“Legislate in haste, repent at leisure.” (JG Fox/Getty)


Adam King
Nov 19 2026 - 12:03am 7 mins

Your teenage son, shall we imagine, was never part of the in-crowd. Not one of “the lads”. Spent too much time alone, in fact. But he grew, and grew handsome, and at a party to which he was lucky to be invited, a girl of slightly higher status took him upstairs. She asked with a smile if he’d done it before, and he lied. He finished in seconds. “What the fuck?” Irrecoverable. His embarrassment manifests as gracelessness.

She’d been with all the hottest guys, but your son, her friends told her, was “a loser”. Tears on Snap. “Something happened which I didn’t want…”.  A three-year police investigation, and a two-year wait for trial. No university. No friends. Just depression — first for him, then for his little sister as your marriage faltered. And now, shortly before trial, in the first conference you’ve been allowed to attend, the barrister — an iron-fist-velvet-glove type woman for whom you have re-mortgaged the house — answers your questions about the Crown’s disclosure.

The complainant, it turns out, has made three other allegations of rape against other young men, which were all dropped by the police. Ah yes, it is explained to your surprise, but the allegations might still all be true: the Court of Appeal has ruled that in those circumstances such reports must be kept from the jury.

Also disclosed is solid evidence that, in the weeks before and after the party, the complainant had consensual sex, in similar circumstances, with a number of others. Doesn’t that at least make it slightly more likely that the complainant consented with my son, you ask? No, no, the KC explains: s.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 says that evidence about previous sexual behavior is inadmissible on the issue of consent, unless it’s more strikingly similar than it is here. After all, saying yes in the past hardly means she said yes on the night in question.

Of course not, you reply, but shouldn’t the jury at least be allowed to consider it? After all, if she had never had sex before, the Crown would be permitted to tell the jury that, wouldn’t they? Yes, she says, but there’s no way round it: a while back, the defense could put this kind of evidence in if the judge thought a trial would otherwise be unfair, but the discretion was removed in 2000. The new rules were heavily criticized in the first few years, including by judges, but, she informs you, we’ve all got used to it now.

Not disclosed, you note, is anything beyond a tiny sliver of the complainant’s social media messages. Surely the police should look at it all — you remember the case of Liam Allan, in which the defendant was saved from a wrongful conviction by text messages disclosed at the last-minute. Well, we did ask, says the barrister, but the police called it “speculation”, and the judge agreed: the disclosure rules have actually become more restrictive since the Allan case. You’ve read a lot about how rape has been “effectively decriminalized”, and that the odds are “stacked against” victims. You begin to wonder how accurate that line really is.

At trial, though, you look forward to hearing what your superstar silk says about the crotchless underwear the complainant was wearing. It’s not proof of consent of course — nothing like — but you can’t help but feel it’s something the jury ought to know about, to weigh in the balance. I mean, it’s not nothing, is it? But when the time comes, it isn’t mentioned. The barrister tells you that, in the end, she didn’t feel it would really land, and mutters something about a “troubling” case in Ireland.

A senior Irish barrister in 2018, you discover, was subjected to an online hate campaign and threats of violence, for making exactly this sort of point in a rape trial. The defendant was acquitted, mind, and no disciplinary action was ever brought against her. And very recently, of course, there was the Russell Brand case, following which his KC was subjected to similar vilification in the media. And so you wonder quietly, glancing at the journalists who await the jury’s verdict in your son’s case, did this lady pull her punches, for the sake of her own reputation?

The minutes between a guilty verdict and a reconsideration of bail are supremely stressful for the defense team, especially in a high-profile trial like Brand’s. If a journalist hostile to your client’s case — especially one who, on behalf of your client, you have argued has perverted the course of justice — approaches you at that moment, sharp words should be avoided. And it was from this error that the pile-on against Ian Winter KC began.

The worst of it had to do with so-called “rape myths”. This is the idea that there exist powerful and dangerous stereotypes about rape, its victims and its perpetrators, that are all too easily believed, and which jurors are wont to fall for. Examples include the idea that it can’t be rape if the woman didn’t fight back; that a true complaint will be reported to the police immediately; or that women who wear revealing clothing must be open to sex.

In Brand’s trial, it seems that the suggestion was made on his behalf that the fact that a complainant did not physically resist, or leave, or complain to the police for many years, was somehow a point in the defense’s favor. Well, Bayes’ theorem — the inarguable logical rule by which evidence affects the probability of a hypothesis — is on the defense’s side here.

If evidence of a complainant having tried to escape makes guilt more likely — which it obviously does, and considerably so — then, all other things being equal, evidence that there was no such attempt makes guilt at least slightly less likely. The same goes for a “delayed” complaint: if an immediate call to police moves the scales of justice in the Crown’s favor (which it does), then a non-immediate call must do the same in the other direction (albeit, again, only to a limited extent, and all else being equal).

