order to “make life harder” for a potential AfD government, “or to coerce the party to behave in ways the political establishment finds acceptable”. The finance minister of Baden-Württemberg points out that the system is anchored in the constitution, as though a single constitutional provision could disguise the political motive behind financially strangling a rebellious region.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A final scenario being contemplated is the so-called “nuclear option”: the <em><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0185" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html%23p0185&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1788546253032000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3n_ewpKISDwn6ZFpTwanmP">Bundeszwang</a></em>, or federal coercion. Under Article 37 of Germany’s Basic Law, the federal government, with the consent of the Bundesrat, the chamber representing the states, may take “necessary measures” to compel a state to fulfill its legal obligations. In other words, Berlin could force a state government to obey federal law, a measure that has never been applied in the history of the Federal Republic, not once since 1949.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The picture that emerges is unmistakable: the same German establishment that is constantly lecturing other countries about democracy and the rule of law is demonstrating that democracy is tolerated only so long as it produces results deemed acceptable. When democratic processes produce an unwelcome government, or risk doing so, ways are sought to circumvent it, to hollow it out or to render it harmless — all in the name of “defending democracy”, of course.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Indeed, it has become increasingly common in recent years in Germany for mainstream parties and media outlets to use the term “<em>Unsere Demokratie</em>” — our democracy. The meaning is clear: only those who hold the “right” positions sit within the perimeter of democracy; those outside it are not opponents within the system but threats to it. In this way, ordinary political disagreement about migration, energy, EU policy or the war in Ukraine can be reclassified as an attack on the constitutional order itself, and the ordinary remedies — debates, elections — can give way to exceptional ones.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In this regard, the German establishment has a formidable ally: the constitution itself. Germany’s postwar order is built on the doctrine of “militant democracy”: the idea, drawn directly from Weimar’s collapse, that a democracy may legitimately refuse to tolerate those who would use democratic means to abolish it. There is a basic logic to the concept, but it is clearly now being stretched to the extreme. One may agree or not with the party’s most radical policy stance, that on remigration — which the AfD itself defines as lawful measures to return foreigners already under removal orders — but that is a policy position, not a program for abolishing democracy or the constitutional order. Even critics of the party have said as much: writing on <em>Verfassungsblog</em>, one German constitutional scholar <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/verfassungsschutz-gutachten-afd/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://verfassungsblog.de/verfassungsschutz-gutachten-afd/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1788546253032000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ikjhJ5Nkh7nQB4Wm28L5f">noted</a> that the case against the AfD largely rests on its portrayal of German democracy as dysfunctional, and that fundamental criticism of the system is the very thing that distinguishes democracy from dictatorship. Yet the doctrine of militant democracy is no longer merely being invoked against the AfD; it is being used to justify waging war on the party by all means necessary, including extra-legal ones.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The German establishment has a formidable ally: the constitution itself.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">In May 2025, the domestic intelligence service formally classified the AfD — by then already the country’s largest opposition party, polling first or second nationally — as a “confirmed right-wing extremist” organization, on the strength of a 1,100-page report the public was not permitted to see, announced by the outgoing interior minister days before leaving office. The designation — which would have unlocked expanded surveillance powers and fueled mounting calls for a formal ban procedure — did not survive judicial scrutiny: in February 2026 the Cologne Administrative Court barred the agency from applying or publicizing it, finding its conditions unmet.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But the episode’s lesson cuts deeper than its outcome: it took a court to halt the state security apparatus’s attempt to brand the principal opposition party an enemy of the constitution. Nor did the judicial setback end the campaign: by summer 2026, a 1,500-page NGO legal opinion had concluded a ban application would probably succeed, and more than 1,000 lawyers, judges and prosecutors had <a href="https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/08/more-than-1000-german-lawyers-back-call-for-afd-ban-to-protect-democracy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/08/more-than-1000-german-lawyers-back-call-for-afd-ban-to-protect-democracy/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1788546253033000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0Pjuw-SxJ3bvG1szQBRZvM">signed</a> an open letter urging ban proceedings. That the prohibition of the largest opposition party in Germany could be seriously entertained, to the routine applause of Brussels-aligned commentary, tells its own story.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The current geopolitical tensions provide another tool in the hands of the political establishment, in Germany and elsewhere: so long as Russia can be framed as an invisible but ever-present threat, anyone who opposes the status quo can easily be delegitimized as a “Kremlin-aligned internal enemy” — an outright national security threat. It has now become commonplace across Europe to blame virtually every unwelcome electoral outcome — <a href="https://x.com/repubblica/status/2094617751281394124" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://x.com/repubblica/status/2094617751281394124&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1788546253033000&amp;usg=AOvVaw03poSJ1IjopZ-T1ivLY1tu">including</a> the recent Icelandic EU referendum — on Russian interference, even in the absence of any evidence. Indeed, a number of journalists and analysts, several of them German, have already been sanctioned for “spreading pro-Russian propaganda”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">No wonder the German establishment seems so intent on escalating tension with Russia. This doesn’t just serve EU-Nato geopolitical interests in Ukraine — where Germany is now leading the charge — but also serves the establishment’s domestic aim of cracking down on the opposition. As mentioned already, the AfD is regularly accused of being a tool of Russian interests, though this largely rests on the party’s programmatic positions: opposition to sanctions, to arms for Ukraine, calls to reopen Nord Stream, and dialog with Moscow — all things that one might argue would serve first and foremost in Germany’s interests. In this light, the German government’s claims that Russia is behind the failed drone attack at Leipzig/Halle airport — for which it has so far failed to provide any concrete evidence — might also be seen as aimed at putting even more pressure on the AfD. The timing of the announcement is noteworthy: four weeks after the alleged attack, but only a few days away from the election in Saxony-Anhalt. Leipzig/Halle airport, incidentally, sits directly on the Saxony-Saxony-Anhalt border, and Halle is Saxony-Anhalt’s largest city.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Finally, the German establishment can count on another formidable ally: Brussels itself. In recent years, the EU has gradually developed a playbook of electoral influence: a dense ecosystem of regulatory, financial, legal and informational instruments capable of shaping electoral conditions and outcomes, which have now been institutionalized through tools like the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Democracy Shield, aimed at the permanent monitoring of electoral processes across all member states — continuous supranational oversight of national elections, without any basis in the Treaties. These are tools that can be — and are — regularly deployed in support of establishment-aligned parties, be they incumbent or in opposition. Though these tools are less useful in the case of state elections, one can be sure that they will be amply deployed in next year’s federal election.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/the-lesson-of-weimar-dont-ban-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/the-lesson-of-weimar-dont-ban-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2248062421.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/the-lesson-of-weimar-dont-ban-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/the-lesson-of-weimar-dont-ban-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The lesson of Weimar? Don’t ban the AfD</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/the-lesson-of-weimar-dont-ban-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Katja Hoyer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Ultimately, one thing is clear: Germany&#8217;s elites are scrambling to shore up their power in the face of collapsing legitimacy and popular consensus. Support for Chancellor Friedrich Merz has plummeted to historic lows, with his personal approval rating now <a href="https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/04/german-conservatives-team-up-with-hard-left-to-change-saxony-anhalt-constitution-ahead-of-afd-win/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/04/german-conservatives-team-up-with-hard-left-to-change-saxony-anhalt-constitution-ahead-of-afd-win/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1788546253033000&amp;usg=AOvVaw12kdTCbLWBzV22ZNxTV6Bs">down to 14%</a> — the worst figure ever recorded for any sitting chancellor. This is hardly surprising: his cabinet is presiding over the deepest industrial contraction in the Federal Republic’s history, one that falls hardest on states like Saxony-Anhalt, whose chemical and automotive employers are being squeezed by high energy prices. At the same time, Merz’s cabinet is rolling back the welfare state (such as scrapping early retirement at 63 for long-serving workers) and promoting a highly dangerous — and highly unpopular, especially in eastern Germany — escalation towards Russia, all while suppressing free speech through surveillance, intimidation and even criminal prosecution. This is ultimately what is fueling support for the AfD: not a renewed taste for “fascism”, but deep-seated hostility towards the establishment. This is particularly true in eastern Germany, or the former GDR, where a long-standing east-west economic and cultural divide has consolidated into a sharp political polarization, with the AfD capitalizing on growing “anti-western” sentiment — “western” here meaning the former West Germany as much as the West at large.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What is at stake in Saxony-Anhalt on 6 September, then, is not really the government of a small eastern state of two million people. It is whether the German establishment still believes it can beat its opponents at the ballot box or whether it has quietly concluded that it cannot, and must therefore win by other means. Every measure now being war-gamed in Berlin is an admission of that second possibility. And each of them, if deployed, would hand the AfD precisely the argument it has been making for a decade: that Germany is governed by a caste which regards the electorate as a problem to be managed, and which is prepared to trample on the most elementary principle of “their” much-vaunted liberal democracy — that whoever wins an election must be able to govern — rather than lose control. The firewall may be crumbling, but the establishment appears intent on laying the foundations for something far more impregnable.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1073368</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>How Europe conquered Hungary</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/08/how-europe-conquered-hungary/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/08/how-europe-conquered-hungary/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2242849590.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Politics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Can Péter Magyar destroy Orbánism forever? (Janos Kummer/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2026 23:03:19 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 05 Aug 2026 23:03:19 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dictatorship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Orbán]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1069065</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Liberal authoritarianism is on the move]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Operation Purgatory. It sounds like a Pete Hegseth fever dream. In fact, it’s Péter Magyar’s name for his assault on the Orbán system and all its works. Blending legislative and administrative measures, the cornerstone of the new Hungarian government’s offensive is a vast constitutional overhaul: a series of sweeping amendments to Hungary’s so-called “Fundamental Law”, designed to destroy what’s left of the ancien régime — and ensure it can never return to power.</p>
<p>The most consequential provision is without doubt the 16th Amendment to the constitution, which imposes a lifetime term limit of eight years (two parliamentary terms) on the prime minister. Effective retroactively, the measure is obviously targeted at Viktor Orbán. Given he’s already served for a total of 20 years, the new law bars him from ever returning to office. Quite apart from its nakedly ad hominem character, which critics have already dubbed the “Lex Orbán”, the provision has no defensible logic. Why should voters be prevented from re-electing a leader, or rather a parliamentary majority that supports him, if they choose to do so? Indeed, virtually no parliamentary democracy — where, unlike in presidential systems, executive power is shared with a cabinet and remains fundamentally dependent on maintaining a parliamentary majority — imposes a term limit on the head of government.</p>
<p>But the new government didn’t stop there. Another provision, the 17th Amendment, sets a 12-year term limit for members of parliament. Again the ad hominem — or in this case <em>ad partem</em> — nature of the law is clear. Conveniently, no sitting MP from Magyar’s Tisza Party is affected: only the opposition. Fidesz and its allied party KDNP, having dominated frontline politics since 1990, stand to lose their entire senior cadre. One might call this Lex Fidesz, though other parties are caught in the net as well. The blow falls equally hard on the political Left, disqualifying most of its veteran figures and rendering a progressive resurgence all but impossible.</p>
<p>Equally striking is the manner in which the new government ousted the incumbent president, Tamás Sulyok, who had been elected by the previous parliament in February 2024 and whose term was supposed to run until 2029. Magyar, who accused Sulyok of being an Orbán puppet, targeted him from the moment of his victory speech and did everything possible to force him to resign. When Sulyok refused to step down, the new government could have initiated an impeachment procedure, the only mechanism for removal provided for by the Fundamental Law.</p>
<p>Instead, Magyar chose simply to slip a line into one of the constitutional amendments which literally reads: “the term of office of the incumbent President of the Republic terminates today”. Meaning: removal by legislative fiat, what we may call Lex Sulyok. Even <a href="https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/amnesty-international-slams-hungarian-government-over-rule-of-law-violations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Amnesty International Hungary</a> criticized the constitutional coup aimed at unseating the president. It is worth noting that Sulyok also appealed to the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe body that advises states on constitutional and rule-of-law questions, to review the amendment. The Commission’s reply, following a brief trip to Hungary? That it would rule on his motion at its next plenary session in October, neatly coming months after his removal.</p>
<p>The judiciary has not been spared either. Magyar’s 17th Amendment reintroduces a mandatory retirement age of 70 for Constitutional Court judges, effectively removing the chief justice and three other judges, and handing Magyar the opportunity to flip the political balance of the court within his first term. The same amendment further establishes a new body, the National Office for Asset Recovery and Asset Protection, tasked with “the tracing and recovery of public assets that have been unlawfully managed or used” by the previous government. Creating a body to investigate alleged corruption might not seem particularly nefarious: until one realizes that Hungary, like every European country, already possesses institutions devoted to precisely this purpose.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-1468579963.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Ukraine war&#039;s big lie</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What makes this one unique is that it’s charged solely with investigating the alleged wrongdoings of a single party — Fidesz — outside judicial and societal oversight. As András Schiffer, the former leader of the green party LMP, <a href="https://www.hetek.hu/cikkek/online/schiffer-andras-brusszeli-utasitasra-cselekszik-magyar-peter" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a>, the body’s aim is to “make it morally impossible for Fidesz to compete through a series of trials — spiced with staged theatrical performances — and inquisitorial proceedings”. The new government’s decision to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), itself a highly politicized body effectively operating under the Commission’s control, will only reinforce this.</p>
<p>Magyar has defended these actions by invoking “the exceptional mandate received from the electorate” and as a “precondition for the restoration of constitutional democracy”. The new prime minister’s argument is simple: since Orbán created a “mafia state” that trampled the rule of law, its restoration requires the complete destruction of the Fidesz system. The constitutional amendments, indeed, are only part of a much wider offensive, which includes shutting down the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/news/hungarian-public-broadcasters-shut-down-to-say-sorry/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">news output of the public media</a>; closing Fidesz-aligned cultural institutions such as MCC and the Danube Institute; and launching a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/hungary-orban-fidesz-raid-embezzlement-probe-12450b8d47bad12fbd590670e69d64d7" target="_blank" rel="noopener">judicial raid</a> on the offices housing Fidesz’s servers to seize its databases, taking the party’s website offline (it still is at the time of writing). For their part, Orbán and his party have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/hungary-orban-resistance-fidesz-magyar-government-0d7fbb31fd85cc1ae30ca2b1e5c1b988" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accused</a> the new government of dismantling the rule of law, eliminating the system of checks and balances, and persecuting the opposition — of creating, in essence, precisely the authoritarian regime that the liberal establishment always accused Orbán’s government of being.</p>
<p>My purpose is not to convince you that Orbán is right. It is rather to reflect on what the post-Orbán transition tells us about the vanishing meaning of words like “rule of law”, “democracy” and “tyranny” in our post-everything age — and to highlight some of the contradictions within both the liberal and the Orbán camps.</p>
<p>Let us start by clarifying that, technically speaking, the new government’s measures are not illegal. Post-communist Hungary has always been defined by what might be called a hyper-parliamentary system: simply put, a government with a two-thirds majority can amend the Fundamental Law, or even replace it wholesale, in a single chamber, in a single vote, without facing any substantive review by judges. A two-thirds majority also controls the so-called “cardinal laws” — electoral rules, media, judiciary, central bank — and key appointments like constitutional judges and the prosecutor general. The Hungarian parliament thus faces far fewer obstacles in its legislative functions than most of its European counterparts, where constitutional revision tends to require multiple votes, referendums or even general elections. In Germany, certain constitutional fundamentals are outright unamendable — permanently beyond the reach of any parliamentary majority, no matter the size. In Hungary, by contrast, a government with a two-thirds parliamentary majority faces effectively no institutional veto at all.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/von-der-leyen-is-coming-for-europes-wallet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/von-der-leyen-is-coming-for-europes-wallet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2256150321.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/von-der-leyen-is-coming-for-europes-wallet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/von-der-leyen-is-coming-for-europes-wallet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Von der Leyen is coming for Europe’s wallet</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/06/von-der-leyen-is-coming-for-europes-wallet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Orbán himself mastered this institutional logic better than anyone before him — and in fact reinforced it after 2010, severely curtailing the Constitutional Court’s power to review constitutional changes. The following year, Fidesz then used its own supermajority to adopt an entirely new constitution, redefining the country’s constitutional identity in explicitly national-conservative terms. From there it expanded the court from 11 to 15 judges, handing itself the opportunity to immediately pick four new justices, even as it consolidated a powerful pro-government media machine.</p>
<p>In this sense, you can argue that Magyar is simply following the democratic logic established by Orbán: that a government with a strong mandate should be free to implement sweeping changes that reflect the popular will, and use its constitutional majority to entrench the ruling party’s political interests. Somewhat ironically, Tisza itself benefited from Orbán’s 2011 electoral reform, which raised the share of single-member constituencies from about 45% to 53%, boosting the majoritarian, winner-take-all component of the system. As a result, Tisza’s 53% of the vote translated to roughly 71% of seats. Certainly, Fidesz’s accusation that Tisza is “dismantling the rule of law”, “eliminating the system of checks and balances” and “destroying the legitimacy of independent institutions” rings rather hollow — even as it mirrors the accusations the EU establishment directed at Orbán for years.</p>
<p>All the same, it is true that Tisza has crossed red lines that Orbán never dared to cross: no previous government, for instance, had ever ousted a sitting president by decree. In this sense, some of the new government’s actions, while not technically illegal, undoubtedly violate well-established constitutional principles — such as the inviolability of the president.</p>
<p>But are we sure this is a principle worth defending from a popular-democratic perspective? Setting aside the specifics of the Hungarian case for a moment, the reality is that many of the “independent” institutions that make up the edifice of modern liberal democracies — presidential offices, independent central banks, constitutional courts and the like — do not limit themselves to “upholding the constitution and the rule of law”. Rather, they pursue their own political and institutional logic, independent of that declared or pursued by the political leadership of the day, and more often than not reflective of entrenched elite (and increasingly supranational) interests. Supreme and constitutional courts, for example, frequently <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/britain-is-ruled-by-a-judicial-elite/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rule against</a> government policies — especially when it comes to controversial issues like immigration. The way in which the Bank of England <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/why-the-left-shouldnt-be-celebrating/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">derailed</a> Liz Truss’s infamous mini-budget is arguably another example.</p>
<p>In other words, they exist to limit the popular will — and indeed routinely rule against elected governments — according to the logic of what we might call “constrained democracy”. This is obviously not to claim that there should be no limits whatsoever on an elected government’s actions. But the current model is deeply flawed — and in this sense the fact that Hungary’s system is much less constrained than elsewhere should be viewed as a positive thing.</p>
<p>Returning to the Hungarian case, then, can we really blame the new government for not wanting to spend four years contending with a president appointed by its predecessor? And if the roles were reversed — if Fidesz had won a two-thirds majority and found itself saddled with a staunchly pro-EU president — would conservatives blame it for wanting to get rid of him? After 2010, indeed, Orbán made sure to appoint presidents aligned with his government’s agenda, and I would argue that this made perfect sense from a popular-democratic standpoint.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Can we really blame the new government for not wanting to spend four years contending with a president appointed by its predecessor?&#8221;</div>
<p>Ultimately, then, I would claim that the new government’s measures should not be challenged on procedural grounds — with arguments that often echo those the EU establishment deployed against Orbán in the past — but on their substance. The real question is what the government’s measures are for, not how they are done. And on this point there is little doubt: they are aimed at essentially destroying the opposition in Hungary — at making sure Fidesz never returns to power — and thereby “locking in” Hungary’s EU-dictated economic and foreign policy agenda forever.</p>
<p>What that agenda entails is no mystery. It means dismantling Orbán’s heterodox economic model — starting with price caps and energy subsidies, and which the new government has already started to unwind. It also means phasing out Russian oil and gas, whatever the cost to Hungarian households and industry. And above all it means full alignment on Ukraine: within weeks of taking office, Magyar had lifted Hungary’s veto on the European Peace Facility, the Orwellian-named off-budget fund through which the EU, whose own treaties bar its budget from financing military operations, reimburses member states for weapons shipped to Ukraine. At the same time, Hungary no longer now opposes opening accession talks for Ukrainian EU membership, with Magyar further signalling that he would no longer block sanctions against Russia.</p>
<p>Beyond the policy questions here, there is simply no way this brazen attack on the opposition can be defended on democratic grounds — and indeed Orbán himself, for all the EU establishment’s claims about the allegedly autocratic nature of his government, never dared to legislate his opponents out of existence. This brings us to the contradictions of the liberal camp. Because regardless of what one makes of liberal-democratic dogmas, there is no doubt that the Magyar government’s measures represent a blatant violation of the rule of law <em>as defined by Brussels itself</em>. It is remarkable watching the EU establishment, which spent a decade and a half accusing Orbán of being a proto-dictator on “rule-of-law” grounds, now reward much graver violations by the new government.</p>
<p>Indeed, the EU’s main response to Operation Purgatory has been to unblock €10 billion in post-pandemic funds which Brussels had blocked Orbán from receiving. Nor is it just the EU. Hungary’s liberal legal scholars — the same experts who spent years cataloguing Orbán’s every constitutional sin — have proved remarkably accommodating now that the shoe is on the other foot. As one of them <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/the-new-constitutional-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a> on <em>Verfassungsblog</em>, the house organ of European rule-of-law orthodoxy: since “the previous legislator has obviously violated the fundamental values of the EU”, and the new majority is “laying the foundations for a new republic, committed to EU fundamental values”, it follows that “the swift removal of the head of state is, exceptionally, acceptable”. In other words, the rule of law may be suspended, provided it is suspended in the name of the rule of law — and, crucially, in the name of “EU fundamental values”.</p>
<p>We have seen this film before. After coming to power in Poland in 2023, the pro-EU coalition led by Donald Tusk launched an unparalleled attack on the rule of law: seizing control of the public media and the judiciary, sidelining constitutional norms and undermining institutional independence. Yet as in Hungary today, all this was met with silence or enthusiasm in Brussels — in that case as well, funds that had been frozen for years were rapidly released. All of which is further confirmation that the European Commission’s insistence on democracy, values and the rule of law is, more than anything, a convenient pretext for targeting dissenting governments that resist aligning with the EU’s expanding supranational authority and broader political agenda. Indeed, when it comes to supporting its own emissaries, there is apparently no red line the EU will not cross — up to and including greenlighting the outright annulment of entire elections when they go the wrong way, as we saw in Romania in 2024. As for Hungary, the strategy seems clear: the EU is bent on punishing the rebellious colony — by making sure it can’t rebel ever again.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1069065</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The Ukraine war&#039;s big lie</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-1468579963.jpg?w=478</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Stalemate</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['When Russians feel pinned against the wall, they harden'. (Sean Gallup/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 23:03:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 17:13:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zelensky]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1066406</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Can Kyiv ever win?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">It has become something of a seasonal ritual. Every summer, Brussels launches a fresh propaganda offensive on Ukraine — and this year is no different. “The tide is turning”, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared on social media a few weeks ago, claiming that Ukraine, with European and Nato help, has seized the initiative, while Russia has been forced onto the defensive. The same phrase has since been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-attacks-on-moscow-show-weakness-of-russia-position-by-sergei-guriev-2026-06?utm_source=Project+Syndicate+Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=6601cb2eb2-Politics_Newsletter_2026_07_01&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_-2e8ee61f44-93818541" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-attacks-on-moscow-show-weakness-of-russia-position-by-sergei-guriev-2026-06?utm_source%3DProject%2BSyndicate%2BNewsletter%26utm_campaign%3D6601cb2eb2-Politics_Newsletter_2026_07_01%26utm_medium%3Demail%26utm_term%3D0_-2e8ee61f44-93818541&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3A5B9VrHkMJismDa2K3TLb">echoed verbatim</a> by politicians and commentators across the transatlantic ecosystem, in what is clearly a coordinated narrative push. Meanwhile, we are told that the Russian economy is — once again — on the brink of collapse, and that even Putin’s downfall may be imminent.</p>
<p dir="ltr">We have been here before. At regular intervals since Putin’s invasion, the Western political-media complex has worked to convince the public that victory for Ukraine was just around the corner, and that Russia itself was on the verge of collapse. In 2023, for instance, Western journalists and agenda-setters spent months hyping Ukraine’s counteroffensive, which was going to “turn the tide” in Kyiv’s favor. The campaign was a catastrophic failure, producing mass casualties and negligible territorial gains.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The latest alleged game-changer is Ukraine’s drone-strike campaign inside Russia — reaching as far as Saint Petersburg and Moscow — targeting logistics, fuel depots, refineries and supply lines. Several civilian targets have also been hit, causing numerous casualties. On Monday, Moscow suffered the largest drone attack so far. President Zelensky has now announced a 40-day operation against Russian targets to “influence the aggressor state in order to press for an end to the war”, which is likely to mean many more such attacks. These measures coincide with the EU’s disbursement of the first €3.2 billion installment of its €90 billion loan to Ukraine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The timing is not coincidental. On Tuesday, a crucial Nato summit began in Ankara, where the pro-war lobby — both in Europe and in Washington — is desperate to make the case that Ukraine is winning. It’s a narrative that Trump himself appears happy to indulge, probably to compensate for the Iran fiasco: he even signed the G7 leaders’ recent statement committing to “increase the delivery of air defense capacities, additional systems and interceptors, and long-range capabilities”; to consider extending production licenses to Ukraine; and to “strengthen our sanctions, including those on the oil and gas sectors”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It is also, in all likelihood, a response to mounting war fatigue in the West, confirmed by the refusal of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary to finance the aforementioned loan — an opt-out that Hungary’s new pro-EU government has strikingly not reversed so far — followed by the new Bulgarian government&#8217;s decision to prohibit arms supplies to Ukraine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Kyiv’s drone campaign is certainly having an impact. Russian oil production has been affected; there have been serious fuel shortages across the country, as even Putin has admitted. Ukraine has also disrupted Russian supply routes north of the Sea of Azov, causing power outages in Crimea and in the Russian-held part of Ukraine’s Kherson region nearby. But these attacks are unlikely to change the course of the war. The Russian economy is faltering, yet it remains in a better position than much of the EU. Indeed, citing higher oil prices, largely a consequence of the Iran war, the International Monetary Fund in April raised its forecast for Russia’s 2026 GDP growth by 0.3 points, to 1.1%. Meanwhile, it revised the forecast downward for the EU’s top three economies — Germany, France and Italy — to 0.8%, 0.9% and 0.2% respectively.</p>
<p dir="ltr">More crucially, though, the Russian army continues to advance on the battlefield. It is steadily closing in on its goal of conquering the entire Donbass. Just the other day, Moscow announced the capture of Kostiantynivka — a town in Donetsk and the largest settlement it’s taken since Mariupol. The city was one of the last strongholds on the road to important Ukrainian-controlled cities, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, whose capture is the Kremlin’s ultimate objective in the Donbass. Russian troops are also advancing around Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, making gains in urban fighting and on elevated positions, and continue to advance around Lyman and Rai-Oleksandrivka. All this flatly contradicts the prevailing “Ukraine has turned the tide” narrative.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2061692449-e1778520510445.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nato is a dangerous grift</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">If further proof were needed that things are going badly for Ukraine, one need only look at the increasingly widespread “busification” policy — the kidnapping of conscription-age men off the streets to be sent to the front, which is fueling growing domestic opposition to the war — or at the EU’s proposal to exclude military-age Ukrainian men, in practice all men aged 23 to 60, from the bloc’s temporary protection scheme.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In this light, the drone campaign looks less like a game-changer than a sign of desperation: given Ukraine’s inability to turn the tide on the battlefield, Kyiv and Nato have decided to “bring the war to Russia”. Yet there is no evidence that Ukraine’s drone campaign will turn the war around — much less force Putin to capitulate. Indeed, over the past few days, Russian forces launched some of the largest drone and missile strikes on Kyiv so far, killing dozens of people.</p>
<p dir="ltr">How much Ukraine’s campaign is affecting public support for Putin is hard to say. It is true that it is having an effect on Russian morale, but as Leonid Ragozin has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/7/1/is-ukraines-campaign-of-targeting-russian-refineries-working" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/7/1/is-ukraines-campaign-of-targeting-russian-refineries-working&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0_gIh22UyOm_aYMWZVWgBh">written</a>, the situation in the country remains relatively stable: for all the dramatic visuals of burning refineries and queues at petrol stations, most Russians have seen worse in their lifetimes, and the vast majority still enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of the poorer EU countries — a far cry from what they endured throughout the bad old days in the Nineties.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The most reliable “poll” will come on 20 September, when Russia holds elections to the State Duma; some analysts <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qy5RCnEOIA8" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v%3Dqy5RCnEOIA8&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3oIVR_Xr8Js3vm_UC8gG8O">predict</a> that the ruling United Russia Party will suffer a humiliating result at the hands of the Communists to its Left and the (confusingly named) Liberal Democratic Party to its Right. But anyone hoping this might pressure Putin into ending the war will be disappointed: both parties have taken an even more hardline stance on the conflict than Putin’s United Russia party. The Ukrainian attacks are, if anything, emboldening the more hawkish voices in the Kremlin, who accuse Putin of mismanaging the conflict and are demanding a far more forceful response. After all, history suggests that when Russians feel pinned against the wall, they do not capitulate; they harden. Thus, the greater the pressure on Russia becomes, the more likely it is that Putin will find himself compelled to escalate the war.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Ukrainian attacks are, if anything, emboldening the more hawkish voices in the Kremlin.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Regardless of the short-term effects, Ukraine’s drone campaign is a textbook example of how drones are rewriting the rules of warfare in real time. Strategic deep strikes — the ability to reach the enemy’s cities, industries and leadership far behind the front — were until recently the privilege of countries with powerful air forces and missile arsenals. But low-cost, mass-produced drones have democratized it. A country losing the attritional contest on the ground — as Ukraine, on paper vastly inferior to Russia in material and manpower terms, plainly is — can now inflict vast damage deep inside the stronger power’s territory. And once the weaker side exercises that option, whatever incentive the stronger side may have had to exercise restraint collapses.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It is, after all, a matter of historical record that so far Russia has refrained from inflicting mass destruction on Kyiv and other major cities far from the front line, and throughout most of the war has conspicuously spared government decision-making centers — despite having the means to do so. For the first eight months of the conflict, Moscow also left Ukraine’s energy grid untouched; strikes began only after the Kerch Bridge attack of October 2022. In this sense, drone warfare does level the playing field, but it also invites escalation, by stripping the weaker side of the indirect protection that asymmetry itself — its inability to inflict mass damage on the enemy — once afforded it.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This is what makes the current moment so dangerous. A nuclear superpower is being subjected to a sustained campaign of strikes against its principal cities, its strategic infrastructure and, by extension, its leadership — supported by Western intelligence, executed with Western weapons and now backed by an explicit G7 commitment to “accelerate” the delivery of long-range capabilities.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As Matthew Blackburn of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs recently has <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-europe-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-europe-war/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw34OkZFCitsSq_rEjVMzv7i">warned</a>, if Moscow decides its restraint within Ukraine is being exploited to impose humiliating damage on the Russian heartland, it may abandon strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure in favor of the European supply hubs and manufacturing sites that make Kyiv’s deep-strike campaign possible in the first place, thereby correcting the asymmetry and restoring deterrence on its own terms. Indeed, Moscow has repeatedly signaled that its patience is not unlimited; voices within the Russian establishment increasingly speak of restoring deterrence by striking targets in Europe itself. The reason Russia has so far refused to do so is obvious: such an attack could easily spiral into an all-out war that Russia has no interest in fighting — as even General Alexus Grynkewich, Nato’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the alliance’s top military commander, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/751d4555-9e8c-42a0-a37b-80893727776c?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.ft.com/content/751d4555-9e8c-42a0-a37b-80893727776c?syn-25a6b1a6%3D1&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2nbEuZFMHsoTOaa0XZEUlL">recently</a> noted. Simply put, the cost of retaliation has thus far exceeded the cost of tolerance. But if the latter keeps increasing, Russia’s calculus could very well change.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2262945841-e1779745278977.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Europe keeps losing</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau </a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The essential fact is that nobody in the West knows where Russia’s red lines lie — and indeed Western policy seems to proceed on the assumption that they do not exist at all. Meanwhile, the Europeans keep arguing that there is no alternative to continuing to support Ukraine indefinitely because “Russia refuses to negotiate”. But as Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute recently <a href="https://mondediplo.com/2026/07/04russia" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://mondediplo.com/2026/07/04russia&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3fD9dZglbBCJ0nVjTyx8aG">wrote</a>, it is the EU — not Russia — that has so far refused to negotiate. While Moscow has spent the past year in sustained talks with Washington and progressively abandoned several of its core demands, the Europeans have made negotiations conditional on an unconditional ceasefire that Russia cannot accept without surrendering its only leverage, and have wrapped this precondition in “principles” that amount to a demand for Russian capitulation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The main victim of this posture has been Ukraine itself, condemned to a grinding war of attrition it cannot win militarily. Should exhaustion eventually produce a ceasefire without a settlement, meanwhile, it could lead to a Kashmir-style condition of permanent insecurity. It is in Ukraine’s interest — and in Europe’s interest as a whole — to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement instead. We know in broad terms what any realistic settlement would entail: territorial concessions from Ukraine in exchange for security guarantees (short of Nato membership and Western troop deployments). Whether such an offer would suffice for Putin to claim his measure of victory and end the war, nobody can yet know. But what we do know is the cost of the status quo.</p>
