It was reported this week that Germany wants to help fund Britain’s nuclear deterrent program, Trident. As fears mount that Russia may test Nato’s resolve by attacking a member state, Germany wants to play its part in deterring Moscow. With US support for Europe wavering, and Berlin banned from having its own nuclear weapons, German politicians have begun to explore the idea of supporting the two existing nuclear powers of the region: France and Britain. But the road from political aspiration to a credible European nuclear umbrella is paved with awkward questions — not least regarding whose fingers are on the button.

“We have a very strong interest that the existing nuclear powers in Europe extend their capabilities,” a German source told The Telegraph. Fears that American troops will be withdrawn from Europe fuel a sense that Nato’s deterrence effect against Russia may be waning. Germany has meanwhile relied on nuclear sharing with the US for years, with an estimated 20 American nuclear weapons in Germany which the Luftwaffe would deliver. No longer sure of Washington’s backing, Berlin is keen to explore its European options.

Support for Britain’s Trident program could come in two ways: money and military support to maintain the British deterrent, for instance by stationing German-operated Patriot air-defense batteries at key locations in Britain to protect the Trident fleet. Similar talks have already been held with France. But whatever German support for these nuclear systems would look like, the fundamental issue remains that Paris and London would retain full autonomy over their deployment. For there to be any added deterrence value vis-à-vis Russia, Moscow would have to believe that the defense interests of all three countries are fully aligned.

That may not be an issue right now, but what if either Marine Le Pen or Jean-Luc Mélenchon win the French presidential elections next year? Both have expressed skeptical views on Nato. And what if the AfD make further inroads in Germany? Concerns have already been raised about the party’s close links with Russia. There’s no telling whether Paris, London and Berlin would be aligned in their attitudes and messaging on defense in future.

Unlike US nuclear power sharing, whereby Germany has agreed to keep and deliver American bombs, there would be no such reciprocal mechanism in a European umbrella. It would have to rely on goodwill, and whether that’s enough to build credible deterrence in the medium and long term is anyone’s guess.

French and British nuclear deterrents work because they are national programs. France’s program is nationally controlled and independent of any foreign nuclear umbrella. Britain participates in nuclear sharing — its Trident missiles are manufactured and serviced in the US — but it still has full control over deployment. Nobody would ever doubt that Paris and London would stand ready to defend their own countries. But would German involvement really extend that psychological umbrella? That is the big question.

In theory, an alternative would be for Germany to develop its own nuclear weapons and integrate them into European agreements. But it’s never done that before, and there are two legal documents — the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Two Plus Four Treaty — banning it from developing and manufacturing them. There are also complex cultural and historical reasons why Germany has never learned to stop worrying and love the bomb. German command structures, for instance, are currently too diffuse for it to be clear who would ultimately be responsible. So a German nuclear program seems out of the question for now.

An explicitly European nuclear umbrella is worth exploring, but it needs careful thought, bearing in mind that the political landscape is shifting rapidly and that the very developments that made American support less reliable may also affect European agreements sooner or later.

Germany is also right to step up on security and defense. That in itself would help free up resources in France and Britain to invest in their nuclear systems. But the country’s considerable money and expertise might be better invested in boosting both conventional and new military capabilities than in nuclear deterrents over which it would ultimately have no say.

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Katja Hoyer is a German-British historian and writer. Her latest book Weimar: Life on the Edge of Catastrophe will be released in May 2026.

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