Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has spent the past few days traveling between Pakistan, Oman, and Russia. The visits are understood to be part of an effort to prepare for two possible post-ceasefire scenarios: one in which the truce holds and evolves into a broader peace deal, and another in which hostilities resume.

All of this is unfolding while Donald Trump seeks to shape the narrative through social media posts, claiming that he is setting the terms. The purpose of Araghchi’s tour was to identify Iran’s options and solidify its conditions for peace talks to resume. Iran’s latest proposal is to cease attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz if the US agrees to end the war and lift the naval blockade. What happens to the nuclear program would be postponed to future talks.

Araghchi’s first stop was in Pakistan, the current mediator between the US and Iran. After their bilateral meeting, Islamabad decided to throw a lifeline to Iran, assuring on Sunday that Pakistan would expand the shipping of third-country goods through Pakistan destined to Iran. This stands in stark contrast to Trump’s idea of strangling Iran by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

The second stop was in Muscat, where Araghchi laid the groundwork for getting Oman involved in the diplomatic process. Iran and Oman sit on opposite shores of the Strait of Hormuz. Any arrangement involving transit fees — or even the clearance of naval mines — would therefore have direct implications for both countries’ maritime security and economic interests.

Iran has, at various points throughout the war, been operating a toll system. Oman rejected the idea of a tolling regime that doesn’t involve other Gulf states. But there are other problems with this system, too. Currently, Iran has only had to deal with a few ships at a time. That is not anywhere near the 100-130 ships a day, give or take, that were transiting the Strait before the war. For comparison, to bring shipping traffic to normal under a toll system, Iran would have to figure out how to get around twice the number of ships per day that transit the Suez Canal through the Strait.

This is likely to prove extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a range of reasons. First are the practical challenges: establishing reliable coordination mechanisms and determining which vessels are authorized to transit. Then there is the navigational risk itself — shipping would be forced through a waterway that was already narrow, now further complicated by the presence of sea mines designed to divert or disrupt traffic.

The other challenge is that it contradicts maritime law. One way to address this issue would be to reframe the arrangement: instead of a conventional toll, Iran could levy charges for providing maritime security and navigation services in the Strait of Hormuz. This could be consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which prohibits tolls but permits fees for special services.

Russia is a key strategic and military ally of Iran. Araghchi’s visit to Moscow served a dual purpose. First, the optics: his visit demonstrated that Iran still has allies. If the stalemate or the war continues, Iran needs some help to rebuild the country and its economy. Support from Russia, as Vladimir Putin promised, would be essential. Military options may be more limited, but are still crucial.

Russia could also play a key role in any comprehensive peace deal with the US. In the 2015 nuclear deal, Moscow functioned as the guarantor for Tehran. After the agreement, Iran shipped more than 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium to Russia. So far, Iran has rejected the idea of sending uranium outside of the country but offered to dilute the enriched uranium instead.

Both sides appear more inclined to return to conflict than to accept defeat. That dynamic is already visible in the Strait of Hormuz, where ships are routinely seized or forced off course in a pattern of recurring maritime incidents.

Dropsite News reports that Iran counts on time and the three M’s: munitions, markets, and the midterms. On 22 April, Iran’s Tasnim news agency — linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — published detailed maps of undersea internet cables running through the Persian Gulf. The report highlighted the region’s fiber-optic infrastructure in a way that was widely interpreted as a warning that such networks could be vulnerable to disruption, raising concerns about potential wider economic fallout from any escalation. Tehran has been using the ceasefire to prepare its own weapons systems for more fighting.

The more the US pressures Iran, the more Iran gets ready to return to war. If critical infrastructure is targeted, Iranian officials have warned that they would respond with disproportionate force, including retaliation at a scale “multiple times” greater than the original strike. It would be unwise to assume this is merely bluster, given how much of the messaging around the conflict has been deliberately ambiguous. The coming week is likely to prove decisive.

This is an edited version of an article that first appeared in the Eurointelligence newsletter.