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					<title>Von der Leyen is coming for Europe’s wallet</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/06/von-der-leyen-is-coming-for-europes-wallet/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/06/von-der-leyen-is-coming-for-europes-wallet/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2256150321.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>economics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Each crisis has served as a pretext for the Commission to assume more authority.' (Luis ROBAYO / AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 23:02:52 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 08:31:03 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bureaucracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1062826</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Beware the Commission’s power grab]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The Multiannual Financial Framework. Even for a body as jargon-prone as the European Union, the phrase feels almost bewilderingly dull. Perhaps that’s the point. For hidden amid the technical language of the EU’s new budget is a kind of technocratic coup — one that promises more power for the Commission, less for member states, and which would ultimately make Brussels even less accountable than it already is today. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Over the past decade, the EU’s institutional balance has already tilted heavily toward the Commission, which has extended its reach into areas once considered the preserve of national governments — from fiscal policy and public health to foreign affairs and defense. The mechanism has been consistent: each crisis — the sovereign debt crisis, Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, the Ukraine war — has served as a pretext for the Commission to assume more authority, make “emergency” decisions and lock in permanent changes to the exercise of EU power. None of this has required formal treaty changes. It has occurred surreptitiously, outside the arena of democratic debate, through what scholars have called “integration by stealth”. The result has been a creeping “Commissionization” and supranationalization of European decision-making, with a corresponding erosion of national sovereignty and democratic accountability. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Now the Commission is using negotiations over the EU’s next seven-year budget — the aforementioned Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028-2034 — to push this process further still. And precisely for this reason it is keen to wrap up a deal by the end of the year. Brussels insiders are acutely aware that the French presidential election of April 2027 could produce a government led by Jordan Bardella of the National Rally — a party hostile to the integrationist agenda underpinning the new MFF. Since the framework requires unanimous approval in the Council, a Eurosceptic France could strangle the budget at birth. The unstated but operative goal is to seal the deal before that risk appears. That this is never said openly only underscores the contempt for democratic deliberation that now pervades the process. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">What, then, is the package that the Commission is so keen to sign into law? It is a framework totaling almost €2 trillion, equivalent to around 1.26% of EU gross national income (GNI) over the seven-year period. The European Parliament, never shy about spending other people’s money, wants to push that to 1.38% of GNI. But neither institution really admits the structural tensions buried in the figures. The EU must service roughly €750 billion in bloc pandemic debt, the repayment of which is now being permanently integrated into the regular EU budget. The Commission’s own proposal earmarks €149.3 billion for repaying the so-called “NextGenerationEU Recovery” and “Resilience Facility” funds — a sum that amounts to nearly 10% of total MFF commitments.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2061692449-e1778520510445.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nato is a dangerous grift</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This matters because of what it reveals about the true nature of NextGenerationEU (NGEU). What was sold to European publics as an exceptional, one-off response to the Covid crisis is now the fiscal template for the Union’s future. The pandemic fund set the precedent: the EU can borrow on capital markets, distribute grants to member states,</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> and then embed the repayment into the general budget for decades to come — all without anything resembling a proper democratic mandate. This is arguably what the “unprecedented” EU fiscal response to the pandemic was always about: normalizing common debt as a mechanism for tilting the institutional balance of power decisively in favor of the Commission, downgrading member states and locking in a structural shift in European integration. Indeed, the EU has since repeated the trick with a €90 billion package for Ukraine, again funded through joint debt backed by the common budget. The “historical exception” has quietly become the norm. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">To repay its vast debts, the Commission has proposed a package of five “new own resources”: a corporate levy on companies with annual turnover above €100 million; taxes on tobacco and electronic waste; and adjustments to revenues from the EU Emissions Trading System and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. Together, these are projected to generate roughly €60 billion a year. This projection, however, should be treated with skepticism: for many of the proposals, revenue estimates are rough at best, and the actual yield will depend heavily on (unresolved) questions of implementation. More fundamentally, adopting “new own” resources requires unanimous agreement among member states and ratification through national constitutions, a high bar that previous Commission attempts at revenue reform consistently failed to clear. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">If the new taxes fall short, the fallback is a compulsory levy on member states. The existing “Own Resources Decision” — another wonderful piece of EU lexicon — already empowers the Commission to call on national governments for additional GNI-based contributions to cover NGEU repayments, on top of regular program spending. In other words, if the new revenue streams underperform, the bill lands automatically on national treasuries, decided not by sovereign parliaments, but by the remorseless logic of the EU’s debt repayment. At any rate, EU debt now functions as a de facto tax on member states, bypassing the normal channels of democratic budgetary control. The tension between net contributors and debtors is already producing open fractures: Sweden’s European Affairs minister has flatly stated that the budget’s size “must come down significantly” and that there is “no such thing as free money”, even as several southern and eastern member states — including Italy, Spain and Poland — have suggested postponing part of the debt repayment plan. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The structural changes to the budget architecture compound this problem. The Commission hopes to reduce the budget’s headings from seven to four, collapsing 52 separate programs into just 16. This is presented as “simplification”. Politically, though, it’s something else entirely: centralizing fiscal control and stripping away the granular program categories whose very specificity constrained the Commission’s ability to reallocate funds on a whim. The old system’s structure, dense and bureaucratic as it was, functioned as a form of democratic constraint: money earmarked for a specific purpose is harder to redirect than money pooled under a broad heading. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Fewer programs and broader headings mean more executive flexibility and less parliamentary oversight. Nowhere is this power shift more visible than in the proposed National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPPs). Under this model, cohesion policy, agriculture, fisheries, migration and border management would all be merged into single bilateral frameworks negotiated directly between the Commission and each member states, as opposed to the current system of separate programs, each with its own rules and oversight structures. Regional and local authorities — who currently have a formal role in overseeing the existing programs — would invariably be marginalized. The Parliament would be sidelined. The Commission, meanwhile, would gain a uniquely powerful position, exercising conditionality over each national plan through the so-called rule-of-law mechanism, set to become a structural feature of the bloc’s budget. If the Commission deems a government non-compliant with the rule of law — as understood, of course, by Brussels — funds cannot simply be frozen; they can be redirected to civil-society organizations and “European values” programs approved by the Commission itself. This amounts to the creation of a system of permanent EU-managed political pressure. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;And now this EU-funded propaganda complex is poised to grow even more powerful.&#8221; </div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Then there is the question of where the EU budget money actually flows. The new AgoraEU program — a merger of the Creative Europe and CERV (Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values) programs — is allocated €8.6 billion: more than double the combined budgets of its predecessors. The CERV strand alone, now rebranded CERV+, sees its budget grow from €1.55 billion to €3.6 billion, even as it remains under direct Commission management. This is the funding stream from which hundreds of NGOs, operating in the fields of “democratic values”, civil society advocacy and media support, draw their operating grants. It goes without saying that these organizations are, by design, institutionally dependent on Brussels and reliably aligned with its agenda. In a recent book, I </span><a href="https://www.thomasfazi.com/p/the-eu-propaganda-machine" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">show</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> how European programs and funds have been progressively oriented towards the diffusion of so-called “European values” — and very often towards the promotion of the EU and the integrationist project as such — through the direct funding of NGOs, think tanks, academic institutions, media outlets and educational projects, to the tune of hundreds of millions each year, with the effect of blurring the boundary between support for civil society, institutional communication and outright political propaganda. And now this EU-funded propaganda complex is poised to grow even more powerful. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2262945841-e1779745278977.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Europe keeps losing</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The two areas where European citizens most directly feel the EU’s presence — the common agricultural policy and cohesion funds for structurally weak regions — are the budget’s biggest losers. This has received surprisingly little public attention, with the debate still largely confined to the technocratic language of net contributions and distribution keys. That framing obscures what is really going on: the construction of a European fiscal executive. For decades, the German-led integration model held that political deepening should proceed without genuine fiscal union. The Maastricht criteria, the Stability and Growth Pact and the no-bailout clause were expressions of this philosophy: prompting integration through common rules, not through common debt or centralized budget policy. That order, however, is now being dismantled, one “exceptional” instrument at a time. The reality is that the Commission no longer treats the budget as a limited distribution instrument but as a strategic policy-making tool for expanding its control over key policy areas — and, increasingly, for imposing its will on recalcitrant member states. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The stakes become clearer when you consider what the Commission has actually done with the powers it has already accumulated. During the pandemic, it ran a €71 billion vaccine procurement program behind closed doors, signed contracts that handed pharmaceutical companies full intellectual property rights and blanket indemnity against legal claims, likely overpaid by tens of billions of euros, and then stonewalled every attempt by MEPs, auditors and the European Ombudsman to scrutinize the contracts — while the EU&#8217;s own Public Prosecutor opened a corruption investigation that remains ongoing. In the ongoing Ukraine war, it has devised and imposed sweeping sanctions packages with minimal consultation of member states and committed the EU to an open-ended maximalist war strategy — including the provision of lethal weapons through a repurposed “peace facility” — that no European parliament ever voted on. It threatened incoming elected governments it disliked with financial consequences. It used “disinformation” as a pretext to build a censorship architecture — the Digital Services Act — that gives Brussels effective leverage over what European citizens can read and say online. And it has consistently used financial conditionality to penalize governments whose domestic politics it disapproves of, redirecting funds away from citizens and toward Brussels-approved “civil society” organizations when it judges a government non-compliant. The new MFF doesn’t just continue this pattern, it institutionalizes and permanently funds it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">All this is especially frustrating given Europe’s weak geopolitical position. It is technically true, after all, that a geopolitically capable, strategically autonomous Europe requires a centralized fiscal capacity. But the EU is not a democratic federation capable of exercising such capacity accountably. It is a structure in which an unelected Commission holds agenda-setting power; the Council operates behind closed doors; and the Parliament has no power to initiate legislation. Handing this structure even greater fiscal autonomy doesn’t solve the EU’s democratic deficit: it deepens it. It is time to acknowledge that the EU’s failures are inherent to the supranational model itself. Attempts to address these shortcomings within the current framework, typically by pursuing “more Europe”, will only make things worse — with</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">grim consequences for European governments and their citizens.</span></p>
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					<title>Nato is a dangerous grift</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Norwegian troops practising manoeuvres in the Arctic Circle. (Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP/Getty) ]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 23:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 12 May 2026 07:39:21 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1059318</guid>
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								<![CDATA[America is milking Europe]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Trump has once again sent Europeans scrambling. This time, he has announced the withdrawal of around 5,000 soldiers from Germany as part of a </span><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/03/europe/germany-trump-troops-europe-intl" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pentagon decision</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> triggered by the president’s public dispute with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over the Iran war. The cut amounts to roughly 14% of the approximately 35,000-36,000 American troops currently stationed in Germany, and is expected to unfold over six-to-12 months, returning US force levels to where they stood before Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Trump has hinted that further cuts may follow. He has framed the move as a “punishment” for Merz’s criticism of Washington’s handling of the war — including Merz’s claim that Iran had “humiliated” the United States. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is part of a broader offensive Trump has waged against NATO allies in recent weeks, for their refusal to send naval forces to help open the Strait of Hormuz. He </span><a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116323481956698353" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">told</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> NATO members that they will “have to start learning how to fight for yourself” because “the USA won’t be there to help you anymore, just like you weren’t there for us”. Trump has also threatened to withdraw troops from Italy and Spain, and has once again raised the prospect of the US leaving NATO altogether. Asked in a recent </span><a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/01/middleeast/trump-nato-us-withdrawal-intl" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">interview</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> whether he would reconsider US membership in the alliance, Trump replied: “Oh yes, I would say [it’s] beyond reconsideration”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In this context, Germany’s sweeping rearmament program is widely presented as a positive step in the right direction — Europe finally taking charge of its own security. But does this narrative hold up? And how seriously should one take the US’s threat of leaving NATO? A closer look reveals a very different picture. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Last month, Germany published its first-ever official military strategy, presented by Boris Pistorius, the country&#8217;s defense minister. Its core ambition is to transform the Bundeswehr into “Europe’s strongest conventional army” by 2035, and a “technologically superior” force by 2039, with the Federal Republic positioned as the continent’s leading military power and the primary partner for its European allies. To achieve this, the strategy envisages massive rearmament with long-range weapons, extensive deployment of AI, automation and autonomous systems, and a total force — including reserves — of 460,000 soldiers. The reserve is explicitly framed as a bridge to civilian society, signaling an intent towards broader social militarization. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2235495933-e1773756881551.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain’s chance to escape America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/03/britains-chance-to-escape-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The strategy has drawn sharply divergent reactions. Some hail it as a long-overdue step towards freeing Germany — and by extension Europe — from American military tutelage, given the US’s apparent “disengagement” from NATO. Others view it as a dangerous revival of German military nationalism, one that evokes the darkest chapter of 20th-century European history. Both readings miss the point. Germany’s rearmament is not designed to make the country more militarily sovereign — for better or worse. It is designed to elevate Germany’s role as the “vassal-in-chief” within the US-controlled NATO command structure. In this sense, the Trump-Merz spat should be seen as little more than political theatre. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The document itself makes this plain. One of its key sentences reads: “NATO must become more European to remain transatlantic”. Germany’s role is conceived not merely as that of a frontline military actor, but as NATO’s logistical and strategic hub — the node linking Eastern, Central and Western Europe while maintaining the transatlantic connection to North America. In other words: Germany must rearm in order to sustain American hegemony on the continent. To paraphrase a famous line from the Italian novel </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Leopard</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">: “Everything has to change so that everything can stay the same”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This was made explicit in a </span><a href="https://x.com/USWPColby/status/2047815123654361354" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent post on X</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> by Elbridge Colby, the US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Colby welcomed Germany’s new military strategy as a vindication of Trump’s pressure on European allies to rearm, framing it as a step towards what he calls “Nato 3.0”. His core argument is that Europe, led by Germany, must now convert the Hague Commitments — where Europeans committed to a landmark defense investment pledge, aiming to spend 5% of their GDP on defense by 2035 — into concrete military capability. He quoted Nato Secretary-General Rutte approvingly: “Air defense systems, drones, ammunition, radars, space capabilities — that is what will keep us safe”. On Germany specifically, Colby presented the new military strategy as proof that Berlin was finally stepping up after “years of disarmament”, noting that rechristened Department of War was already working closely with the Germans to accelerate the transition. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The strategy itself, as Colby quoted it, acknowledges that Washington “is increasingly shifting its strategic focus towards its Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific” and is demanding allies “step up their efforts to safeguard their own security”. Germany, in this framing, must become “an even stronger military ally to the United States” precisely because the US is repositioning elsewhere. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is simply a restatement of the “division of labor” that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced at the very outset of the Trump administration. He made clear that the US needed to pivot elsewhere — we now know that meant Iran, and ultimately China — and that Europe would therefore have to assume responsibility for “managing its own security”, meaning the maintenance of pressure on Russia through Ukraine. Europe duly obliged: it has increased its defense spending and has doubled down on support for Kyiv, including through the recently approved €90 billion loan. We are now watching the natural progression of that logic, as Europe assumes the full financial burden for the continuation of the proxy war against Russia. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In short, the US is not “disengaging from Europe”; it is simply demanding that Europe contribute more to Nato, while remaining firmly embedded within the Alliance’s command structure — in short, that it pays more for its own subordination. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This requires a reassessment of Trump’s broader strategy towards Russia. Though he is routinely accused of “appeasing Putin” — with critics citing his cut-off of US funding to Ukraine and his (failed) attempts to broker a peace deal — the reality is more complicated. Washington has long sought to force Europe to decouple from Russian gas and replace it with American LNG, and the war in Ukraine has allowed them to achieve just that — so much so that one has to wonder if America&#8217;s decades-long strategy in Ukraine, from helping topple the democratically elected government in Ukraine in 2014, to drawing the country firmly into Nato’s informal orbit, wasn’t designed precisely to lure the Russians into war. The bombing of the Nord Stream pipeline should always be understood as part of this strategy. This becomes even clearer in light of the latest US National Security Strategy, published in November 2025, which designates “American energy dominance” across oil, gas, coal and nuclear power as a top strategic priority, explicitly framing the expansion of American energy exports as a means to “project power”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This logic illuminates not only the US’s military campaigns against Venezuela and Iran, but also why, in order to keep Europe dependent on American energy and severed from Russian supplies, Washington has a structural interest in keeping the proxy war going. It’s therefore easy to conclude that the US was never genuine about its intentions to make peace with Russia. The only difference today is that the war is now being waged not only through Ukraine, but through Europe itself. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In this light, the ostensible US “threats” to leave Nato — and the European establishment’s rearmament program, Germany’s above all — are revealed as components of the same strategy: keeping Europe subordinated to American geopolitical priorities. The new German military strategy is nothing more than Berlin fulfilling the role Washington has assigned it: holding the line against Russia while the US turns towards the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. This is not nationalism, military or otherwise, but its opposite: the undermining of German and European core interests at the hands of a transnational elite.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In this context, Germany should be understood as the anchor of a new Europeanized Nato core, comprising Germany, France, the UK — and Ukraine itself (even if formally outside of the alliance). This too reflects a longstanding American design. In his 1997 book </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Grand Chessboard</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the influential Polish-American diplomat Zbigniew Brzezinski predicted that “Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian political collaboration&#8230; could evolve into a partnership enhancing Europe’s geostrategic depth”, adding that “America’s central geostrategic goal in Europe can be summed up quite simply: it is to consolidate through a more genuine transatlantic partnership the US bridgehead on the Eurasian continent”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This should dispel any remaining notion that what we are witnessing amounts to a move towards German or European strategic autonomy. It is no coincidence that Germany’s new military strategy identifies Russia as “the most serious and immediate threat” to European security — a claim that forms part of a broader European narrative warning of an inevitable war with Moscow in the coming years. At face value, this anti-Russian posturing might appear to reflect a distinctly “European” stance, one seemingly at odds with Washington’s public position. But this is largely an illusion. Not only has the European transatlantic establishment thoroughly internalized America’s strategic priorities, but the Nato command hierarchy makes the real chain of authority plain. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-1734144833.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Paris Agreement was a fantasy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Real operational control of the proxy war against Russia remains firmly in Anglo-American hands. At the top sits the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, which translates political decisions into military objectives. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) — always an American general, dual-hatted as commander of US European Command — runs it alongside a British deputy. A German general coordinates staff work as Chief of Staff, but effective decision-making stays with the top two. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Below SHAPE, operational command splits into two tracks: three Joint Force Commands (JFCs), the true theater commanders for large-scale operations, and three Component Commands covering air (Ramstein, Germany), land (Izmir, Turkey) and sea (Northwood, UK). MARCOM, the maritime command, has traditionally been UK-led, but the US recently took control of it, placing all three Component Commands under US command — a significant consolidation that has gone largely undiscussed. Even when a European officer commands a JFC — such as the leadership of JFC Naples, which recently passed from the US to Italy — the overall strategic direction remains under American control; JFC commanders implement objectives set by SHAPE. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Two further structural dependencies reinforce American dominance. The first is the C4ISR concept of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: European allies are almost entirely dependent on US satellite, aerial and maritime platforms for real-time intelligence, surveillance and targeting — which together represent the backbone of Nato warfighting. Indeed, it has been </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-to-provide-ukraine-with-intelligence-for-missile-strikes-deep-inside-russia-ca7b2276" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">acknowledged</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> even by the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Wall Street Journal</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that Ukraine’s deep-strike operations inside Russia — including, recently, against several oil production facilities — could not be conducted without American intelligence and satellite capabilities. The second dependency, less visible in public debate but potentially more consequential, is the dense presence of American staff officers embedded throughout Nato’s command structure at every level of the hierarchy, giving Washington an institutional grip that no change in command titles can easily displace. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">All of this should dispel any notion that the US is not deeply involved in the Ukraine war — or that it intends to leave Nato and truly “disengage” from Europe. Beyond the command architecture, the United States operates numerous bases and military installations across the continent, both within the Nato framework and under exclusive American control, which are indispensable to its global power projection. Ramstein Air Base in Germany — home to around 16,000 troops — functions as the hub controlling military drone traffic on a global scale, while coordinating American air operations across Europe, Africa and the Middle East. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-quietly-playing-a-crucial-role-in-the-iran-war-aad34a00" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recent </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Wall Street Journal</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> investigation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> confirmed that, despite the public protestations of European leaders, US bases across the continent have functioned as the essential infrastructure for the American war on Iran. As the article put it, “Europe remains the bedrock of US force projection in the world”. Even Nato Secretary-General Rutte recently </span><a href="https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/cg/date/2026-04-08/segment/02" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">described</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the purpose of Nato as being a “platform of power projection for the United States”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another element is what analysts call the “hidden dividends” of Nato: contracts and orders for American defense industries. This web of 1,300 agreements among the 32 member states that set standards for Nato weapons and equipment — covering everything from ammunition calibers to fuel-tank diameters — were originally imposed by Washington and overwhelmingly favor the American military-industrial complex. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Another element are the so-called &#8216;hidden dividends&#8217; of Nato: contracts and orders for American defense industries&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">German and European rearmament, then, in the context of a supposedly more “European” Nato, is not strengthening European autonomy, but further eroding it. Not only does it make Europe complicit in Washington’s increasingly reckless military adventures, as the Iran war demonstrates, but more gravely still, it is pushing the continent towards a potentially catastrophic confrontation with Russia. Moscow is watching and responding accordingly. In a recent </span><a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2099030/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">speech</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Foreign Minister Lavrov stated openly: “A war against us has been openly declared. The Kyiv regime is being used as the tip of the spear. However, everyone is aware that this tip is unusable without Western supplies of weapons, intelligence data, satellite systems, training of military personnel and much more”. Lavrov added that Western leaders are actively preparing their publics for war with Russia — using Ukraine to buy time — and that Russia takes the threat very seriously. One cannot overstate the dangers of the path we are treading. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A final observation is warranted. The French historian Emmanuel Todd has </span><a href="https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16511707?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">argued</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that much of what passes for nationalism in the West today — from Germany to Japan — is in fact a form of “imaginary” nationalism: vassalage towards the US dressed up as sovereignty. He contrasts this with “real” nationalism, a genuine sovereignty-oriented politics that is today largely absent. German neo-militarism, as argued here, falls squarely into the former category. But this does not mean that a “true” German nationalism — with its attendant aspirations towards continental hegemony — could not resurface. The militarization of German society and the hardening of anti-Russian sentiment are real and deepening phenomena. There is a historical precedent, after all. A century ago, the Anglo-American establishment tolerated the Nazi military build-up as an anti-Soviet bulwark — only for the German monster to eventually slip its leash. The domestic German context today is obviously very different — and of course one may argue, and hope, that a “true” German nationalism would recognize that the country’s genuine interests lie in peace rather than war. Even so, the parallels are impossible to ignore. </span></p>
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					<title>The Paris Agreement was a fantasy</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/04/the-paris-agreement-was-a-fantasy/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Climate Change</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['If disaster is inevitable, the rational response is to stop bothering.' (Daniel Leal/AFP via Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 23:02:17 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 10:48:38 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Climate change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy transition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Net Zero]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Paris Agreement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sovereignty]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1056971</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Climate catastrophism has backfired]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Remember the Paris Agreement? Signed a decade ago today, it was hailed as a historic milestone in the fight against climate change, with practically every country promising drastic action to keep global warming below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. And, at the time, the stakes couldn’t have felt higher. As Western politicians and activists <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/426353-ocasio-cortez-the-world-will-end-in-12-years-if-we-dont-address/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">endlessly</a> warned, unless carbon emissions were urgently and drastically reduced by 2030, climate change would have apocalyptic consequences, potentially extinguishing humanity — if not all life on Earth.</p>
<p>For a time, climate seemed to dominate. Terms such as Net Zero, carbon footprint and green transition became fixtures of national and global politics. More than that, they justified a sweeping range of measures, from carbon taxes to fuel levies, and helped fuel a new wave of climate activism personified by Greta Thunberg. But then, almost as quickly as it appeared, the climate crisis faded, overshadowed by more short-term emergencies.</p>
<p>The pandemic shifted the focus from “saving the planet” to “saving lives”. The war in Ukraine was about energy security, not decarbonization. The carnage in Gaza, trade wars and, most recently, the Iran conflict, further crowded out climate angst. Trump’s second withdrawal from the Agreement, upon taking office for his second term, barely even registered. And when COP30 closed in Brazil earlier this year, familiar calls to end fossil fuels were met with public indifference.</p>
<p>Ten years on, then, one cannot help but ask: did the Paris Agreement, and the broader UN Conference of the Parties (COP) process, actually achieve anything? The record is damning. Global fossil CO2 emissions are roughly 5% higher today than at the moment Paris was signed. The 2024 rate of increase in atmospheric CO2 was the largest ever recorded. Meanwhile, national emissions-reduction plans are projected to deliver only a 12% cut in global emissions by 2035, against the 60% reduction (relative to 2019 levels) that scientists say is needed to honor the Agreement’s targets.</p>
<p>There is one significant nuance: the rate of emissions growth has decelerated sharply. Climate advocates point to this as evidence that Paris produced a genuine change in direction. Yet as skeptics rightly note, the <em>absolute</em> level of emissions has continued to rise, while the deceleration owes at least as much to cheap renewables and structural economic shifts as to the Agreement itself. In a sense, both observations are true. But what’s not in dispute is the gap between ambition and outcome.</p>
<p>How one interprets this failure depends on your perspective. Climate activists see it as a tragedy — proof that we are sleepwalking into catastrophe precisely as political commitment to climate action wanes. Climate skeptics, on the other hand, see it as a non-issue: the “energy transition” is quietly being dropped from the political agenda, and good riddance. In truth, both positions are wrong, albeit for different reasons.</p>
<p>The activists, for their part, are wrong to maintain that civilization-ending consequences are locked in unless emissions reach net zero by 2030 — a claim that’s both scientifically dubious and politically counterproductive. Not only do rising temperatures not necessarily entail mass death, but, as Albert Hirschman observed in <em>The Rhetoric of Reaction</em>, doomsday narratives tend to induce fatalism rather than action. If disaster is inevitable, the rational response is to stop bothering. The climate movement’s relentless escalation of apocalyptic language has almost certainly accelerated its own decline.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2022669077.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The EU’s new censorship machine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But the skeptics are wrong to dismiss the energy transition altogether. For countries that lack abundant domestic fossil fuel reserves, reducing dependence on imported hydrocarbons is not an act of idealism — it’s a matter of hard-nosed national interest. The current geopolitical turbulence has clearly driven this message home, with energy import dependence becoming an acute economic and strategic liability. Europe’s exposure to the Iran conflict, and the broader volatility of global energy markets in recent years, illustrates the cost of building an entire industrial model based around imported fossil fuels, especially ones hailing from halfway around the world.</p>
<p>The reason both sides misread the issue — and the reason the climate agenda largely failed — lies in how the entire debate was framed from the outset. Since its origins at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, COP has been defined by two inseparable characteristics: catastrophism and globalism.</p>
<p>The catastrophism has deep roots. <em>The Limits to Growth</em>, a 1972 report commissioned by an Italian nonprofit, introduced the idea that humanity itself must be restrained for the planet’s survival. <em>The First Global Revolution</em>, its 1991 sequel, made this agenda explicit. “In searching for a new enemy to unite us, we came up with the idea that pollution, the threat of global warming, water shortages, famine and the like would fit the bill&#8230; The real enemy, then, is humanity itself.” From that point on, environmentalism ceased to be a movement for the rational management of resources, becoming instead a project of planetary governance, one that treats humanity as both cause and culprit. Policies framed exclusively in terms of sacrifice — more expensive energy, higher taxes, restricted mobility — predictably alienated the very public whose buy-in was essential.</p>
<p>The globalism was equally damaging. By framing climate change as a planetary problem, one requiring planetary governance, COP foreclosed more practical, interest-based approaches to decarbonization rooted in national sovereignty. Any action taken by a single country was implicitly framed as futile; only coordinated global action counted. Moreover, the kind of state-directed industrial policies needed to actually build the infrastructure of decarbonization ran counter to the market-oriented neoliberal zeitgeist. This logic delegitimized countries such as China, which were actually investing in decarbonization through five-year plans, massive subsidies and deliberate manufacturing scale-up rather than multilateral consensus.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;By framing climate change as a planetary problem, COP foreclosed more practical, interest-based approaches to decarbonization&#8221;</div>
<p>This framing, however, was not simply a strategic error; it was, in part, deliberate. COP took shape precisely as globalization was being institutionally embedded: the first Rio conference in 1992 coincided with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which marked the birth of the European Union. Arguing that democratic decision-making had to give way to technocratic governance in the name of planetary salvation served to reinforce this broader supranational project.</p>
<p>This globalist orientation was compounded by the ideological makeup of the climate movement itself. Stemming predominantly from liberal internationalist and pseudo-Marxist traditions, most environmental activists and writers share those traditions’ hostility to the nation-state. In their view, national sovereignty is an obstacle to be overcome by international governance. Paul G. Harris, a prominent environmental expert, <a href="https://paulgharris.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/paul-g-harris-table-of-contents-and-introduction-to-whats-wrong-with-climate-change-politics-and-how-to-fix-it.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote</a> for instance of the “cancer of Westphalia”, the state-centric system that privileges national interests over international ones. In Harris’s telling, this framework had to be replaced by a system of international governance, for the good of the planet if nothing else. The result was predictable: more conservative and nationally oriented politicians came to associate any energy transition policy with globalism and its discontents, ensuring that the issue became entangled in culture wars and depriving it of any positive, sovereignty-affirming interpretation.</p>
<p>The institutional architecture reinforced the dysfunction. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, established in 1992, created a permanent negotiation apparatus, a framework for consultation rather than action. Each year, thousands of diplomats, officials and NGO representatives convene to “assess progress”; the very structure of the system ensures inertia. A vast bureaucratic ecosystem — UN agencies, EU directorates, NGOs, consultancies and think tanks — grew up with a material interest in perpetuating the “climate emergency”. The goal of reducing emissions became secondary to preserving the system itself, alongside the political benefits that system conferred on the elites who managed it — including <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/07/climate-hysteria-has-no-class/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">all manner</a> of authoritarian fantasies.</p>
<p>These dynamics explain not only the Agreement’s failure on its own terms, but also the way in which globalist-framed “climate action” actively undermined the national interest of nation-states: including industrially advanced ones.</p>
<p>The European Union is the most instructive example. Over the past decade, Brussels led the global charge on climate and Net Zero. At the same time, the EU has expanded its renewable energy share: from 17% of gross final energy consumption in 2014 to around 25% today. But because this was driven by climate idealism rather than a coherent push for energy sovereignty, it proceeded alongside growing external fossil fuel dependency. North Sea production declined; nuclear capacity was phased out, most dramatically in Germany; natural gas was treated as the indispensable “bridging” fuel for an intermittent-renewables grid. The paradoxical result was that the EU’s overall energy import dependency actually increased — from around 54% of gross available energy in 2014 to 58% today, with a peak of 63% in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. All that despite a sharp drop in energy consumption, largely driven by stagnating economic conditions.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/mario-draghis-neoliberal-hypocrisy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/mario-draghis-neoliberal-hypocrisy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-2203937951.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/mario-draghis-neoliberal-hypocrisy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/mario-draghis-neoliberal-hypocrisy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The hypocrisy of Mario Draghi</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/mario-draghis-neoliberal-hypocrisy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Until 2022, however, Europe could at least rely on relatively cheap, and reliable, Russian gas. Since then, it has substituted it with far more expensive and volatile American LNG, on which it is now heavily dependent. The Iran conflict has exposed what this means in practice: Europe remains among the regions most exposed to energy-price spikes and supply-chain disruptions.</p>
<p>The energy transition has now largely disappeared from Europe’s political agenda: but not because climate idealism has been replaced by clear-eyed geopolitical thinking. Rather, it is because a policy so thoroughly divorced from Europe’s strategic interests has left the continent without the institutional capacity to think strategically at all. A return to genuine geopolitical realism would be welcome; indeed, it is the only context in which a rational energy transition could be pursued.</p>
<p>To understand what that would look like, it’s instructive to examine the country that has taken the most coherent alternative approach: China. In recent years, the People&#8217;s Republic&#8217;s investment in renewable energy has dwarfed that of every other country. In 2024, it spent over $800 billion on its energy transition, more than double any other economy and equivalent to 31% of the world’s total clean energy investment. Just that year, more wind turbines and solar panels were installed in China than in the rest of the world combined. It did so quietly, without grand proclamations and without tiresome moralizing. Crucially, it did all this not to “save the planet” but for reasons of hard national interest.</p>
<p>As Professor Warwick Powell from the Queensland University of Technology explains, the <a href="https://warwickpowell.substack.com/p/its-energy-stupid" target="_blank" rel="noopener">key analytical concept</a> here is something called “Energy Return on Energy Invested” (EROEI): the ratio of energy produced to the energy required to produce it. High-EROEI systems generate surpluses that can be reinvested into the economy; low-EROEI systems drain it. Historically, fossil fuels offered EROEIs of 50:1, or even 100:1 in the early decades of Middle Eastern extraction. Those days are over. Shale oil and tar sands offer returns as low as 3:1 to 5:1 — barely above breakeven when system costs are included. Conversely, modern onshore wind can deliver EROEIs of up to 50:1; utility-scale solar now achieves 10:1 to 30:1 and falling. In short, the economic logic is increasingly stark.</p>
<p>The broader point is that China’s focus on renewables is not merely about electrification; it is electrification in the service of energy sovereignty. By increasing the share of domestically produced, high-EROEI energy into its supply mix, Beijing reduces its dependence on volatile foreign supply chains, insulates itself from outside shocks in oil and gas markets, and bolsters its net energy surplus per unit of investment. The results are clear: despite massively increasing its energy consumption over the past decade, China’s overall energy import dependency has held stable at around 20% — and the disruption caused by the conflict in Iran has left it largely unscathed.</p>
<p>In conclusion, the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement should be neither an occasion for mourning nor for celebration, but for clear analysis. The Agreement failed on its own terms, largely because it was structured to fail: it was embedded in a globalist institutional architecture opposed to national-interest reasoning and was promoted through apocalyptic narratives that generated fatalism instead of action. What it leaves behind is not a legacy of climate governance but an object lesson in how not to organize.</p>
<p>All the same, the energy transition is far from over — and it need not be driven by climate idealism to be worth pursuing. For any country serious about sovereignty, security and long-term economic resilience, the case for reducing fossil fuel import dependence remains a strong and entirely self-interested one. The question now is whether Western governments can shed the ideological baggage of the COP era and embrace a national-interest approach to the energy transition, one that simultaneously draws on renewables, domestic resources, nuclear energy and the most rational import sources available. So far, the signs are not encouraging.</p>
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					<title>Will European populists dump Trump?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/03/will-european-populists-dump-trump/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/03/will-european-populists-dump-trump/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2212857581.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>sovereignty</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The optics of self-described European patriots saying little while their transatlantic ally economically waterboards the continent are not good.' (Stefano Guidi/ Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 00:01:54 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 11:48:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AfD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Right]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reform UK]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1052176</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Blind support is a vote loser]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>On the face of it, Donald Trump looks like a natural ally for Europe’s sovereigntists and national-populists — and most of them eagerly embraced him as one when he returned to the White House in 2025. A few went so far as to even adapt his branding, advocating to Make Europe Great Again (MEGA). But that embrace may now be unraveling. Trump’s aggressive tariff campaign against Europe, his annexationist rhetoric over Greenland, and above all the ongoing war against Iran and its attendant energy disruptions are making even some of his closest European populist allies jittery. For the European Right, a painful reckoning with the reality of American power may soon become unavoidable.</p>
<p>The real question, however, is how they failed to see this coming. The uncritical acceptance of Trump by Europe’s populist Right reveals a poor understanding of US foreign policy, and a near-total absence of geopolitical vision. Regardless of who sits in the White House, the logic behind America’s foreign policy remains the same: advancing US economic and geopolitical interests at the expense of everyone else.</p>
<p>Since the early Nineties, every single American president has ended up bombing some faraway country, despite all of them — <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-bush-foreign-policy-revolution/#:~:text=In%20the%20campaign%2C%20the%20Bush,Policy%E2%80%9D%20or%20of%20continuing%20Clinton?" target="_blank" rel="noopener">including</a> George W. Bush! — campaigning against foreign entanglements. Trump 2.0 is merely the latest, and most brazen, iteration of this pattern. Having vowed to “stop all wars” as recently as in his inauguration speech, he has since pursued the most aggressive and militarist foreign policy since Bush Jr., culminating in the attack on Iran — something none of his predecessors had dared to do, despite four decades of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z11bkMsHVpE#:~:text=Was%20Donald%20Trump%20persuaded%20by%20Benjamin%20Netanyahu,to%20achieve%20for%2040%20years%20%E2%80%93%20to" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Israeli pressure</a> to that end, precisely because they understood the catastrophic consequences. For Europe’s self-described patriots, America’s addiction to military intervention — much of it, over the past quarter century, on or near Europe’s doorstep — should have prompted some caution. That would have been far safer than automatically aligning with “America First” or taking Trump’s promise of peace at face value.</p>
<p>This imperial logic applies to its allies just as much as to its adversaries. Since the Second World War, Washington has consistently treated Europe as a key extension of its global empire, a region to be controlled politically, economically and militarily, and kept firmly aligned with US interests. Nato has been central to this project. As summarised by its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, its function was that of “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down”. In other words, the original purpose of the Alliance was not to defend Europe, but to prevent the emergence of an autonomous bloc, ensure its strategic subordination to the United States and foreclose rapprochement with Russia.</p>
<p>Earlier European sovereigntists understood this. Charles de Gaulle deeply resented what he saw as American domination of Western Europe under the guise of the Atlantic alliance, arguing that it reduced European nations to the status of protectorates rather than genuine sovereign states. In 1966 he acted on this conviction, withdrawing France from Nato’s military structure and expelling US forces from French soil.</p>
<p>In the six decades since, US policy towards Europe has remained essentially unchanged. In the Eighties, when European nations, led by France and West Germany, sought to pursue a détente with the Soviet Union, Washington pushed back, insisting that European security policy be subordinated to American Cold War strategy. And even after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US made clear that that European security would remain anchored to American leadership through Nato.</p>
<p>Far from providing security to the continent, the Alliance’s eastward expansion was a key factor in triggering the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which the US then exploited not only to “bleed” Russia — but also to drive a wedge between Europe and Russia, and force the EU to decouple from Russian gas and turn to American gas instead, both of which were longstanding US <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">strategic imperatives</a>. This was made possible by a European political class in submission to the transatlantic dogma. Just look at their silence in the face of the Nord Stream bombing, an act of sabotage carried out with at least <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/nord-stream-cia-war-offenbar-frueh-in-plaene-der-angreifer-eingeweiht-a-d95f5682-dc5b-47a7-82e2-5bb09661b210" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US foreknowledge</a>, if not <a href="https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream" target="_blank" rel="noopener">direct US involvement</a>.</p>
<p>European populists have long attributed this subservience to ideology — an unholy alliance between liberal-globalists on both sides of the Atlantic. But Trump himself explodes this thesis. Despite being as ideologically remote from Europe’s liberal-transatlanticist class as it is possible to imagine, he has extracted from them essentially the same compliance: on trade, defense, Nato spending and even Greenland. The master-servant relationship, it turns out, has nothing to do with ideology; it is structural. One might expect this from a “globalist” political establishment quite clearly beholden to foreign and vested interests. Yet the same transatlantic streak seems to run through virtually all European Right-populist parties, which means the continent’s sovereigntists are either comfortable with Europe’s subordination to Washington or genuinely blind to its structural nature, believing that Trump would somehow be different.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The master-servant relationship, it turns out, has nothing to do with ideology; it is structural.”</div>
