August 28 2026 - 1:00pm
When John Ratcliffe, director of the CIA, visited Moscow earlier this week, he reportedly warned Russian officials against attacks targeting European neighbors. The surprise trip amplified already widespread fears across the continent that Vladimir Putin, frustrated with the lack of progress in Ukraine, would soon expand his war and “test Nato” with a strike aimed at Europe.
The risks of escalation between Europe and Russia are real and rising. But the prevailing narrative — that Putin sees a window of opportunity to undermine Nato’s credibility — misunderstands the drivers of that escalation. Retaliation and insecurity, not aggression, are the biggest causes of confrontation between Europe and Russia today, and reassurance, not military pressure, is the only way to stop it.
Concerns that long-standing tension between Russia and Nato’s European members would spiral out of control have gained momentum this summer, as Western support for Ukraine has increased and Russia’s hybrid war campaign has intensified. In European capitals, drone incursions into frontline states and cases of suspected Russian sabotage — such as mysterious explosions at munitions plants that support Ukraine — are seen as signs of Putin’s aggression. European leaders accuse Moscow of probing to find Nato’s weaknesses and planning a future invasion of European territory.
But this is almost certainly a misreading of Russia’s intentions. From Putin’s perspective, Europe is a direct combatant in its conflict against Ukraine rather than an innocent bystander. After all, it is European money, and in some cases weapons and technology, that are fueling Ukraine. In this context, Moscow views its own military activities as retaliation and even self-defense against an increasingly malign European bloc, not provocation. Moscow does not aim to test Nato’s resilience but to impose costs on Europe, just as the continent’s proxy war is imposing costs on Russia.
Russia’s military operations against Europe over recent months have a tit-for-tat nature. European countries stepped up their seizures of Russian vessels, so Putin announced plans to reciprocate by seizing European ships in Pacific waters. Britain announced its drones had been used in Ukrainian deep strikes and that it would give Ukraine access to advanced missile technology, and Russia indicated British military targets would be fair game.
To argue that Russia understands its own military actions against Europe as reactive is not to justify them, but rather to explain their motivation. The fact that Russia seeks to punish Europe for its support for Ukraine shows it is acting largely out of insecurity. Russia might still pose a challenge to Europe. Still, it is a very different and more tractable challenge than an aggressive and risk-accepting Russia ready to launch an unprovoked attack.
Most importantly, if Russia is reactive and sees Europe as a threat, it may still find reasons to avoid a full-blown conflict, providing space for an off-ramp. First, there is the question of resources. With its own military still tied up in Ukraine, the costs of a second war in Europe are likely prohibitive. Europe’s own assessment is that Russia’s military loses more people per month than it can replace through recruitment. Any sustained military action directed at Europe would further drain Russian finances and pull personnel and equipment away from what is Russia’s priority, achieving Putin’s aims inside Ukraine. Furthermore, if conflict with Europe escalates too quickly, this could force Russia to end its campaign in Ukraine before its goals are met.
Second, there is always the question of how the US would respond to any attack on Europe. Trump has raised doubts about America’s commitment to Nato’s Article 5. But if Moscow is even a little bit unsure about Washington’s intentions, it may refrain from any action that might pull the United States in — even an American military weakened by the Iran war could cause great damage to Russia.
Fundamentally, Russia does not want a war with Europe. But miscalculations will remain possible, especially if the root causes of the current escalation spiral are not addressed. If Moscow’s military action toward Europe is indeed retaliation for support to Ukraine, the best way to prevent further escalation would be to end that conflict as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, a peace deal still seems a long way off.
A more realistic alternative would be serious investment in Europe-Russia dialog, not about Ukraine, but on de-escalation in surrounding regions. The two sides could set red lines, offer mutual reassurance, and communicate clearly about actions that would trigger kinetic responses.
Many in Europe are opposed to opening such a channel, seeing dialog as a reward. But in the current context, with the US (Europe’s security guarantor) running low on munitions, pragmatism must come before principles. Neither Europe nor Russia can afford more war right now.
jekavanagh