The departure of John Healey as Defence Secretary came as a surprise. Long famed for his loyalty, Healey had, only hours earlier, been characterized by an ex-RAF officer in the Financial Times as “a completely aligned and inside-the-tent Cabinet minister”. Healey was, in other words, a man who was committed to this Government.

Healey’s resignation is yet another sign of Prime Minister Keir Starmer losing his grip. Besides the loss of an ally, this will only add momentum to leadership challenges at a time when No. 10’s strategy hinges on slowing the maneuvering. Moreover, the episode exposes intense behind-the-scenes wrangling over military spending and the delayed Defence Investment Plan, with departments forced to cut capital budgets to meet defense demands.

For all the rancor behind closed doors, the final plan — as Healey himself put it — “falls well short of what is required”, lacking both ambition and urgency. The truth is that, while the Government may have been forcing departments to raid their coffers, defense spending has never been a deeply felt priority for Labour. As a former senior military official stated, they spent “14 years in opposition dreaming great dreams of what they would accomplish once in power again. And it was not to raise defense spending”. One need only look to Work and Pensions Secretary Pat McFadden’s private remark that Labour MPs were constantly asking who to tax “in order to pay benefits” to show where the party’s true interests lie. See also the immediate drop-off in support for Ukraine once Labour got into power, including delays to supplies of long-range missiles.

Even Starmer’s much-vaunted commitment to raise defense spending to 2.5% of GDP from April 2027, with an ambition to reach 3% in the next parliament, was driven more by a desire to avoid battles with Washington than with Moscow. It was simply a diplomatic, rather than strategic, calculation designed to secure a favorable meeting with Donald Trump. Subsequent geopolitical turbulence, much of it emanating from Washington itself, has already rendered those targets outdated. Healey promised after that commitment that he would not empty the Treasury’s piggy bank for additional defense spending this parliament. In practice, however, the UK’s efforts to placate the White House by offering to lead on peacetime actions in Ukraine and the Strait of Hormuz have only upped the financial pressures.

The UK is poorly placed to respond to a febrile and increasingly dangerous military landscape. It is currently ranked second to last on a list assessing Nato members’ progress on capability, an embarrassing position made starker only by the fact that it sits just above Iceland, which has no standing army. It has also emerged that the Royal Navy’s entire available fleet of nuclear attack submarines has been stuck in port — a gift for the Kremlin as Russia ramps up hostile activity in British waters.

Meanwhile, as Nato allies agree that Moscow could be ready to attack one of them by 2029, the British army is so depleted that it could “seize a small market town on a good day”, according to General Sir Richard Barrons. The stalled Defence Investment Plan has already caused further strife, with the Commons Public Accounts Committee warning that the associated delays have weakened the country’s credibility with allies and made procurement of equipment costlier, “hindering the government’s attempt to modernize the armed forces”.

Starmer wanted this plan to be his legacy. Indeed, it stands as a neat encapsulation of his premiership: late, hesitant, unambitious and corrosive to ministerial unity. Healey spoke in his letter of having outlined alternatives to meet mid-term funding challenges, but Starmer was clearly willing to lose a loyal ally rather than embrace those. It was, in the Prime Minister’s mind, better to chip away at other budgets than turn to taxation or borrowing. Now the UK will head to the Nato summit next month with a new, untested Defence Secretary and the spotlight — not to mention Donald Trump’s focus — solely on its substandard defense posture. In politics and war alike, that is the problem with being weak; it only invites more bullies and battles.

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Bethany Elliott is a writer specialising in Russia and Eastern Europe.

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