<p>In fact, things have only got worse. Since returning to the White House, Trump has launched an aggressive trade war against Europe, threatened to annex part of its territory, weaponized the continent’s dependence on American gas to extract political concessions and demanded Europeans spend hundreds of billions on US weapons. Europe’s globalist establishment has dutifully complied with all of it. But Europe’s sovereigntist parties have not put up much of a fight either. Whatever the short-term political calculations, the optics of self-described European patriots saying little while their transatlantic ally economically waterboards the continent are not good.</p>
<p>The war on Iran may prove to be the turning point. Europe is already feeling the economic ripples: oil and gas prices have surged dramatically, heaping further hardship on households and businesses already battered by the switch from Russian to American energy. Indeed, <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/eu-chief-iran-war-costs-091431867.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according</a> to the EU Commission President, the war has already cost European taxpayers an additional €3 billion in fossil fuels imports. A prolonged conflict — or even a stabilization of prices at current levels — would be economically devastating for the continent. And if Europe loses access to Qatari LNG, its dependence on American gas will become absolute.</p>
<p>That alone would be alarming if it were simply an unintended consequence of war. What if rising energy prices were, however, factored in from the outset? As the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, and Europe’s principal energy supplier, the United States stands to gain substantially from the price surge. This raises the possible scenario: if the proxy war in Ukraine was designed to decouple Europe from Russian gas, the Iran war may be aimed at decoupling it from Mediterranean resources altogether. As noted earlier, US imperial strategy spans decades and administrations, and the ideological color of the president is largely irrelevant to its execution.</p>
<p>Nor does this account for the war’s other potential consequences: mass refugee flows towards Europe, as previous US Middle Eastern wars have generated, and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/04/europe/europe-response-iran-strikes-trump-intl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">growing pressure</a> on European governments to become more directly involved militarily. Europe now faces two devastating wars on its doorsteps — one to the east, stoked by Washington, and one to the south, actively waged by it. The first pushed Europe into economic and geopolitical vassalage, but the second may be the shock that finally breaks it, plunging it into economic and social collapse.</p>
<p>In light of all this, it’s little wonder that rifts are starting to emerge between MAGA and the European populist camp, and most visibly in Germany, the country most economically affected by these wars.</p>
<p>The AfD is probably the party that has received the most explicit US backing, including Elon Musk’s notorious declaration that “only the AfD can save Germany”. But the Trump administration’s increasingly reckless and aggressive foreign policy is now causing serious strains within the party.</p>
<p>The AfD has always been broadly split into two camps. One — stronger in western Germany, associated with party leader Alice Weidel and foreign policy spokesman Markus Frohnmaier — is pro-MAGA, transatlantic, pro-Israel and neoliberally oriented. The other — dominant in the east, represented by party co-chairman Tino Chrupalla and Thuringian leader Björn Höcke — is more openly nationalist and Eurocentric, more sympathetic to Moscow, hostile to US interventionism, and <a href="https://www.nzz.ch/international/die-afd-und-israel-die-rechten-ringen-um-das-mass-an-solidaritaet-ld.1826517" target="_blank" rel="noopener">critical</a> of Germany’s unconditional support for Israel.</p>
<p>Höcke has been characteristically blunt. In 2022, he <a href="https://www.endstation-rechts.de/news/afd-politiker-berufen-sich-auf-ns-kompatibles-grossraum-konzept" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stated</a>: “It was and is US strategy, as a foreign power on our continent, to drive wedges between peoples and nations that could actually work very well together.” He argues that Germany must cease to be a “vassal state” of the United States, and that Washington, as a non-European power, “should withdraw from Europe”, since “the natural partner for our way of working and living would be Russia”.</p>
<p>When Trump bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities last June, the divide became impossible to paper over. Chrupalla <a href="https://x.com/Tino_Chrupalla/status/1933450279586087146" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote</a> on X: “A fuse has been set on the powder keg of the Middle East.” More recently he <a href="https://x.com/AfD/status/2028790095097029010" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>: “Donald Trump started as a president of peace. In the end, Donald Trump will end as a president of war.” Meanwhile, within the other wing, Frohnmaier <a href="https://www.campact.de/blog/2025/06/afd-israel-iran-konflikt-deutschland-zuerst/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> that Israel had “every right” to ensure that “its existence is not threatened”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2229506470.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Ukraine war ends</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The party leadership has tried to manage these tensions, largely aligning with Trump on most issues. But the outbreak of the war in Iran has caused these pressures to bubble to the fore. In a notable break with other European Right-populist parties, most of which either endorsed or stayed silent about the US-Israeli strikes, the AfD issued an official <a href="https://afdbundestag.de/lage-im-nahen-osten-erfuellt-uns-mit-sorge/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">statement</a>, claiming that “the renewed destabilization of the Middle East is not in the German interest and must be brought to an end”. It is a modest step, but a telling one. And as the war grinds on and its costs for Germany mount, the Eurocentric wing of the party is likely to grow stronger.</p>
<p>Similar fault lines will inevitably open in other Right-populist parties across the continent and beyond — and indeed they already are. A vivid example comes from the UK, where Nigel Farage’s Reform has found itself tied in knots over the Iran war. Within the space of days, Farage criticized Starmer for not backing the US operation more forcefully, while simultaneously attacking the rising fuel prices that the same war has caused. Meanwhile, Reform’s own ranks were split: deputy leader Richard Tice called for full UK support for the US offensive, while the party’s new Treasury spokesperson Robert Jenrick, who recently defected from the Conservatives, told the BBC: “If you’re asking me the question, do I think that it is in the interests of the British people&#8230; for us to be deploying British airmen in bombing raids over Iran right now, when our allies have not asked us to do that, then, no, I don’t think that’s necessary.”</p>
<p>Labour wasted no time <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fc83a7b6-8b50-456c-ad7a-7f0f72a8bc4e" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pointing out</a> these contradictions, accusing Reform of “saying they would bomb Iran” one week and “backtracking as petrol prices rise” the next. It illustrates the impossible position in which Trump’s war has placed his European populist allies: they cannot support it without owning its economic consequences, and they cannot oppose it without betraying their transatlantic loyalties. But more crucially, it points to the total lack of geopolitical vision among most Right-populist parties.</p>
<p>They better get their act together fast. Any national-populist party that wants to seriously challenge the European liberal-globalist status quo — and wishes to retain credibility with its voters — can’t limit itself to anti-immigration, anti-“woke” and anti-establishment domestic politics. It needs to articulate a coherent foreign-policy framework in line with Europe’s core economic and geopolitical interests. As de Gaulle understood 60 years ago, this necessarily means breaking with Washington and its forever wars.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1052176</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>How the Ukraine war ends</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/02/how-the-ukraine-war-ends/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2229506470.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Can a transition to a genuine multipolar order occur without catastrophic confrontation?' (Drew Angerer/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 00:01:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 11:17:41 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1050298</guid>
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								<![CDATA[A multipolar world is coming]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Yesterday, Russia, Ukraine and the US met for yet another round of peace talks in Geneva. At around the same time, scores of missiles and hundreds of drones pummeled Ukrainian infrastructure, causing chaos across eight regions and injuring dozens of people. And, in a sense, both these events are connected: as the war in Eastern Europe enters its fifth year, a peaceful resolution seems no closer than it did a year ago, when Trump began his second term promising a swift end to the conflict. If anything, in fact, peace seems to be receding ever further from reach.</p>
<p>On the surface, the explanation appears straightforward: Russia and Ukraine remain deadlocked over territory. Moscow insists on full control of the eastern Donbas region — of which it holds only a portion — as well as of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. On both counts, Zelensky has refused to budge, despite Russia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwng25114ro" target="_blank" rel="noopener">relentless</a> attacks on Ukraine’s dwindling power grid.</p>
<p>But framing the impasse as a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia obscures a deeper reality: this has always been, at its core, a proxy war between Russia and the United States — one which can only be resolved through an agreement between the two powers. The Ukrainian military, after all, is effectively kept on life support by Washington, particularly through the satellite intelligence that has become indispensable to modern drone warfare. Both Moscow and Washington are aware of this, which is why over the past year they have repeatedly privileged bilateral talks from which Ukraine and Nato allies were excluded.</p>
<p>Last August’s summit between Putin and Trump in Anchorage marked the high point of the new US-Russia détente. It was the first face-to-face meeting between the US and Russian presidents since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, and the first such encounter on American soil in nearly two decades. The substance of the talks was never officially disclosed, but the symbolism was unmistakable. From the red-carpet welcome, to Trump calling Putin warmly by his first name, everything was choreographed to signal a turning point in relations, which, since 2022, had sunk to levels of hostility not seen since the Cold War.</p>
<p>Since then, Russian officials have frequently invoked the “spirit of Anchorage” to describe the framework of understanding purportedly reached between the two leaders. In practice, we can surmise that this sought to reconcile Trump’s transactional instincts, in the form of economic arrangements beneficial to US companies and Trump’s own prestige, with Putin’s insistence on the need to address the “primary roots of the conflict”: namely the need for a new security arrangement in Europe. This agreement, however, always rested on very shaky grounds, precisely because the two parties invested Anchorage with two very different meanings. From Moscow’s standpoint, what is at stake is nothing less than a fundamental renegotiation of the rules underpinning European and global security; Washington, by contrast, sees the matter in narrower terms: a specific conflict to be managed and contained, without disturbing the broader structure of international power that suits Washington just fine.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/gettyimages-1216662360-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Trump keeps Europe weak</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Russia has sought to manage this tension through what might be called a double-track approach. On the one hand, it has tasked Kirill Dmitriev — the Harvard-educated financier who heads Russia’s sovereign wealth fund — with negotiating a large-scale economic deal with the US. Meanwhile, senior diplomats, above all the veteran foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, have worked in parallel on the broader geopolitical settlement. This approach has so far failed to yield concrete results, prompting the diplomatic track to ratchet up its rhetorical pressure on Washington. The clearest sign of this came in a <a href="https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2078196/?lang=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent interview</a> in which Lavrov spoke of the Trump administration in unprecedentedly harsh terms.</p>
<p>Lavrov openly challenged the idea that the US is working towards the cooperative framework meant to emerge from the Anchorage talks. He claimed that Russia had accepted Washington’s proposals on resolving the war in Ukraine, only to find the US backing away from them in practice. “They made an offer, we agreed — the problem should have been resolved. Having accepted their proposals, we believed we had fulfilled the task of resolving the Ukrainian issue and could move on to full-scale, broad, mutually beneficial cooperation. But in practice everything looks the opposite”.</p>
<p>Lavrov accused the US of not only failing to take concrete steps to rein in Kyiv — most likely an implicit reference to Ukraine’s continued drone strikes on Russian territory, which could not be carried out without US intelligence and satellite support — but, more fundamentally, of actively intensifying its economic war on Moscow. He cited new sanctions, Washington’s campaign against Russian tankers in international waters, and efforts to pressure India and other partners into abandoning Russian oil. “This is pure ‘Bidenism’”, Lavrov remarked, offering it as proof that the US’s true objective remains that of “achieving economic domination”.</p>
<p>At the same time, Lavrov framed all this as part of a broader “neo-imperial” strategy on Washington’s part that extends well beyond Russia. “The West,” he said, “is reluctant to relinquish its formerly dominant positions… With the arrival of the Trump administration, this struggle to constrain competitors has become particularly obvious and explicit” — a reference to the White House’s hyper-bellicose posture over recent months, including the capture of Nicolás Maduro, the escalation of US <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/02/18/americas/cuba-us-trump-oil-tourism-intl-latam" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pressure</a> on Cuba, and the growing threats against Iran.</p>
<p>It remains unclear whether Lavrov’s remarks signal a genuine rift — within the Kremlin’s corridors of power and more broadly between Moscow and Washington — or whether they are simply a manifestation of the double-track approach: pairing backroom diplomacy with calculated public pressure. What is clear, though, is that the current deadlock is emboldening the more hawkish elements within the Russian security establishment.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The current deadlock is emboldening the more hawkish elements within the Russian security establishment.&#8221;</div>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://karaganov.ru/en/middlegame-and-a-strategy-for-the-day-after-tomorrow/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a>, Sergey Karaganov, who heads the influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy think tank, openly criticized the Kremlin’s “muffled responses to open aggression” by the West: especially the Europeans. Karaganov argues that Russia’s excessive restraint to date — its refusal to retaliate against Nato for Western-backed attacks on Russian territory, or to launch decapitation strikes against Kyiv’s political and military command centers — has in fact increased the risk of all-out war between Russia and Nato, by emboldening the West to keep escalating, in both practical and rhetorical terms.</p>
<p>Karaganov’s prescription is stark. Europe, he argues, is preparing for a future confrontation with Russia, and will likely deploy the reconstituted remnants of the Ukrainian army to prosecute it. The only way to stop this, in his view, is for Russia to demonstrate a genuine willingness to strike the command centers, infrastructure and military bases of those European countries most actively involved in operations against Russia. Should conventional strikes prove insufficient, he argues, Russia must be prepared to escalate to strategic nuclear weapons. His conclusion pulls no punches: “At present, [the Europeans] only give the appearance of fearing us, so as to build up their military strength. But they should <em>actually</em> fear us. They should be in terror of us. They should understand that escalating or even continuing the conflict risks their immediate physical destruction, and that a military buildup is pointless, as it will entail an obliterating nuclear response”.</p>
<p>One might dismiss this as mere sabre-rattling — and it is quite possible that such options would never be seriously entertained by the Kremlin — but the mere fact that these scenarios are being openly debated in Russia ought to send a shiver down the spine of every European. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Ukraine war, fringe ideas have a way of becoming mainstream when conflicts drag on and frustration mounts; the longer this one continues without end, the louder and more influential radical voices are likely to become.</p>
<p>There is, moreover, a deeper danger that operates independently of any deliberate choice Russia might make. By allowing tensions with Moscow to keep rising, we are constructing a situation whereby a single miscalculation — an errant strike, a misread signal, an escalatory move that spirals beyond anyone’s intentions — could set off a chain of events that no single actor would be able to arrest. How long, for instance, before the Russian Navy starts providing armed escorts to its oil fleets, and treating any seizure of its tankers as an act of war? Or taking similar action against Western tankers? The gravest wars in history have not always begun with conscious decisions; they have begun with incidents that spun out of control. That possibility grows more real with every week the conflict remains unresolved.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2254358804.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Europe ever wake up?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yet if that&#8217;s partly true of Russia itself — what with the hawkish language of its outriders, and its continued assaults on Ukrainian soil — European leaders appear reckless themselves. At the recent Munich Security Conference, the assembled Brussels elites and their attendant apparatchiks took turns stoking the drumbeat of war, ramping up their own hawkish rhetoric while offering little in the way of serious strategic reflection. <em>Politico</em> captured the prevailing mood with uncomfortable precision. “Western countries see World War III coming”, it <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/world-war-iii-defense-spending-europe-poll/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>, a headline that glossed over the inconvenient fact that many of those sounding the alarm are themselves among the most vigorous advocates for continued escalation. As Nato’s Secretary General Mark Rutte <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-mark-rutte-says-europe-must-prepare-for-scale-of-war-our-grandparents-endured/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recently</a> put it, Europeans “must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents and great-grandparents endured”. There is something deeply troubling about a European political class that cultivates war hysteria while remaining seemingly indifferent to where that hysteria might lead.</p>
<p>The situation is particularly disconcerting when set against the backdrop of Europe’s ongoing industrial decline. One might expect a weakening continent to seek accommodation and de-escalation; instead, European leaders continue to think in rigidly unipolar terms, dismissing Russia’s security concerns as illegitimate while remaining blind to the material reality of a world that is rapidly becoming multipolar — a shift that is already translating into Europe’s own economic and geopolitical marginalization. In this, however, they are simply mirroring Washington’s broader posture.</p>
<p>As the Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan recently <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/multipolar-delusion-mohan" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argued</a> in <em>Foreign Affairs</em>, we are living through a hybrid and deeply unstable geopolitical moment: one marked by growing multipolarity in economic terms, yet remaining largely unipolar in military terms, with the United States still uniquely capable of projecting force across the globe with impunity. The consequences of this asymmetry, Mohan suggests, have been paradoxical. Rather than ushering in a more balanced international order, the rise of economic multipolarity has, if anything, emboldened Washington to shed the constraints that once tempered its behavior and to project its power ever more aggressively — a dynamic that the Trump administration has made more explicit than ever.</p>
<p>This raises difficult questions. Can a world in which the US remains free to engage in repeated acts of military and economic aggression — unchecked by other powers — truly be called multipolar in any meaningful sense? And can a transition to a genuine multipolar order, one in which unrestrained US military primacy gives way to a world based on sovereign equality for all, occur without the world first passing through a period of acute and potentially catastrophic confrontation? These are not abstract theoretical puzzles. Given the trajectory of events in Ukraine and beyond, they are among the most urgent questions of our time.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1050298</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>How Trump keeps Europe weak</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/01/how-trump-keeps-europe-weak/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/gettyimages-1216662360-594x594-1.jpg?w=553</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Trump has made Europe’s squalid reality impossible to ignore. (Credit: Doug Mills-Pool / Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 31 Jan 2026 00:20:46 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 31 Jan 2026 00:20:46 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multipolarity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1046850</guid>
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								<![CDATA[America weaponizes energy]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“Europe is securing control of our energy supply and strengthening our autonomy.” So declared Roberta Metsola, president of the European Parliament, in a speech this week — explaining that the bloc had just approved a total ban on Russian gas, expected to come into force by the end of the year. Unfortunately, such blithe self-confidence is seriously misplaced, for the EU has just replaced one dependency with another. What the continent once imported via pipeline from Russia, it now largely secures from the United States, which today accounts for roughly 60% of EU liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports.</p>
<p>Nor do things end there. American LNG is not only significantly more expensive than Russian pipeline gas, it is also far more volatile. Pipeline gas was typically delivered under long-term contracts with predictable pricing. LNG, by contrast, is tied to global spot markets, making prices highly sensitive to fluctuations in supply and demand, weather events and geopolitical shocks. Indeed, the timing of Europe’s announcement could not have been more unfortunate: as officials in Brussels congratulated themselves on their newfound “energy autonomy”, US gas prices surged around 70% in a week, reaching their highest level in three years after severe cold weather froze pipelines, disrupted supply, and drove up domestic demand in the US.</p>
<p>Those price spikes will feed directly into higher gas and electricity costs in Europe — during one of the coldest winters in years, and at a time when millions of Europeans are already <a href="https://voxeurop.eu/en/europe-energy-poverty-heating-home/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unable to afford</a> adequate heating. Higher energy prices have already crippled industrial competitiveness and pushed major economies, above all Germany, towards deindustrialization.</p>
<p>Taken together, the episode encapsulates the self-destructive character of EU energy policy over the past four years. Yet the problem is not merely that cheap and reliable Russian gas has been replaced with costlier and more volatile American LNG. More troubling still is that the United States is far more likely to use its energy exports as an instrument of political pressure than Russia ever was, leaving the EU more dependent on its imperial master than ever.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2254358804.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Europe ever wake up?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For all the talk of Russia’s “weaponization” of gas supplies, history tells a different story. For decades, first the Soviet Union and later Russia continued supplying energy to Germany and the rest of Europe through multiple geopolitical crises, including during the height of the Cold War. More recently, even after the delivery of German weapons to Ukraine, and then the attack on Nord Stream, Moscow repeatedly stated that it was up to Berlin whether to resume gas supplies or not.</p>
<p>The United States, by contrast, has a long and well-documented <a href="https://savageminds.substack.com/p/how-washington-uses-energy-as-a-weapon?utm_source=post-email-title&amp;publication_id=65949&amp;post_id=184409359&amp;utm_campaign=email-post-title&amp;isFreemail=true&amp;r=yj1zs&amp;triedRedirect=true&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener">history</a> of weaponizing energy — using it as leverage to extract economic and geopolitical concessions. And under Donald Trump, this has become explicit policy. The US National Security Strategy, published in November 2025, designates “American energy dominance” across oil, gas, coal and nuclear power as a top strategic priority, explicitly framing the expansion of American energy exports as a means to “project power”. This is not mere rhetoric. The Trump administration has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to intervene aggressively in domestic and global markets, upend established policies and exert pressure not only on adversaries but also on long-standing allies.</p>
<p>By the time Trump returned to office, Europe’s dependence on US energy was already a <em>fait accompli</em>, following the EU’s decision to cut itself off from Russian gas and the sabotage of Nord Stream. Since then, Trump has only actively sought to deepen that dependence. In April 2025, for instance, his administration used the so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs to pressure Germany and other EU states to refrain from importing any Russian energy.</p>
<p>A few months later, Trump strong-armed the European Commission into a commitment to buy $750 billion worth of US LNG, oil and nuclear energy products, in exchange for avoiding punitive tariffs. The figure in itself is unrealistic, but that was never the point. As Trump’s energy secretary Chris Wright <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/news/interview-trumps-energy-secretary-sees-long-term-eu-dependence-on-us/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a>, the objective was to signal that Europe’s energy dependence would be “long-term”. The pressure worked. <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/european-natural-gas-imports" target="_blank" rel="noopener">According</a> to Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, LNG shipments from the United States to the EU rose by around 60% in 2025 compared to the previous year.</p>
<p>At the same time, Washington has increasingly politicized these energy flows, with US officials openly linking continued LNG supplies to regulatory and political concessions. Just months ago, Wright and his Qatari counterpart jointly <a href="https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-energy-secretary-and-qatari-energy-minister-send-letter-eu-regarding-proposed-corporate" target="_blank" rel="noopener">urged</a> EU leaders to repeal climate and environmental regulations deemed obstacles to fossil fuel imports, explicitly tying these demands to Europe’s reliance on LNG from America and the Gulf.</p>
<p>But it took Trump’s explicit threat to take over Greenland to finally snap Europeans out of their complacency. As <em>The New York Times</em> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/26/business/europe-natural-gas-united-states-russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a>, European leaders and analysts now fear that Trump could weaponize US energy exports to extract concessions not only over Greenland but across a wide range of issues. As Sophie Corbeau of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy put it, “people have started to realize we are probably a little bit too dependent on US LNG.”</p>
<p>That’s a polite way of describing the fact that Europe now finds itself heavily dependent for its gas on a country whose President openly threatens the territorial integrity of a European state. Whatever risks were associated with dependence on Russian gas, they pale in comparison. It is telling that the EU’s energy commissioner, Dan Jørgensen, is now <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-will-seek-to-cut-us-energy-reliance-after-trumps-greenland-threats/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">speaking</a> of the need to diversify away from American LNG.</p>
<p>However, this is little more than performative indignation. The prevailing European narrative suggests that none of this would have been conceivable before Trump. But this is ludicrous. Trump’s crude tactics pale in comparison to the bombing of the Nord Stream pipelines, the single largest act of industrial sabotage in Europe’s history — an operation that was either directly carried out or politically sanctioned by the Biden administration to forcibly sever Europe from Russian gas and lock in dependence on US LNG. Recall, if nothing else, Washington’s own <a href="https://euractiv.de/news/biden-aus-fuer-nord-stream-2-wenn-russland-in-die-ukraine-einmarschiert/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">threats</a> on this very issue. Germany’s — and Europe’s — silence in the aftermath of the attack makes today’s expressions of shock look like mere political theater.</p>
<p>The truth, then, is that the dangers of replacing Russian gas with American LNG were obvious from the start. The economic and political costs were foreseeable and indeed widely <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">predicted</a>. The only difference between then and now is that Trump has made Europe’s squalid reality impossible to ignore.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The dangers of replacing Russian gas with American LNG were obvious from the start.&#8221;</div>
<p>It is crucial to understand, however, that Trump’s weaponization of European energy supplies is about far more than bluster or the ruthless pursuit of short-term gains. As the US National Security Strategy makes clear, these moves are part of a broader, long-term strategy aimed at securing American energy dominance for decades to come. No less important, US bullying should be seen as part of a last-ditch effort to preserve the country’s hegemony in a rapidly changing global order.</p>
<p>Control over energy has long been a central pillar of US postwar foreign policy. For much of that time, this effectively meant control over the global oil trade. From the overthrow of Iran’s nationalist government in 1953, to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, virtually every major US intervention in the Middle East followed this logic. This was never solely about securing oil supplies for domestic consumption. More fundamentally, it was about entrenching American global power.</p>
<p>By ensuring that oil was traded in dollars — and that exporting countries recycled those dollars back into the US financial system — Washington was able to elevate the dollar to the status of the world’s reserve currency, granting itself what Giscard d’Estaing <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-dollars-international-role-an-exorbitant-privilege-2/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> the “exorbitant privilege” of self-financing its imports. At the same time, by controlling the physical and financial choke points of the oil trade, the lifeblood of the global economy, the US acquired a powerful coercive tool: the ability to punish states whose policies ran counter to American interests, either by cutting off their access to energy supplies or by excluding them from the dollar-centric financial system via sanctions.</p>
<p>In recent years, though, the foundations of this system have come under increasing strain. Countries operating outside US control — notably Venezuela, Iran and Russia — have supplied growing volumes of oil to global markets, especially China, helping fuel its rapid rise. In parallel, these and other oil exporting countries, including traditional allies of the US such as Saudi Arabia, have begun pricing oil in non-dollar currencies or openly threatened to do so, challenging the monetary underpinnings of American power.</p>
<p>Until Trump’s recent attack, for instance, Venezuela was supplying around 5% of China’s oil needs. Iran, despite years of sanctions, has maintained remarkably high oil export levels. More than 80% of the Islamic Republic’s crude now goes to China, accounting for 13% to 15% of the PRC&#8217;s total crude oil imports. The freedom of countries to export oil and other resources on terms not dictated by the US — and this also applies to Russia’s gas exports to Europe before 2022 — poses a dual threat to its hegemony. It not only undermines dollar dominance, but also weakens Washington&#8217;s ability to use energy and sanctions as tools of geopolitical discipline.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/britains-atlantic-subordination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/britains-atlantic-subordination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2227402412.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/britains-atlantic-subordination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/britains-atlantic-subordination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain&#039;s Atlantic subordination</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2026/01/britains-atlantic-subordination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Trump has been candid about these stakes. In 2024, he <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2024/06/21/like-losing-a-war-donald-trump-issues-dollar-collapse-warning-after-huge-bitcoin-donation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned</a> that losing the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency would be “like losing a war”. Others have been similarly explicit. Marco Rubio, commenting in 2023 on a trade agreement between Brazil and China, cautioned that such deals were creating a parallel global economy “totally independent from the United States” — one in which Washington would no longer have the ability to enforce economic sanctions. This is why any country pursuing an independent energy policy is automatically framed as a security threat.</p>
<p>Seen in this light, many US actions in recent years — from severing Europe’s access to Russian gas, to the seizure of Venezuelan oil assets, to escalating pressure on Iran — can be understood as elements of a single, coherent strategy: reasserting American physical and financial control over global energy flows, gaining leverage over adversaries and allies alike, and deterring countries from breaking with the unwritten rules of the US order.</p>
<p>Trump summed up this strategy when he <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=china+can+buy+the+oil+from+us&amp;sourceid=chrome&amp;ie=UTF-8#fpstate=ive&amp;vld=cid:7af64694,vid:Z4fPSOLrfOo,st:0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>, after the attack on Venezuela, that “China can buy all the oil it wants from us” — but in dollars, and on American terms. It remains to be seen whether this gamble will be successful. But one thing is clear: the greatest threat to peace today doesn’t lie in the emergence of a multipolar world, but in the United States’ determination to prevent it, even at the cost of driving its own allies into the ground.</p>
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					<title>Will Europe ever wake up?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2026/01/will-europe-ever-wake-up/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2254358804.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Imperialism</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Supportive of US aggression? (Ludovic Marin/Pool/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2026 00:01:23 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 09 Jan 2026 00:01:23 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[greenland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1044182</guid>
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								<![CDATA[America loathes the continent’s elites]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Stephen Miller is not one for gentility. “Nobody is going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland,” Trump’s aide asserted brashly on CNN a few days ago, just hours after Maduro’s kidnapping by US forces. But if Miller’s pugnacious style was familiar, European reactions told a different story: they were scattered, confused and deeply revealing. Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, rebutted America’s annexation claims and warned that US aggression against Greenland would effectively mark the end of Nato, while in a joint statement, the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the UK and Greenland itself reaffirmed their commitment to the Atlantic Alliance while stating that Greenland belongs to its people and that decisions regarding the island are for Denmark and Greenland alone.</p>
<p>Conspicuously absent, however, was any response from the EU’s institutional leadership. The same Brussels officials who routinely issue dire warnings about the alleged Russian threat to Europe declined to comment on an explicit US threat against European territory. And only hours earlier, most European leaders had offered either tepid or implicitly supportive responses to Trump’s unambiguous aggression against Venezuela. If there was a logic, it was to avoid confrontation with Washington at all costs. And yet ironically those same leaders quickly found themselves facing the prospect of similar US action directed against a European country.</p>
<p>A direct US military seizure of Greenland remains unlikely, though not unthinkable. A more probable scenario is an “association agreement” modeled on Washington’s arrangements with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. Under these agreements, the US exercises sweeping authority over defense and security in exchange for financial assistance. The states involved remain formally sovereign, but in practice are tightly bound to US strategic priorities. An analogous arrangement with Greenland would offer Washington the advantage of consolidating control while formally respecting Greenlandic self-rule, all while weakening Denmark’s position. A 1951 agreement already allows the US to station unlimited numbers of troops on the island; today, only one active base remains, but the legal framework for expansion is firmly in place.</p>
<p>The ambiguity is intentional. Earlier this week, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that the use of the US military was “always an option” as Trump and his advisers reviewed different annexation scenarios. Whatever path the administration chooses, it is determined to resolve the matter swiftly. And European leaders, judging by their response so far, are likely to acquiesce. How can one account for the seemingly irrational, and indeed outright suicidal, posture of Europe’s political leadership? By acknowledging a simple fact: European elites are deeply embedded in the transatlantic system from which they derive their power and legitimacy. They perceive that system as under threat and are prepared to defend it at almost any cost, even if that cost includes European sovereignty or territory.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;European elites are deeply embedded in the transatlantic system from which they derive their power and legitimacy.&#8221;</div>
<p>After all, Europe has already sacrificed its core economic and security interests to US imperial diktats. It has joined a proxy war against Russia that has devastated Ukraine and hollowed out European industrial competitiveness. It has imposed sanctions that inflicted far greater damage on European economies than on Russia. It has remained conspicuously silent following the destruction of Nord Stream, a critical piece of European energy infrastructure — an act probably carried out with at least indirect US involvement and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/nord-stream-pipeline-explosion-real-story-da24839c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">likely foreknowledge</a> by some European governments themselves. If European leaders were willing to accept all of this, acquiescing to US control over Greenland — whether through military pressure or pseudo-legal arrangements — would not represent a radical departure.</p>
<p>So much for Europe’s much-vaunted “strategic autonomy”. The reality is that beneath the rhetoric of independence, European governments have systematically appeased Trump — from increased Nato military spending, much of which will flow directly into US defense contractors, to punitive trade conditions to accepting financial responsibility for sustaining the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>From the perspective of Europe’s governing classes, Nato and the proxy war in Ukraine are less about security or prosperity than about preserving an imperial architecture in which they can play a subordinate but privileged role. This is why Nato would likely survive even a US move against Greenland, albeit stripped of any remaining illusions of sovereign equality among its members.</p>
<p>This dynamic also helps explain a seeming paradox. Globalist European leaders openly despised by Trump — figures such as Emmanuel Macron or Friedrich Merz — have been more supportive of US aggression against Venezuela than Right-populist forces openly favored by Trump, such as Marine Le Pen or Viktor Orbán, who have adopted more cautious or critical positions. EU institutions, in particular, have been notably supportive of Washington’s actions — the bloc is not a counterweight to US power, rather one of its central pillars.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/donald-trumps-petulant-foreign-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/donald-trumps-petulant-foreign-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/GettyImages-2252098056.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/donald-trumps-petulant-foreign-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/donald-trumps-petulant-foreign-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Donald Trump’s petulant foreign policy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/donald-trumps-petulant-foreign-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonathan Kirshner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It is therefore plausible that elements of the EU establishment are coordinating closely with factions of the US national security apparatus — or even with the Trump administration itself. After all, while it is true that Trump has abandoned any pretense of transatlantic unity and increasingly treats Europe in openly transactional, even neo-colonial terms, Europe’s political class has demonstrated its willingness to comply. Once one understands that Europe’s current leaders long ago ceased to think in terms of national or even “European” interests, and have instead become beholden to a single objective — the preservation of a dying system of Western hegemony, or the so-called “rules-based order”, and the benefits they derive from it in their sub-imperial role — their seemingly irrational behavior begins to make sense.</p>
<p>What should alarm Europeans is not the prospect of US “abandonment” or Nato’s collapse — developments that could, in principle, create space for genuine autonomy. In fact, it&#8217;s the opposite: the likelihood that Europe remains locked into a subordinate role precisely as Washington adopts an increasingly aggressive and lawless posture.</p>
<p>This is the broader context in which Trump’s attack on Venezuela and threats against Greenland must be understood. The events are revealing about the evolving nature of US foreign policy. While some analysts interpreted the latest National Security Strategy (NSS), along with Trump’s attempts to negotiate a settlement in Ukraine and his calls to scale down commitments in Europe, as evidence of a sober acceptance of multipolarity, Venezuela suggests a very different conclusion. Far from abandoning hegemony, the US is attempting to preserve it through new means, by globalizing a proxy-war strategy that targets weaker links in the rival system. While avoiding direct military containment of China or Russia, confrontation is displaced onto peripheral theaters and sustained through permanent destabilization. In this model, even the most elementary rules of international coexistence are discarded.</p>
<p>This shift is a reaction to a deep crisis of US hegemony. Its economic dimensions are well known: ballooning public debt, unsustainable private leverage, a financial system increasingly detached from productive activity, extensive deindustrialization and the gradual erosion, however partial, of the dollar-centric system. In short, this is a specific crisis of both US capitalism and the broader post-1945 imperial order.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/how-bardella-would-break-the-eu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/how-bardella-would-break-the-eu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2157866499.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/how-bardella-would-break-the-eu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/how-bardella-would-break-the-eu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Bardella would break the EU</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/how-bardella-would-break-the-eu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The US response to this is not to accept Washington’s role within a new global arrangement — one in which America could continue to prosper as a powerful but “normal” state — but to aggressively reassert its dominance. This reassertion increasingly takes the form of naked imperialism or neo-colonialism: not merely economic coercion, but the direct seizure of resources, the control of shipping lanes and supply chains, and even the open claim to foreign territory. Trump’s declaration that Venezuela will be “run” by the United States, coupled with the threat of further “kinetic” action should a future government resist, is thus emblematic.</p>
<p>This orientation is stated openly in the National Security Strategy. The document declares that the US will deny non-hemispheric competitors control over strategically vital assets, condition aid and trade on political alignment, discourage governments from cooperating with rival powers such as China or Russia, and use financial, technological and security — including military — means to ensure compliance. In practice, this strategy is already being implemented, well beyond the Western Hemisphere. Over the past year, the US has conducted bombing operations in seven countries — as varied as Iran, Nigeria and Somalia — none authorized by the UN Security Council and none credibly justified as acts of self-defense under the UN Charter. In parallel, Trump has issued direct threats against a growing list of other states.</p>
<p>In purely empirical terms, there is nothing new about the US resorting to violence to defend its economic and strategic interests; this has been a constant feature of US policy, even and especially under the so-called rules-based order. Across Latin America in particular, Washington has repeatedly intervened, covertly and overtly, whenever governments pursued land reform, resource nationalism or independent development paths that challenged US interests. What is new is the abandonment of even the pretense of legality or humanitarian concern. This is what domination looks like without hegemony: power exercised openly and coercively.</p>
<p>And it is precisely this nakedness that makes the current moment so dangerous. By signaling that no rules remain, not even rhetorically — Washington is effectively legitimizing a world of unrestrained power politics — one that is arguably already a reality, but which the West, until recently, at least claimed to oppose. This is particularly destabilizing given that US actions against Venezuela and Greenland should not be understood solely in economic terms; they are also strategic moves directed against China, and to a lesser extent Russia. Contrary to the idea that Washington is willing to divide the world into stable spheres of influence, the goal appears instead to create platforms from which US power can be projected more aggressively, ultimately to confront China before the balance of technological and economic power shifts irreversibly.</p>