Now, like any plank of evidence that only weakly supports your case, if you make an inaccurate claim about its strength and lean on it too heavily, it is apt to snap. Juries are not stupid. So even if Winter had put one of these points too stridently — and it’s not entirely clear that he did; certainly the most widely impugned line “not one of them resisted or screamed or even tried to leave” simply points to a piece of the evidence — we have to ask: to whose benefit does a bad-defense point operate?

“Barristers are not a protected class, immune from public criticism. No one has to like us.”

Since the turn of the century, an almost supernatural belief has developed, according to which the incantation of a rape myth — that without injuries it cannot have been rape, say — will inevitably be believed, despite its obvious falsity, and despite both the prosecutor and the judge explaining to the jury why it’s not true. How has this come about? Well, in an unavoidably imperfect system, with the criminal standard of proof being what it is (“so that the jury are sure”), guilty men will sometimes be acquitted. And that fact, given the unique horror of the crime of rape, provokes an urgent desire for a remedy, for an explanation we might be able to control. Unfortunately, as with some other magical beliefs, its adherents react poorly to heresy.

A decade ago, Professor Cheryl Thomas KC, of the UCL Jury Project, was commissioned by the senior judiciary to carry out a large-scale jury study, which was published in 2020. It was the first study to question real jurors (almost 800 of them) about rape myths — and it found, essentially, that the idea was itself a myth: juries do not believe such claims. Her work, it seems, was not widely publicized. Certainly, not a single one of those now lambasting Winter — from the Met Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley to the Justice Secretary Alex Norris — has engaged with it. But even if Professor Thomas is wrong, I have seen no attempt to explain why current judicial directions on the topic, set out at length in the judges’ handbook, are insufficient. (Example extract: “You must not assume that the way the complainant was dressed meant she was looking to have sex or willing to have sex if the opportunity came up. Just because someone dresses in revealing clothing it does not mean that they are inviting or willing to have sex.”)

Instead, sections of the press, politicians, and a couple of lawyers who should know better, have whipped up a febrile mob in an attempt to publicly shame Winter. Ian Hislop and others even mocked him for having acted for Harold Shipman 25 years ago (is this some kind of pattern?!), scorning his attempt to stay proceedings in Brand’s case for Abuse of Process due to the actions of the media. “Perverting the Course of Justice? Contempt?” they sneered. “Proceedings hadn’t even started when the documentary was made!” No, but that’s no bar to Perverting, or even common-law Contempt, actually.

Unsuccessful though the Abuse application was, the defense team would probably have been negligent if they hadn’t made one, given the unusual circumstances by which the allegations came to court: interviews with anonymous complainants, broadcast to millions, prompting the indicted complaints only then to come forward. Such applications, even if they fail to stop a trial, allow relevant facts to be aired and argued, and often elicit concessions of one sort or another in order to protect a defendant from unfairness.

And the Criminal Bar Association — led until September by Brand’s prosecutor, with the current Chair as deputy — rather than defending their member to any extent at all, appeared to jump on the bandwagon, uniquely issuing two statements praising the judge, and implicitly criticizing Winter’s conduct. This can be contrasted with their — also unique — statement complaining of the “chilling effect” of the Contempt proceedings brought against Rajiv Menon KC for his actions in a recent Palestine Action trial during which, it is alleged, he breached the terms of a judicial order by informing the jury of the principle of “jury equity” (essentially their right to acquit according to conscience rather than the evidence). The matter is yet to be determined, and it is said Menon is at risk of a custodial sentence.

Barristers are not a protected class, immune from public criticism. No one has to like us. But what we are witnessing here is a campaign of intimidation tending to prevent defense lawyers from properly doing their job, and that is bad for justice, bad for victims, bad for the public. Inevitably, there are now calls in Parliament to create a specific disciplinary offense to stop barristers from relying on “rape myths”. However that might be drafted, the effect will be to restrict defendants — further than is already the case — from putting relevant and probative evidence before a jury.

“Fear no one!” goes the lawyers’ rallying cry. Quite right. But that doesn’t just mean standing up to grumpy judges. It means that we speak up for the rights of defendants in unpopular types of cases, and conduct those cases to the best of our ability and without regard to how our submissions might play out on TikTok to a politically hostile audience.

And let’s again be clear: rape has not been “effectively decriminalized”. Jurors convict of rape more often than they acquit, and more often than of GBH. We should not be putting our thumb on the scales of justice by preventing the defense from adducing, or commenting on, ever-expanding categories of relevant evidence — whether by legislation or by public shaming.

Scotland is ahead of us in this respect. Last year, the Supreme Court held that the combined effect of various pieces of Scottish anti-rape-defendant law, not so very different from our own, was in breach of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR: relevant evidence, helpful to the defense, was being excluded when it should be allowed. If we’re not there already, it is where we are heading. And it must be resisted — by practitioners, by the leaders of the Bar, by lawyers in Parliament, and by everyone who wants rapists convicted, and the innocent to walk free. Legislate in haste, repent at leisure.


Adam King is a criminal barrister at QEB Hollis Whiteman.

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