One of the artifacts of the post-2022 sanctions regime against Russia, still kicking around, is the oil price cap. It was initially set by the G7 as a hard cap, meaning no oil could be sold at a price above $60 per barrel. That proved ineffective, and Russia would just sell its oil above the cap to buyers outside the G7 or below it to the G7 when the market hit this rate. That led to a switch to a dynamic cap last year from the European Union, which would be set at 15% below average market prices for Russian crude oil.

Now the EU is reportedly considering a return to the hard cap. Currently, the dynamic cap is set at $44 a barrel. The next review for the pricing is in July, and would likely see the new limit go well above the initial $60 hard cap that the G7 had agreed on. The possibilities for the next step — which could come as a part of the EU’s next sanctions package — include freezing the cap at the current $44-a-barrel rate, suspending cap reviews for this year, or reinstating the $60-a-barrel cap.

The problem with this is that it is typical EU hubris, as these price caps have no real effect on Russia. In the wake of the Iran war, Putin’s government has benefited massively from a spike in oil prices, and Europe is deluded in thinking it can cap its way toward a broader Russian economic collapse. While the Strait of Hormuz is shut, Russia will continue finding ways to sell its oil at whatever rate its wealthiest customers are willing to pay. The massive increase in Moscow’s oil revenue during the Iran war, despite intense Ukrainian drone attacks on its infrastructure, is a testament to this point.

Then, in late March, which was one of the most intense periods of Ukrainian attacks, Russia’s export volume dropped to below late-February levels, but revenue was up 62% up compared to that period. For much of the recent conflict, Russian ESPO blend oil, delivered out of its Pacific port infrastructure to China, has actually been trading at a premium on a delivered basis versus Brent. This has eased off a bit lately because of weaker demand, but it is still attracting high prices.

In reality, Europe’s new price cap measures demonstrate a lack of willingness and ability to make Russia bend to its will. Although broader oil sanctions usually mean Russia sells at a discount, Moscow frequently sells oil above the cap, at whatever rate it can find willing buyers for it. Even when Western insurers cannot be involved with handling the shipments, there are workarounds. These might be inconvenient for Russia, but they are feasible.

Instead, the cap is a form of virtue-signaling. It is something that European leaders know doesn’t work but insist on anyway, because it’s a relatively low-cost way to give the appearance that something is being done to push back against Putin. It is a fig leaf for the West’s broader lack of a strategy for Ukraine, and continuing to pursue the cap will only increase Europe’s vanity rather than providing meaningful help for Kyiv.

This is an edited version of an article that first appeared in the Eurointelligence newsletter.