<p>This is a gamble rooted in the assumption that sustained military and economic attrition can at least delay a tectonic shift in the global order. It is a position inherited from an older colonial worldview which saw non-Western development itself as an existential threat. In this sense, as one commentator insightfully <a href="https://themindness.substack.com/p/weaponizing-time-part-ii-the-global" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a>, time itself is being weaponized. American elites are engaged in what might be called governance by delay: prolonging conflict and maintaining instability in the hope that some external shock — let’s say a technological breakthrough, an internal crisis among rivals — will restore lost leverage.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/fazi.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The myth of central bank independence</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The irony is that this strategy is profoundly self-defeating. The more openly coercive US behavior becomes, the faster it erodes the very structures that once underpinned American hegemony. After 1945, US dominance was not built through territorial annexation, or pure military power, but through administrative architecture: a dense web of alliances; the dollar-backed financial system; global trade regimes; standards bodies; technological ecosystems. This networked hegemony made integration with US-led systems the path of least resistance for most states — though, of course, the threat of violent reprisal was always there and often used.</p>
<p>Instead, when a hegemon instead behaves like a caricature of imperial power, it encourages states to seek alternatives — which now, unlike even just a decade ago, actually exist. To rephrase, Trump is incentivizing other nations to further diversify reserves, reduce dollar exposure, explore new payment systems and forge new security partnerships. Indeed, many countries, from South Africa to Brazil to India, are already pushing back against Trump’s bullish tactics. Thus, the primary beneficiaries of Trumpian aggression are precisely those Washington seeks to contain. China, and Russia too, have spent years advocating for an alternative framework for global cooperation based on sovereign equality and multipolarity. Each act of US lawlessness strengthens their appeal. After the illegal assault on Venezuela, expect the queue of countries seeking closer association with BRICS (and similar groupings) to grow longer, even as the US responds by escalating threats against those who do.</p>
<p>Europe, meanwhile, risks guaranteeing its own decline. By clinging to a subordinate role in America’s fraying imperial system, European elites are sacrificing the continent’s long-term autonomy for the prospect of their continued access to power. Yet this also means aligning themselves with a hegemon that governs through naked violence and coercion, at precisely the moment when adaptability and restraint are most needed. In doing so, they expose their own societies to escalating risks — economic, political and military — without any increase in security or influence. While the future of the global order remains uncertain, Europe’s own fate seems sealed.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1044182</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Why the Brussels money-grab will fail</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/12/why-the-brussels-money-grab-will-fail/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/12/why-the-brussels-money-grab-will-fail/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/GettyImages-2251856917-e1766143989472.jpg?w=550</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>weekend essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['The Union is beginning to resemble a crumbling empire.' (Thierry Monasse / Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 20 Dec 2025 00:20:51 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 20 Dec 2025 08:19:43 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brussels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ursula von der Leyen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1041838</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Even moderate voices are defying Brussels]]>
							</description>
												
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								<![CDATA[<p>Belgium’s prime minister learned the hard way that one does not need to be a rabble-rousing populist to incur the EU’s wrath. Until recently, the moderate conservative Bart De Wever had largely stayed out of the European spotlight. This was relatively easy, given that his party belongs to the center-right European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament, which has strongly aligned with Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission on Ukraine. Yet in a matter of months he became the Brussels establishment’s public enemy number one.</p>
<p>His offense? Opposing Brussels’s plan to seize Russia’s frozen assets held in Europe. The overwhelming majority of them are parked at Euroclear, a Brussels-based clearing house that sits at the heart of global securities settlement. For Europe’s pro-war lobby, led by France and Germany, confiscation was presented as the only way to continue financing Ukraine’s war effort — or, failing that, to force member states to assume the burden collectively through other, increasingly extraordinary means.</p>
<p>Belgium, however, had compelling reasons to resist. Confiscating — or functionally expropriating — Russian central bank assets would violate one of the most sacrosanct principles of international finance: the neutrality and inviolability of sovereign reserves. Breaching that principle would not only set a dangerous precedent, but would also expose Belgium to potentially severe legal, financial and geopolitical consequences — as Euroclear is domiciled there.</p>
<p>As Robert Volterra, one of London’s most respected international lawyers, <a href="https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/wirtschaft-verantwortung/russland-enteignung-absolut-illegal-top-voelkerrechtler-rechnet-mit-eu-ab-li.10009953" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned</a>, confiscating Russian assets would be “absolutely illegal” and would haunt the EU for generations. The legal fallout could be enormous. Russia had multiple avenues for challenge and had begun to explore them, already filing a lawsuit in Moscow against Euroclear.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2239301599.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will we ever escape the ECHR?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>From there, Russia could pursue litigation in Belgian courts, potentially all the way to the supreme court. Belgian judges would be forced to determine whether Russian property rights under domestic law had been violated and whether the principle of sovereign immunity had been breached. On both counts, Russia’s case would be strong. Were Russia to prevail, Euroclear itself would be liable. Given the sums involved, the clearing house would almost certainly be rendered insolvent, triggering national and EU-level deposit guarantee mechanisms.</p>
<p>In such a scenario, Euroclear would in turn be compelled to sue the Belgian state, which would have ordered the effective expropriation of client assets. The prospects of such a claim would be far from negligible. Beyond Belgium, Russia could also bring cases before the European Court of Justice, the International Court of Justice and multiple international arbitration forums. Even setting litigation aside — one might argue that in the current context it would be hard to find a Western judge willing to rule in Russia’s favor — it is difficult to see how Belgium could justify refusing to unfreeze Russia’s reserves if and when a peace settlement is eventually reached.</p>
<p>It is therefore hardly surprising that Belgium emerged as one of the most vocal opponents of the plan. De Wever <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/seizing-russian-frozen-assets-act-of-war-belgian-pm-bart-de-wever/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has bluntly warned</a> that confiscation would amount to “an act of war”, likening it to entering a foreign embassy, stripping it of its contents and selling them off. One might reasonably conclude that he is simply defending his country’s interests by upholding international law. And yet, for this, he has found himself subjected to a smear campaign by the EU’s political and media establishment. He has been accused of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/17/belgian-politicians-finance-bosses-targeted-russian-intelligence-seized-assets" target="_blank" rel="noopener">acting</a> under Russian intimidation — or worse, of being a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-russia-bart-de-wever-moscow-funds-brussels-bank-ukraine-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russian asset</a> himself. At the same time, Brussels threatened to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-belgium-hungary-ukraine-loan-war-russia-funds-finances/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“treat Belgium like Hungary”</a> if it continued to oppose the plan. That’s what happens when even loyal pro-EU governments dare to step out of line.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It is hardly surprising that Belgium emerged as one of the most vocal opponents of the plan.&#8221;</div>
<p>Despite the massive pressure, De Wever stood his ground. And he was joined by a growing front of dissenters. Hungary and Slovakia openly rejected the scheme, with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán accusing the Commission of “systematically raping European law”. Italy, Bulgaria and Malta also expressed reservations.</p>
<p>The economic and financial implications of confiscation, after all, would extend far beyond Belgium. Once the assumption that sovereign reserves held abroad are immune from political seizure is broken, there is no telling what the consequences may be. Countries would begin to view euro-denominated assets not as a safe store of value, but as a political liability — one that can be confiscated at Brussels’s discretion. The message would be unmistakable: your assets are safe only as long as you remain politically compliant. The result would almost certainly be that capital would start to flee Europe — even faster than it already is.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, faced with growing resistance, Brussels last week resorted to invoking emergency powers under Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to indefinitely freeze the Russian assets, claiming this would allow it to act by qualified majority rather than unanimity. Yet this represents a blatant distortion of the Treaty. Article 122 applies strictly to emergency economic measures in response to natural disasters or severe economic disturbances. It does not apply to foreign policy, which unequivocally requires unanimity. The fate of Russia’s frozen sovereign assets, however, is self-evidently a foreign policy matter. Claiming otherwise is an extra-legal sleight of hand.</p>
<p>This is another example of a Brussels power grab. If Article 122 — or any other provision — can be stretched to justify the seizure of foreign sovereign assets and the imposition of massive liabilities on unwilling member states, it can be used to circumvent unanimity across a wide range of foreign policy decisions.</p>
<p>The threat, however, worked. On Friday, at the European Council meeting, the Commission failed to secure an agreement on the use of the frozen Russian assets. Instead, it secured agreement on a separate €90-billion loan, backed by the EU budget and underwritten by all member states except three (Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), which were granted opt-outs. In effect, the political obstacle was bypassed not by changing strategy, but by shifting the financial risk directly onto European taxpayers. As von der Leyen made clear in advance of the summit, there was little room for dissent: “No one will leave the EU summit until the issue of Ukraine’s financing is resolved.”</p>
<p>Incredibly, the deal foresees that the loan will have to be repaid by Ukraine only if and when Russia agrees to pay war reparations — effectively transforming hypothetical future reparations into immediate financing. This idea is, at best, wishful thinking. It is highly unlikely that Russia would accept binding reparations even in the event of a peace deal, meaning that there is little chance Ukraine will ever repay the loan. This is all the more striking given how much Europe has already spent: EU parliaments <a href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-steps-support-ukraine-almost-eu6-billion-cover-its-financial-needs-2025-11-13_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have approved at least</a> €187 billion in support for Ukraine, on top of massive indirect costs.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/europes-humiliation-over-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/europes-humiliation-over-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/GettyImages-2161516576-e1764526214252.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/europes-humiliation-over-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/europes-humiliation-over-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe’s humiliation over Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/12/europes-humiliation-over-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This episode illustrates how the EU operates: by manufacturing false binaries that foreclose genuine political choice. Member states were presented with a stark alternative — either agree to confiscate Russia’s frozen assets or be prepared to collectively underwrite a massive new loan. What was never seriously considered was a third option: to stop pouring money into a demonstrably failed strategy and instead work to bring the war to an end through negotiations.</p>
<p>Yet it’s easy to see why the EU can’t afford to confront the failure of its Ukraine strategy — one that has inflicted immense economic damage on Europe while delivering nothing on the battlefield, and that has left Ukraine in a worse position than at the start of the war. Acknowledging this reality would carry enormous political costs for EU elites, particularly those most invested in the victory-at-all-costs narrative — hence their determination to keep the war going at all costs. This is why, even after failing to agree on confiscation, Brussels pushed through a massive, budget-backed loan as a substitute. The consequences will be dear: Ukrainians will continue to suffer and die in an unwinnable war, while Europe will remain entrenched in a permanent state of economic warfare and military-by-proxy confrontation with Russia, with a constant risk of escalation into direct conflict.</p>
<p>If there is a silver lining to this grim trajectory, it is that the recklessness of these choices will only exacerbate the contradictions of a project that is pushing the continent to the brink, ultimately forcing a reckoning — within member states and among Europe’s citizens alike. Indeed, the Commission may have succeeded in avoiding a catastrophic humiliation, but in doing so it exposed the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Union, willing to override national interests and discard legal constraints, democratic norms and basic economic rationality in pursuit of ideological crusades. Meanwhile, the enormous financial burden imposed by the latest deal will only deepen internal fractures and push national budgets to the breaking point — especially when it becomes clear that it will entail yet more resources diverted from Europe’s own crumbling infrastructure, underfunded hospitals and overstretched schools.</p>
<p>And Ukraine is far from the only flashpoint. Brussels is also struggling to secure backing for the Mercosur free-trade agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Here, too, resistance is growing. France has long led the opposition, with Emmanuel Macron reiterating recently that the deal lacks reciprocity on production standards, pesticide rules and food safety. The front broadened significantly this week, when Italian Prime Minister <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/meloni-signing-mercosur-deal-now-would-be-premature/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Giorgia Meloni described&nbsp;</a>the deal as “premature”, citing inadequate safeguards for European agriculture. Italy’s stance is pivotal, as it raises the prospect of a blocking minority in the Council that includes Poland, Hungary and Austria too.</p>
<p>Protests have added to the pressure. On Thursday hundreds of tractors converged on Brussels as farmers from across Europe denounced what they see as unfair competition. Proposed safeguards have done little to calm opposition — leading to the ratification of the deal to be postponed once again at the European Council.</p>
<p>And so, as the contradictions within the EU continue to accumulate, it is increasingly difficult to see how Brussels can manage the backlash for much longer. The Union is beginning to resemble a crumbling empire, reliant not only on repression, censorship and electoral manipulation to maintain control, but also on ever more aggressive tactics directed even against pro-EU governments themselves. By forcing through ever more reckless commitments in the name of unity, it is simply setting the stage for an even more catastrophic implosion down the road.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1041838</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Europe’s new war on privacy</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/11/europes-new-war-on-privacy/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/11/europes-new-war-on-privacy/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Screenshot-2025-11-26-at-19.50.57.jpg?w=596</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Surveillance</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The EU wants more power to access people's messages. Image: Getty composite]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 27 Nov 2025 00:03:33 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 27 Nov 2025 09:20:37 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Child sexual abuse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Grooming]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Surveillance]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1038861</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Chat Control will violate fundamental rights]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In theory, Chat Control should have been buried last month. The EU’s ominous plan to mass-scan citizens’ private messages was met with overwhelming public resistance in Germany, with the country’s government refusing to approve it. But Brussels rarely retreats merely because the public demands it. And so, true to form, a reworked version of the text is already being pushed forward — this time out of sight, behind closed doors. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Chat Control, formally known as the Child Sexual Abuse Regulation, was first proposed by the European Commission in 2022. The original plan would have made it mandatory for email and messenger providers to scan private, even encrypted, communications — with the purported aim of detecting child sexual abuse material. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The tool was sold as a noble crusade against some of the world’s most horrific crimes. But critics argued that the tool risked becoming a blueprint for generalized surveillance, by essentially giving states and EU institutions the ability to scan every private message. Indeed, a </span><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12726-Child-sexual-abuse-online-detection-removal-and-reporting-/public-consultation_en"><span style="font-weight: 400;">public consultation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> preceding the proposal revealed that a majority of respondents opposed such obligations, with over 80% of explicitly rejecting its application to end-to-end encrypted communications.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet despite repeated blockages, and widespread criticism for violating privacy and fundamental rights, the text was never abandoned. Instead, it was repackaged, and continually pushed forward from one Council presidency to the next. Each time democratic resistance stopped the original plan, it kept returning in new forms, under new labels, each time dressed up as a “necessary” and “urgent” tool to protect children online, yet always preserving its core logic: normalizing government-mandated monitoring of private communications on an unprecedented scale. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The tool was sold as a noble crusade against some of the world’s most horrific crimes.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In May, the European Commission once again presented its proposal. Yet several states objected. That included Germany, but also Poland, Austria and the Netherlands. As a result, Denmark, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the European Council, immediately began drafting a new version, known as “Chat Control 2.0” and unveiled earlier this month, which removed the requirement for general monitoring of private chats; the searches would now remain formally voluntary for providers. All this happened under the auspices of Coreper, the Committee of Permanent Representatives — one of the most powerful, but least visible, institutions in the EU decision-making process. It is where most EU legislation is actually negotiated; if Coreper agrees on a legislative file, member states almost always rubber-stamp it. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The gamble worked. Yesterday, this revised version was quietly greenlit by Coreper, essentially paving the way for the text’s adoption by the Council, possibly as early as December. As digital rights campaigner and former MEP Patrick Breyer </span><a href="https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/chat-control-2-0-through-the-back-door-breyer-warns-the-eu-is-playing-us-for-fools-now-theyre-scanning-our-texts-and-banning-teens/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">put it</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, this maneuver amounts to “a deceptive sleight of hand” aimed at bypassing meaningful democratic debate and oversight. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">While the removal of mandatory on-device detection is an improvement on the first draft, the new text still contains two extremely problematic features. First, it encourages “voluntary” mass scanning by online platforms — a practice already allowed in “temporary” form, which would now become a lasting feature of EU law. Second, it effectively outlaws anonymous communication by introducing mandatory age-verification systems. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2022669077.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The EU’s new censorship machine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">An </span><a href="https://csa-scientist-open-letter.org/Nov2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">open letter</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> signed by 18 of Europe’s leading cybersecurity and privacy academics warned that the latest proposal poses “high risks to society without clear benefits for children”. The first, in their view, is the expansion of “voluntary” scanning, including automated text analysis using AI to identify ambiguous “grooming” behaviors. This approach, they argue, is deeply flawed. Current AI systems are incapable of properly distinguishing between innocent conversation and abusive behavior. As the experts explain, AI-driven grooming detection risks sweeping vast numbers of normal, private conversations into a dragnet, overwhelming investigators with false positives and exposing intimate communications to third parties. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Breyer further emphasized this danger by noting that no AI can reliably distinguish between innocent flirtation, humorous sarcasm — and criminal grooming. He warned that this amounts to a form of digital witch-hunt, whereby the mere appearance of words like “love” or “meet” in a conversation between family members, partners or friends could trigger intrusive scrutiny. This is not child protection, Breyer has argued, but mass suspicion directed at the entire population. Even under the existing voluntary regime, German federal police warn that roughly half of all reports received are criminally irrelevant, representing tens of thousands of leaked legal chats annually. According the Swiss Federal Police, meanwhile, </span><a href="https://www.republik.ch/2022/12/08/die-dunklen-schatten-der-chatkontrolle"><span style="font-weight: 400;">80%</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of machine-reported content is not illegal. It might, for example, encompass harmless holiday photos showing nude children playing at a beach. The new text would expand these risks dramatically. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Further concerns arise from Article 4 of the new compromise proposal, which requires providers to implement “all appropriate risk mitigation measures”. This clause could allow authorities to pressure encrypted messaging services to enable scanning, even if this undermines their core security model. In practice, this could mean requiring providers such as WhatsApp, Signal or Telegram to scan messages on users’ devices before encryption is applied. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Electronic Frontier Foundation has </span><a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/chat-control-back-menu-eu-it-still-must-be-stopped-0?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">noted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that this approach risks creating a permanent security infrastructure, one which could gradually become universal. Meta, Google and Microsoft already scan unencrypted content voluntarily; extending this practice to encrypted content would merely require technical changes. Moreover, what begins as a voluntary option can easily become compulsory in practice, as platforms face reputational, legal and market pressure to “cooperate” with the authorities. Furthermore, this doesn’t affect just people in the EU, but everyone around the world, including the United States. If platforms decide to stay in the EU, they would be forced to scan the conversations of everyone in the bloc. If you’re not in the EU, but you chat with someone who is, then your privacy is compromised too. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another major danger is the introduction of mandatory age-verification systems for app stores and private messaging services. Though the Council claims these systems can be designed to “preserve privacy”, critics </span><a href="https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Segregate-and-Suppress.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">insist</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the very concept is technologically unworkable. Age assessments inevitably rely on biometric and behavioral data, both of which require invasive data collection. Far from protecting children, these systems would increase the volume of sensitive personal information being stored and potentially exploited. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2239301599.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will we ever escape the ECHR?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Requiring official identity documents for online verification would exclude millions of people who lack easy access to digital IDs or who won’t provide such sensitive documentation merely to use a messaging service. In practice, this would spell the end of anonymous communication online, forcing users to present ID or face scans simply to open an email or messaging account. Breyer has warned that such measures would be particularly disastrous for whistleblowers, journalists, political activists and others reliant on online anonymity. It would also push under-16s towards less safe, poorly regulated alternatives that lack encryption or basic safety protections. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ultimately, critics </span><a href="https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/messaging-and-chat-control/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">argue</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that mass surveillance is simply the wrong approach to combating child sexual exploitation. Scanning private messages does not stop the circulation of child abuse material. Platforms such as Facebook have used scanning technologies for years, yet the number of automated reports continues to rise. Moreover, mandatory scanning would still fail to detect perpetrators who distribute material through decentralized secret forums or via encrypted archives shared using only links and passwords — methods that scanning algorithms cannot successfully penetrate. The most effective strategy would be to delete known abuse material from online hosts, something Europol has repeatedly failed to do. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Chat Control, in short, would do little to actually help victims of child sexual exploitation while harming everyone else. Every message would become subject to surveillance, without any judicial oversight, contrary to long-standing guarantees of private correspondence. There’s a legal question here too. The EU Court of Justice has previously ruled that general and automatic analysis of private communications violates fundamental rights, yet the EU is now poised to adopt legislation that contravenes this precedent. Once adopted, it could take years for a new judicial challenge to overturn it. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The confidentiality of electronic communication — essential for personal privacy, business secrecy and democratic participation — would be sacrificed. Sensitive conversations could be read, analyzed, wrongly flagged or even misused, as past scandals involving intelligence officials and tech employees have shown. One of the most notorious cases of intelligence abuse came from the US National Security Agency, in which multiple NSA employees were </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/world/uk/nsa-staff-used-spy-tools-on-spouses-ex-lovers-watchdog-idUSBRE98Q14H/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">caught</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> using the agency’s powerful surveillance tools to spy on romantic partners and ex-lovers. Leaked documents have also </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26367781" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">shown</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the UK intelligence agency GCHQ captured and stored images from Yahoo webcam chats, including millions of sexually explicit images of completely innocent users. There have also been several cases of Big Tech employees — from </span><a href="https://www.wired.com/2010/09/google-spy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Google</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to </span><a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/facebook-employees-look-at-user-data/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Facebook</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — using internal tools to spy on unsuspecting users. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Furthermore, secure encryption, a foundation of cybersecurity, would be compromised by introducing backdoors or client-side scanning tools that foreign intelligence services or criminal actors could exploit. At the same time, the responsibility for criminal investigations would shift from democratically accountable authorities to opaque corporate algorithms, with minimal transparency or oversight. </span></p>
<p><a href="https://stopchatcontrol.eu/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Opponents</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> therefore argue that the EU should instead adopt a fundamentally different approach: one that protects children without undermining fundamental rights. They propose ending the current voluntary scanning of private messages by US internet companies — restoring the principle that targeted surveillance requires a judicial warrant and must be limited to individuals reasonably suspected of wrongdoing — and maintain that secure end-to-end encryption, and the right to anonymous communication, must be preserved. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Particularly worrying is the issue of function creep, the process by which a technology introduced for a narrowly defined purpose gradually expands to serve broader, and sometimes entirely different, purposes over time. The UK’s Online Safety Act, passed in October 2023, obliges firms to develop child sexual abuse detection systems, even though the British government itself admits that such infrastructure is not yet technically available, creating legal authority awaiting technical capability. In the United States, “temporary” surveillance measures introduced under the post-9/11 Patriot Act became permanent, and indeed expanded in scope. Once a technological infrastructure for comprehensive online surveillance exists, it can easily be repurposed and is hard to dismantle. Technologies designed to detect harmful content can quickly be extended to political repression; examples from authoritarian states demonstrate how similar systems are used to identify and target dissidents. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Breyer </span><a href="https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/chat-control-2-0-through-the-back-door-breyer-warns-the-eu-is-playing-us-for-fools-now-theyre-scanning-our-texts-and-banning-teens/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">summarized</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> this pattern starkly: “They are selling us security but delivering a total surveillance machine. They promise child protection but punish our children and criminalize privacy.” The implications are ominous. Europe effectively stands on the threshold of building a machine that can see everything. Once constructed, it will serve not only the current political authorities — the idea of Ursula von der Leyen spying on everyone’s messages is disturbing enough — but whoever wields power next. With yet another vote approaching, the window to stop Chat Control is narrowing. </span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1038861</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The EU’s new censorship machine</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2022669077.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Spotlight</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Ursula von der Leyen is amassing power. Sean Gallup/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 15 Nov 2025 00:05:28 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 15 Nov 2025 00:05:28 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brussels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Censorship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ursula von der Leyen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1037283</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Democracy Shield will police speech]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The EU loves talking about freedom. Just look at one of its recent press releases, launching something called the European Democracy Shield, which promises to protect everything from “free people” to “free elections” to — this being Brussels — “a vibrant civil society”. All admirable stuff, perhaps, at least on paper. In reality, though, the Democracy Shield is just the latest vision in <em>unfreedom</em>: suppressing dissent and policing speech under the pretext of defending democracy from foreign interference and fake news.</p>
<p>As part of the Democracy Shield, the Commission proposes the creation of a Monitoring Center that would identify and remove “false content” and “disinformation” from the internet. As Henna Virkkunen, Executive Vice President for Security and Democracy, stated, the Shield will enable Europe to “respond faster and more effectively to information manipulation and hybrid threats”. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, made no secret of the anti-Russian nature of the initiative: “we are seeing campaigns, including from Russia, specifically designed to polarize our citizens, undermine trust in our institutions and pollute politics in our countries.”</p>
<p>The term “independent” appears repeatedly in the press release. A new “independent European network of fact-checkers” will be set up in all official EU languages, while the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), the EU’s flagship “fact-checking” network, financed to the tune of almost €30 million, will gain new “independent” analytical powers to monitor elections and crisis situations. But, remember, independence in Brussels translates to financial dependence on the Commission. Indeed, to guarantee this “independence”, the Commission promises generous funding to &#8220;independent&#8221; NGOs and media outlets.</p>
<p>The Democracy Shield builds upon the recent Digital Services Act (DSA), the most sweeping internet regulation ever implemented in Europe. In theory, these initiatives are meant to protect democracy; in practice, they do the opposite. Their aim isn’t to “fight disinformation”, as claimed, but rather to control the narrative at a time when Europe’s political elites are facing unprecedented levels of public distrust, by centralizing control over the flow of information and imposing a single “truth” defined by Brussels. In short, the European Commission is building a continent-wide censorship machine</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-long-death-of-the-centre-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-long-death-of-the-centre-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/starmbot.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-long-death-of-the-centre-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-long-death-of-the-centre-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The long death of the centre-left</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-long-death-of-the-centre-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As one EU diplomat recently <a href="https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/11/12/eu-unveils-controversial-democracy-shield-with-new-information-monitoring-centre/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a>, in truly Orwellian fashion: “Freedom of speech remains for everyone. At the same time, however, citizens must be free from interference.” But who decides what constitutes “interference”? Who determines what is “true” and what is “fake”? The same institutions and corporate media outlets that have repeatedly engaged in fearmongering and disinformation themselves. Just a few weeks ago, Ursula von der Leyen claimed that the GPS system on her plane had been jammed by Russia — an allegation quickly debunked by <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/gps-jamming-ursula-von-der-leyen-bulgaria-bulgaria-europe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">analysts</a>. Meanwhile, the BBC, often held up as a paragon of journalistic integrity, was recently caught editing footage of a Donald Trump speech to make it appear more extreme.</p>
<p>The EU claims to be protecting citizens from “falsehoods” but on what democratic or moral basis does the Commission assume the authority to decide what is true, especially when it is clear that the EU’s political-media establishment itself engages in disinformation and propaganda on a regular basis? Moreover, when so-called independent fact-checkers are hand-picked and financed by the Commission itself, the result is a closed feedback loop: the EU funds institutions that then “verify” and amplify the EU’s own narratives. The Democracy Shield, like its predecessors, thus institutionalizes the power to define reality itself.</p>
<p>In a series of reports, I have shown that the European Union already operates a vast propaganda and censorship apparatus that spans every level of civil society — <a href="https://brussels.mcc.hu/publication/the-eus-propaganda-machine-how-the-eu-funds-ngos-to-promote-itself" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NGOs</a>, think tanks, <a href="https://brussels.mcc.hu/publication/brusselss-media-machine-eu-media-funding-and-the-shaping-of-public-discourse" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the media</a> and even <a href="https://brussels.mcc.hu/publication/professors-of-propaganda-how-the-eus-jean-monnet-programme-corrodes-academia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">academia</a>. The cornerstone of this system is a network of EU-funded programs — notably CERV (Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values), Creative Europe and the Jean Monnet initiative — that collectively funnel billions of euros into organizations that are, in theory, “independent” but are in fact deeply enmeshed in the Brussels machine.</p>
<p>Through the CERV program alone — which boasts a budget of almost €2 billion for 2021-2027 — more than 3,000 NGOs have received funding to carry out over 1,000 projects. Officially, these funds promote “European values”. In practice, they finance progressive and pro-EU activism: gender ideology, multiculturalism, anti-nationalism and “countering Euroscepticism”. Many projects are explicitly designed to “increase trust in the EU” or “counter anti-EU narratives”. Meanwhile, NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe are generously funded to “combat autocratic narratives” and “challenge Euroscepticism”, often directly targeting governments in Poland (under the previous executive) or Hungary — external influence strategies not unlike those historically associated with agencies like USAID.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/europe.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Kaja Kallas is the real threat to Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The result is a pseudo-civil society — a network of nominally “grassroots” actors functioning as proxies for the Commission, amplifying its agenda and manufacturing the illusion of popular support for its policies.</p>
<p>The same pattern applies to the media. My research has shown that the EU channels at least €80 million annually directly to newspapers, broadcasters, news agencies and “journalistic partnerships”— amounting to nearly €1 billion over the past decade. Programs such as IMREG (Information Measures for Cohesion Policy) have paid media outlets to publish articles praising EU cohesion funds, in some cases without even disclosing that the content was EU-financed. The Commission calls it “raising awareness”. In any other context, it would be called covert advertising or propaganda.</p>
<p>The EU’s propaganda machine extends into academia as well. Through the Jean Monnet program, the Commission allocates about €25 million a year to universities and research institutes worldwide, financing over 1,500 Jean Monnet Chairs in 700 institutions. The goal is not to support independent scholarship but to embed pro-EU ideology into higher education. Official documents state explicitly that recipients are expected to act as “ambassadors of the European Union” and “outreach agents” engaging with media and NGOs. The academy has effectively been transformed into an ideological instrument.</p>
<p>With the Democracy Shield, the Commission now intends to vastly expand this machinery. It proposes to not only establish what amounts to a de facto Ministry of Truth, but also to inject even more money into NGOs, “independent” media and fact-checking networks tasked with promoting “European values”. Von der Leyen is, in effect, buying consensus — and using citizens’ own money to do it — collapsing the boundaries between the European super-state, media, civil society and academia.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Giving the Commission its own intelligence apparatus would mark yet another milestone in Europe’s transformation into a techno-authoritarian juggernaut.&#8221;</div>
<p>And if the EU’s goal, here, were merely to manipulate narratives, that would be alarming enough. But the pattern now points towards direct interference in electoral processes. We have already seen this play out in countries like Romania and Moldova, where local elites — with open or tacit support from Brussels — invoked the specter of “Russian interference” (without providing much evidence) to justify blatant manipulation of domestic elections. In Romania, authorities canceled an election and barred the leading populist candidate from running. In Moldova, pro-EU authorities used “security concerns” to prevent Russia-leaning expatriates from voting. Protecting democracy thus becomes the pretext for suspending it, even as the Democracy Shield explicitly foresees strengthening the European Cooperation Network for Elections and, ominously, promoting “systematic exchanges on the integrity of electoral processes”.</p>
<p>The Commission’s appetite for control is not limited to information and elections. Ursula von der Leyen recently also initiated the creation of a new intelligence unit under the direct authority of the European Commission. The goal, according to the <em>Financial Times</em>, is to unify intelligence data from member states and “enhance the EU’s ability to detect and respond to threats”. The plan foresees the eventual creation of a European intelligence cooperation service, effectively a supranational agency that would operate alongside national intelligence services. Officially, it would enhance “strategic autonomy”. In practice, it would likely function as a subsidiary of Nato and, by extension, of the CIA, especially since the same proposal explicitly calls for “strengthening EU-NATO cooperation”.</p>
<p>It points to a broader worrying trend of power centralization in the hands of the Commission — and of von der Leyen personally. Understandably, many observers <a href="https://x.com/yanisvaroufakis/status/1988139297925722574" target="_blank" rel="noopener">find</a> the prospect of giving “Empress Ursula” an army of supranational spies — operating beyond the oversight of national parliaments — profoundly disturbing. Giving an unelected, opaque institution like the Commission its own intelligence apparatus would mark yet another milestone in Europe’s transformation into a techno-authoritarian juggernaut — one that surveils not foreign enemies, but its own citizens.</p>
<p>Seen in this context, the Democracy Shield appears like nothing more than a tool to further institutionalize a regime of managed speech and narrative control. Its goal is to police online speech according to vague, politically charged definitions of “disinformation”; to compel platforms, journalists, academics and citizens alike to conform to a narrow, Commission-approved worldview; and to silence dissent in the name of “fighting foreign interference”. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that the real war on democracy isn’t being waged by Moscow or Beijing; it is being waged from within, by the very institutions claiming to defend it.</p>
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					<title>Will Britain ever escape the European Court?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>75 years on</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The ECHR was once a guardian of liberty. Not anymore. Oli Scarff via Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 00:03:05 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 12:13:29 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[juristocracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[post-war liberalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sovereignty]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1035752</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Rule by judges protects elite interests]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>For much of its existence, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and its enforcement arm, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), occupied a relatively uncontroversial place in the European and British imagination, credited with landmark advances in civil rights, from protections for journalistic freedom to equality for homosexuals. Yet, 75 years after its founding, the institution that was once seen as a guardian of liberty has become something quite different: a transnational court that functions in practice as a supranational authority, reserving for itself the power to decide, and constantly redefine, what counts as a “human right”.</p>
<p>In recent years, the Court has increasingly come into conflict with elected governments — most notably over questions of migration and deportation. Its critics, particularly in Britain, argue that the Convention has expanded far beyond its original remit, interfering in areas that go to the heart of democratic sovereignty: border control, national security and the prerogative of parliaments to set the law. When nine European leaders signed a joint letter in May this year, questioning whether the ECtHR had overstepped its mandate on migration, the Council of Europe’s Secretary General, Alain Berset, dismissed their concerns outright. “No judicial body should be subject to political pressure,” he declared. The implication was clear: the ECtHR sits above democratic scrutiny; its authority, derived from moral principle rather than electoral consent, is to be accepted without debate.</p>
<p>A key turning point came in 2023, when the ECtHR intervened, via Rule 39, to block the UK’s so-called “Rwanda plan”, which would send certain asylum seekers and illegal migrants to Africa for processing. Just hours before the first flight was due to depart, a single judge in Strasbourg issued an emergency injunction that grounded it. Whatever one’s opinion of the policy, the episode raised a profound constitutional question: should an unelected foreign judge have the power to overturn a decision approved by a sovereign parliament?</p>
<p>The debate has only intensified since. Both the Conservatives and Nigel Farage’s Reform UK have pledged to withdraw from the Convention. Even Keir Starmer, while rejecting outright withdrawal, has suggested the Government will review how international human rights law, including the ECHR, is interpreted by British courts — particularly to stop unsuccessful asylum seekers from blocking deportation.</p>
<p>Leaving the Convention would not, by itself, solve the complex problem of illegal migration. But across Europe, elected governments — in Poland, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands and elsewhere — have often found themselves constrained when trying to respond to growing public concern over the phenomenon which has become one of the defining political issues of our time. What we are witnessing is not simply a technical legal dispute, but a clash between democracy and a transnational judiciary that increasingly sees itself as a moral authority above politics.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/what-reform-could-learn-from-greece/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/what-reform-could-learn-from-greece/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/boats.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/what-reform-could-learn-from-greece/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/what-reform-could-learn-from-greece/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What Reform could learn from Greece</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/what-reform-could-learn-from-greece/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The European Court of Human Rights has, over the past two decades, engineered what can <a href="https://brussels.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/02/e737af034aaeeca0f918034272f66c9752d9b6fe.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">be described as</a> a “quiet power grab”. Through a series of legal innovations and doctrinal reinterpretations, the Court has progressively widened its jurisdiction, often beyond what member states ever agreed to.</p>
