Following a five-hour meeting in Moscow last night between Vladimir Putin, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, there have still been no major breakthroughs to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.

This should come as no surprise, even if it is a disappointment to those whose hopes for peace were raised by the bullish optimism of Trump administration officials. It would be wrong, however, to call the latest round of talks a failure. It served an important purpose, shoving into the spotlight three unforgiving but fundamental realities that must inform future efforts to end the conflict.

Firstly, despite much positive spin, no progress has been made on finding workable solutions to address the war’s core issues: namely territory, security guarantees, and the capabilities and alignment of Ukraine’s future military. For its part, Kyiv has refused to cede the rest of Donetsk and continues to insist on security guarantees that exceed those the United States is willing to offer, or which Europe can provide. In addition, most now recognise that Nato membership for Ukraine is off the table, though the country’s leadership is loath to formally commit to this.

Russia’s position is equally unyielding, and Putin’s confidence has only grown after the controversial US 28-point peace plan caused a panic among Washington’s Nato allies. After Witkoff’s meeting with Putin, for instance, Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov indicated that proposed US territorial compromises were unacceptable. The Russian President has similarly held fast to his demand that any settlement enforce a neutral Ukraine which cannot pose a military threat to Moscow.

The Trump administration continues to insist that peace is getting closer, but these promises amount to little if the intractable disagreements at the root of the conflict remain unresolved. Moreover, addressing these issues will require painstaking, working-level negotiations of a kind the Trump team has not yet tried — or demonstrated the patience for — rather than more high-profile summits that are long on pomp and short on substance.

Secondly, any deal that ends the war will be unfair and painful for Ukraine. There is no “just peace” to be had, and the final settlement will favour Russia. This is not because the Trump administration has taken Moscow’s side over Kyiv’s but because Russia is winning on the battlefield and has the upper hand in dictating the final settlement as a result.

There is still room for debate around the terms of what Ukraine will be required to give up, and the US can use incentives such as sanctions relief to reduce the cost of peace for Ukraine. But in the end, Washington may have to exert significant pressure on Kyiv to convince it to accept what many in Ukraine will consider a surrender. The Trump administration should not be afraid to take this step. For political reasons, it may be easier for Ukraine’s leaders to sell an imposed deal than one they accept voluntarily.

Finally, the latest round of talks has underscored the limits of US leverage over both Moscow and Kyiv, making the task of finding peace in Ukraine entirely unlike that of reaching a ceasefire in Gaza. The approach that worked in the latter case will not work in the former, and efforts to replicate it may make things worse rather than better.

Washington has few sticks left to influence Putin’s calculus. Meanwhile, Zelensky needs US support but his country could continue the war for some time without it. He might choose to do so if the deal proposed by Washington is deemed to leave Ukraine’s future sovereignty at existential risk.

Going forward, then, the Trump administration faces an unenviable challenge: reaching a deal that minimally meets Moscow’s objectives but which is just palatable enough to Kyiv that Washington can coerce Ukraine’s leaders into accepting. Such a settlement likely exists, but finding it will not be easy or quick.

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Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.

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