Milburn, a former arch-Blairite health secretary, is overhauling the benefits system. (Brook Mitchell/Getty Images)
“Work beats welfare every single time,” says Alan Milburn, the former Blairite minister par excellence, in introducing his report promoting a move from a “welfare state to a working state”. Employment subsidies, mental health support, differential sickness payments for the young — he’s proposed a panoply of measures to lower the crippling burden of young unemployment.
There was a time, not so long ago, that such language was common on all sides of politics. In the decades after 1945, the state promoted job creation through its extensive networks of nationalized industries, while the unions, many affiliated to the Labour Party, protected their members militantly against redundancy. For Ernest Bevin, in fact, unemployment was nothing less than a “social disease” which “must be eradicated from our social life”.
All of that changed in the Seventies as the priority became taming inflation. Joblessness was seen as something between a necessary evil and a key economic tool, a useful salve for taming aggregate demand and tempering the bargaining power of rabble-rousing shop floor recalcitrants. By the heyday of Thatcherism — a declining Britain’s original sin, in Andy Burnham’s reading — the decimation of the old industries was accompanied by a tacit diversion of vast quantities of former blue-collar industrial workers onto incapacity benefits.
Sure enough, the benefits bill rose inexorably. As heady as the square mile’s “Big Bang” was, after all, not everyone can make it as a City spiv. And since successive clampdowns on the stubbornly dole-dependent have become as regular as the seasons under governments of all stripes, so, in turn, sickness-related welfarism has emerged as a lead item on the Treasury’s annual ballooning cash transfer bill, not least since the contemporary cult of mental illness has led to an explosion in dubious diagnoses. The upshot: £140 billion a year spent on working-age benefits.
This is the context in which Milburn delivers his welfare reform proposals. He faces a Labour Party instinctively queasy about presenting a million NEETs as a result of moral or individual failure rather than as a consequence of the broader macro forces. In the Blair-Brown years, with the party acquiescing to the central tenets of an open, liberalized, service-driven political economy — no industrial strategy, no public ownership, an emasculated labor movement — welfare payments became the number one mechanism for doing “Nice Labour Things”: like using the power of government to make poor people richer. During Brown’s tenure as Chancellor, there was no problem that a direct cash transfer wouldn’t solve. Public spending on welfare went up in inverse proportion to investment in public capital projects.
Poverty, to be sure, was reduced drastically: not by driving productive investments, by demand management, or by targeted support for regional and essential industries, but instead by showering the indigent with fortnightly payments. The state became less an active agent in production, steering the market towards strategic goals (such as full employment), and more a giant clearing house for shifting ever-expanding tax monies to pensions and benefits via the Department for Work and Pensions. This was the model, the Faustian New Labour pact: don’t alter the mode of production, allow the City its foibles, and engage in post-hoc redistribution of the spoils in the form of increasing entitlements. Labourism, in short, became welfarism.
Now, of course, the spluttering paradigm on which Labour’s political economy was built is causing serious headaches. An over-taxed working public has little time for subsidizing the lives of the workless, and an aging population puts ever-greater pressure on what’s already a bleak fiscal outlook. Meanwhile, the double cost of youth unemployment — in both lost tax revenues and additional cash payments — eats away at budgets and into an alarming reduction in the worker-pensioner ratio.
There’s a broad acceptance even among the mushy, bleeding-heart core of the Parliamentary Labour Party that something has to give. A failure to cut the welfare bill in 2025 signaled the beginning of the end of Starmerism as soft Left MPs launched a rebellion that ultimately the Government to withdraw its proposals. From that moment on, it was only a matter of time before Sir Keir’s lame-duck premiership was put out of its misery. Today, though, the welfare rebels are in charge, with Cabinet Secretary Louise Haigh and Chief Whip Anneliese Midgley transformed from awkward-squad organizers to the new Burnhamite establishment’s praetorian guard. They will now likely face their own rebellion. The question is: how big?