<p>One of the Court’s controversial doctrines is that of extraterritorial jurisdiction — the idea that the ECHR applies even outside a state’s borders. This instrument has allowed the Court to extend its reach into foreign territory and even international waters. In the case of <em>Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy</em>, for instance, the Court ruled in 2012 that Italy could not intercept migrants in the Mediterranean and return them to Libya, despite the operation taking place outside Italian territory. The result was a de facto outlawing of “pushbacks”, which is a core component of border enforcement. In practice, the judgment meant that states could no longer prevent illegal entrants from reaching their shores to lodge asylum claims, no matter the operational or humanitarian cost.</p>
<p>Another key development concerns the doctrine of non-refoulement — the prohibition on returning individuals to countries where they may face serious harm. Though not explicitly mentioned in the Convention, the ECtHR has expanded this principle far beyond its original postwar intent. In several cases, the Court has ruled that even transfers to other EU countries may be unlawful if conditions there are deemed inadequate. It has also insisted that each deportation must be subject to an “individualized assessment” of risk — an administrative nightmare that renders mass removals practically impossible. National security considerations are given almost no weight: even individuals deemed dangerous cannot be expelled if they might face mistreatment abroad.</p>
<p>Finally, there is Article 8 of the Convention — the “right to respect for private and family life”. Once a narrowly defined protection of home and correspondence, it has become a catch-all provision invoked to prevent deportations of convicted criminals and illegal immigrants. The Court has repeatedly ruled that deportations must be halted if an offender has established a family life in the host country, however tenuous. This has led to an avalanche of cases in which serious offenders — from violent criminals to drug traffickers — have successfully appealed against removal on Article 8 grounds. British tabloids have gleefully reported cases where criminals were able to avoid deportation because their child <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/albania-deportation-chcken-%20nuggets-home-office-b2695233.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">liked chicken nuggets</a> or <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14327129/Jamaican-drug-dealer-avoids-deportation-gender-questioning-child-speak-issue.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">questioned their gender</a>. But behind the tabloid absurdity lies a serious constitutional reality: an international court has assumed the authority to decide who may remain within a nation’s borders.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/europes-boneheaded-sanctions-regime/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/europes-boneheaded-sanctions-regime/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-2181230452.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/europes-boneheaded-sanctions-regime/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/europes-boneheaded-sanctions-regime/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe’s boneheaded sanctions regime</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/europes-boneheaded-sanctions-regime/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Court’s defenders insist that it merely applies the principles that states themselves agreed to uphold. Yet this is no longer credible. The ECtHR has, by its own admission, embraced the doctrine of the Convention as a “living instrument” — meaning that its provisions must be interpreted in light of “present-day conditions”. In practice, this gives judges carte blanche to reinterpret and expand the meaning of rights according to contemporary political sensibilities. What began as a limited postwar charter has become an evolving moral code enforced by an unelected elite with a de facto veto power over national law.</p>
<p>The ECHR, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. The Court operates within a wider ecosystem of judicial and technocratic power that extends far beyond Strasbourg. Its rulings are cited by the European Court of Justice, domestic supreme courts and international bodies, and often transcribed into national law. National judges, NGOs and human-rights lobbies use its jurisprudence to influence policymaking. An entire regime of judicialized governance has emerged — what legal scholar Ran Hirschl has <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674025479" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> juristocracy: rule by judges.</p>
<p>Over the past half-century, vast areas of public life once decided through political debate — from migration and security to macroeconomic policy — have been transferred from parliaments to courts, tribunals and independent authorities. This process of depoliticization was a deliberate response by political elites to the growing assertiveness of mass democracy. As voting rights expanded in the late 19th and 20th centuries, Europe’s ruling classes feared that popular majorities might use their new power to challenge the economic and social order. The solution was to create institutional checks — constitutional courts, independent central banks, and supranational treaties and institutions — that insulated key areas of governance from democratic contestation.</p>
<p>In the postwar decades, this model spread rapidly. Germany, Italy, France and Austria all established constitutional courts with the power to strike down legislation. Internationally, new bodies such as the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice emerged as guardians of a liberal order that placed “rights” and markets above popular sovereignty. Even Westminster-style systems like Britain eventually succumbed. In the Seventies and Eighties, political elites across the Anglosphere embraced judicialization as a means of enforcing policies that might otherwise have faced public resistance.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Political elites across the Anglosphere embraced judicialization as a means of enforcing policies that might otherwise have faced public resistance.&#8221;</div>
<p>Examples include the creation of independent monetary and pricing bodies, and the extensive use of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (quangos) to implement policy at arm’s length from parliamentary control. The 1998 Human Rights Act, which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law, epitomizes the judicialization trend. As Hirschl observed, “deference to the judiciary” served elite interests well: for example, it allowed governments to pursue controversial neoliberal economic and labor reforms while blaming unelected judges or independent bodies for their consequences.</p>
<p>The result is the system we inhabit today: a “constrained democracy” in which the forms of representation remain, but the substance of political choice has been hollowed out. Immigration policy, once the preserve of parliaments, has become the domain of judges interpreting “rights”. Economic and social policies are now dictated by international treaties and constitutional doctrines.</p>
<p>To criticize the ECtHR is not to oppose human rights, but to ask who defines them and by what authority. When “rights” are expanded indefinitely without democratic consent, they cease to be instruments of liberty and become tools of control. Governments, meanwhile, though nominally constrained by such courts, often welcome their interference, which allows them to outsource politically costly decisions to unelected judges — to pursue or preserve policies they privately support but dare not defend — or simply to evade responsibility for problems they are incapable of solving. This is why politicians’ condemnations of the ECHR, especially coming from the Conservative camp that so spectacularly betrayed the Brexit mandate while in power, ring so hollow.</p>
<p>The British public appears to sense this contradiction. While many citizens would probably agree that the ECHR’s authority has gone too far, polls <a href="https://nation.cymru/news/more-support-for-staying-in-echr-than-leaving-poll-suggests/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggest</a> that a majority do not favor outright withdrawal from the Convention. Perhaps they intuitively understand that leaving the ECHR would make sense only as part of a broader project of political renewal — a re-democratization of governance that restores the primacy of parliament and popular sovereignty. But such a project would require a political class that actually believes in democracy — something in short supply, in Britain and across Europe.</p>
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					<title>Europe’s boneheaded sanctions regime</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/09/europes-boneheaded-sanctions-regime/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/09/europes-boneheaded-sanctions-regime/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>energy</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Unless there is a dramatic shift, the continent’s future will be one of stagnation and irrelevance'. John Thys/AFP via Getty.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 23:03:14 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 23:03:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LNG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sanctions]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=1029118</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Moscow and Beijing are laughing at Brussels]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“It is time to turn off the tap,” announced European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week, in her 19th attempt to apply pressure on Russia. The latest proposed package of sanctions includes a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) from January 2027 — one year earlier than previously planned — and extends sanctions to refineries and oil traders in third countries, such as China and Russia, accused of helping Russia circumvent sanctions.</p>
<p>On paper, this is presented as a decisive step to “cut Russia’s war revenues” and to force Moscow to the negotiating table. In practice, it is little more than the continuation of a policy that has failed time and time again. Russia has not been brought to its knees and has redirected energy flows elsewhere, while Europe has been crippled by higher prices and locked itself into a position of permanent dependence on the United States.</p>
<p>Before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia was the EU’s largest supplier of oil and natural gas. Since then, Russia’s share of EU oil imports has dropped from 29% to 2%, and that of gas from 48% to 12%. Yet imports have not ceased entirely. Two pipelines remain operational: the Druzhba pipeline, which still delivers oil to Hungary and Slovakia, and the TurkStream pipeline, which supplies gas to Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece and Romania. Meanwhile, the EU has rushed to replace Russian pipeline gas with much more expensive and volatile LNG, whose share of total EU gas imports has more than doubled from 20% to 50%. Nearly half of this LNG now comes from the United States, making Europe the most important market for US LNG exports.</p>
<p>The irony is that while the EU boasted of cutting pipeline imports from Russia, it has <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/1707644/eu-imported-e4-4-billion-worth-of-russian-lng-in-first-half-of-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">quietly increased</a> its purchases of Russian LNG, most of which goes to France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. This is simply a matter of economic reality: not only is Russian LNG <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ef4230c1-befa-4053-97b2-397c69c20002" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“significantly cheaper”</a> than American liquefied gas, but existing agreements <a href="https://ca.news.yahoo.com/eu-sets-2027-deadline-phase-152806926.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bind</a> European buyers to Russian supplies.</p>
<p>Nothing, however, illustrates the absurdity of the EU’s sanctions regime more than the fact that Europe continues to indirectly import large quantities of Russian oil. Instead of buying cheap crude directly from Russia, as it used to, it now purchases refined products from countries like India and Turkey, which import Russian crude, refine it and sell it back to Europe at a significant markup. In the first six months of 2025 alone, the EU and Turkey <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/economia/2025/09/14/news/petrolio_russia_paesi_nato_ue_trump_ucraina-424845288/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">imported</a> 2.4 million tonnes of petroleum products from India. Estimates suggest that two thirds of this originated from Russian crude. In effect, the EU and Turkey paid India around €1.5 billion for oil that was Russian in all but name.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/fazi.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The myth of central bank independence</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This means that Europe is now paying more for the same Russian oil than it did before, while also paying more for LNG to replace Russian pipeline gas. The bloc has thus shot itself in the foot twice: once by substituting cheap Russian pipeline gas with more expensive American (and Russian) LNG, and again by substituting direct Russian oil imports with indirect and more costly purchases from India and Turkey.</p>
<p>The consequences have been brutal. Europe has endured three consecutive years of industrial stagnation. Germany — once the engine of the continent — is now experiencing outright deindustrialization, with 125,000 industrial jobs <a href="https://www.insideredgereport.com/p/germanys-125000-job-cuts" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lost</a> in just the past few weeks.</p>
<p>Russia, meanwhile, has emerged relatively unscathed, redirecting its exports to Asia and consolidating its partnership with China. From the standpoint of Europe’s long-term interests, the obvious path would be to re-normalize economic relations with Moscow, resume cheap energy imports and work towards a negotiated end to the war. But rationality has long since disappeared from European policy. Indeed, Brussels has doubled down, announcing not only the LNG ban but also a de facto prohibition on any future use of the Nord Stream pipelines, while at the same time sabotaging any peace effort.</p>
<p>The justification, once again, is that sanctions will force Russia to end the war on the West’s terms. The reality is that 18 packages of sanctions have failed to achieve this goal, and the 19th will fare no better. What it will do, however, is deepen Europe’s dependence on the United States.</p>
<p>Indeed, the timing of the new sanctions package was not coincidental. Just days earlier, Donald Trump issued an ultimatum to Nato allies. The US, he declared, would only impose “major” new sanctions on Russia once Europeans had agreed to stop buying Russian oil. He went further, suggesting Nato impose 50-100% tariffs on China and India, both of which he accused of circumventing sanctions. He insisted such measures would weaken Russia’s “strong control” over its partners. Trump even claimed that halting Russian energy imports, combined with heavy tariffs on China, would be “of great help” in ending the conflict.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-needs-a-metternich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-needs-a-metternich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2222761288.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-needs-a-metternich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-needs-a-metternich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe needs a Metternich</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-needs-a-metternich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The logic is baffling. Europe has no power to force China or India to stop buying Russian oil. Tariffs on those countries would fuel sky-high inflation and trigger counter-tariffs that would devastate European exporters, while doing little to change their purchasing behavior. Even EU diplomats privately <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-donald-trump-russia-politics-ukraine-nato-tariffs/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">acknowledge</a> that Trump’s conditions are unrealistic — as Trump himself likely understands all too well. Yet his demands reveal the transactional essence of transatlantic politics today.</p>
<p>Trump’s ultimatum dovetails with a broader US strategy: to dominate Europe’s energy market. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright made this explicit: “You want to have secure energy suppliers that are your allies, not your foes.” Under Washington’s plan, the US could account for nearly three-quarters of Europe’s LNG imports within a few years. Indeed, ExxonMobil now <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/45169ac4-c51c-4d03-8b77-c6155a0e1b44" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expects</a> Europe to sign multi-decade contracts of US gas as part of its pledge to buy $750 billion American energy.</p>
<p>Until recently, EU countries resisted such deals, fearing fossil fuel dependence and the undermining of climate goals. But the tide has shifted. Italy’s Eni recently signed a 20-year deal with Venture Global, its first long-term agreement with a US LNG producer. Edison and Germany’s Sefe have signed similar agreements. The result is structural dependence on US gas — which is not only more expensive but also has a far higher carbon footprint than Russian pipeline gas — for decades to come. This is a textbook example of geopolitical vassalage.</p>
<p>But it gets worse. Even as Europe is told to cut all ties with Russian energy, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/exxon-rosneft-russia-oil-talks-f524e81f" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reports</a> have emerged of secret talks between ExxonMobil and the Russian oil company Rosneft about resuming cooperation on the massive Sakhalin project in Russia’s Far East. If confirmed, it would mean that while Europeans are forbidden to buy cheap Russian gas and oil, American companies are quietly preparing to return. The aim, it would seem, is to buy Russian energy cheaply, resell it at a premium and push competitors like Turkey and India out of the game.</p>
<p>But there’s a clear flaw in this strategy. It is hard to imagine US companies actually resuming business with Russia while the war continues — especially as Washington threatens ever-tighter sanctions on Russia and its key partners, such as China and India. Indeed, Exxon’s CEO has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exxon-mobil-has-no-plans-re-enter-russia-financial-times-reports-2025-09-18/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">denied</a> the rumors. This contradiction highlights the limits of Trump’s transactional approach: the belief that he can neatly separate economics from politics, striking commercial deals with Moscow while challenging Russia’s broader security and geopolitical aims.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The result is a geopolitical paradox so twisted that it almost defies comprehension.&#8221;</div>
<p>All the while, the push to decouple Europe from Russian energy has only strengthened the strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing. Earlier this month, they signed a memorandum to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a $13.6-billion project stretching 2,600 kilometers through Mongolia. If confirmed, it would deliver 50 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China, providing Beijing with a reliable source of cheap energy.</p>
<p>For Europe, this is a disaster. Having voluntarily cut itself off from Russian energy, the continent is now committed to a future of high prices and low competitiveness. Russia, by contrast, is securing long-term markets in Asia. The new pipeline would also have implications for the US as well. Analysts <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3324749/china-russia-pipeline-would-be-shock-global-lng-trade-analysts" target="_blank" rel="noopener">predict</a> the pipeline will cause a “structural shock” to global LNG trade, reducing China’s reliance on seaborne cargoes and undermining US ambitions for long-term contracts.</p>
<p>But this simply highlights why it is imperative for the US to keep its client states as reliant as possible on American fossil fuels. Seen in this light, the war has been nothing short of a triumph for the United States: guaranteeing windfall profits for its energy companies and binding Europe ever more tightly to its geopolitical priorities. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that this outcome was part of the rationale all along. After all, driving a permanent wedge between Europe and Russia while securing Europe as a captive market for US energy has arguably been a consistent <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">objective</a> of American strategy for decades.</p>
<p>By adopting sanctions that align with Trump’s demands, Brussels is sacrificing what remains of its autonomy. The result is a geopolitical paradox so twisted that it almost defies comprehension. European governments, trapped by their own rhetoric and by a dogmatic commitment to permanent confrontation with Moscow, have maneuvered themselves into a laughable position. They have allowed Trump to frame his demands as a perverse quid pro quo: he can present Europe’s economic self-harm and growing dependence on US energy as the price they must pay in order to accelerate their own strategic decline.</p>
<p>Overall, the EU’s energy policy since 2022 has been a textbook case of self-inflicted harm. By cutting itself off from cheap Russian supplies, it has handed the United States a once-in-a-generation opportunity to dominate Europe’s energy market. By embracing sanctions, which have failed to weaken Russia but have devastated European industry, Brussels has turned the continent into a geopolitical pawn. Europe’s leaders claim to be defending values and solidarity; in reality, they are presiding over a process of deindustrialization and decline, while continuing to dangerously escalate tensions with Russia. Unless there is a dramatic shift, the continent’s future will be one of stagnation and irrelevance — and, at worst, all-out war.</p>
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					<title>The myth of central bank independence</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/09/the-myth-of-central-bank-independence/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/fazi.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>technocracy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Trump has lambasted Powell as a 'numbskull'. Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2025 23:02:23 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 16 Jan 2026 18:00:08 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ECB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neoliberalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[the federal reserve]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=762430</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Unelected bureaucrats run Western economies]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The stage was set for a classic Washington showdown. Yesterday Stephen Miran, one of Donald Trump’s key economic advisors, sat before a Senate Banking Committee to testify on his nomination to the powerful Federal Reserve Board. The President’s relentless campaign to bend the world’s most influential central bank to his will is gathering steam.</p>
<p>For years, Trump lambasted Fed Chair Jerome Powell as a “numbskull” and a “stubborn mule” for refusing to slash interest rates on command. But now the rhetoric has turned to action, with Trump firing the sitting Governor Lisa Cook over claims of mortgage fraud. Enter Miran, an acolyte who has publicly argued for the President’s right to dismiss Fed governors at will, yet who promised in his written testimony to uphold the Fed’s cherished independence.</p>
<p>This dramatic confrontation has sent a familiar shudder through the halls of global finance: central bank independence, they tell us, is under grave threat. The guardians of economic orthodoxy — from central bank governors to mainstream economists and pundits — are ringing alarm bells, warning that political control of monetary policy would be a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y3110edzgo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">very serious danger”</a> to the global economy and would <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/dd3e505d-9093-4bed-8bfb-f241f7a2a3ea" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“undermine the very foundations of our democracy”</a>. This has been the mainstream mantra for the past 40 years. The narrative is clear: independent central banks are technocratic bulwarks against the short-term, populist whims of politicians, and their autonomy is synonymous with economic stability and democratic health.</p>
<p>The concept of central bank independence appeared in the wake of the stagflation crisis of the Seventies. According to the Chicago School economists, short-sighted, vote-hungry politicians could not be trusted with the levers of monetary policy: they would be tempted to juice the economy with low rates before an election, risking longer-term inflation for short-term gain. The solution was to hand the keys to the economy to a priesthood of supposedly apolitical and neutral experts — technocrats immune from electoral pressures who could make tough, necessary decisions for the long-term health of the economy.</p>
<p>This idea was institutionalized globally in the Eighties and Nineties. Countries like the UK, Canada, and Sweden granted their central banks statutory independence. The pinnacle of this movement was the creation of the European Central Bank in 1998, designed from the ground up to be fiercely independent with a single-minded focus on price stability. To this day, it remains an unquestionable dogma. As IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/03/21/strengthen-central-bank-independence-to-protect-the-world-economy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stated</a> earlier this year, “independence is critical to winning the fights against inflation and achieving stable long-term economic growth.” Any threat to it is treated as economic heresy. But this dogma collapses under scrutiny.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2182550504-e1747044989980.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The battle for the Fed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Leah Downey</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The most compelling rebuttal to the panic is also the simplest: the myth of independence was always just that — a myth. As economist James Galbraith <a href="https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/4/article/two-ossified-american-rituals-the-budget-and-the-central-bank.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">noted</a>, the historical record shows that since its inception the Fed has been a creature of the state. Created by Congress in 1913, its powers are granted, limited and revised through legislation. The Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 also subjected it to regular congressional scrutiny. Congress, in other words, has always held the ultimate authority. It appoints the Fed’s leadership and, crucially, has the legal power to mandate policy changes, a threat it wielded in 1982. Former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke himself once <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pH2RLObp41o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conceded</a> that “the Fed will do whatever Congress tells us to do”. The debate thus shouldn’t be about defending a fiction, but about deciding who the Fed should answer to: the<br />
executive — as Trump would want — the legislature, or, ideally, the public.</p>
<p>Moreover, on a practical and operational level, central banks <em>cannot</em> be fully independent from the treasury. The functions of the two have to be closely coordinated on a daily basis to ensure that the policy targets of each can be met. They are two wings of the same government body, not separate entities. This is the case in most Western countries: a former Reserve Bank of Australia governor, for example, <a href="https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/1994/sp-gov-231194.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">noted</a> in 1994 that legislation in most democracies allows the elected government to override the central bank. Independence, in other words, was always conditional, a carefully managed illusion. The only real exception is the ECB — a point we will return to.</p>
<p>Central bank independence may be an illusion, then, but it is one that has proved extraordinarily useful for elites. It has been one of the most powerful neoliberal tools to depoliticize unpopular economic actions, such as austerity or high interest rates, allowing elected governments to divert responsibility to “external” agencies, such as budgetary offices, or to “independent” central banks, for policies that they themselves supported but feared selling to the public.</p>
<p>In Britain and elsewhere, governments are once again accused of “overspending”, and citizens are told that ballooning deficits and rising bond yields leave no choice but to cut spending or raise taxes — even, in some cases, to consider an IMF bailout. But this yet another myth: while fiscal deficits are often linked to bond issuance — seemingly giving private markets leverage over governments — in reality central banks can (and do) always intervene, purchasing bonds themselves and setting yields at will. The real problem lies in the deliberately opaque accounting structures that conceal this fact, perpetuating the illusion of market discipline where none truly exists.</p>
<p>Small wonder the establishment is freaking out as Trump&#8217;s actions risk exposing their cynical ruse. Especially since the era of supposedly independent central banking has been a parade of catastrophic failures. These expert technocrats failed to predict the 2008 financial crash. They then spent a decade failing to revive inflation to their targets. And from 2020 onward, they catastrophically failed to see the coming inflationary surge, responding with the most aggressive rate-hiking cycle in decades while failing to bring down inflation.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Small wonder the establishment is freaking out as Trump&#8217;s actions risk exposing their cynical ruse.&#8221;</div>
<p>This isn’t just because central banks privileged policies that benefited the financial sector at the expense of the real economy. Ultimately, it’s because their power to steer the economy has been exaggerated. In the past, the Fed could influence the economy through commercial banks. Today, shadow banking and global capital markets dwarf its traditional tools — not to mention the fact that the true drivers of inflation, supply and demand, are largely beyond the control of<br />
central banks. Galbraith put it bluntly: “Fifty years ago, the actions of the Federal Reserve mattered. Today, they do not.” Their policies have often simply exacerbated inequality and fueled financial bubbles, proving their technocratic expertise is a shadow of the power ascribed to them.</p>
<p>In any case, even if true independence were possible, it would be profoundly undesirable, since the institution would be truly unaccountable. Just look at the only major central bank designed to be truly independent of democratic institutions: the European Central Bank. Whereas in currency-issuing nations, the central bank is effectively dependent on government or representative institutions, that relationship switches in the euro area, where governments are dependent on their central bank.</p>
<p>In the wake of the financial crisis, the ECB revealed itself as a brutally political actor. In 2011, it forced Silvio Berlusconi to leave office in favor of the unelected Mario Monti, by effectively engineering a fiscal crisis by discontinuing the central bank’s Italian bond purchases. Then, in 2015, it arbitrarily shut down the Greek banking system to force an elected government to accept austerity.</p>
<p>In short, by adopting the euro, European nations did not merely relinquish control over their monetary policy to a supranational authority — an unprecedented move in monetary history — but they ceded it to an authority with a clear, elite-driven socioeconomic agenda. This underscores the reality of a central bank that is truly independent of democratic mechanisms.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/europe.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Kaja Kallas is the real threat to Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But even currency-issuing governments are not immune. The fate of UK Prime Minister Liz Truss is a stark example. The mainstream narrative is that the “markets” punished her for an irresponsible budget. The reality, as Narayana Kocherlakota, former president of the Minneapolis Fed, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/markets-didnt-oust-truss-the-bank-of-england-did/2022/10/26/dd92c4d2-54eb-11ed-ac8b-08bbfab1c5a5_story.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">noted</a>, is that “markets didn’t oust Truss, the Bank of England did”. Like Trump, Truss’s real sin was challenging the orthodox narrative and questioning the Bank’s remit, not her admittedly questionable economic policies.</p>
<p>One of her first acts was to sack the Treasury’s top official, a symbol of fiscal conservatism and central bank deference. In response, the Bank of England, by deliberately refusing to quickly quell market turbulence, effectively orchestrated her downfall. Truss, of course, bears responsibility for failing to stand up to the central bank — and for not insisting that it accommodate the policy of the elected executive. It was a stark lesson in how the myth of independence empowers unaccountable institutions to veto the platform of an elected government.</p>
<p>The real debate we should be having, then, is not about preserving a myth, but about redesigning the system for genuine democratic accountability. The advent of quantitative easing proved what critics always said: money is created out of thin air. The urgent question is who controls that process, and for what purpose. Optimally, the central bank and treasury should be formally consolidated. There is no technical reason for one part of the state to “lend” to another.</p>
<p>This would end the obfuscation, make macroeconomic policy fully accountable to voters and refocus our efforts on the policies that truly matter: fiscal, industrial and investment strategies. The implications are particularly stark for eurozone countries: the only way to restore genuine democratic accountability is to abandon the single currency and reclaim economic sovereignty. Until we smash the myth of central bank independence, we will remain trapped in a system where economic power is wielded without responsibility — a system that is not only inefficient but corrosive to democracy itself.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">762430</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Mario Draghi’s neoliberal hypocrisy</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/08/mario-draghis-neoliberal-hypocrisy/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/08/mario-draghis-neoliberal-hypocrisy/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-2203937951.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>EU</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['If Draghi’s refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the EU’s problems is bad enough, his proposed solutions are worse still.' Photo: Martin Bertrand/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 23:02:14 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 29 Aug 2025 11:05:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Central Bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Integration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Italy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neoliberalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[single market]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=704451</guid>
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								<![CDATA[He turned Europe into an American vassal]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“For years,” Mario Draghi <a href="https://archive.is/VvVfW" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proclaimed</a> last week, “the European Union believed that its economic dimension, with 450 million consumers, brought with it geopolitical power and influence in international trade relations.” But this year, he said, would be remembered for when that illusion evaporated. As the former European Central Bank president and erstwhile Italian premier explained, the EU has been pressured by the United States into accepting damaging tariffs and needlessly high military spending “in ways and forms that likely do not reflect Europe’s interests”, even as it had been reduced to a mere “spectator” everywhere from Gaza to Ukraine.</p>
<p>Draghi is often praised for his rare bluntness in assessing Europe’s condition, a quality that has earned him a reputation as one of the continent’s most insightful thinkers. And, certainly, he is right in arguing that the neoliberal architecture of the EU — grounded in “a conscious reduction of the power of states” in favor of rules-based market mechanisms — has left Europe woefully unequipped to navigate a world where military and economic power are increasingly deployed to protect national interests.</p>
<p>The problem is, Draghi’s so-called analyses usually amount to little more than stating the obvious — facts that are evident to anyone not blinded by ideology or vested interests. The acclaim, in short, says less about Draghi’s brilliance than about the poverty of European public debate. But even more importantly, while Draghi may correctly grasp the surface symptoms of Europe’s malaise, he consistently fails — deliberately so — in properly diagnosing their underlying causes.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The problem is not lack of integration but integration itself.&#8221;</div>
<p>For if he is right to say that the EU’s neoliberal framework — based upon state retrenchment, fiscal austerity, wage compression and an obsession with boosting exports — has weakened Europe, it’s a policy cocktail that he himself helped blend. He was an architect and enforcer of that model. Already in the early Nineties, when he was director general of the Italian finance ministry, he emerged as a leading advocate of the concept of <em>vincolo esterno</em> (“external constraint”) — the idea that only by “tying the hands” of national governments via a political-economic straitjacket could neoliberal reforms, which lacked popular support, be forced through. That external constraint was, of course, the European Union, and above all the single currency, whose roadmap was laid out in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. In that position, Draghi was also instrumental in driving forward the large-scale privatization of Italy’s state-owned enterprises.</p>
<p>Over the next three decades, moving between the private sector (notably Goldman Sachs) and senior public posts, Draghi established himself as one of the foremost champions of neoliberal orthodoxy. This role reached its fullest expression during his tenure as president of the ECB from 2011 to 2019, and the act that symbolically marked the beginning of his tenure couldn’t be more paradigmatic.</p>
<p>In August 2011, at the height of the so-called “euro crisis”, Draghi and his outgoing predecessor Jean-Claude Trichet sent a letter to the Italian government. Intended to remain secret, it was subsequently <a href="https://www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_italiano_405e2be2-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml">leaked</a>. The letter claimed that Italy’s post-crisis deficit-cutting plan was “not sufficient”, and set out detailed demands, including “the full liberalization of local public services”, “large scale privatizations”, wage reductions and even “constitutional reform tightening fiscal rules”. Giulio Tremonti, Italy’s then-minister of economy and finance, later privately told a group of European finance ministers that his government had received two threatening letters that year: one from a terrorist group, the other from the ECB. “The one from the ECB was worse”, he quipped.</p>
<p>Draghi must have concluded that the conditions set out in the letter had not been met, because a few months later he “forced” (to <a href="https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/11/09/2195680/the-euro-is-not-a-punishment-system/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">quote</a> the solidly neoliberal <em>Financial Times</em>) Silvio Berlusconi to leave office in favor of the unelected Mario Monti. Draghi achieved this by discontinuing the central bank’s Italian bond purchases — thus deliberately causing interest rates to rise above safety levels — and by making Berlusconi’s ouster the precondition for further ECB support of Italian bonds. This was belatedly admitted by none other than Monti himself, who <a href="https://www.corriere.it/politica/17_luglio_15/mario-monti-renzi-disco-rotto-fiscal-compact-governo-deficit-" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed in a 2017 interview</a> that, in late 2011, Draghi “decided to stop the purchases of Italian government bonds, which had kept the Berlusconi government afloat in the summer and autumn of 2011”.</p>
<p>It is hard to imagine a more disturbing scenario than a supposedly “independent” and “apolitical” central bank using monetary blackmail to oust an elected government from office and impose its own political agenda. Yet all evidence suggests that this — a monetary coup d’état — is exactly what happened in Italy in 2011. Just a few years later, Draghi deployed the same tools against Greece, effectively shutting down the country’s banking system to force the government to comply with EU-demanded austerity policies, which Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s then-finance minister, likened to a form of “economic waterboarding”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Screenshot-2025-05-30-at-11.33.44.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The real winner of Europe’s Russia policy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Even in his brief role as Italian premier, between 2021 and 2022, Draghi continued these policies. The few “structural” measures enacted by his government were all aimed at promoting privatization, liberalization, deregulation and fiscal consolidation — while he imposed on his country some of the most draconian Covid policies in the world.</p>
<p>Overall, then, few figures over the past decades have been more unwavering in their commitment to advancing undemocratic neoliberalism than Mario Draghi. But his responsibility for Europe’s downward spiral extends well beyond his role as neoliberal enforcer-in-chief. In his speech last week, he effectively conceded that the EU had been vassalized by the United States. Yet, once again, Draghi omitted any mention of his own role in bringing about this sorry state of affairs: he has always been a staunch Atlanticist, and as such has played a key role in ensuring the EU’s structural subordination to Washington.</p>
<p>The EU’s response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis is a good case in point. In his much-discussed report on European competitiveness, published a year ago this week, Draghi highlighted high energy costs as one of the main reasons for the EU’s loss of competitiveness. The report emphasized that European companies face significantly steeper prices compared to their US counterparts, seriously hindering industrial growth and investment.</p>
<p>Fair enough — yet this was hardly an act of God. Rather, it was a direct consequence of the EU’s decision to decouple from Russian gas, which before the war accounted for almost half of the bloc’s supply, in favor of much more expensive American liquefied natural gas (LNG). More to the point, this policy was vehemently supported by Draghi. Shortly after Russia’s invasion, he defended as prime minister the EU’s decision to impose a gas embargo on Russia, from which Italy imported around 40% of its gas. “Do you want air conditioning or peace?”, he <a href="https://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2022/04/07/do-you-want-air-conditioning-or-peace-asks-draghi_0121bf79-3ee5-4942-8e9f-f917dedece0a.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">asked</a>, the logic stark in its dubiousness. Draghi was likely suggesting that sanctions would soon cripple the Russian economy and force an end to the war — a scenario that anyone with even a rudimentary grasp of economic and geopolitical realities could have dismissed from the outset.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/afd.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Merkel fuelled the AfD</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Katja Hoyer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A few months later, in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8BArVz6aTw" target="_blank" rel="noopener">speech</a> at the UN that in retrospect appears almost comically misguided, Draghi doubled down, claiming that the sanctions had imposed “extremely harsh costs on Russia” and had “a disruptive effect on the Russian war machine and on its economy”, making it “harder for Russia to respond to the defeats piling up on the battlefield”. As we know, none of this came to pass — the Russian economy proved resilient, the war machine kept churning, and the defeats mounted not in Moscow but in Draghi’s delusional forecasts. All of this was easily predictable, and indeed was predicted by many of us.</p>
<p>All this raises an obvious question: how is it that Draghi continues to be an enlightened statesman for denouncing the consequences of flawed policies he himself promoted? In a normal world, he would be laughed off the stage — or pelted with rotten eggs. That he so easily evades accountability is the clearest expression of the kakistocratic nature of EU politics, where failure is not punished but rewarded, and where incompetent leaders routinely fail upwards.</p>
<p>But if Draghi’s refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the EU’s problems is bad enough, his proposed solutions are worse still. For Draghi, the cure for the EU’s dysfunction is — to give the EU even more power. “The European Union will have to move towards new forms of integration”, he declared in his latest speech. Translation: yet more political, fiscal, military and technological centralization. In other words, then, Europe’s problems, in Draghi’s view, can only be solved by transferring still more authority to Brussels and further sidelining national governments and parliaments.</p>
<p>But the last thing Europe needs is to give even more power to people like Draghi. On the contrary, if the continent is to have any chance of reversing its decline, it must reject the delusional dogma of “more Europe” and finally hold to account the very technocrats who built the crisis-ridden order they now pretend to diagnose.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">704451</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Trump’s Ukraine endgame</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/08/trumps-ukraine-endgame/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/08/trumps-ukraine-endgame/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/troompo.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Diplomacy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The summit amounted to an indirect acknowledgment that the West has effectively lost this war.' Photo: Win McNamee/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2025 23:03:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 20 Aug 2025 09:13:18 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=702018</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[An American retreat will be disguised as peace]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Though this week’s White House meeting between Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelensky and a bunch of European leaders yielded no tangible outcomes, it nonetheless marked an important step towards peace in Ukraine. For the first time, the Ukrainian leader and his counterparts in Europe agreed to discuss the war on the basis of realities on the ground, rather than wishful thinking. Up until just a few months ago, Kyiv’s accession to Nato was regarded as non-negotiable by European diplomacy and Nato. Now, not only does that prospect appear to have been definitively set aside, but for the first time the discussion has shifted from Ukraine’s “territorial integrity” to potential “territorial concessions”.</p>
<p>Monday’s summit earned Trump praise even from usually critical mainstream outlets. “It was the best day Ukraine has had in a very long time&#8230; President Donald Trump offered tantalizing glimpses of how he could approach presidential greatness by saving Ukraine, securing Europe and genuinely deserving the Nobel Peace Prize,” CNN <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/19/politics/trump-zelensky-meeting-oval-office-putin-war-analysis">enthused</a>. Yet the meeting would not have occurred had it not been for Trump’s summit with Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, just two days earlier — which instead drew near unanimous criticism from Ukraine supporters for “legitimizing” Putin. But this carefully staged “de-demonization” of Putin injected a much-needed dose of realism and pragmatism into the discussion.</p>
<p>The Alaska meeting formally reestablished direct dialogue between the world’s two largest military and nuclear powers. It marked the first face-to-face meeting between a US and Russian president since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, and the first such encounter on American soil in nearly two decades. It also marked a turning point in US-Russia relations which, since 2022, had reached levels of hostility not seen since the Cold War.</p>
<p>The symbolism was carefully staged: from the red-carpet reception and the ceremonial ride in the American presidential limousine to Trump’s informal reference to “Vladimir”. It was all intended to signal a new chapter in US-Russia relations. But for Moscow, it meant even more. The summit was a political victory. The sight of Trump hosting Putin exposed the failure of the Western strategy of “isolating Russia” and “crippling its economy”. Far from being marginalized, Russia has emerged stronger: it has deepened its strategic relationship with China, expanded its influence among Global South states, and weathered the sanctions regime that was supposed to destroy its economy. Simply by shaking Putin’s hand, Trump acknowledged that Russia remains a power to be reckoned with, not a pariah state.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-zelensky-lost-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-zelensky-lost-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-2202971853.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-zelensky-lost-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-zelensky-lost-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has Zelensky lost the West?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-zelensky-lost-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>More importantly, the summit amounted to an indirect acknowledgment that the West has effectively lost this war. Ukrainian forces cannot retake the territories annexed by Russia. On the contrary, Moscow continues to make incremental advances on the battlefield. This reality makes a negotiated settlement the only possible exit from the conflict — one that would necessarily involve territorial concessions: Crimea, plus the four annexed eastern and southern oblasts.</p>
