Last night’s ITV documentary was just the latest in a string of undercover investigations into the party, in which journalists have posed as supporters, activists, donors and even employees. That these programs have, in some cases, revealed genuine misconduct has made it easy for Reform’s detractors to dismiss complaints of unfair treatment, and it appears that voters have broadly done the same. The party’s support has dropped significantly over the past year, during which time its spokespeople have placed more emphasis on these procedural imbalances than on any other issue, with Nigel Farage going so far as to call a by-election as a result.
Nevertheless, that the broadcast media should hold an effective veto on the eligibility of any candidate for office is deeply concerning. During the last parliament, multiple Tory MPs resigned their seats following discovery of sexual impropriety. These stories were reported on extensively, individual offenders were defenestrated, and in Chris Pincher’s case it even led to the downfall of a government. Yet this pattern was rarely taken as a sign of fundamental and endemic corruption in the Conservative Party, or at least the processes by which it selects its candidates. Had an undercover reporter been sent into CCHQ in the aftermath of the Pincher scandal, what would they have heard from Tory employees? What did they know about Pincher’s behavior, and when?
Any misconduct within Reform, however, is immediately cast as evidence that the party is an essentially criminal organization. Significant donations to the party from cryptocurrency billionaires Ben Delo and Christopher Harborne have been consistently painted as warning signs of corrupt influence, exposed to a scrutiny which big-money donors to other parties do not receive. This may be compounded by the fact that the two men have made their money through technology that most voters do not understand and of which they are therefore somewhat wary, with the media eagerly pandering to this impression.
The same imbalance can be seen in coverage of local candidates. If one were to take media commentary for granted, one would assume that Reform councilors are uniquely flawed due to a sloppy vetting process failing to filter out bad characters before their election. Yet, since the 2024 election, only 6.1% of the nearly 2,600 councilors who have represented Reform have resigned from office — less than both other major parties, with Labour at 6.5% and the Conservatives at 7%. Instead of presenting the truth revealed by this holistic picture, a story is constructed out of selective focus on individual failures — a story which could just as easily be constructed for any other party, as these numbers show.
Ultimately, Westminster is full of people whose income relies on having access to a network of powerful figures from whom they can source information. Whatever it might mean in policy terms for Reform to come to power, the biggest immediate impact in Westminster would be the changing of the guard: hundreds of MPs, thousands of staffers, and many more working in party HQs will find themselves out of power, and in most cases out of a job. The access of these people to power is the guarantee of each reporter’s access to information, and as such their career interests are deeply entangled.
That relationship produces a mutually assured destruction that results in something like neutrality — politicians expect some degree of fair play from the press, and in return they continue to feed their ravenous appetite for gossip. Because of its comparative hostility to the media, however, Reform’s MPs and employees are seen as more disposable by the press. A party which refuses to build relationships with reporters will find that there are no voices in the newsroom advocating against unfair treatment in order to protect those relationships. As press treatment worsens, Reform retreats further inside itself, producing a tragically self-reinforcing cycle.
For Farage, complaining will produce little benefit, no matter how justified. The public does not like a loser, even less one who moans about their defeats. Reform’s initial rise has already demonstrated that it is possible to overcome these disadvantages by shaking off the narratives imposed from outside and setting its own agenda. Yet if the party does feel the need to level the playing field, attempting to compete through its own media channels is unlikely to do so. Engaging with the enemy may feel counterintuitive, especially to a party under siege. But if you want a seat at the table, it helps to bring a bottle of red.