Unlike Starmer, Andy Burnham has the rhetorical ability to sell Milburn’s proposals as progressive reforms rather than a slapdash cost-cutting exercise. To that extent, his avuncular charm and the rhetorical social-democratic nostalgia has buried Starmerism, winning out against his predecessor’s lawyerly bean-counting. Burnham is selling a political imaginary of good-vibes socialism that is, for now, disguising a centrist policy agenda. This in stark contrast to Starmer, who was selling nothing in particular, but who was nevertheless asking nervous Labour MPs to explain to welfare-dependent constituents why they were actively voting to reduce their meager incomes.
Burnham is now asking the same, but with the political scaffolding in place to justify the moves and soften the blow. Though the long-term result of the measures will be a reduction in spending, they include significant initial outlays on pathways back into work. Apprenticeships will be expanded. New “Youth Opportunity Services” will give unemployed young people a single named advisor and individual, tailored training plans. Savings, then, will take some years to emerge. Where Starmer could do little else but give his boilerplate, wooden defense of crude attempts to hack away at PIP — which anyway appeared out of nowhere — his successor has spent time building up a narrative around the need for radical action: there will be sticks and carrots, something presented less as Osbornomics redux, and more as a last-ditch effort to save a lost generation.
Despite this, Milburn’s proposals are attracting the ire of figures on Labour’s harder Left, the Corbynite holdouts and unreconstructed radicals on the backbenches. The Socialist Campaign Group is likely to provide the backbone of whatever parliamentary rebellion emerges. It may be smaller than the one that ruined Starmer’s original plans, but it won’t be insignificant. More awkwardly, it threatens to take some of the shine off Burnham’s carefully cultivated projection of a Leftward pivot. Eventually, voters will notice the incongruity of promises to end neoliberalism while allowing Milburn, a former arch-Blairite health secretary, to overhaul the benefits system.
The ultimate winner here, if he plays his hand intelligently, could be Zack Polanski, reversing the Green-to-Labour switchers of the Burnham bounce by restating his vapid-but-effective calls for a “wealth tax” and “welfare not warfare”. Ultimately, then, it’s hard to see how the Prime Minister can keep both John McDonnell and Pat McFadden comfortably on side. There is no rhetorical sleight of hand — no talking Left and governing Right — that can unify a coalition of New Labour modernizers and diehard Bennites or younger Corbynistas.
That hints at a broader philosophical challenge for Burnham. Labour, after all, is now a party where “universal basic income” is more popular than the public-works programs of old. That’s ironic in an institution founded to protect the labor interest, to say nothing of the millennial Left’s more quixotic fantasies of nationalized AI and “post-work futures” delivered by robots. We’ve come a long way from Lenin’s famous injunction: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat!”
There’s a more practical problem here, too, which no amount of clever presentation or investment in employment support can resolve. The British economy has spent the better part of four decades demonstrating an inability to generate sufficient numbers of good, permanent, secure and decently remunerated jobs for the population as a whole. That’s produced a bifurcated labor market, with a cohort of salaried professionals at one end and a vast precariat on the other. The gig economy, zero-hours contracts, casualized retail and hospitality work, and the proliferation of low-productivity service jobs — all these are features, not bugs, of the British labor market, while entry-level graduate roles are disappearing under clouds of large-language models. Burnham has outlined a desire for “reindustrialization” and a post-neoliberal Britain, but as ever the detail is sorely lacking. Perhaps, at its more exciting end, this could encompass state-backed jobs at minimum wage; a publicly-owned social-care sector providing secure work for British school-leavers; and public investment in industry and training schemes. Alas, the recent Budget was a damp squib, with nothing approaching this breadth of vision.
Learn a little about Milburn himself, and perhaps that’s unsurprising. He is a former Trotskyist whose Days of Hope bookshop in Newcastle was once mockingly referred to as “Haze of Dope”: the gathering point of choice for the North East’s radical-revolutionary Left. Given where he ended up, few embody the journey from the radical politics of the Seventies to the managerial, market-friendly consensus better than him. That isn’t necessarily a disqualification — but it does, once again, rather undermine the idea that what we are witnessing is a “circuit breaker” administration on a par with 1945 or 1979. There is, to be fair, a definite circularity about a Labour government turning to one of the original architects of the New Labour settlement to fix the consequences of that very settlement. But that hardly means you can welfare-reform your way out of an economy that doesn’t work.