<p>This perhaps explains why Trump quietly backtracked on the various threats he has leveraged at Russia over the past weeks. In July, he announced a 50-day deadline for Russia to halt the war or face “severe economic consequences”. Putin ignored it. Trump shortened the deadline to 12 days. Putin did not respond. Even on the eve of the Alaskan summit, Trump was still insisting on a ceasefire as a minimum outcome. Yet Putin had been clear: Russia has no interest in a ceasefire that would allow Ukraine to rearm and bolster its defenses with Western support.</p>
<p>Moreover, Moscow’s demands have always extended well beyond the question of territorial recognition, seeking a comprehensive settlement that addresses the “primary roots of the conflict”, as he repeated in Anchorage: that Ukraine will never join Nato, that the West will not transform it into a de facto military outpost on Russia’s border, and that a broader “balance of security in Europe” be restored. As even the hawkish <em>New York Times</em> recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/07/world/europe/putin-trump-russia-ukraine-summit.html">acknowledged</a>: “The Russian leader’s overarching goal is primarily to secure a peace deal that achieves his geopolitical aims — and not necessarily to conquer a certain amount of territory on the battlefield.”</p>
<p>In an effort to strong-arm Putin, Trump also threatened to impose secondary sanctions on purchasers of Russian oil — including China and India. Yet both countries swiftly dismissed the threat, making it clear such measures would be ineffective. Far from isolating Moscow, the sanctions would only have pushed Beijing and New Delhi even closer to Russia.</p>
<p>After Anchorage, Trump abandoned both of his original positions. He said that a peace deal was preferable to a ceasefire, and that secondary sanctions were off the table. For Putin, this was a major win. For the US, it was an implicit admission that Washington lacks the leverage to impose terms. In Trump’s words, it simply “doesn’t have the cards”. This was a blunt recognition of the diminished military and economic clout of the United States and the collective West.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">”For the US, it was an implicit admission that Washington lacks the leverage to impose terms.”</div>
<p>A comprehensive peace deal, however, remains elusive. No terms were agreed in Alaska, largely because Europe — and Zelensky himself — remain opposed to any settlement on Russian terms. European leaders are so heavily invested in the narrative of “victory” that conceding even part of Russia’s demands would be suicidal. Having spent two years assuring their citizens that Ukraine was winning the war, they cannot suddenly pivot without facing public outrage — especially given the dramatic economic repercussion of the war on European economies.</p>
<p>But the deeper issue is structural: European leaders have come to rely on the specter of a permanent Russian threat to justify their ongoing erosion of democracy — from expanding online censorship to persecuting dissenting voices, and even canceling elections, all under the pretext of combating “Russian interference”. Zelensky, too, has reasons to resist peace. Ending the war would mean lifting martial law in Ukraine, exposing his government to pent-up discontent over corruption, repression and the catastrophic handling of the war. Indeed, a recent poll<a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/693203/ukrainian-support-war-effort-collapses.aspx"> revealed</a> that Ukrainians themselves increasingly favor negotiations over endless fighting. No wonder the Alaska summit triggered panic in European capitals as well as in Kyiv.</p>
<p>Perhaps this explains why Monday’s discussion carefully sidestepped the most sensitive question — territorial concessions — with Zelensky and the Europeans instead pressing for “Article 5-style” security guarantees for Ukraine, effectively treating Ukraine as a Nato member even if it is not formally one. While Russia has signaled general openness to the concept of Western security guarantees, the devil lies in the details. European leaders demanded legally binding US participation and backing — something neither Moscow nor Washington is likely to provide, given the risk of being drawn into direct confrontation with each other. Even less acceptable to Russia is any arrangement involving a Nato military presence in Ukraine, as floated by Britain and France. It seems European leaders have adopted a strategy of expressing openness to a settlement while ensuring, through their conditions, that no such agreement can realistically materialize.</p>
<p>More fundamentally, though, it’s unlikely that Trump himself is prepared to concede to Putin’s demand for a wholesale reconfiguration of the global security order — one that would reduce Nato’s role, end US supremacy, and acknowledge a multipolar world in which other powers can rise without Western interference. For all his rhetoric about ending “forever wars”, Trump continues to embrace a fundamentally supremacist vision of America’s role in the world — albeit a more pragmatic one than that of the liberal-imperialist establishment. His administration continues to support Nato rearmament and even the redeployment of US nuclear weapons along multiple fronts, from the UK to the Pacific. Trump’s policies toward China, Iran and the broader Middle East confirm that Washington still sees itself as an empire whose global dominance must be preserved at all costs — not only through economic pressure, but also through military confrontation when deemed necessary.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/newtrump.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe isn’t prepared for peace</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Within this framework, Russia remains a central challenge. As a pivotal ally of both China and Iran, it is embedded in the architecture of the emerging multipolar order that threatens US hegemony. For Washington, Moscow is not simply a regional actor but a key node in a broader strategic realignment.</p>
<p>Trump, however, appears willing — at least temporarily — to put the “Russia problem” on hold, focusing instead on the larger confrontation with China. But this indicates a shift in priorities rather than principles: the logic of American supremacy ensures that Russia will remain on the list of adversaries, even if the spotlight briefly shifts elsewhere.</p>
<p>In this sense, Trump would probably be content with a scenario in which the US extricates itself from the Ukrainian debacle while leaving Europe to shoulder the burden a while longer — possibly until conditions on the ground deteriorate so severely that a settlement on Russian terms becomes unavoidable. Indeed, JD Vance and Pete Hegseth said as much, arguing that the US will stop funding the war, but Europe can continue if it wishes — buying American weapons in the process. This “division of labor” would allow Washington to reallocate resources to the coming confrontation with China, while leaving Europeans stuck in an unwinnable war.</p>
<p>The Russians are well aware of all this. They likely harbor no illusions about the real objectives of the US imperial establishment. And they know full well that any deal struck with Trump could be overturned at any moment. However, Putin’s short-term goals align with Trump’s. one could say that Russia and the United States are strategic adversaries whose leaders nonetheless share a tactical interest in cooperation.</p>
<p>Seen in this light, one might postulate that the purpose of the Alaska summit was never to secure a final peace agreement. Both Trump and Putin doubtless understand that such a deal is currently impossible. Rather, the meeting was about allowing the US to step back from Ukraine without admitting defeat, while Russia continues to advance. For Washington, this creates political cover: Trump can claim he tried diplomacy, while offloading the burden of war onto Europe. For Moscow, the advantage lies in Ukraine’s gradual weakening as US logistical support fades. Indeed, in order to encourage an American exit, Russia might even agree to a temporary ceasefire and possibly also to vague US “security guarantees” — with Russia and the US presenting these as significant concessions and victories, respectively — though such a truce is unlikely to hold.</p>
<p>The most likely outcome will be a temporary thaw in US-Russia relations, though the broader geopolitical struggle will go on. And the real losers will be Ukraine and Europe. Ukrainians will continue dying in a war they cannot win, while Europeans will continue to foot the bill. Eventually, they too will be forced to accept a deal on Russian terms — but only after further suffering. Even then, Europe will remain trapped in a hostile and militarized relationship with Russia, with the potential for renewed conflict at any time. At best, the Alaska summit and its aftermath signals a temporary relaxation in an ongoing confrontation between the West and the emerging multipolar order. At worst, it ensures that Europe and Ukraine continue to pay the price for a war that the US has already chosen to leave behind.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">702018</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Has Zelensky lost the West?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-zelensky-lost-the-west/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/07/has-zelensky-lost-the-west/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-2202971853.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Is corruption an open secret? Nicolas Tucat / AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2025 23:03:51 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 01 Aug 2025 16:01:15 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Volodymyr Zelensky]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=696335</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[He is becoming a liability]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As uneventful diplomatic talks in Istanbul wrapped up with little more than discussions of a prisoners-of-war swap and vague promises of further meetings, Volodymyr Zelensky found himself facing a crisis much closer to home: unprecedented protests erupting across major Ukrainian cities.</p>
<p>Thousands took to the streets to denounce a controversial law that, according to Zelensky, was designed to “curtail Russian influence” — but which would, in reality, compromise the independence of the country’s two leading anti-corruption agencies at a time when both were reportedly closing in on senior members of Zelensky’s own administration.</p>
<p>The law’s passage sparked not only mass protests within Ukraine but also widespread condemnation in Western capitals. Ursula von der Leyen was quick to issue a sharp rebuke: the legislation conflicted with Europe’s “respect for the rule of law”, and could jeopardize Ukraine’s EU accession prospects. The US government even went so far as to <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/politics/2025/07/25/zelensky-defied-senior-us-officials-on-corruption-law/">order Zelensky</a> to withdraw the legislation. Meanwhile, Western media gave the protests ample coverage. For the first time since the Russian invasion, Zelensky’s domestic policies were openly criticized by outlets that had previously lionised him as a heroic defender of democracy.</p>
<p>Reeling from the backlash, Zelensky has sought to calm the storm by introducing a new anti-corruption bill that would re-establish the agencies’ independence. But several questions remain. Why did Ukrainians, who have tolerated far more unpopular government actions since the start of the war, choose to protest now? Why did the Western establishment so energetically back the demonstrations? And why did Zelensky even move against the agencies in the first place?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/europe.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Kaja Kallas is the real threat to Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The scale and intensity of the protests were surprising in many respects. Since February 2022, Zelensky’s government has implemented deeply unpopular measures — from extending martial law to shuttering opposition parties and media outlets — without triggering comparable public unrest. These measures have been used not only to centralize power but also to neutralize any dissenting voices that might challenge his government’s “war‑at‑all‑costs” policy, by framing any questioning of the latter as unpatriotic or even treasonous. In this way, measures initially justified as temporary wartime necessities have been instrumentalized to entrench executive authority and suppress alternative perspectives on Ukraine’s future.</p>
<p>Corruption, long endemic in Ukraine, has only worsened during the war. Senior judges, politicians and officials have all faced corruption charges, with the Ministry of Defence repeatedly at the center of major scandals. These have included the purchase of vastly overpriced eggs and winter jackets, the payment for 100,000 mortar shells that were never delivered, and bribes accepted from men seeking to evade conscription. Perhaps most worryingly, the Ukrainian company Opendatabot <a href="https://opendatabot.ua/en/analytics/weapon-wanted-2024">reported</a> last year that more than 270,000 weapons had been lost or stolen since the beginning of the war.</p>
<p>Transparency International has <a href="https://cpi.ti-ukraine.org/en/">ranked</a> Ukraine 105th out of 180 countries in its 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; extreme corruption is an “open secret”, as Almut Rochowanski, a researcher at the Quincy Institute, <a href="https://x.com/rochowanski/status/1947749689916318057">wrote</a>. Yet so far, this had not sparked significant protests, doubtless because over the past three and a half years, demonstrating against government policies or even voicing dissenting opinions has become deeply risky Opposition media and parties have been banned, government critics jailed or driven into exile, and “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/28/abramovich-and-ukrainian-mp-may-have-been-poisoned-this-month">problematic</a>” political figures — such as Kyiv’s former chief peace negotiator — have been assassinated under murky circumstances.</p>
<p>The testimony of Ukrainian dissident journalist Vasyl Muravytskyi, now living in exile, underscores this climate of fear. “There is no freedom of speech whatsoever in Ukraine. Everything is being censored… The situation in [the country] is far, far worse than people in the West might think,” he said in an <a href="https://www.thomasfazi.com/p/ukrainian-dissident-reveals-brutal?utm_source=publication-search">interview</a> last year. Consider, too, historian Dr Marta Havryshko, who has long warned about the rise of ultra-nationalism and neo-Nazism in Ukraine. For this, she has <a href="https://www.newglobalpolitics.org/an-open-letter/">sustained</a> antisemitic abuse, death and rape threats directed at her and her child by neo-Nazi paramilitary groups. Recently, she was dismissed from the Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies under the pretext of “absence from the workplace”, despite being on approved unpaid leave in the United States.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Corruption, long endemic in Ukraine, has only worsened during the war.&#8221;</div>
<p>Another troubling case is that of <a href="https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/world-int/24744-the-tragic-end-of-gonzalo-lira-a-voice-silenced-in-ukraine.html">Gonzalo Lira</a>, an American citizen who had lived in Ukraine for several years and was a prolific blogger. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Lira began criticizing the policies of the Ukrainian government. In 2023, he was arrested by Ukrainian authorities for allegedly spreading propaganda and he died in custody soon thereafter — amid the deafening silence of Western governments, including that of Lira’s own country.</p>
<p>These stories reflect a broader pattern. The Council of Europe has recently <a href="https://rm.coe.int/memorandum-on-human-rights-elements-for-peace-in-ukraine-by-michael-o-/1680b678ec">condemned</a> Ukraine for “reported instances of alleged intimidation and other forms of harassment of Ukrainian journalists, lawyers, civil society, political and opinion leaders critical of the government”. In several cases, the Ukrainian authorities have imposed so-called “personal sanctions” on over 80 individuals — including Oleksiy Arestovych, Zelensky’s former advisor — severely restricting their freedom of movement, expression and property rights.</p>
<p>Forced mobilization, or gang-pressing, has also become widespread. Every day, Ukrainian social media is flooded with videos showing men being violently seized by recruitment officers on the streets — often bundled into unmarked vans and in some cases even threatened at gunpoint. These scenes suggest a state struggling to meet its mobilization targets and resorting to increasingly coercive measures. This reality stands in sharp contrast to the official narrative of a nation united behind the war effort. Instead, it suggests mounting resistance among Ukrainians who see conscription not as a patriotic duty but as a potential death sentence.</p>
<p>Given such widespread repression, it is hardly surprising that Ukrainians have refrained from protesting until now. The anti-corruption issue, however, was different. It could not easily be framed as unpatriotic or “pro-Russian” because, if anything, the agencies are the antithesis of Russian influence. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) were established in 2015 as part of Ukraine’s post-Maidan reform commitments. Western governments tied financial aid, debt relief and EU visa liberalization to the creation of these “independent” anti-corruption bodies insulated from Ukraine’s notoriously politicized Prosecutor General’s Office.</p>
<p>NABU’s creation was heavily financed by Western donors, particularly USAID and the EU, while Western advisers provided training and infrastructure. SAPO prosecutors were selected with significant input from Western-backed “civil society” groups and international experts, in a clear sidelining of Ukrainian sovereignty. Former Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin even went so far as to <a href="https://gordonua.com/ukr/news/politics/-shokin-nabu-bulo-stvoreno-nezakonno-shchob-bajden-i-jogo-bijtsi-mogli-trimati-ruku-na-pulsi-ukrajini-1496587.html">assert</a> that NABU was effectively created at the behest of then-US Vice President Joe Biden in order to “steal the investigation powers from the State Bureau of Investigation to NABU and put there emissaries who listen to the United States”.</p>
<p>In short, NABU and SAPO are widely perceived as Western-aligned institutions. By rallying behind them, protesters likely believed they were shielded from accusations of disloyalty. As Rochowanski noted, the bill arguably served as a “strawman”: a safe justification for Ukrainians to express “pent-up anger at Zelensky, his team and daily grotesque, in-your-face corruption”, and broader frustration with the government and its handling of the war, without fear of reprisal.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/inside-a-secret-ukrainian-drone-factory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/inside-a-secret-ukrainian-drone-factory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/ukraine.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/inside-a-secret-ukrainian-drone-factory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Further reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/inside-a-secret-ukrainian-drone-factory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Inside a secret Ukrainian drone factory</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/inside-a-secret-ukrainian-drone-factory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This also helps explain the vehemence of the Western response. The issue was arguably less about concern for Ukraine’s endemic corruption — which has long been tolerated — than about Zelensky’s attack on institutions of Western influence.</p>
<p>Could there be more at play? Zelensky’s move against NABU and SAPO came hard on the heels of several <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/ukrainians-have-lost-faith-in-zelensky/">attacks</a>, launched via various Western mainstream media outlets that had previously lauded him. But, until recently, anyone who dared to speak openly in the West about Ukraine’s appalling human rights situation and growing public resentment was ignored, smeared, threatened or silenced. So why is the Zelensky narrative changing?</p>
<p>One possible explanation is that Western governments, or at the very least the US administration, have decided it is time to throw Zelensky under the bus, and they are preparing the ground. The delegitimizing of Zelensky is something that Donald Trump was very vocal about after their falling out in the White House. Certainly, US investigative journalist Seymour Hersh recently <a href="https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/the-end-for-zelensky">reported</a> that government officials were already discussing potential successors, possibly General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the former commander-in-chief ousted by Zelensky in 2023.</p>
<p>Aware of Washington’s increasing mistrust, Zelensky’s instinct for political survival has the potential to drive him toward increasingly heavy-handed measures — such as further repression of dissent — which could undermine US strategic flexibility. From a realpolitik perspective, the US might have concluded that a new leader would better manage the optics of a frozen conflict or eventual negotiated settlement, however unlikely those scenarios may seem at the moment.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Screenshot-2025-05-30-at-11.33.44.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The real winner of Europe’s Russia policy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Could this explain Zelensky’s pre-emptive strike against NABU and SAPO, for fear that these Western-backed agencies could be used to undermine him? Some Ukrainian sources have <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2025/07/25/7523334/">reported</a> that NABU and SAPO tapped conversations involving Zelensky’s close friend and business partner, Timur Mindich — conversations in which Zelensky himself allegedly participated. In that case, this would suggest that the anti-corruption bodies were already circling dangerously close to the President.</p>
<p>Whether or not Zelensky’s fears were justified, the attempt to bring NABU and SAPO under his control has clearly backfired. Instead of consolidating power, he has triggered the first major wave of domestic opposition since the war began and drawn unprecedented criticism from his Western backers. Even if he survives this crisis, the president’s political position appears weaker than at any time since February 2022. The protests have exposed rising public discontent with his government, and they have revealed the limits of his previously unquestioned Western support.</p>
<p>Western governments face their own dilemma. Having invested heavily in portraying Zelensky as a Churchillian figure, openly moving to replace him could undermine public support for the war effort at home. For ordinary Ukrainians, however, these elite power struggles offer little hope: their political leadership remains forever bound to the competing agendas of its foreign patrons — agendas that bear little relation to the interests of Ukrainians.</p>
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					<title>How Western democracy died</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/07/how-western-democracy-died/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Uniparty</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Coke or Pepsi? Dan Kitwood/Pool/AFP via Getty. ]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 20 Jul 2025 23:03:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 20 Jul 2025 23:03:42 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diverse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Francis Fukuyama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The West]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=693794</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Real change is an illusion]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>From a stumbling economy to soaring crime, France has plenty of problems. But, judging by recent events, the government seems to have another threat in mind: social media. Earlier this month, prosecutors opened a criminal investigation into Elon Musk’s X, alleging foreign interference through algorithm manipulation, while also condemning the platform for spreading “hateful” content. This followed a police raid on the headquarters of the National Rally, France’s leading opposition party, after the launch of yet another dubious investigation into campaign financing.</p>
<p>The Fifth Republic is far from alone here. For Western democracy is under threat — not from “foreign adversaries”, or “far-Right populists”, but from its own elites. Whether in Britain, Germany or Ireland, censorship has become routine across Europe and beyond, even as dissent is increasingly <a href="https://www.public.news/p/eu-travel-ban-on-three-journalists" target="_blank" rel="noopener">criminalized</a> and legal systems are weaponized to suppress opposition. In recent months, these trends have escalated into direct assaults on the basic institutions of democratic governance. In Romania, to give one example, an entire election was annulled because it delivered the wrong outcome, while other countries <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-social-democrats-urge-ban-on-far-right-afd-party/a-73087281" target="_blank" rel="noopener">contemplate</a> similar measures too.</p>
<p>In theory, all this is being carried out in the name of defending democracy. In truth, the purpose is clear: to help ruling elites maintain their grip on power in the face of a historic collapse of legitimacy. Whether they will succeed in doing so remains to be seen. What is clear, though, is that the stakes are enormous. If elites manage to entrench their control through increasingly authoritarian means, the West will enter a new era of managed democracy — or democracy in name only. If they fail, and in the absence of a coherent alternative, the resulting vacuum may give way to deepening instability, social unrest and systemic crisis. Either way, the outlook for the future of Western democracy is grim.</p>
<p>Critics have been raising alarms about this elite-driven democratic backsliding for years. As far back as 2000, political scientist Colin Crouch coined the term “post-democracy” to describe the fact that, even though Western societies boasted the trappings of freedom, they had increasingly become a meaningless facade. Elections, Crouch argued, had become tightly managed spectacles, orchestrated by professional persuaders who operated within a shared neoliberal consensus — pro-market, pro-business, pro-globalization — and offered voters little choice on fundamental political or economic questions. Citizens, for their part, played a passive role, helpless in the face of political and corporate power. Politics, Crouch said, was “slipping back into the control of privileged elites in the manner characteristic of pre-democratic times”.</p>
<p>Crouch was writing at the peak of what Francis Fukuyama famously called the end of history. In the political scientist’s telling, the Cold War’s end, and the global triumph of Western liberal democracy, marked the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution”. Subsequent upheavals — especially following the 2007-8 financial crisis — shattered any illusion of history’s halt. Yet Fukuyama’s core argument wasn’t so much that the clock of history had stopped spinning, but that, from then on, there would be no essential challenge to liberal democracy and market capitalism, deemed the pinnacle of social evolution.</p>
<p>For a while, Fukuyama’s prediction proved correct. The historical defeat of socialism shrank the ideological space in the West, foreclosing any fundamental challenge to capitalism and enabling the emergence of a technocratic, depoliticized governance model underpinned by the “TINA” (There Is No Alternative) consensus around neoliberalism — centered on individual responsibility, market hegemony and globalization. Left-wing protests, whether against globalization or the Iraq War, failed to transition into formal politics. On the contrary, much of the post-Cold War Left, having abandoned class conflict for liberal-cosmopolitan identity politics, became a legitimizing force for an aggressive “progressive neoliberalism” — a fusion of pseudo-progressivism and neoliberal economic policies.</p>
<p>Geopolitically, meanwhile, US “hyperpower” status allowed it to aggressively assert global hegemony, creating a unipolar “new world order”. This was underpinned by structural economic shifts within the West: the decline of traditional manufacturing, and the Fordist-Keynesian social contract, replaced by services, labor dispersion, precarity and fragmentation. Most Western countries saw manufacturing employment decline by a third-to-half in absolute numbers. This pulverized the working class as a unified political subject — along the way wrecking trade unions and other material symbols of postwar mass politics.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/europe.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Kaja Kallas is the real threat to Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This historical trend was exacerbated by policies deliberately aimed at reducing labor’s bargaining power (anti-union laws, labor market flexibilization), and promoting privatized consumerism and apathy. Meanwhile, decision-making processes were increasingly insulated from democratic pressures, chiefly through the surrendering of national prerogatives to supranational institutions and super-state bureaucracies such as the European Union. This strategy of depoliticizing democracy birthed what <a href="https://books.google.it/books/about/The_End_of_the_End_of_History.html?id=z7QMzgEACAAJ&amp;redir_esc=y" target="_blank" rel="noopener">some</a> have called “post-politics”: a regime where political spectacle thrives, but where systemic alternatives to the neoliberal status quo are not just repressed but foreclosed. The American journalist Thomas Friedman aptly described the post-political neoliberal regime as one where “policy choices get reduced to Pepsi or Coke” — minor variations within an unchallenged framework.</p>
<p>The concept of post-politics inevitably intersects with that of democracy. A minimalist view of democracy, focused only on rules and elections, suggests it survived the “end of history”, as formal institutions persisted and in some cases expanded (such as in former communist states). Yet substantive democracy — meaning citizens’ ability to actively shape government policy and the political agenda — has eroded dramatically. With no systemic alternative, politics and substantive democracy withered, resulting in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/generational-and-institutional-sources-of-the-global-decline-in-voter-turnout/B9EB23098C2A905FECA7072C384CD34F" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declining</a> voter turnout. One might say that the defining characteristic of post-democracy is that, despite the existence of elections, the majority does not rule — at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. Instead, power and influence are concentrated in the hands of a small subset of society.</p>
<p>Of course, since authors like Crouch first diagnosed this hollowing out of democracy from within, things have become exponentially worse, especially in the wake of the financial crisis. The post-democratic politics of the neoliberal era were actually <em>intensified</em> during the 2010s, becoming increasingly repressive and authoritarian. In the EU, under the pretext of responding to the financial and euro crises, the bloc’s supranational institutions (notably the ECB and European Commission) dramatically expanded their powers, imposing budgetary rules and structural reforms on member states without democratic oversight.</p>
<p>Beyond these institutional shifts, meanwhile, unelected elites increasingly interfered in the democratic processes of member states. The ECB’s “monetary coup” against Berlusconi in 2011, where the central bank effectively forced the prime minister to leave office by making his ouster the precondition for further support for Italian bonds and banks, is one good example here. The financial blackmail of Greece’s Tsipras government is another. Taken together, anyway, these events led some observers to <a href="https://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue62/Elsner62.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggest</a> that the EU was becoming a “post-democratic prototype” — one fiercely opposed to national sovereignty and democracy both.</p>
<p>The scorched earth left behind by the financial crisis, and the elite-imposed austerity that followed, fueled in the mid-2010s our century’s first major anti-establishment uprisings: Brexit, Trump, the Yellow Vests and growing anti-EU sentiment across Europe. This mass awakening seemingly marked the <a href="https://books.google.it/books/about/The_End_of_the_End_of_History.html?id=z7QMzgEACAAJ&amp;redir_esc=y" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“end of the end of history”</a>, a widespread rejection of the post-Cold War neoliberal order. Even so, these challenges ultimately failed — absorbed or neutralized by the establishment through repression and ideological counter-offensives.</p>
<p>In this sense, the pandemic, beyond its epidemiological nature, can be interpreted as a “deep structural event” that accelerated this authoritarian centralization of power. Governments inflated the danger of the virus to sweep aside democratic procedures, militarize societies, crack down on liberties and implement unprecedented measures of social control — in the process “freezing” democratic politics and sapping whatever energy was left from the populist movements of the late 2010s.</p>
<p>Similar authoritarian dynamics resurged with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with the media-political establishment smearing, censoring and even punishing voices critical to Western hawkishness. Just over a month ago, the EU, in a shocking and utterly unprecedented decision, <a href="https://www.thomasfazi.com/p/eu-sanctions-three-journalists-in" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sanctioned</a> three EU citizens — banning them from traveling through the EU and freezing their bank accounts — for allegedly engaging in “pro-Russian propaganda”.</p>
<p>At the same time, new populist threats to the established order have emerged, predominantly from the Right. But so far, these too have failed to disrupt the status quo, partly because the West’s increasingly unpopular and delegitimized elites have turned to ever more brazen forms of repression to influence electoral outcomes and suppress these challenges. The Romanian case marked a fateful escalation: elites, backed by NATO and the EU, overturned a presidential election result, barring the populist candidate via unsubstantiated claims of Russian interference.</p>
<p>These events signal a disturbing trend: elites no longer limit themselves to “managing” electoral outcomes through “soft” or covert means — media manipulation, censorship, lawfare, economic pressure and intelligence operations. Rather, they are increasingly willing to discard the formal structures of democracy altogether. In retrospect, the “post-democratic” era of technocratic managerialism described by Crouch appears positively benign by comparison. All this repression is carried out in the name of defending democracy from so-called internal threats (populists) and external ones (foreign adversaries). Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that its true aim is shoring up elite power.</p>
<p>Most anti-establishment analyses of the current “crisis of democracy”, however, rest on flawed assumptions: that the current phase deviates from a historical norm; that postwar social-democratic capitalism was truly democratic; and that a return to it is possible. These assumptions crumble under scrutiny.</p>
<p>Western liberal democracy, even minimally defined as representative government based on universal suffrage, is a very recent phenomenon. Full male suffrage emerged in a limited number of countries only between the middle of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. Women’s suffrage generally came after the Second World War. Effective voting rights for racial minorities, such as African Americans, arrived decades later. In short, democracy as universal adult suffrage, regardless of wealth, property, race or class, has existed for mere decades. Previously, it was the exclusive domain of propertied elites, or else based on sex or skin color.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Western liberal democracy is a very recent phenomenon.&#8221;</div>
<p>Besides, as noted above, democracy is about something far more substantial than the mere act of voting. If it means anything, it must surely allow citizens to influence the state’s direction and shape the political agenda on fundamental issues — whether immigration, foreign policy, or the overall trajectory of social and economic policy. It’s hard to claim Western democracy is thriving on those terms. Yet that still leaves one more question: if “real democracy” is now dead, was it ever alive at all?</p>
<p>For a relatively short period — roughly between the Forties and the Seventies — we did witness a form of democracy that was decidedly <em>more substantive</em> than what exists today. Over these decades, often described as the “golden age” of capitalism, the working classes were integrated into the West’s political systems for the first time in history. This allowed them to gain a significant influence over the political agenda, leading to a substantial expansion of social, economic and political rights, in a context of growing politicization of the masses. The contrast to the post-political period is very stark indeed.</p>
<p>All the same, it’d be wrong to idealize the mid-century West. Even then, democracy in its substantive sense remained heavily constrained. Though the ruling classes were forced — under pressure from popular movements, the Cold War, and the threat of social unrest — to extend voting rights and acknowledge a range of political and social rights, they did not do so willingly. On the contrary, they were often driven by the fear that the masses could pose a real threat to the established social order — that workers might use democracy to overturn existing power relations.</p>
<p>As a result, alongside economic concessions, Western elites also constrained democratic participation in various ways. Modern constitutional systems — including nascent supranational ones like the European Court of Justice, established in 1952 — explicitly limited popular sovereignty. Elected governments were prevented from enacting certain economic or social policies, or even challenging existing international alliances. All the while, power shifted. Parliaments got weaker, and technocrats and judges grew more powerful, each in their way proving capable of overriding national laws. This was often justified as a way of protecting democracy from what elites feared could be the irrational or destabilizing demands of the masses — a longstanding argument in liberal political thought that equates too much popular participation with the risk of populism, mob rule or economic irresponsibility.</p>
<p>In some countries, the concept of “militant democracy” became a further means to limit the popular will. In Germany, for example, it legitimized the banning of political parties, most notably the country’s Communist Party. State authorities, supported by media and institutional elites, systematically repressed demands for deeper democratization, whether via police force, media delegitimization or institutional restructuring. Meanwhile, Western “permanent states” — the military, intelligence and security apparatuses — exercised considerable influence behind the scenes, generally under the direction of the US. That infamously included terrorist acts aimed at curbing the power of Left parties and movements, for example through Gladio. In short, from the very beginning of modern liberal democracy, the ruling classes actively worked to contain democracy within the boundaries of what they deemed acceptable politics.</p>
<p>All the same, for a while, the organized power of the masses was indeed able to constrain, to a greater degree than ever before, the power of capital. As noted, however, this brief period of relative substantive democracy depended on a unique confluence of factors. As these conditions crumbled from the mid-Seventies, the marriage between capitalism and democracy dissolved.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-populist-revolt-isnt-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-populist-revolt-isnt-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/brexit.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-populist-revolt-isnt-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-populist-revolt-isnt-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The populist revolt isn’t over</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-populist-revolt-isnt-over/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the symbolic end of this era. In the decades since, we have witnessed a steady erosion of democratic norms — a process that has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Relevant, here, is Carl Schmitt’s “state of exception”, whereby constitutional safeguards are suspended to impose decisions unachievable via normal democratic channels. Yet as the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben emphasized over 20 years ago, the state of exception has now become a permanent condition in Western states.</p>
<p>This, of course, is a paradox: if it is permanent, then, by definition, it is no longer a state of exception. It becomes the rule. But is this permanent state of exception unique to the “post-democratic” era? An analysis of the postwar era suggests not. Rather, it is a fundamental characteristic of the state itself, even in its liberal-democratic guise. This challenges common conceptions of the state: across the Western world, we are accustomed to identifying the state with the executive and with parliament, assuming that these institutions act in accordance with constitutions and the rule of law.</p>
<p>But this is a misunderstanding: the state doesn’t coincide with the institutions of representative democracy. Rather, the two belong to entirely distinct spheres of politics. On the one hand, there is the politics of the state. On the other, there is what we might call popular politics, embodying popular sovereignty and typified by political parties, trade unions, social movements and civil society. The state operates with a significant degree of autonomy from the latter, meaning it is not only largely independent of civil society, but also of parliaments and even governments themselves.</p>
<p>In theory, after all, state bureaucracies act as neutral executors of government policy. In reality, they often act independently of, or even in opposition to, elected parliaments and governments, particularly when it comes to protecting institutional continuity, legal norms or elite interests. Supreme and constitutional courts, for example, frequently <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/11/britain-is-ruled-by-a-judicial-elite/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rule against</a> government policies — especially when it comes to controversial issues like immigration. The way in which the Bank of England <a href="https://unherd.com/2022/10/why-the-left-shouldnt-be-celebrating/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">derailed</a> Liz Truss’s infamous mini-budget is another example here. This phenomenon is obviously much more pronounced when national governments are subordinated to supranational institutions, as in the European Union. And then, of course, you have the military and intelligence bureaucracies, which today arguably exercise more influence than ever before (see, for instance, the Russiagate hoax).</p>
<p>The state thus emerges as a social organism endowed with its own internal logic and continuity, capable of pursuing goals and directions often independent of those declared or pursued by the political leadership of the day. This has always been true — even if, depending on the relative balance of class forces within society, the state may at times be forced to make concessions to the forces of popular politics. In other words, then, today’s crisis doesn’t represent democracy’s sudden collapse, but instead the unveiling of how power truly works. The contemporary crisis of Western democracy exposes the limits of formal democratic institutions, bringing the logic of state power into blindingly sharp relief.</p>
<p>The future, unfortunately, seems bleak. The conditions enabling the brief period of substantive democracy are gone, and unlikely to return soon. In a real sense, substantive democracy is dead. Even so, the unraveling geopolitical order underpinning Western dominance — challenged by the emergence of a multipolar order underpinned by the rise of powers like China — marks a profound political and economic shift. The erosion of Western hegemony is weakening its elites, whose dominance has long relied on both internal suppression and power projection abroad. Declining influence overseas exacerbates domestic discontent, especially when fueled by rising and systemic inequality.</p>
<p>This unraveling exposes the structural weaknesses of the Western system. Without the geopolitical stability and economic dominance that once masked its internal contradictions, elites are growing more vulnerable. Crucially, this decline also paves the way for a potential new order — not just a geopolitical reconfiguration, but a potential reimagining of political and economic systems. As Western elites grapple with their waning power, there are vast opportunities for alternative visions of governance and democracy.</p>
<p>What lies ahead is not merely a question of whether democracy can be “restored”, but whether a new political project can emerge to replace the exhausted model of elite-managed liberalism. The old order is collapsing, but the new has yet to be born. In this vacuum, anything can happen.</p>
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					<title>Kaja Kallas is the real threat to Europe</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/europe.jpg?w=526</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Profile</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Does she still believe Nato should send troops to Ukraine? Photo: Kevin Dietsch/Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2025 23:01:05 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 22 Dec 2025 12:06:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kaja Kallas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ursula von der Leyen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=691348</guid>
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								<![CDATA[She personifies the bloc at its worst]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>While Ursula von der Leyen may have survived yesterday’s vote of no confidence, the result has laid bare growing cross-party discontent with her increasingly authoritarian leadership. Support for the European President is eroding.</p>
<p>The most notable shift was from the right-wing ECR group, which includes Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. Previously, these MEPs had supported von der Leyen on several key proposals, but few voted against this motion, with most opting to desert it altogether. Also revealing was the support the motion received beyond its Right-populist sponsors: several MEPs from The Left group as well as non-affiliated Left-populist deputies from Germany and elsewhere, also backed it. Overall, von der Leyen secured the backing of 360 MEPs — 40 fewer than in her 2024 re-election.</p>
<p>A key point of convergence between these otherwise divergent forces is their shared opposition to the Commission’s belligerent stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Indeed, the no-confidence motion also referenced the Commission’s proposal of using an emergency clause in the EU treaty to shut MEPs out of approving a €150 billion loan scheme to boost the joint procurement of weapons by EU countries, mainly to increase military support for Ukraine.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that the motion of censure wasn’t just directed at von der Leyen but at her entire Commission — in particular, her second-in-command, Kaja Kallas, Commission Vice-President and High Representative for Foreign Affairs, the closest thing the EU has to a foreign minister.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/germanys-dangerous-submission/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/germanys-dangerous-submission/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2218057865.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/germanys-dangerous-submission/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/germanys-dangerous-submission/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Germany’s dangerous submission</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/germanys-dangerous-submission/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Kallas, the former Prime Minister of Estonia — a country of just 1.4 million people, fewer than reside in Paris — was confirmed as the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Affairs in December of last year. Since then, she has come to personify, more vividly than anyone else, the EU’s toxic blend of incompetence, irrelevance and outright stupidity.</p>
<p>At a time when the war in Ukraine is unquestionably Europe’s foremost foreign policy challenge, it is difficult to imagine anyone less suited to the role than Kallas, whose deep-seated hostility towards Russia borders on obsession. On her very first day in the job, during a trip to Kyiv, she <a href="https://x.com/kajakallas/status/1863120005040128379" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tweeted</a>: “The European Union wants Ukraine to win this war” — a statement that immediately caused <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/kaja-kallas-is-acting-like-a-prime-minister-her-critics-say/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unease</a> in Brussels, where officials viewed it as out of step with settled EU language two years into the war. “She is still acting like a prime minister”, one diplomat commented.</p>
<p>Just months before her appointment, she <a href="https://naapuriseura.fi/en/viron-paaministeri-ehdottaa-venajan-hajottamista-pieniksi-valtioiksi/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposed</a> breaking Russia into “small states” and, since then, has repeatedly demanded the full restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 borders, including Crimea — a position that effectively rules out negotiations. While even Donald Trump has acknowledged that Ukrainian Nato membership is a non-starter, Kallas insists it remain a goal — despite it having been a red line for Russia for nearly two decades. Kallas has even declared that “if we don’t help Ukraine further, we should all start learning Russian”. Never mind that Russia has no strategic, military or economic reason to attack the EU. Earlier this year, she denounced Trump’s efforts to negotiate an end to the war, dismissing them as a “dirty deal”, which explains why US Secretary of State Marco Rubio abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with her in February.</p>
<p>Kallas’s single-minded fixation on Russia has rendered her virtually silent on every other foreign policy issue. As former UK diplomat Ian Proud, who served at the British Embassy in Moscow from 2014 to 2019, <a href="https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/kaja-kallas-is-the-wrong-person-to" target="_blank" rel="noopener">observed</a>, she comes across as a “single-issue High Representative” who is “intent only on sustaining the decade-long European policy on non-engagement with Russia, whatever the economic cost”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-cant-afford-its-defence-commitments/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-cant-afford-its-defence-commitments/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2220716707.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-cant-afford-its-defence-commitments/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-cant-afford-its-defence-commitments/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin knows we are spreadsheet warriors</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/06/europe-cant-afford-its-defence-commitments/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Her aggressive, unilateral rhetoric — often delivered without prior consultation with member states — has alienated not only openly Euro- and Nato-sceptic governments in Hungary and Slovakia, but also countries like Spain and Italy, which, while broadly aligned with Nato’s Ukraine policy, don’t share Kallas’s assessment of Moscow as an imminent threat to the EU. “If you listen to her it seems we are at war with Russia, which is not the EU line”, one EU official <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/kaja-kallas-is-acting-like-a-prime-minister-her-critics-say/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">complained</a>.</p>
<p>Technically, the High Representative’s role is to reflect the consensus of the member states as an extension of the Council, not to freelance as a supranational policymaker. Yet, Kallas interprets her role otherwise, repeatedly acting as though she speaks on behalf of all Europeans — a top-down, anti-democratic approach that is symptomatic of a broader authoritarian trend supercharged by von der Leyen.</p>
<p>Despite her proclamations about defending democracy, Kallas herself has no democratic mandate. Not only was she never elected to her current office, but her party — the Estonian Reform Party — received fewer than 70,000 votes in the last European Parliament elections, representing less than 0.02% of the European population. Von der Leyen, though, has packed her Commission with these like-minded Baltic officials — hailing from a region of just over six million people — to fill key defense and foreign policy posts. These appointments reflect a strategic alignment between von der Leyen’s centralizing ambitions and the ultra-hawkish worldview of the Baltic political class. Both share an unwavering commitment to the NATO line and a deep hostility to any diplomacy with Moscow.</p>
<p>Kallas’s anti-Russian zeal made her a natural choice for the job. But rarely mentioned is the fact that Kallas’s own family, far from being the victim of Soviet oppression, actually lived a relatively comfortable life as part of the Soviet establishment — or what may very well be considered the Soviet middle class.</p>
<p>In fact, Kaja Kallas was born into one of Estonia’s most powerful political families — a family whose rise was facilitated, in no small part, by the very Soviet system she now demonizes. Her father, Siim Kallas, was an influential member of the Soviet apparatchik and then a key figure in Estonian post-Soviet politics, eventually becoming Prime Minister before serving as a European Commissioner for over a decade. Few will be surprised to learn that immediately after completing her studies, in 2010, Kaja decided to enter politics and joined the Reform Party — her father’s own party — nor that she followed his footsteps in moving to Brussels after serving as Prime Minister from 2021 to 2024. It’s hard to shake the idea that elite continuity and inherited privilege had a helping hand. One is also left wondering, given her upbringing, whether her aggressive anti-Russian posture is a sincerely held conviction, or a cover for personal ambition.</p>
<p>One story sheds particularly interesting light on her geopolitical attitude. In 2023, when Kallas was still Prime Minister, three major Estonian newspapers called for her resignation after it emerged that her husband’s transport company had continued to do business with Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. However, Kallas dismissed the scandal and refused to resign, claiming no wrongdoing, sparking accusations of hypocrisy: demanding the total economic isolation of Russia on one hand, while turning a blind eye to her own family’s business ties with the country.</p>
<p>All things considered, Kallas is dramatically ill-suited for the job — stumbling from one blunder to the next. Only recently, she managed to offend nearly every Irish citizen by <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/politics/2025/0619/1519390-ireland-remarks-kallas/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggesting</a> that Ireland’s neutrality stems from not having experienced atrocities such as “mass deportations” or “suppression of culture and language” — a bizarre statement, given Ireland’s long history of British colonial rule and the bloodshed of the Troubles.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Kallas’s anti-Russian zeal made her a natural choice for the job.”</div>
<p>Some blunders are far more consequential. In a recent meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Kallas demanded that China condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine and fall in line with the “rules-based international order”. Yi, usually soft-spoken, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/china-tells-eu-it-cannot-afford-russian-loss-ukraine-war-sources-say" target="_blank" rel="noopener">responded</a> sharply, noting that China had not supported Russia militarily — but also had no intention of seeing Moscow defeated, since that would simply bring the West’s wrath upon China next. He may have been alluding to Kallas’s earlier <a href="https://x.com/Kanthan2030/status/1896626896877867250" target="_blank" rel="noopener">remark</a>: “If Europe cannot defeat Russia, how can it take on China?”. That a senior EU official would frame global affairs in such stark, confrontational terms reflects an astonishing lack of diplomatic nuance.</p>
<p>The fact that Kallas felt comfortable lecturing China on international law and the &#8220;rules-based order&#8221; reveals not only a striking blindness to Europe’s diminished global standing, but also a profound lack of self-awareness about how the EU’s double standards are viewed in Beijing and across the Global South. While loudly condemning Russian attacks on civilians, Kallas has consistently whitewashed — or outright endorsed — Israel’s atrocities in Gaza. A recently <a href="https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0246a0da" target="_blank" rel="noopener">leaked</a> EU report confirmed that Brussels acknowledged a long time ago that Israel was committing war crimes in Gaza, including &#8220;starvation, torture, indiscriminate attacks and apartheid&#8221; — yet Kallas has neither condemned Israel nor questioned EU-Israel ties. Similarly, she said nothing about US threats to annex Greenland and supported the US-Israeli bombing of Iran — a clear violation of international law.</p>
<p>This selective moralism has done lasting damage to the EU’s credibility, particularly in the eyes of the Global South. But to lay the blame solely at Kallas’s feet would be a mistake. In the end, it’s not Kallas who should concern us most, but the system that made her possible — a system that rewards the loudest hawks, holds scant regard for democracy, and replaces statesmanship with social media posturing. If Europe continues on this path, it won’t just lose its place in the world; it will become the most vivid expression of the West’s broader slide into kakistocracy — government by the worst, the least qualified and the most unscrupulous.</p>
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					<title>Germany’s dangerous submission</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/06/germanys-dangerous-submission/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/06/germanys-dangerous-submission/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>nato</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[‘Merz, while publicly critical of Trump, is in fact executing Trump’s vision.’ Saul Loeb / AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2025 23:01:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 25 Jun 2025 11:24:04 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[friedrich merz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rearmament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=687226</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Atlanticists don’t care about the national interest]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>At the Nato summit currently underway in The Hague, Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is expected to present his plan to transform the Bundeswehr into “the most powerful conventional army in Europe”. This dramatic announcement represents more than a shift in policy — it signals a rupture with the fundamental strategic identity Germany has maintained since 1945.</p>
<p>The idea of rearming the German military dates back to Olaf Scholz’s 2022 <em>Zeitenwende</em> speech — the so-called “turning point” announced in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Scholz promised a €100 billion fund for the military and pledged to meet Nato’s then 2% spending target. Yet that “turning point” largely failed to materialize. Two years later, the German Council on Foreign Relations bluntly <a href="https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/end-zeitenwende" target="_blank" rel="noopener">concluded</a> that little had changed.</p>
<p>Now, Merz is determined to deliver what Scholz only gestured towards. He has made defense and security the cornerstone of his chancellorship, launching the most ambitious rearmament campaign since the Second World War. The scale is staggering: a proposed €400 billion in defense and security investments, including a plan to raise annual defense spending to 5% of GDP — as demanded by Nato. That would represent nearly half of the federal budget — around €225 billion — a transformation with sweeping political and social consequences. On Monday, Berlin confirmed that its military spending will reach 3.5% of GDP by 2029, with the 5% target to be reached in the years to come.</p>
<p>To achieve this, Merz rammed through a constitutional amendment to reform the “debt brake”, a fiscal mechanism that has been enshrined in Germany’s Basic Law since 2009 and has since capped the federal structural deficit. Despite pledging during the campaign that the debt brake would remain untouched — and failing to mention his rearmament plans — Merz reversed course immediately after his election. His government exploited the final session of the outgoing parliament — even though a new Bundestag had already been elected — to approve the change. The aim was explicitly stated: to unlock vast new funding for military expansion.</p>
<p>On 19 May, Germany’s top-ranking military official, Inspector General Carsten Breuer, issued a directive laying out a sweeping vision for the Bundeswehr. The goal: to achieve “full operational readiness” by 2029. The list of priorities is extensive and ambitious. It includes fully equipping and digitalizing all troop formations, reviving conscription, building up anti-drone and missile defense, expanding offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, and even developing space-based defense systems. Plans also include strengthening Germany’s role in Nato nuclear-sharing arrangements and enhancing the country’s long-range strike capacity — a major symbolic and strategic departure.</p>
<p>These changes are not just about military doctrine: they reflect a deeper transformation in Germany’s foreign policy posture. Merz has rapidly embraced a confrontational approach toward Russia, echoing some of the most hawkish voices in Nato. He has warned that Russia is “waging an aggressive hybrid war every day”, and declared that “there is a threat to us all from Russia”. Ahead of the Nato summit, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/german-military-deems-russia-existential-risk-nation-europe-spiegel-reports-2025-06-20/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a> that “we have to fear that Russia will continue the war beyond Ukraine”, implying that Russia represents a direct military threat to Europe in the near-to-medium term.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, just the other day, <em>Reuters</em> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/german-military-deems-russia-existential-risk-nation-europe-spiegel-reports-2025-06-20/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> on a leaked Bundeswehr strategy document describing Russia as an “existential risk” and outlining Kremlin preparations for large-scale conflict with Nato “by the decade’s end”. The notion that Russia could launch a full-scale attack on Europe within a few years has become an official talking point among EU and Nato leaders — despite the fact that Moscow has neither the capacity nor strategic interest in such a move.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Screenshot-2025-05-30-at-11.33.44.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The real winner of Europe’s Russia policy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Immediately upon taking office, Merz launched an active foreign policy campaign. He toured European capitals to coordinate policy toward Moscow and Kyiv. One of his first acts was to travel to Kyiv alongside the leaders of France, Britain and Poland — a symbolic show of unity with Ukraine and a signal of defiance toward Trump, who had publicly advocated for a negotiated settlement with Russia. In Berlin, Merz hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and floated the delivery of German-made Taurus missiles, which have a range of more than 500 kilometers. Although domestic opposition forced him to partially retreat, he quickly pivoted to a new strategy: a €5 billion agreement to co-produce long-range missiles on Ukrainian territory using German technology.</p>
<p>Even more provocatively, Merz announced that Western-supplied weapons are no longer subject to range restrictions. “Ukraine can now also defend itself by attacking military positions in Russia,” he declared — effectively giving the green light for strikes deep into Russian territory with Western equipment. For the first time since 1945, Germany is now not only rearming at scale but actively encouraging direct military engagement with Russia, a nuclear-armed power. To underline this shift, Merz also confirmed that new German air defense systems would be delivered to Ukraine under a long-term, multi-year plan.</p>
<p>But what makes this rearmament campaign especially significant is that it is not limited to the military sphere. Merz’s vision is one of total mobilization — a “whole-of-society” approach that seeks to prepare not just the armed forces, but the entire German economy and civil infrastructure for confrontation with Russia. Media, education, industrial policy and civil defense are all being aligned to support this new war footing. Dissent — whether political, journalistic, or academic — is increasingly stigmatized as subversive or even a threat to national security. Renowned journalists and intellectuals such as <a href="https://www.thomasfazi.com/p/enemy-of-the-state-the-political" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ulrike Guérot</a>, Gabriele Krone-Schmalz and Patrik Baab have been attacked and professionally marginalized for urging diplomatic solutions to the Ukraine conflict.</p>
<p>This is a profound rupture. For most of the postwar period, Germany deliberately defined itself in opposition to its militaristic past. It wielded influence not through tanks or missiles, but through trade, diplomacy and its leadership within the EU. The doctrine of <em>Zivilmacht</em> — civilian power — was not only a policy orientation, but a moral commitment forged in the ashes of Nazi militarism. Germany saw itself as a peacekeeper, not a power-broker. The Bundeswehr was a “parliamentary army”, structured to prevent misuse by the executive and embedded in multilateral institutions designed to constrain sovereign adventurism.</p>
<p>Merz’s aggressive anti-Russian rhetoric — and broader strategic posture — also marks a radical departure from Germany’s postwar tradition. Even his predecessor, Olaf Scholz, though a firm supporter of Ukraine, stopped short of authorizing the use of Western-supplied weapons for strikes inside Russian territory — a red line that Merz has now crossed. Moscow has warned that such actions could trigger retaliatory strikes against NATO targets. Not long ago, this would have been unthinkable for a German chancellor.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/why-germany-isnt-ready-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/why-germany-isnt-ready-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-2199985362.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/why-germany-isnt-ready-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/why-germany-isnt-ready-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Germany isn’t ready to fight</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/why-germany-isnt-ready-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Chris Reiter and Will Wilkes </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Indeed, throughout most of the postwar period, despite the Cold War, German policy was aimed at improving relations with Russia, then the Soviet Union — a policy known as <em>Ostpolitik</em> (East politics). At its core, <em>Ostpolitik</em> was built on the conviction that political stability and peace in Europe could be achieved through closer economic ties and sustained dialogue with the Soviet Union. Rather than confrontation, it pursued détente — a strategy of engagement grounded in the idea that interdependence would foster trust, reduce tensions and gradually open space for political reconciliation.</p>
<p>This was the German consensus for over 50 years — essentially up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — though over time the country’s political leadership, most notably Merkel, found it increasingly difficult to balance Germany’s strategic interests with its transatlantic ties, amid growing US pressure to destabilize Russia via Ukraine. In her memoir, for example, Merkel <a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recounts</a> her commitment to getting Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements, which were intended to bring an end to the civil war in eastern Ukraine. As Merkel recalls, talks ultimately collapsed due to powerful forces in the US and elsewhere who were advocating for a military resolution to the conflict. This was in no small part designed to drive a wedge between Russia and Europe, and Germany in particular.</p>
<p>Since 2022, however, the postwar consensus started being dismantled — and is now being radically overturned. But how did we go, in the span of just a few years, from <em>Ostpolitik</em> to Merz vowing to do “everything” to ensure the Nord Stream pipeline never reopens, embarking on a massive rearmament program and even flippantly talking about helping Ukraine bomb Russia? Is this simply a “natural” reaction to Russia’s invasion and the new post-Ukraine geopolitical reality, further exacerbated by Trump’s decision to disengage from Europe?</p>
<p>According to some observers, this shift signals a dangerous resurgence of German nationalism and chauvinism — long simmering beneath the surface among segments of the elite, and even within broader society. For decades, this narrative goes, this latent impulse was restrained by the postwar consensus and contained within the framework of the US-led security order.</p>
<p>Now, with Washington increasingly preoccupied elsewhere and hinting at strategic disengagement from Europe, that restraint is eroding. According to this narrative, Germany is seizing the moment to reassert its dominance on the continent, using the vacuum left by American retrenchment to reclaim a hegemonic role — this time not through economic leverage alone, but through an assertive military posture, and doing so with a confidence that recalls far darker chapters of the 20th century.</p>
<p>But this interpretation is, in my view, mistaken. What we are witnessing is not a return of German nationalism, but its opposite. The policies now being implemented — from massive rearmament to the escalation of conflict with Russia — are not rooted in a cold pursuit of German national interests, but in their negation. They are the expression of a political class that has internalized the Atlantic ideology so thoroughly that it can no longer distinguish between national strategy and transatlantic loyalty.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;What we are witnessing is not a return of German nationalism, but its opposite.&#8221;</div>
<p>This is the long-term consequence of how the German question was “resolved” after the Second World War: not through the restoration of sovereignty, but through the absorption of Germany into the “collective West” under US strategic guardianship. As noted, throughout most of the postwar period, German leadership attempted to balance this with the pursuit of the national interest, but in the years following the coup in Ukraine, the “American” wing of the German establishment began taking over — and with Merz, a <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">former BlackRock representative</a>, it is firmly in the driving seat.</p>
<p>Now the leadership thinks only in terms of alignment with a Western project whose priorities are often defined elsewhere. In an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c1bf5fe8-602d-4887-a5eb-1bd247be9d54" target="_blank" rel="noopener">op-ed</a> published yesterday in the <em>Financial Times</em>, for example, Merz and Macron once again reaffirmed their commitment to the transatlantic relationship and NATO — which has always entailed Europe’s strategic subordination to Washington — despite their recent rhetorical gestures toward a more autonomous European policy.</p>
<p>It is telling in this sense that Merz, while publicly critical of Trump, is in fact executing Trump’s vision: pressuring Germany to drastically increase defense spending, take over leadership in the Ukraine war and sever energy ties with Russia. And yet they are presented as expressions of German and European sovereignty. Contrary to Merkel’s courageous stance against the US invasion of Iraq 20 years ago, Merz has also offered a full-throated endorsement of Trump’s recent attack on Iran.</p>
<p>The problem today then, is not German ambition, but German submission. And the tragedy is that this submission is being dressed up as strategic autonomy — a grim parody of sovereignty in an age of ideological dependency. If German leaders once understood that peace with Russia was in Germany’s fundamental interest, today’s leaders act as if permanent conflict is a condition of responsible statecraft. That reversal is not only dangerous for Germany, but for Europe as a whole.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-eus-american-queen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-eus-american-queen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-1243215541-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-eus-american-queen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-eus-american-queen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The EU&#039;s American Queen</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/03/the-eus-american-queen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The good news is that Germany’s militaristic ambitions collide with an unyielding reality: the Bundeswehr can’t find enough people to fight its wars. The military is short of 30,000 personnel, and one in four recruits quits within six months. NATO has asked Berlin to raise seven new brigades — requiring 60,000 more soldiers — a goal even Defense Minister Boris Pistorius calls unrealistic.</p>
<p>Pistorius says that for now conscription is “off the table”, not for lack of will but because it’s logistically impossible. “We don’t have the capacity — not in barracks, not in training,” he told Parliament. Still, he hinted that this might only be a transitory phase, subject to the military finding enough volunteers.</p>
<p>But the real barrier may be cultural, not logistical. A YouGov poll found that 63% of Germans aged 18-29 oppose conscription; just 19% would fight if Germany were attacked. Among those over 60 — long past draft age — support is strongest. As the researchers Chris Reiter and Will Wilkes <a href="https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/germany-is-losing-the-war-at-home" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a>: “This generational divergence is more than just an attitudinal shift. It reflects two vastly different lived realities. Postwar Germans came of age in a Cold War world with a shared civic mission: defend democracy against Soviet expansionism. In return, the state offered stable jobs, affordable housing, and a sense of national purpose.”</p>
<p>But this social contract has broken down, amid deteriorating social and economic prospects for young people. “For many, the call to serve in uniform doesn’t feel like patriotism — it feels like one more extraction by a system that hasn’t given back,” Reiter and Wilkes wrote.</p>
<p>“When you ignore our concerns and then ask us to die for the state — that’s absurd,” said influencer Simon David Dressler in a televised forum. This feeling was probably best articulated by 27-year-old German journalist Ole Nymoen in a book titled <em><a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/05/16/etdd-m16.html">Why I Would Never Fight for My Country</a></em>, in which the author addresses his generation’s widespread opposition to militarization, conscription and rearmament. That disillusionment is also reshaping politics. In recent elections, nearly half of young voters rejected establishment parties, turning to Die Linke or the AfD — not necessarily out of ideological alignment, but as a rejection of NATO’s agenda and skepticism towards the rearmament push.</p>
<p>Ultimately, this may be the greatest obstacle to rearmament, in Germany and beyond: that a growing number of people are beginning to realize that their real enemies are not in Moscow, but within their own political and economic elites.</p>
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					<title>The real winner of Europe’s Russia policy</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/05/the-real-winner-of-europes-russia-policy/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The consequences have been brutal for Germany. Ina Fassbender/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2025 23:02:02 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 30 May 2025 10:34:51 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[friedrich merz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[liquefied natural gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LNG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[America stands to gain]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The EU’s suicide by a thousand sanctions continues unabated.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">Apparently unsatisfied with the economic and industrial fallout it has already inflicted on Europe over the past three years, the European Commission unveiled earlier this month a new plan to eliminate all Russian energy imports within two years — including gas, liquefied natural gas, oil and enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">As part of its updated REPowerEU roadmap, the Commission pledged to ban spot market gas imports from Russia — including both existing and new contracts, which currently account for a third of EU gas purchases — by the end of 2025. It also proposed banning all long-term Russian energy contracts by 2027. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Prior to the war in Ukraine, Russia supplied the bulk of the EU’s gas via pipelines. Since then, the EU has slashed Russia’s share of its gas imports from 45% in 2021 to 19% in 2024, with a further decline to 13% projected for 2025. Still, Russia remains the EU’s third-largest gas supplier after Norway and Algeria. To fill the gap, Europe has turned to liquefied natural gas, or LNG, whose share in total gas imports has risen from 20% to 50%. Nearly half of that comes from the United States. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The problem is that LNG is far more expensive and volatile than pipeline gas. While pipeline imports are typically secured through long-term contracts, LNG prices are tied to the global spot market, making them vulnerable to financial speculation and geopolitical shocks — resulting in higher costs and greater uncertainty. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Ironically, while reducing pipeline imports from Russia, the EU has been </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">increasing</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> its purchases of Russian LNG. In the first four months of 2025 alone, Russian LNG deliveries to Europe jumped 12% year-on-year. Why? Partly because a full and immediate cut-off was never feasible; moreover, countries like Hungary and Slovakia explicitly refused to swap cheap Russian gas for costly US LNG. But this was also for legal reasons: many European companies remain locked into long-term “take-or-pay” contracts with Russian suppliers. Under these agreements — often signed before 2022 — buyers must pay for contracted volumes whether they receive the gas or not. This makes continued imports, even at higher prices, a rational choice. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Ironically, while reducing pipeline imports from Russia, the EU has been increasing its purchases of Russian LNG.&#8221;</div></span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy are currently the largest importers of Russian LNG. Once regasified — that is to say, converted back into natural gas — that gas enters the European grid and ultimately supplies other countries too, such as Germany. Meanwhile, Russian pipeline gas still flows into Europe — and, surprisingly, Ukraine as well — via the TurkStream pipeline, transiting through Turkey to Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary, even as other major routes (Yamal-Europe, Nord Stream, Ukraine) have shut down. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But Brussels now wants to put an end to all of this. “Last year we still paid €23 billion to Russia for our energy imports,” EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen stated. “We do not wish to import one single molecule in the future. For our own security and our solidarity with Ukraine.” Commission President Ursula von der Leyen added: “Now is the time for Europe to completely sever its energy ties with an unreliable supplier. The energy resources that reach our continent must not finance the war against Ukraine.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The EU has also announced a tough stance toward Hungary and Slovakia, which still import 80% of their oil from Moscow, having been exempted from the sixth sanctions package that banned seaborne imports of Russian crude from the end of 2022 and Russian refined petroleum products from February 2023. They will be required to submit plans to phase out remaining imports by 2027. The Commission is also exploring ways to let companies invoke “force majeure” to exit Russian gas contracts without incurring penalties. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Finally, Brussels is also considering a ban on new energy contracts with Russia and fresh sanctions on existing imports. But such measures would almost certainly face vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia. As Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó put it: “The EU Commission’s politically motivated plan to ban Russian energy is a serious mistake. It threatens energy security, drives up prices and violates sovereignty.” It’s hard to disagree. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Indeed, the higher cost of imported LNG — particularly US LNG — has deeply affected European households and industries. The recent Draghi report confirmed that high energy prices are a major factor in Europe’s declining competitiveness. EU firms now pay two to three times more for electricity and four to five times more for gas than their US counterparts. The consequences have been brutal: three consecutive years of falling industrial output and stagnation across the EU, and outright deindustrialization across much of Western Europe — especially Germany. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Even though Germany, like other countries, was undoubtedly grappling with pre-existing challenges, it’s clear that energy costs are now the single greatest threat to German and European industry. Many firms have begun </span><a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/energy-costs-uncertainty-fuel-german-industry-plans-cut-or-relocate-production-survey" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">relocating</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> production abroad. Major chemical groups are </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fbfbdbd4-7be7-4cff-9cc5-4d467f5aa004" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">reportedly</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> preparing to exit Europe entirely. One </span><a href="https://ageei.eu/perche-i-prezzi-dellenergia-spingono-i-gruppi-chimici-a-valutare-luscita-dalleuropa/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> noted that “these shifts come at a time when Europe’s energy costs have remained exceptionally high for nearly three years. The chemical sector — which accounts for 5-7% of EU manufacturing output and employs 1.2 million people — is under extraordinary pressure. The European Chemical Industry Council has warned of the planned closure of more than 11 million tons of production capacity across 21 major sites, and has called for urgent action”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Brussels, however, isn’t listening. Indeed, a full EU ban on Russian gas would likely deliver the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">coup de grâce</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> to Europe’s already flailing industrial base. Not only would Europe be forced to import even larger volumes of higher-priced LNG — primarily from the US — but, as Russia redirects its LNG to more distant markets, transport costs will rise, pushing up already volatile global gas prices and making imports to the EU even more expensive. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">So what’s the logic behind this seemingly suicidal policy? The official argument — that Russian energy “funds Putin’s war machine” — is weak. Russia pays its soldiers and builds its weapons in roubles, not foreign currency. Whether it sells gas to Europe, China or India makes little difference to Russia. One can only assume that the bureaucrats in Brussels understand this — which suggests that the EU Commission’s latest move is less about weakening Russia’s capacity to wage war in Ukraine, and more about pursuing other objectives. Among them, I would suggest, is the desire to pre-empt any future normalization of EU-Russia relations. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This was made clear by the new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who vowed to do “everything” to ensure the Nord Stream 2 pipeline — which suffered an underwater bombing sabotage in 2022, </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/nord-stream-pipeline-explosion-real-story-da24839c" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">reportedly</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> at the hands of a rogue Ukrainian crew — never reopens. Von der Leyen even mentioned Nord Stream as part of the “new package of sanctions” her team was working on. </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3fcbf8b2-9796-4695-987c-9ba875abe5d4"><span style="font-weight: 400">According</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> to the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Financial Times</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">, discussions in Berlin and Brussels about preventing any revival of Nord Stream were triggered by news of Russian and US business interests exploring options to resume the pipeline’s operations. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/merzoid.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More by this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Germany trust Friedrich Merz?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Merz’s decision to endorse a permanent ban on Nord Stream is not only economically senseless — it also effectively legitimizes the worst act of industrial sabotage in European history, an event still shrouded in mystery, especially concerning potential foreknowledge of the attack by the German government and its allies. Moreover, it shows a clear disregard for the growing public support within Germany for restoring Russian gas supplies. A recent </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3fcbf8b2-9796-4695-987c-9ba875abe5d4" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">poll</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> found that 49% of residents in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the pipeline ends, support resuming Russian gas imports. Meanwhile, the AfD, now polling over 20% nationally, has called for Nord Stream to be reopened — a position increasingly shared by business leaders and members of both the CDU and the Social Democrats.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">It’s easy to see why: reopening the pipeline makes economic and strategic sense</span>.<span style="font-weight: 400"> Russian gas is cheaper, more stable and less environmentally damaging than American LNG, which is produced through high-emission fracking and shipped halfway around the world. The usual counter-argument to this is that Nord Stream created “an irresponsible dependency on Russian gas”. But as one German analyst </span><a href="https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=133228" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">pointed out</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, for a long time, first the Soviet Union and then Russia continued to supply energy to Germany despite several geopolitical crises. This continued even when the West unleashed an economic war accompanied by aggressive rhetoric. And even after the delivery of German weapons to Ukraine and then the terrorist attack on Nord Stream, the Russian side repeatedly stated that it was up to the German side whether to resume gas supplies or not.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/GettyImages-2183596127.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More by this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The EU thrives on fear</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Yet German and EU leaders remain the staunchest opponents of re-engagement. Why? Partly due to their deeply entrenched hostility towards Russia. But there are also deeper geopolitical dynamics at play. The global LNG market is supply-constrained. Few countries have excess capacity. The United States — currently expanding its LNG export infrastructure — is uniquely positioned to profit. Trump has made LNG central to his trade policy, pressing the EU to buy more as a way to narrow the trade imbalance. This makes a mockery of the EU’s talk of “strategic autonomy”. Publicly defiant of Trump, EU leaders are quietly implementing his energy demands — even if it accelerates Europe’s economic decline. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">As one German commentator </span><a href="https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=132562" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">observed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">: “The planned ban on Russian gas imports has little to do with the war in Ukraine — and everything to do with the American trade war. The EU is capitulating to Trump. The cost of that capitulation will be devastating, especially for Germany.” And let’s not forget the climate hypocrisy of EU leaders.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> US LNG has a far higher carbon footprint than Russian pipeline gas — due to both its long-distance transport and its fracking-based extraction. Yet ironically it is the German Greens, the self-proclaimed environmentalists, who are most opposed to restoring pipeline flows. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Ultimately, it should be clear that resuming Russian gas imports makes sense on every level: it is cheaper, more reliable, environmentally cleaner than LNG, and it would also help stabilize geopolitical relations with Moscow. Which is precisely why it’s no surprise that EU leaders are doing the exact opposite: deepening dependence on more expensive, more volatile, and more polluting LNG from across the globe, accelerating Europe’s deindustrialization and fanning the flames of confrontation with Russia. </span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">680813</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Trump’s peacemaking was always doomed</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2212826685.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Hardliners</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The most likely scenario remains prolonged war. Photo by MICHAL CIZEK/AFP via Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 08 May 2025 23:01:52 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 08 May 2025 23:01:52 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Volodymyr Zelensky]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=675488</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Ukraine war is intractable]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">One thing is clear: Trump can no longer claim that the war in Ukraine is “Biden’s war”. It is now Trump’s war as well. Months after the </span><span style="font-weight: 400">US President</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> pledged to swiftly end the fighting between Ukraine and Russia, his administration has announced that the United States will no longer take part in what has often been described as shuttle diplomacy between the two sides. Last week, State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce confirmed that the US would no longer serve as a mediator in the negotiations. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">These, she said, are “now between the two parties,&#8221; adding that</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> “now is the time that they need to present and develop concrete ideas about how this conflict is going to end. It’s going to be up to them”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Meanwhile, in an interview with NBC, Trump struck an even more pessimistic tone, stating that “maybe it won’t be possible” to reach a peace agreement. Indeed, the conflict seems to be escalating once again — and with the White House’s approval. On 4 May, <em>The</em></span><i><span style="font-weight: 400"> New York Times</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> reported that a US-supplied Patriot air defense system currently stationed in Israel is being redirected to Ukraine. Since all Patriot exports require formal US approval under American arms transfer laws, the move indicates direct White House authorization. Just days earlier, Washington approved a possible $300-million deal for F-16 training and support. The package includes aircraft upgrades, spare parts, software, hardware and training for Ukrainian personnel. In addition, Ukrainian media reported that the White House had green-lit $50 million in new arms exports to Ukraine. The deal reportedly includes unspecified military hardware and defense-related services. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">On Tuesday, Ukrainian drones targeted Moscow for the second night in a row, forcing temporary flight suspensions at four airports in the Russian capital and nine more in surrounding regions. The strikes came just days before Russia’s annual Victory Day military parade, an event expected to host international dignitaries including Chinese President Xi Jinping. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">In the lead-up to the celebrations, Putin announced a unilateral three-day ceasefire in Ukraine, citing “humanitarian considerations”. Zelensky, however, rejected the truce as insufficient, stating that Kyiv would only consider a ceasefire lasting at least 30 days. In a pointed message to leaders traveling to Moscow for the 9 May festivities, Zelensky warned that Ukraine “cannot be responsible for what happens on the territory of the Russian Federation” while hostilities continue. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Trump places the blame for the collapse of peace talks on Zelensky and Putin, yet he himself bears a significant share of responsibility. Upon taking office, he began the negotiations on the right footing — acknowledging that the conflict was fundamentally a proxy war between the United States and Russia, and that it could only be resolved through a direct agreement between the two powers. This is why the Europeans and Ukrainians were initially excluded from the talks. This approach, though controversial, had a certain logic: a durable settlement required engagement between the actual power brokers. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But it didn’t last. Within weeks, the administration reversed course. The US repositioned itself as a neutral mediator rather than a direct party to the conflict — despite continuing its military and intelligence support to Ukraine (following a brief pause). That contradiction was always bound to undermine the negotiation process. One cannot be both a participant and an honest broker. Following the recent arms deals, the pretense of neutrality has become even more untenable.  </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/GettyImages-2183596127.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The EU thrives on fear</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In a broader sense, Trump’s diplomatic efforts faltered for several reasons. First, he underestimated the unwillingness of Europe and Ukraine to accept any compromise that might be politically toxic. Both had powerful incentives to maintain the status quo. For European leaders, a peace deal that acknowledged Russian gains would be politically ruinous. The war has become a </span><a href="https://www.compactmag.com/article/europes-anti-democratic-militarization/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">legitimizing narrative</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, justifying economic hardship, technocratic centralization and even </span><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">authoritarian tendencies</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. Admitting defeat would expose their failures and embolden political opposition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Zelensky faces even higher stakes. For him, ending the war could mean not only the end of his political career but possibly his personal safety, </span><span style="font-weight: 400">as he would be far more vulnerable to reprisals from his numerous political adversaries. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">These domestic political constraints made a negotiated peace deeply improbable without overwhelming external pressure — which the US has proven unwilling to apply. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Had the United States fully withdrawn military support for Ukraine, and acquiesced to Russia’s core demands, there arguably would have been little the Europeans could have done to sustain the war for any meaningful length of time. So why didn’t Washington take that path? </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The answer lies less with Europe or Ukraine than with the internal dynamics of the United States itself. For Trump, negotiating such a deal with Moscow was always going to be politically fraught. The American national security establishment — and Trump’s own administration — is filled with hardliners committed to prolonging the conflict. While Trump and a small circle of close advisers may have been serious about reaching a deal, the internal resistance was overwhelming. Faced with this pressure, Trump appeared unwilling to take the political risk necessary to follow through. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The American national security establishment is deeply entrenched with hardliners committed to prolonging the conflict.&#8221; </div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Compounding the challenge was a critical miscalculation: Trump likely underestimated the firmness of Russia’s position. He seems to have believed that offering a framework that included recognition of Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine would be enough to secure a breakthrough. He likely expected Moscow to respond with significant concessions in return. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But from the outset, Russia made it clear that any deal had to address far more than the status of annexed Ukrainian territories. For Moscow, the war is about redrawing the global security order. Its demands have always included a new European security architecture </span><span style="font-weight: 400">on the model of the Helsinki Accords</span><span style="font-weight: 400">, with limits on NATO expansion and a broader restructuring of the international system — a restructuring that reflects the rise of new centers of power, particularly Beijing and Moscow.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> In this view, global governance should be based on sovereign equality, regional balances of power and negotiated spheres of influence, not on the universalization of Western norms or the expansion of Western-led military alliances. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">In short, Russia is not seeking a truce on narrow terms, but the formalization of a multipolar world order in which Western hegemony is replaced by a balance among great powers. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Given that, Trump’s insistence on an immediate ceasefire as a precondition for negotiations was never viable. Moscow has long insisted that a truce can only follow agreement on the broad contours of a settlement — not precede it. Trump also misstepped in entertaining a European proposal to deploy “peacekeeping” troops to Ukraine as a stabilizing force. For Russia, such a move was unacceptable and would have been seen as a direct provocation rather than a confidence-building measure. Equally unacceptable from Russia’s standpoint was the </span><a href="https://www.jpost.com/international/internationalrussia-ukraine-war/article-849911" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">Kellogg Plan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, which envisioned a frozen conflict and deferred NATO membership. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">On the Ukrainian side, moreover, the US made another strategic error by pushing Kyiv to formally accept Russian control over Crimea. That demand — which, notably, Russia never actually issued — was politically untenable for Ukraine and predictably rejected. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Achieving a settlement would have required a phased approach: a gradual normalization of diplomatic and economic ties with Russia, a slow drawdown of support for Ukraine and carefully managed, trust-building negotiations over a prolonged period — potentially years. But Trump, in his characteristically impatient fashion, sought to force a comprehensive deal within an arbitrary 100-day window. The result was not a breakthrough, but a breakdown. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/gettyimages-2194353829-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to America&#039;s techno-military future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Overall, the US approach to the negotiations amounted to a textbook case of strategic and diplomatic incompetence. This is in part due to the inclusion on Trump’s team of figures like Steve Witkoff and Marco Rubio, who lack diplomatic experience and underestimated the complexity of the conflict. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">However, the failure of Trump’s peace initiative also reflects deeper realities within American foreign policy thinking. While his rhetoric may appear to break with the bipartisan interventionist orthodoxy of the past, his “America First” doctrine remains grounded in a belief in US global supremacy — as evidenced by his aggressive trade tactics. This is why Washington could not engage seriously with Russia’s broader demands. As noted, Moscow does not merely want recognition of territorial changes; it seeks an acceptance of the multipolar reality of the international landscape. For the US foreign policy establishment — even under Trump — that remains an unacceptable proposition. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Thus, even though Trump may have been genuinely committed, on a rational level, to ending the war in Ukraine, the institutional culture that helped initiate and sustain the conflict remains deeply entrenched. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">As a result, Trump has not only failed to end the war — he has, to some extent, deepened US entanglement. This leaves him politically exposed. He cannot claim the mantle of peacemaker, yet he clearly has no appetite to serve as Biden 2.0. Walking away entirely might have preserved some consistency. But by staying in, he has made the war his own. Paradoxically, the much-criticized mineral deal may turn out to be more advantageous for Ukraine than the US. It ensures continued American involvement and shields Kyiv from complete abandonment, even if the mineral wealth in question ultimately proves illusory. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But lukewarm US military support will not reverse Ukraine’s battlefield fortunes. A Russian breakthrough remains likely, and with it, a potential Ukrainian collapse. Whether this outcome would force the West back to the negotiating table, or else drive further escalation, is uncertain. In either case, a fundamental problem remains: all parties understand that whatever is agreed on today could be overturned tomorrow. This mutual distrust means that Russia, Ukraine — and by extension, the West — are likely to remain locked in embittered relations for years to come, even if a formal deal is eventually reached. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">At the same time, Russia is likely to maintain a robust military posture in the region for the foreseeable future — especially in the context of Europe’s rearmament plans and aggressive rhetoric. This, in turn, will provoke a response from Europe, prompting yet another round of Russian countermeasures. All this will unfold within a deeply toxic political environment, where distrust runs deep and the cycle of escalation remains difficult to break. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For now, then, the most likely scenario remains prolonged conflict, rising costs and deepening divisions — not only between Russia and the West, but within the West itself. The war will not end until Washington and its allies are willing to confront the core issue: the persistence of a hegemonic doctrine that brooks no rivals. Until that happens, peace will remain elusive and the bloodletting will continue. And Donald Trump, whether he likes it or not, risks being remembered not as the man who ended the war — but as the one who inherited it and let it burn.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">675488</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The EU thrives on fear</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/04/the-eu-thrives-on-fear/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/GettyImages-2183596127.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Paris and Berlin are unlikely to be threatened. Photo by Kostiantyn Liberov/Libkos/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2025 23:02:19 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 02 Apr 2025 17:39:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COVID-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=667064</guid>
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								<![CDATA[First Covid, now Russia]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Mild feelings of panic were induced across the European Union last week, as citizens were urged to prepare for impending disaster. Stock your cupboards! Draft emergency plans! No, it’s not the opening of a mediocre dystopian novel — it’s the EU’s newly minted “</span><a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-preparedness-union-strategy-prevent-and-react-emerging-threats-and-crises-2025-03-26_en"><span style="font-weight: 400">Preparedness Union Strategy</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">”. This grand initiative is designed, allegedly, to protect Europeans from floods, fires, pandemics and, of course, a full-scale Russian invasion.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The strategy draws inspiration from Poland, where housebuilders are now legally obliged to include bomb shelters in new builds, and Germany, which is reviving Cold War-era civil defense schemes with a bunker geolocation app. Meanwhile, Norway is advising people to stock up on iodine tablets in the case of a nuclear attack. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The EU wants its citizens to be self-sufficient for at least 72 hours, recommending households stockpile food, water, medicine and — </span><a href="https://x.com/hadjalahbib/status/1904858985972351264"><span style="font-weight: 400">why not</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">? — playing cards and power banks. Because, of course, should nuclear war break out, a good round of poker and a fully charged phone will see us through. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Yet, as ludicrous as these preparations might seem, they should worry us all. The Preparedness Union Strategy is only the latest layer in an architecture of control that has been building for decades. It rests squarely on the shoulders of the EU’s recent defense policy reboot, ReArm Europe, now renamed less ominously, “Readiness 2030”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The core narrative behind this push is simple and endlessly repeated: the idea that Russia is likely to launch a full-scale attack on Europe in the coming years, especially if Putin isn’t stopped in Ukraine. The European Parliament resolution in favor of the ReArm Europe programme warned that “if the EU were to fail in its support and Ukraine were forced to surrender, Russia would then turn against other countries, including possibly the EU member states”. As Macron recently put it, Russia is an “imperialist” country that “knows no borders… it is an existential threat to us, not just to Ukraine, not just to its neighbors, but to all of Europe”. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The notion that Russians are massing at the borders, with designs on Paris or Berlin, is a fantasy.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But the notion that Russians are massing at the borders, with designs on Paris or Berlin, is a fantasy. Indeed, when we’re told to prepare for war by packing a power bank and a waterproof pouch for our ID, it’s hard not to be reminded of Cold War absurdities like “Duck and Cover”, the “preparedness strategy” of the time designed to protect individuals from the effects of a nuclear explosion by instructing people to crouch to the ground and cover their heads. That campaign, too, sold the illusion of safety in the face of annihilation. And beneath the clownish veneer of the push lies a calculated aim: the EU’s attempt to further consolidate power at the supranational level, elevating the Commission’s role in security and crisis response — domains traditionally under national control. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The EU’s preparedness plan is based on the recommendations of a </span><a href="https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400">report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> from the former Finnish president Sauli Niinistö, which calls for the establishment of a central operational crisis “hub” within the European Commission; greater civilian-military cooperation, including by conducting regular EU-wide exercises uniting armed forces, civil protection, police, security, healthcare workers and firefighters; and developing joint EU-Nato emergency protocols. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">When considered alongside the EU’s rearmament plans, it suggests a comprehensive, society-wide militarization, something which in the years ahead, will become the dominant paradigm in Europe: all spheres of life — political, economic, social, cultural and scientific — will be subordinated to the alleged goal of national, or rather supranational, security. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Western governments have been resorting to fear as a means of control for a very long time. Indeed, it’s a telling coincidence that the EU’s announcement coincides with the fifth anniversary of the Covid lockdowns, which ushered in the most radical experiment ever attempted in fear-driven politics. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The pandemic response used a totalizing narrative that wildly inflated the threat of the virus to justify historically unprecedented policies. As the Director-General of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, put it, it was everyone’s moral duty to “come together against a common enemy” and “wage war on the virus”. In this struggle for the greater good — public health — virtually any action was justified. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">From the perspective of “crisis politics”, the widespread use of the war metaphor to frame the Covid pandemic was no coincidence: war is, after all, the emergency </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">par excellence</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">. Across the globe, we saw an authoritarian turn as governments used the “public health emergency” to sweep aside democratic procedures and constitutional constraints, militarize societies, crack down on civil liberties and implement unprecedented measures of social control. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Throughout the pandemic, we witnessed — and populations largely accepted — the imposition of measures that would have been unthinkable until that moment: the shutdown of entire economies, the mass quarantining (and enforced vaccination) of millions of healthy individuals and the normalization of digital Covid passports as a regulated requirement for participating in social life. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/gettyimages-2194353829-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to America&#039;s techno-military future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">All this prepared the ground for the collective reaction of Western societies to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — a real war at last, after years of rehearsing metaphorical ones. In terms of communication, we immediately saw the emergence of a similarly totalizing narrative: it was Western societies’ moral duty to support the Ukrainians’ fight for freedom and democracy against Russia and its evil president. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">However, as it becomes increasingly apparent that Ukraine is losing the war, and as the world is faced with Trump’s attempt to negotiate peace, European elites are recalibrating their narrative: it’s not just Ukraine’s survival at stake — but that of Europe as a whole. The threat is no longer over there but right here at home: not only is Russia preparing to attack Europe, but, we are told, it is already waging a wide array of </span><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-hybrid-war-vladimir-putin-germany-cyberattacks-election-interference/"><span style="font-weight: 400">hybrid attacks</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> against Europe, ranging from cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns to election interference. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">All this suggests that Western elites learned an important lesson during the pandemic: fear works. If a population is made anxious enough — whether about disease, war, natural disasters or some polycrisis cocktail comprising all of the above — they can be made to accept almost anything.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/merkel.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Angela Merkel: mother of German decline</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The EU’s Preparedness Union Strategy could, therefore, be read within this broader context. It is not really about water bottles and power banks. It is a continuation of the Covid-era paradigm: a method of governance that fuses psychological manipulation, militarization of civilian life and the normalization of emergency rule. Indeed, the EU explicitly talks of the need to adopt, in case of future crises, the same “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approach first spearheaded during the pandemic.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This time, though, the attempt to engineer yet another mass psychosis seems to be failing. Judging from the social media reaction to a </span><a href="https://x.com/hadjalahbib/status/1904858985972351264"><span style="font-weight: 400">cringeworthy video</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> by Hadja Lahbib, EU Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management, there appears to be widespread skepticism about the bloc’s fearmongering. But while this is good news, the worry is that as propaganda falters, those in power are increasingly turning to repressive tactics to muzzle political rivals — evident in moves like the electoral ban on Le Pen. This strategy of mounting authoritarianism, though, is untenable in the long run: fear and repression are no substitute for actual consensus, and in the latter’s void, new forms of resistance are bound to emerge.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">667064</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Europe isn&#039;t planning for peace</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/03/europe-isnt-planning-for-peace/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/03/europe-isnt-planning-for-peace/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/banger.jpg?w=524</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>ceasefire</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[How long will European leaders prolong the war in Russia? Photo: Alexey Furman/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 12 Mar 2025 00:01:33 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 12 Mar 2025 00:01:33 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ursula von der Leyen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=662089</guid>
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								<![CDATA[It will pay the price for this tug-of-war]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In a surprising reversal from the Oval Office standoff between Zelensky and Trump and the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine, Kyiv, late on Tuesday, announced its willingness to implement an immediate 30-day ceasefire — provided Moscow agrees to reciprocate. This followed initial talks between US and Ukrainian representatives in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, prompting Washington to swiftly resume military assistance to Ukraine. “The ball is now in Russia’s court,” US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated — a sentiment echoed by several European leaders.</p>
<p>This marks a significant shift in the US approach to ending the conflict. Previously, Washington sought to pressure Ukraine into accepting a US- and Russia-brokered deal largely on Moscow’s terms. Now, America is attempting to strong-arm Russia into accepting a ceasefire as the first step toward a broader peace plan — warning that if Moscow refuses, “we’ll unfortunately know what the impediment is to peace here,” as Rubio put it.</p>
<p>Whether Russia will agree remains uncertain. Moscow has repeatedly stated that it does not view a ceasefire as viable without a broader framework for negotiations. But the parties are far from agreeing on this broader framework. Russia’s demands are clear: above all, legal recognition by Ukraine and the West of Russia’s annexed territories as part of the Russian Federation.</p>
<p>Yet, just days ago, Zelensky <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3966177-zelensky-no-chance-ukraine-to-give-up-its-territories.html">reiterated</a> his opposition to any territorial concession, while all European leaders (except Orbán) outlined a “peace strategy” that involved boosting Ukraine’s military capabilities (including through the delivery of air defense systems, ammunition and missiles) in order to improve its position at the negotiating table and achieve a deal that “respects Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity&#8221;. In other words, no territorial concessions. This would be followed by strong security guarantees in the form of European (ie, Nato) troops on the ground — a demand echoed by Zelensky but firmly rejected by Russia.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/merzoid.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Germany trust Friedrich Merz?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It’s difficult to see why Moscow would accept a ceasefire under these conditions — especially as it continues to make gains on the battlefield. But that may be precisely the point from the perspective of Zelensky and European leaders: to “put the ball in Russia’s court”, anticipating that Moscow will reject the offer — thus allowing them to portray Russia as uninterested in peace. If so, it would mean that Trump has been cornered by the pro-war party.</p>
<p>Indeed, ever since Trump began negotiations with Putin to end the proxy war in Ukraine, European leaders have been doing everything in their power to derail his peace efforts, hijack the negotiations and prolong the conflict. After all, their insistence on a “just and lasting peace”, and their emphasis on Ukraine’s “territorial integrity”, is, in effect, a recipe for continuing the war under the guise of “peace through strength” — the same failed strategy that has landed Ukraine in this mess in the first place. Meanwhile, the Europeans have unveiled a sweeping rearmament plan, aimed at deterring Russia’s alleged expansionist ambitions — if not actually preparing for a war with Russia.</p>
<p>This is not the behavior of those genuinely seeking peace. The same can be said for Zelensky’s insistence on territorial integrity and European peacekeepers — both non-starters for Russia. Adding to the contradictions, just hours before the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, Ukraine launched its largest drone strike yet on the Moscow region, killing at least three people — an unusual way to enter peace talks.</p>
<p>At this stage, the most probable outcome is therefore a continuation of the war — at least in the short term. This would be the worst possible way forward for Ukraine: the longer the war continues, the worse Ukraine’s position will become. However, from Zelensky’s standpoint, it makes sense. If the war were to end, his political career would likely be over — and, in a more extreme sense, his very life could be at risk. In other words, Ukraine’s interests aren’t necessarily the same as Zelensky’s.</p>
<p>The same goes for Europe. From the perspective of Europe’s core interests, it is entirely irrational. Far from protecting Europe, the continent’s military build-up could very well create the very danger it purportedly seeks to avoid. Russia has neither the means nor the intent to invade Europe, yet the continuation of the proxy war, and Europe’s rearmament plans, only increase the risk of escalation. This is the exact dynamic that we saw play out in the case of Nato’s eastward expansion, and then in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Yet for the current European leadership, admitting defeat in Ukraine would be a massive <em>political</em> blow — especially given the steep economic toll borne by ordinary Europeans. The war has arguably become the sole source of purpose for EU leaders; without it, their failures would become painfully obvious. Meanwhile, the massive increase in defense spending, and the escalation of tensions, will further empower military-industrial lobbies and solidify the elites’ grip over European society by undermining welfare states and continuing their stifling of democracy under the guise of “fighting Russian interference” — as we are seeing in Romania.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Far from protecting Europe, the continent’s military build-up could very well create the very danger it purportedly seeks to avoid.&#8221;</div>
<p>Escalating tensions with Russia also offers a chance to further centralize power within the supranational arm of the EU — the European Commission. As <em>Politico</em> reported: “National capitals fear European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will exploit this crisis to extend Brussels’ powers to new areas and strengthen her influence vis-à-vis national governments.”</p>
<p>Yet it would be a mistake to view the current transatlantic rift solely through the lens of the diverging interests of the European and American leaderships. Beyond these differences, there may be deeper dynamics at play: a coordination between Europe, the Democratic establishment and the liberal-globalist faction of the US permanent state — the web of entrenched interests spanning American bureaucracy, security state and military-industrial complex. These networks all have a shared interest in derailing peace talks and disrupting Trump’s presidency.</p>
<p>The US has, of course, a long history of political influence in Europe. Over the decades, it has built strong institutional ties with the state apparatuses of Western European countries, particularly among their defense and intelligence services. Additionally, the US establishment exercises considerable influence over European public discourse through mainstream English-language media outlets and think tanks. These organizations, such as the German Marshall Fund, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Atlantic Council, help shape the political narratives that dominate European society — and indeed today are at the forefront of pushing <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/asserting-agency-how-europeans-can-ensure-ukraines-security/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the idea</a> that “no agreement is better than a bad one.”</p>
<p>Its origins lie in the Cold War, with the US actively promoting European integration as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. In other words, the EU, especially through its earlier iterations, has always been wedded to Atlanticism, and this has only intensified post-1991. This is why the EU’s technocratic establishment — specifically the European Commission — has historically been more aligned with America than European national governments. Ursula von der Leyen, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-american-president-paradox-ursula-von-der-leyen/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dubbed</a> “Europe’s American president”, is a prime example of this alignment, working tirelessly to maintain the EU’s commitment to America’s hawkish geopolitical strategy, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine.</p>
<p>A key tool in this alliance has always been NATO, which today plays a key role in countering Trump’s efforts to shift the US approach towards Russia. In this context, Europe’s stance, though ostensibly aimed at Trump, stems from the recognition that elements within the US ruling class strongly oppose Trump’s overtures to Putin, harbor deep animosity toward Russia, and view the President’s threats to disengage from NATO and undermine other pillars of the post-war order as a strategic challenge to the systems that have upheld American hegemony for decades.</p>
<p>In other words, what on the surface appears to be a clash between Europe and the US may actually be, in a more fundamental sense, a struggle between different factions of the US empire — and, to a large degree, within the US establishment itself — waged through European proxies. After all, many of today’s European leaders have strong connections to these networks.</p>
<p>This could explain the “irrational” policies of those leaders, at least from the perspective of Europe’s objective interests — first, their blind support of the US-led proxy war in Ukraine, and now their insistence on continuing the war at all costs. According to this telling, the objectives of the transatlantic establishment appear quite clear: to demonize Trump, portraying him as a “Putin appeaser”; and to stoke European anxieties over their military vulnerability, including by inflating the Russian threat, in order to push the public into accepting increased defense spending and the continuation of the war for as long as possible.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trump-has-europe-in-check/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trump-has-europe-in-check/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-2202257081.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trump-has-europe-in-check/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trump-has-europe-in-check/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump has Europe in check</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/03/trump-has-europe-in-check/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Neither side in this transatlantic civil war truly has Europe’s interests at heart. The Trumpian faction deems Europe as an economic rival, with Trump himself repeatedly criticizing the EU, calling it an “atrocity” designed to “screw” America. Just last week, he announced plans to impose 25% tariffs on European goods “very soon”. On the other hand, the liberal-globalist faction views Europe as a critical front in the proxy war against Russia.</p>
<p>In this context, a scenario in which Europeans prolong the war in Ukraine — at least in the short term — could be seen as a compromise between the two factions. The US can extricate itself from the Ukrainian quagmire while pursuing rapprochement with Russia and shifting its focus to China and Asia-Pacific, all while placing the blame for the failure to achieve peace squarely on Zelensky and the Europeans.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Europe’s continued involvement in the war ensures its ongoing economic and geopolitical separation from Russia, and reinforces its continued economic dependence on the US — especially in the context of its defense spending hike, much of which would flow to the US military-industrial complex. At the same time, the European representatives of the liberal-globalist establishment would continue to use the Russian threat to entrench their power. Overall, this arrangement could be seen as acceptable by both sides.</p>
<p>In other words, as the geopolitical researcher Brian Berletic has <a href="https://x.com/BrianJBerletic/status/1892412334574096570" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggested</a>, what is often presented in the media as an unprecedented “transatlantic rift” may, in fact, be more of a “division of labor” in which the Europeans maintain the pressure on Russia while the US turns its attention to China. What’s worse, the scenario wouldn’t change that much even if some kind of peace deal were eventually worked out. Europe would bear both the cost and the responsibility for post-war security arrangements, while remaining locked in a new Cold War with Russia — all while the United States secures its control over Ukraine’s resources.</p>
<p>The long-term effects of this strategy would leave Europe in a perpetual state of instability, its resources drained by ongoing defense spending and its political autonomy further undermined. The true losers in this arrangement would be the people of Europe — and, of course, Ukraine — who will continue to bear the burden of this geopolitical tug-of-war.</p>
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					<title>Will Merz sell Germany to BlackRock?</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/02/will-merz-sell-germany-to-blackrock/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/merzoid.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Analysis</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/thomas-fazi-1-15.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Once a Davos Man, always a Davos Man.' Liesa Johannssen/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 22 Feb 2025 00:05:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 23 Feb 2025 09:00:06 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AfD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blackrock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[friedrich merz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[German elections 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=658147</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The frontrunner is celebrated in C-suites]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>At the ripe age of 69, Friedrich Merz has waited decades for this moment. Ahead of Sunday’s election, he is Germany’s chancellor-in-waiting, with his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) predicted to secure 30% of the vote. He&#8217;ll have to cobble together another coalition of disparate parties, but Merz won’t mind. Come Monday morning, he will have completed one of the most remarkable comebacks in recent political history.</p>
<p>Merz joined the party decades ago as a student. But today, he is effectively running on a “Make Germany Great Again” platform — a calculated attempt to win votes from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) by shifting his party to the Right on issues such as immigration. His cynicism here shouldn’t be underestimated: like Donald Trump in America, the millionaire Merz is a corporate king in conservative clothing.</p>
<p>Merz, let’s not forget, has long represented the interests of some of the world’s most powerful corporate and financial elites, most notably as a key representative of BlackRock in Germany between 2016 and 2020. Indeed, if Merz is elected, Germany will become the first country to be ruled by a former BlackRock official. But his ties to elite institutions go back much further: for over two decades, even before joining BlackRock, he embodied the revolving door between politics, business and finance.</p>
<p>After the 2002 federal election, Angela Merkel, the then-leader of the CDU, secured the chairmanship of the parliamentary group, while Merz was appointed as her deputy. Their relationship, however, was far from breezy, and Merz resigned just two years later, gradually withdrawing from politics until he left parliament in 2009. Yet he struck gold even before his departure. In 2004, he was hired as senior counsel by the international law and lobbying firm Mayer Brown, a heavyweight in the industry with an annual turnover of billions.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/europe-cant-escape-economic-malaise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/europe-cant-escape-economic-malaise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-1250668232.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/europe-cant-escape-economic-malaise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/europe-cant-escape-economic-malaise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe can kiss the future goodbye</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/europe-cant-escape-economic-malaise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Here, Merz discovered a far more fruitful relationship. As Werner Rügemer, author of <em>BlackRock Germany</em>, <a href="https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=128643" target="_blank" rel="noopener">explains</a>, at Mayer Brown Merz helped facilitate deals that promoted the interests of US capital in Germany, encouraging American investors to buy companies in the Federal Republic. The result was the sale and restructuring of thousands of German firms, which involved slashing jobs and freezing wages — an approach openly praised by Merz in his book <i><span style="font-weight: 400">Dare to Be More Capitalist</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">. </span>No doubt keen to embody his book’s thesis, during this period Merz also sat on the supervisory and administrative boards of several major corporations. And then BlackRock, arguably one of the most powerful companies to ever exist, came knocking. How could Merz say no? Pharmaceuticals, entertainment, media and, of course, war — there is virtually no sector that <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/07/the-capitalists-are-circling-over-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">BlackRock</a> won’t try and profit from.</p>
<p>The attraction of hiring Merz isn’t hard to glean. He facilitated meetings between BlackRock CEO Larry Fink and German politicians, helping to shape the policies that would benefit the company and its vast portfolio of investments. Under Merz’s influence, for instance, BlackRock became one of the largest non-German shareholders in many of the country&#8217;s most important companies — from Deutsche Bank to Volkswagen, BMW to Siemens. Yet his work wasn’t just about increasing profits for shareholders; it was also about shaping a political environment where corporate interests were aligned with government policy. By happy coincidence, it also created a climate in which someone like Merz could easily flit between big business and the Bundestag.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The millionaire Merz is a corporate king in conservative clothing.”</div>
<p>And so it came to pass in 2021, when Merz, armed with a bulging bank balance and two <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/20/two-private-jets-middle-class-friedrich-merz-germany-anti-merkel" target="_blank" rel="noopener">private jets</a>, returned to politics as the leader of the CDU. Unsurprisingly, his political philosophy is firmly rooted in neoliberalism. He is a vocal proponent of privatization and deregulation. This is often couched in promises to reduce bureaucracy and attract foreign investors. But, in reality, this corporate doublespeak is designed to mask his emphasis on private-sector solutions to public problems. Merz is a strong supporter of the privatization of social welfare systems — to the benefit of companies such as BlackRock, a leader in private pension schemes. He has also traditionally been a staunch opponent of the minimum wage and of laws against unfair dismissal. Under his watch, German workers are very likely to see their wages continue to stagnate, or worse.</p>
<p>But then it’s hard to truly believe that ordinary Germans are Merz’s concern. Once a Davos Man, always a Davos Man — and his long history of representing powerful industries, including the chemical, financial and metallurgic sectors, suggests he will have other priorities. As chancellor, for instance, Merz could be called upon to regulate sectors with which he has long been associated — and which Mayer Brown, his former employer, still represents.</p>
<p>Recall, too, that under Merz’s leadership the CDU has received millions of euros in campaign donations from the very business interests he represented in the past — <a href="https://themunicheye.com/financial-windfall-cdu-fdp-major-donations-analyzed-8606" target="_blank" rel="noopener">more</a> than any other party. For both German and global corporate lobbyists, then, having Merz — a former colleague — as chancellor would be a dream come true. Or, as Rügemer <a href="https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=128643" target="_blank" rel="noopener">puts it</a>: “This is putting the fox in charge of the henhouse.”</p>
<p>Nor is this simply a matter of economics: Merz’s corporate connections shape his foreign policy as well. At heart, he’s a staunch Atlanticist, and a firm believer in America’s role as the guarantor of the global order. This ideological stance has led Merz to align with the US on issues such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, calling for the project’s cancellation long before the escalation of the Ukraine crisis. His hawkish position on foreign policy, particularly around his muscular support for Ukraine, further illustrated his alignment with America’s erstwhile geopolitical priorities — even at the expense of his own country’s core interests. After all, one of the main reasons for Germany’s contracting economy and ongoing industrialization is its decision to decouple from Russian gas under strong US pressure.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/germanys-immigration-meltdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/germanys-immigration-meltdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/afd.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/germanys-immigration-meltdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/germanys-immigration-meltdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Germany&#039;s immigration meltdown</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/germanys-immigration-meltdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Now, of course, Washington has a very different Ukraine policy. So will Merz be forced to abandon his Atlanticist beliefs? Not necessarily. Though his strong anti-Russian stance and militaristic tendencies seem at odds with Trump’s efforts to de-escalate the conflict, the reality is that their visions are more aligned than might initially seem to be the case. What, in the end, does Trump demand from Europe? Higher defense spending and a significant role in shouldering both the financial and strategic responsibilities for post-war security in Ukraine, something which could even involve the deployment of a European “peacekeeping” force.</p>
<p>These policies align neatly with Merz’s own vision. He has long advocated boosting Germany’s defense budget, a stance welcomed by his corporate allies in the German military-industrial complex. Now, in fact, he has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-brace-us-trump-end-nato-germany-friedrich-merz-election/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">joined the chorus</a> calling for Europe to “take its security into its own hands”. Trump couldn’t ask for more. This strategic convergence, coupled with Merz’s conservative leanings, deep ties to the US financial and corporate sectors, and ingrained Atlanticism, all make him well-placed to become America’s European “vassal-in-chief” in our post-liberal era. This would place Germany back at the helm of a European Union that is both economically weaker and militarily emboldened — even as it remains strategically adrift.</p>
<p>This arrangement will be accompanied by much rhetoric about German and European “autonomy” — and possibly even heated public disagreements between Berlin and Washington. In reality, though, it would largely be a façade, for the new dynamic would merely serve European and American elites. The former would continue to stoke the fear of Russia as a means to justify more defense spending, directing funds away from social programs and legitimizing their continued crackdown on democracy. As for the latter, they would continue benefiting from Europe’s economic dependence on the US. All the while, people like Merz would be well placed to aid the further cannibalization of Europe at the hands of US capital.</p>
<p>Not that we should be surprised. Over the past two decades, Merz, just like Trump, has proved himself a businessman first and a politician second. Yet unlike Trump, who at least has some populist credentials, Merz’s victory will be celebrated in the boardrooms of BlackRock and other major corporations, which can expect to see their bank balances start ticking steadily upwards. As so often, though, ordinary voters should not expect this bounty to flow their way.</p>
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					<title>Trump&#039;s diplomacy won&#039;t bring peace</title>
					<link>https://unherd.com/2025/02/trumps-diplomacy-wont-bring-peace/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://unherd.com/2025/02/trumps-diplomacy-wont-bring-peace/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Russia-Ukraine</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[(Photo by Mikhail Klimentyev /SPUTNIK/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 13 Feb 2025 00:03:15 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 13 Feb 2025 00:03:15 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unherd.com/?p=655910</guid>
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								<![CDATA[European hawks are escalating tensions]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">So now we know. Washington is intent on decoupling from Europe and reconnecting with Russia. America’s stance was reaffirmed yesterday, in Brussels, by the newly minted Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, who was there primarily to discuss the Ukraine conflict. We already knew the top lines: NATO membership for Ukraine is “unrealistic”, he said, and the war “must end” through diplomacy. Kyiv must abandon aspirations of reclaiming pre-2014 borders —</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> that includes Crimea — and prepare for a negotiated settlement with Russia. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But Hegseth’s message extended beyond Ukraine. “Stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe,” he continued, stating that European forces should assume responsibility for providing post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, explicitly ruling out US troop involvement. This aligns with Trump’s broader push for NATO allies to increase their defense spending. He clarified that these troops would not be part of a NATO-led mission and would not be covered under the alliance’s Article 5 guarantee, underscoring America’s disengagement from European security affairs.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">While these statements didn’t come as much of a surprise to European leaders, given Trump’s previous rhetoric, they did reinforce a fundamental shift in US Ukraine policy, one which prioritizes diplomacy over continued military engagement. While this represents a welcome departure from Biden’s more confrontational stance, the path to peace remains fraught with obstacles.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Hegseth did not outline specifics for a possible peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. But, according to a leaked version of Trump’s proposed peace plan, reported by Ukrainian media, the territories seized by Russia would be ceded in exchange for security guarantees. Kyiv would be expected to renounce military and diplomatic efforts to reclaim lost land and officially recognize Russian sovereignty over these regions.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/gettyimages-2194353829-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to America&#039;s techno-military future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/welcome-to-americas-techno-military-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Regardless of this plan’s veracity, it is clear that it reflects Russia’s main condition for peace — something of which Trump is fully aware. His administration’s recognition of this geopolitical reality, coupled with the improbability of Ukraine regaining those territories, signals an important shift toward realistic diplomacy. Further reinforcing this new diplomatic approach, Trump announced on Truth Social that he had held a “lengthy and highly productive” phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. “We agreed to work together, very closely, including visiting each other’s nations… We will begin by calling President Zelensky, of Ukraine, to inform him of the conversation, something which I will be doing right now”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Re-establishing direct dialogue between Washington and Moscow is undoubtedly a positive development. However, the biggest near-term risk is that Trump may attempt to pressure Putin into a ceasefire without a fully developed peace framework. This is bound to fail.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For Moscow, we know, will not compromise on its key demands, which include the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from four Russian-occupied regions. We know from Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov that any ultimatums from the US would be ineffective and that any negotiations must recognize the “reality on the ground”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A major problem here is the proposal to have European-led peacekeeping forces in Ukraine, which is almost certain to face strong resistance from Moscow. Regardless of whether they are NATO-affiliated or not, Russia would see them as a NATO proxy force — an unacceptable scenario. As Anatol Lieven</span> <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-peacekeepers/"><span style="font-weight: 400">put it</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">: “This is just as unacceptable to the Russian government and establishment as NATO membership for Ukraine itself. Indeed, the Russians see no essential difference between the two”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Another complicating factor is that America’s security decoupling from Europe — the Europeanization of NATO — also risks becoming an obstacle to peace, insofar as it is, paradoxically, emboldening a more hawkish stance from key European leaders.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Moscow, we know, will not compromise on its key demands.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Within the European Union, an influential pro-war coalition has emerged, primarily driven by Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania. The new European Commission has placed these countries in key foreign policy and defense roles, further solidifying their influence. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in his inaugural address as European Council President, stated: “If Europe is to survive, it must be armed”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Similarly, Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has insisted that Europe must significantly increase its defense spending in response to the US disengagement, while maintaining the position that Russia must be defeated at all costs. Meanwhile, Andrius Kubilius, the new European Commissioner for Defense, has called for a “Big Bang approach” to ramp up European defense production.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Beyond the EU, the UK is equally belligerent and is doubling down on its military support for Ukraine. On January 16, Starmer signed a bilateral defense partnership in Kyiv, pledging an additional £3 billion in annual military aid, on top of the £12.8 billion already provided. The deal also reaffirms Britain’s backing for Ukraine’s NATO membership.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">NATO Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, echoed these sentiments on Wednesday, stating that he “agrees” with Trump on the need to “equalize security assistance to Ukraine” but warned that “to truly change the course of the conflict, we must do even more”. His remarks follow recent statements advocating for NATO to “adopt a wartime mindset”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Underlying this growing military buildup is the belief that Russia poses an existential threat to Europe, despite Moscow lacking both the capability and intent to attack NATO. What might be dismissed as European posturing in response to US disengagement actually represents a significant obstacle to peace. As long as European leaders continue to escalate militarily, the chances of a diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine war diminish.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-1159007452.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is this the end of American hegemony?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau </a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The real danger is that by persistently predicting an inevitable war with Russia, and preparing for it, Europe may ultimately bring that very war into reality. Faced with a rapidly growing European arms buildup and entrenched anti-Russian sentiment, Moscow may conclude that waiting is no longer an option. If European NATO members continue escalating tensions, Russia could decide to strike preemptively rather than risk allowing NATO’s military capabilities to reach a critical threshold. Even in a less extreme scenario, Europe’s increasingly aggressive posture is fundamentally incompatible with a lasting peace in Ukraine.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In other words, while the Trump administration’s pivot away from Europe and push for diplomacy may appear to be a step toward de-escalation, it risks unintentionally achieving the opposite. Rather than restraining Europe’s military ambitions, US disengagement is emboldening key EU and NATO actors — particularly in Eastern Europe — to pursue an increasingly confrontational stance toward Russia.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The Europeanization of NATO, framed as a necessity following US withdrawal, has accelerated the continent’s militarization and its leaders’ demonization of Russia, perpetuating the very conditions that caused the conflict in Ukraine in the first place. Instead of using this moment to engage in diplomacy, European leaders view the US retreat as a reason to escalate militarily. In this sense, Washington’s decoupling from Europe is at odds with Trump’s stated aim of achieving peace in Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Unless European leadership acknowledges Russia’s security concerns, the prospects for a long-term settlement will remain bleak — and the risk of a larger war will continue to loom over the continent. Ironically, the US’s attempt to distance itself from European security affairs may ultimately pull it back into an even larger conflict — one that it will have far less control over.</span></p>
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